Photo by Quinn Dombrowski

Turkish foreign policy since the Justice and Development Party (AKP in Turkish) came to power in 2002 has been oriented towards deepening economic relations with the Middle East, and advancing Turkish interests in the region.  The Arab Spring only intensified Turkish involvement.  The Turkish government has been using different instruments, such as democracy promotion, Islamic solidarity, and economic interdependence to foster stability while playing for greater influence over the emerging regimes.  Yet this instrumentalism, which benefits Turkey in the short term, unless well-balanced by tangible support from the Turkish state in treating the new regimes as equal partners, may decrease Turkish credibility in the medium to long term.

With the onset of the Arab Spring, Turkey’s growing involvement in the Middle East increased its importance in the eyes of regional actors as well as the European Union and the United States, while providing the ruling AKP with ample opportunities to acquire economic and political clout.  Turkey had already established strong and deep economic ties with authoritarian regimes in Libya, Syria and Saudi Arabia.  In the past decade, it became Syria’s primary trading partner.  Cooperation between the two neighbors even extended to joint military exercises before recent strains in relations. Yet while economic integration has been the foremost aim of the Turkish government, democracy promotion was not necessarily on the agenda.

As revolutionary verve spread across the Arab world, Turkey adopted a new stance and began to lend its support to pro-democracy movements.  That support, however, has varied by country, depending upon Turkish interests at stake.  In cases where Turkish investment and trade relations would be adversely affected by political instability, Turkey approached events with caution and tried to play a mediatory role in democratic reforms.  In Libya and Syria, where Turkish investments were substantial, the Turkish government prioritized stability and gradual reform.  In contrast, Turkey lent quick support for popular movements in Tunisia and Egypt, where Turkish investments are relatively limited.  Yet Turkey remained conspicuously silent on the events in Bahrain. The democracy rhetoric that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan used so liberally in other cases did not extend to Bahrain, where Saudi forces under Gulf Cooperation Council auspices were deployed to restore stability in the country.  Apparently, relations with Saudi Arabia were too important to jeopardize.

Ankara has not only changed its tune from one country to the other, but even within countries depending on the course of events and their impact on Turkish interests.  Libya is a prime example.  Just weeks after Erdogan claimed that NATO intervention in Libya was unacceptable, Turkey quickly adjusted to political realities once it was clear that the Gaddafi regime would fall and a new Libya would emerge.  Suddenly, a NATO operation would restore stability in Libya sooner and remaining on the sidelines as a new Libya was born would hurt Turkish interests. This abrupt turn indicated Turkish priorities as well as its preference for instrumentalism and pragmatism over principled foreign policy.

Turkey’s response to Syria has also been determined by stability concerns.  Turkey estimated its losses to stand at millions of dollars as the bilateral trade between the two neighbors stopped and Syrian refugees began to flow into Turkey.  To that effect, Turkey initially proceeded with caution. In the early stages of popular protests in Syria, rather than publicly denouncing the Syrian regime, the Turkish government sought behind-the-scenes mediation between Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the opposition.  When mediation attempts failed, Erdogan openly called upon Assad to make reforms, which could bring stability to Syria and allow deepening economic cooperation with Turkey to resume.  The tone of the Turkish reaction, however, has become harsher as Assad has refused to take concrete steps toward liberalization, brought the country to the brink of civil war, and has quelled Turkish hopes for a quick return to stability.  Recently, Ankara turned to multilateral efforts with the Arab League and the UN to take action against the Syrian regime, including economic sanctions and the possible instatement of a buffer zone along the Turkish-Syrian border.

While concerns for stability dominated Turkey’s early response to popular movements during the Arab Spring, its desire to establish strong relations with the new regimes shaped its later approach.  Turkey decided to participate in the NATO operation in Libya, which it had categorically rejected when it was first discussed, and it also released a financial aid package worth $200 million to the Libyan opposition.  Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Libya twenty-four hours after the Libyan opposition captured Tripoli.  Erdogan was the first foreign leader to visit post-revolution Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.

In this effort to build ties with the new regimes, Turkey has played the cards of anti-imperialism, Islamic solidarity, and historical as well as emotional ties with the Middle East in order to distinguish Turkey from Western powers.  In his visits and speeches, Erdogan frequently refers to the sovereign rights of the people, the legacy of Western imperialism in the region, Islamic history and values, as well as current issues such as Palestinian statehood and Israeli policies.  The primary aim in constructing this highly emotional discourse built around notions of Islamic solidarity is to discredit the Western countries with which Turkey competes and thus establish influence over these emerging regimes, particularly since Islamic political parties are likely to be at center-stage in those countries.

While this discourse of brotherhood appeals to many in the region, Turkey’s instrumentalist and transparently self-interested policy-making, its close ties with the US, Erdogan’s didactic approach to fellow Islamic movements, and some of the contested decisions of the AKP government – such as freezing Libyan assets in Turkey – undermine Ankara’s sincerity.  Turkey’s pick-and-choose foreign policy in the Middle East may yield short-term benefits, but it is not a credibility-enhancing strategy for the long term.  Treating these new regimes as equal partners rather than as economic and political instruments will better serve Turkish interests, and will help ensure that the values the Arab Spring movements fought for can be realized.

The Yale Journal of International Affairs is sporting a new look this year. We’ve redesigned our print format, and we’ve streamlined the organization of our website at Yalejournal.org. In our continuing efforts to link the policy and academic worlds, we also feel that the current issue of the Journal marks a definitive high point in our publication’s history, made possible by our excellent contributors.

We are excited to feature a selection of articles for Volume VII, Issue I covering a diverse array of policy-oriented subjects. Hossein Askari, Iran Professor of Business and International Affairs at George Washington University, discusses the risk-reduction benefits of a global financial system modeled after the tenets of Islamic finance. Peter Uvin, Henry J. Leir Professor of International Humanitarian Studies at Tuft’s Fletcher School, and Bhaskar Chakravorti, Senior Associate Dean for International Business and Finance also at Tuft’s Fletcher School, engage in a dialogue about the lessons aid agencies can teach multinational corporations about working successfully in emerging markets. Oona Hathaway, Sabria McElroy, and Sara Aronchick Solow of Yale Law School explore the enforceability of international treaties in US courts, and Steven C. Roach, Associate Professor at the University of South Florida, reviews the power of the International Criminal Court. J. Michael Greig, Associate Professor of the University of North Texas, and Paul Diehl, Henning Larsen Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, ask if peacekeeping can actually undermine peacemaking in the long run. Conflict management consultant Jeffrey Bernstein talks about the relationship between peace and fighting in Afghanistan. Michael Beckley, research fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School, looks at the relationship between China and Pakistan, while Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, director of the Center for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization, and Tara Vassefi of the Naval Postgraduate School, consider Pakistan and Afghanistan.

This issue also offers illuminating interviews with US Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano; chief prosecutor of the Rwandan and Yugoslavian war crimes tribunals, Richard Goldstone; former economics ministers of Argentina and India respectively, Domingo Cavallo and Rakesh Mohan; human rights activist John Prendergast; and intelligence expert Michele Malvesti. Rounding out the issue, our op-eds and book reviews take us from international copyright law and US military power, to Kosovo, Africa, and Syria.

We are particularly excited about our upcoming issue, Volume VII, Issue II, in which we will be showcasing our first-ever “IR Scholars Forum,” where top international relations scholars will discuss the impact of their scholarly work on their policy opinions. Look for it late summer 2012.

Now in its seventh year, the Journal has made some tremendous strides since its inception, and owes much of its success this year to the labors of previous years’ staff. We are proud to continue the creative, hard-working tradition they started.

Audrey Latura
Editor-in-Chief
2011–2012

Click here to access March 2012 issue (pdf)

]]> http://yalejournal.org/2012/04/march-2012/feed/ 0 http://yalejournal.org/2012/03/yes-you-can-say-genocide-mr-president-3/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=yes-you-can-say-genocide-mr-president-3 http://yalejournal.org/2012/03/yes-you-can-say-genocide-mr-president-3/#comments Fri, 16 Mar 2012 15:54:23 +0000 Managing Editor for YJIA.org http://yalejournal.org/?p=2730 Mark Dietzen
March 16, 2012

Photo by REUTERS/Michael Dalder

On April 24, 2012, the 97^th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, President Obama will have the opportunity to fulfill his campaign promise to officially recognize Ottoman Turkey's deliberate and systematic destruction of its Armenian population as genocide. For decades, the United States has refrained from formal recognition of the mass killings of Armenians as genocide for fear of upsetting its relations with Turkey, a strategic ally. The Turkish government has perpetuated this apprehension by issuing strong but ambiguous threats of ‘negative diplomatic consequences’ in the event of US recognition.

Yet Turkey’s state-sanctioned denial of its genocidal past and the hypocritical US failure to speak truthfully about the Armenian Genocide threatens the reputations of both as well as their respective capacities for regional and global leadership. It is time to remove this albatross.

On the night of April 24, 1915, Turkish authorities arrested some 250 of Constantinople's Armenian intellectuals and community leaders and sent them to prison camps, where most were summarily executed. The following eight years saw the annihilation of some 1.5 million Armenians. Obama knows this history well, stating on January 19, 2008, "that the Armenian Genocide is not an allegation, a personal opinion, or a point of view, but rather a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming body of historical evidence.  The facts are undeniable."

Yet despite his 2008 commitment to recognize the genocide as president, Obama has not been true to his word. As a precursor to his first Armenian Remembrance Day statement on April 24, 2009, he refrained from using the "G-word" three weeks beforehand on April 6th during a speech to the Turkish parliament. "My views are on the record and I have not changed views," he said. "I want to focus not on my views right now, but on the views of the Turkish and Armenian people. If they can move forward and deal with a difficult and tragic history, then I think the entire world should encourage that."

Sure enough, when April 24^th arrived, his much-anticipated statement employed similar language. Obama referred to the genocide as "Meds Yeghern," which in Armenian means "Great Calamity," rather than calling it the "Armenian Genocide" outright. "My interest," he stated, "remains the achievement of a full, frank and just acknowledgment of the facts. The best way to advance that goal right now is for the Armenian and Turkish people to address the facts of the past as a part of their efforts to move forward." Not saying the words "Armenian Genocide," Obama appears to have thought, would aid the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation process.

Initially, that indeed seemed to be the case. Six months later in October 2009, after lengthy negotiations and intensive 11^th hour shuttle diplomacy by US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, Foreign Ministers Ahmet Davutoğlu of Turkey and Eduard Nalbandian of Armenia signed the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey (hereafter “the Protocols”). The accord was penned amidst much fanfare: the signing ceremony was attended by Clinton, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the European Union's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana. The great expectations of the protocols, however, were only met with great disappointments.

Shortly after the Protocols were signed, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Turkey’s ratification of the Protocols would depend on a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian enclave which broke away from Azerbaijan during the eclipse of the Soviet Union. In so doing, Erdoğan linked Turkey’s implementation of the Protocols with one of the most intractable and complicated conflicts in Eurasia.

Yet the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not mentioned in the Protocols anywhere. Azerbaijan, a close ally of Turkey, had expressed serious concern that normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations would make the Armenians less likely to make concessions at the bargaining table. Thus Turkey, capitalizing on this sentiment and in a calculated bid to ensure that the Protocols would fail so that Turkey would not have to take action in regards to Armenia, recrafted the Protocols into an imaginary Armenian-Azerbaijani concern.

This precipitated the slow death of an agreement that the Obama Administration once touted as a major diplomatic achievement. Obama had perceived Turkey’s commitment to the Protocols to be genuine and rewarded it by abstaining from use of the word “genocide,” as both Obama’s 2010 and 2011 Armenian Remembrance Day statements employ similarly evasive language as his first statement in 2009. Unfortunately, Turkey had different intentions for the Protocols from the beginning.

President Obama's purging of "Armenian Genocide" from his lexicon did not result in a change in the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation process. Armenia extended a hand, but Turkey was unwilling to unclench its fist, squandering a momentous opportunity for peace.

This is a loss for both Turkey and the United States. True, formal US recognition of the Armenian Genocide would strain US-Turkish relations in the short-term, including the temporary withdrawal of Turkey’s Ambassador to the United States and a provisional restriction on the use of Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey. The long-term consequences of genocide denial, however, impose far greater strategic and reputational costs, most notably in threatening Turkey’s accession to the European Union. There is also the genocide's most enduring human rights legacy: an open wound on the collective memory of the Armenian people.

Furthermore, Turkey’s threats of political and economic retaliation against those countries that have officially recognized the Armenian Genocide have turned out to be largely empty. Ankara’s ambassador to France returned to Paris four months after being recalled following France’s 2001 recognition of the genocide. And international trade data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development reveal that ten advanced economies – including Russia, France and Canada – have actually experienced growth in bilateral trade with Turkey despite their recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

History can be a bitter pill to swallow, yet Turkey is not the first country to require US prodding in order to confront its past. Obama should remember that good allies, like good friends, must be willing to not only praise achievements, but also reproach failures. In addition, this issue has repercussions for Obama's reelection. Many Armenian-Americans feel his message of “hope and change” does not apply to them, that they have traded their votes for an empty promise. So long as Obama remains a hypocrite in their eyes, he should not expect their support in 2012.

Vice-President Biden, Secretary of State Clinton, and Special Assistant Power – whose book, A Problem from Hell, devotes its first chapter to the Armenian Genocide – have all previously gone on record in support of Armenian Genocide recognition. As April 24^th approaches, they should recall the fate of the Armenians in Constantinople in 1915. And if this year’s Armenian Remembrance Day statement is just a reworded version of last year's equivocation, perhaps one of them will have the courage to tell Obama, “Yes, you can say ‘genocide,’ Mr. President.”  And yes, he should.

 Mark Dietzen is an international affairs analyst and consultant specializing in European and Eurasian Affairs. He holds an MA in International Relations with Concentrations in U.S. Foreign Policy in Europe and Eurasia, and International Law, and Certificates in International Security and Policy Studies, from Yale University. The views expressed are solely those of the author.

HIV/AIDS, while no longer a taboo in China, remains a sensitive topic. Government officials tend to shy away from it for fear of upsetting “social harmony,” under the belief that disseminating information about HIV/AIDS will evoke widespread panic. Yet without sufficient public attention, HIV has spread at a rate far beyond expectation. In the first nine months of 2008, nearly 7,000 people in China died as a result of HIV/AIDS, whereas up until three years prior to this the cumulative mortality was less than 8,000.[i] What led to this sudden burst of AIDS deaths?

The unwillingness of the government to share information about the true scope of the AIDS epidemic and its suppression of AIDS activists is a big barrier in the fight against AIDS. Dr. Gao Yaojie, an AIDS activist who became famous in China for exposing a blood transfusion scandal in Henan Province, endured various obstacles in work created by the government, including arbitrary detention, harassment and intimidation.[ii] Other Chinese activists like Zhao Liang and Wan Yanhai, who played important roles in promoting public awareness and education about the disease, met similar obstacles.[iii] This has prevented people, especially health care workers, from conducting AIDS research and from speaking openly about AIDS, thus impeding efforts to control the disease.

If China’s leaders want to eliminate AIDS, they can no longer avoid discussing it openly. Furthermore, they must involve the public in addressing the problem and they must be receptive to those who aim to improve the healthcare system. Concealing information will not only hinder China’s efforts to check the spread of the disease, but will also limit its ability to seek help from the international community.  Beijing should learn from the 2003 SARS pandemic, when the Chinese propaganda department’s attempts to cover up the disease resulted in a rampant spread of SARS from Guangzhou to Hong Kong, and then across the world.  The Chinese government risks making the same mistake with AIDS: without accurate information, delayed preventive measures may lead to an uncontrollable spread of the disease, undermining any previous efforts to address the problem.

Wan Yanhai, China’s best-known AIDS activist, believes China suffers ten times the number of HIV cases (650,000) estimated by Chinese health officials.  If this is true, then a serious outbreak in a country with such a huge population, and whose workforce drives the Chinese economy, could have significant global health as well as international economic impacts.  Health communication reforms, such as the establishment of a separate and independent health surveillance system under direct supervision of the national government, averts corruption by local officials and is necessary for China and for the global community.

That is crucial because the spread of AIDS is not limited by national borders.  Thus, the fight against AIDS must be a collaborative effort, and will require international participation through organizations such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS.  Such collaboration is imperative in order to survey, investigate, and identify optimal solutions to the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  An outbreak in even a small and remote area today could be detrimental for the whole world tomorrow. Sharing accurate information is not only in every country’s interests, but also part of our common responsibility to promote global health.

The attempt to silence voices and facts might, in the eyes of Chinese officials, maintain a harmonious society in the short term. They should recognize, however, that long-term stability and public trust in the government outweighs these concerns. Depriving people of their right to know, particularly in situations where lack of information constitutes a direct threat to public health, is unwise.  A more transparent and open health communication system is indispensable. The Chinese government should allow free public speech and establish a worldwide platform for data sharing to monitor AIDS cases. Beijing must cost-effectively allocate its resources now, or risk facing an uncontrollable problem later.

Nestled between the Himalyas and the Pir Panjal mountain range, Kashmir was, is and always will be a paradise. Sadly these views are not without a price. With boundaries that stretch across two hostile countries – India and Pakistan, Kashmir has a tragically tortured past and present. Currently occupied by over 7,00,000 army, police and paramilitary personnel, the valley maintains the world’s highest concentration of soldiers, outnumbering all other conflict zones including Afghanistan, Burma and Iraq. Sentiments of fear and ferocity engulf the region. This photo story is an anthology of the many facets of everyday life in Kashmir, that I captured over the course of my decade-long coverage of this ill-fated paradise. I focused my lens on the disruption produced by imposed curfews and ceaseless protests on the daily lives of the Kashmiri people. What follows is a compilation of what I witnessed, be it an eerie curfew day, a dreadful silent night, raging protests, the death of an innocent bystander, or children playing cricket. These photos offer a window into the terror and dread that fill Kashmiri eyes and captures those unfortunate daily events that have created a conflict zone amidst deft serenity. Civilians and those in uniform alike, all live in a noose of fear. These photos aim to speak for a people that is rarely heard.

Atiqa's husband Nazir was picked up by men from Dogra regiment. Atiqa was only 18 years when her husband went missing. Atiqa has since raised two daughters and two sons, wh0 make their living in Baramulla Zogiyar village.

Hanifa is another such half widow from Baramulla who lost her husband

A child living at a village near Drass.

Curfew day in Lal Chowk in Srinagar. Carrying curfew passes are mandatory.

Angry villagers in Bomai after two boys were killed in an army encounter.

Aunt of Umer Bhatt cries. Umer, seventeen was killed in police custody in August 2010

A young boy in his teens hurls stones at the Indian security forces in Soura in Kashmir.

Grandfather of boy killed in a cross fire in Nohatta in 2008.

Friend of Umer Bhatt killed in police custody in 2010 August mourns on the way to the funeral.

A protester gets ready to fight the Indian security troops.

An Indian security personal from CRPF (Central Reserve Police force) uses a sling to hurl stones at protesters

A curfew night

A young girl from Maisuma looks at the crowd below during a protest. He father also went missing many years back.

An old women looks down to find her son involved in street protest in Nowahatta in downtown Srinagar.

SHOME Basu was a picture-editor for Open, Outlook Business & Outlook Money magazines where he covered a variety of assignments from politics, features & business. Before that he was with the India Today group as a photographer. He has worked for many publications like India Today, Business Today,Outlook group, Marie Claire,Cosmopoliton, Outlook Traveler, Open, Wall Street, Amnesty international, UNICEF & many others. 

Deadline: April 1, 2012

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Recent contributors to YJIA include: Janet Napolitano, Richard Goldstone, Oona Hathaway, Paul Diehl, Bhaskar Chakravorti, Peter Uvin, Hossein Askari, Stanley McChrystal, Todd Moss, Isobel Coleman, Elisabeth Wood, Tony Blair, Paul Collier, Joseph Stiglitz, John Negroponte, and Mary Kaldor, among others. To view YJIA’s archives, visit us online at yalejournal.org

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Last month, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced plans to slash the defense budget by hundreds of billions of dollars over the next decade, reducing the size of the army 14% by 2022. Panetta and the Obama administration simultaneously plan to increase Washington’s fleet of armed, unmanned aircraft by almost 300%, ushering in a smaller force that gets more lightly involved, but is able to intervene militarily in more places. Unmanned aircraft already comprise 31% of all military aircraft, up from 5% in 2005.

The unique nature of drones and the liberal way Obama uses them mean the budget cuts actually increase executive power as they shrink portions of the military. Evading congressional oversight of drone use has permitted the executive branch to expand its mandate to commit force abroad by circumventing the mechanisms of executive accountability.

Take Libya, for example. Last year, the Obama administration maintained that its actions did not necessitate invocation of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 because they did not amount to “hostilities.” Congress designed the War Powers Resolution to be a check on the executive’s mandate to commit American force abroad. Two pillars of the administration’s argument in regard to Libya were the limited scope of operations and the small numbers of potential casualties, both of which drones enabled. The administration claimed that the nature of the campaign was not the sort that Congress had in mind when drafting the War Powers Resolution.

Compare this to ongoing operations in and around Pakistan. In 2011, Obama ordered well over twice the drone strikes he did in Libya. Yet in Pakistan Obama maintains we are engaged in a “non-international armed conflict,” a term Congress itself believed to exceed mere hostilities in scope when drafting the War Powers Resolution. “Armed conflict” implies the existence of hostilities, and falls under the purview of Congressional oversight. The fact that US actions in Libya were not deemed hostilities is clearly contradictory to the administration’s approach in Pakistan: more military force was committed in Libya yet considered a lower threshold of conflict by the executive. Even Obama’s top lawyers at the Pentagon and the Justice Department thought Libya was misdefined. He just didn’t listen to them.

This inconsistency compromises public checks on the executive. That no branch of government enjoys excessive power is a hallmark of US democracy and the use of force is the most salient form of that power. Given Obama’s track record and the Pentagon’s vision of an expanded drone program, where are the checks and balances? Drone strikes should not be the exclusive preserve of the executive branch. While Congress probably wouldn’t have shut the door on Obama’s intervention in Libya, he never gave it the choice, and no one made him.

It is not just the War Powers Resolution that the executive branch seems to be maneuvering around. In September 2011, the administration targeted and killed American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen without due process as guaranteed by the 5^th amendment. Regardless of how the White House may justify that strike, it is disturbing that even American citizens can be targeted by drones without any judicial or Congressional oversight.

And the records show there’s more to come. A Department of Defense report from March 2011 indicates that in the coming years, the growth of drones will greatly outstrip that of any other category of aircraft.

New technologies may increase US forces’ tactical accuracy, but they will not eliminate the fog of war, nor answer the question of whether or not to intervene in the first place. Committing force is about more than just spending money and risking domestic discontent. It’s also about taking the lives of other people – some of them civilians – and either respecting or threatening international norms of sovereignty. Intervention with high-tech, pointillist weapons is still intervention.

Drones are undoubtedly useful. If President Clinton had used them instead of Rangers in Somalia, he probably wouldn’t have faced anywhere near the sort of popular backlash he did in 1993. In 2011, the American people found it easier to stomach a third theater of war in Libya in times of economic hardship because they didn’t risk great human or financial costs. Drones were a central part of this story.

Without any mechanisms of accountability, the use of drones gives the president too much power to carry the nation to war without considering the consequences. Isn’t that what Obama ran against in 2008? “Future presidents should think through the implications of a military incursion before they launch one,” he said in 2007. By shutting Congress out of the drone equation, Obama is ensuring that doesn’t happen.

 
Aroop Mukharji is a Marshall Scholar at King’s College London and was previously a Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Perhaps the 2012 election that has the greatest potential to change the landscape of United States foreign policy is one that few Americans are paying attention to:  Venezuela’s next presidential election, scheduled for October 7, 2012. Venezuela watchers are waiting to see if Hugo Chavez can once again scheme his way into another term in office or if the opposition, the finally unified Coalition for Democratic Unity (MUD), can defeat the defiantly anti-American president. The latter would not only be significant because of the socialist and anti-American foundation that has paved the way for Chavez to become one of the most influential leaders in Latin America. Considering the fact that many of the actions of the Chavez government conflict with US objectives; whether it be support for democratic institutions, the isolation of Iran, or fighting the drug war; the election of a Venezuelan president who is less preoccupied with opposing “the imperialists” could further American interests, not just in Latin America, but globally.

Since the mid-2000’s, the Chavez regime has used the Bolivarian Alliance; a regional trade bloc intended to be a counter-weight to US trade agreements;  to support other leftist governments throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Slush funds from Venezuela’s vast oil wealth support the Ortega government in Nicaragua, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, the Castro regime in Cuba and others. These governments have been accused of suppressing political opposition through violence and intimidation, unequal wealth redistribution to impoverished supporters, corruption, bribery, and political patronage. If funding from Venezuela dried up, it would be much more difficult for those power brokers to cull support from domestic elites, who will later be rewarded for their loyalty, and their impoverished citizens, whose votes can be bought with government services. As long as Chavez remains in power, those lifelines will not only be available, but they may get stronger as the discovery of the Orinoco Belt of extra-heavy crude promises to inflate Venezuela’s financial strength.

At the same time, the relationship between the Chavez government and Iran has been getting a lot of attention lately. Hugo Chavez’s friendship with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is well chronicled, although fears over Iran reportedly building its largest embassy in Venezuela have been overblown. Still, more than 200 agreements have been signed between the two governments, including Venezuela’s offer to provide Iran with refined gasoline, as well as plans for the Venezuelan state-run oil company, PDVSA, to invest about $800 million in the development of new gas fields in Iran. As long as Chavez holds power, oil revenues from Venezuela will be funneled into social projects of the Iranian regime’s choosing, limiting the effectiveness of western efforts to isolate and punish Iran.

The Venezuelan-Iranian relationship continues to draw the attention of US foreign policy makers. What has captured the attention of most Venezuelans, on the other hand, is corruption, the vast increase in urban violence, and Chavez’s grab for unchecked power. Opposition candidates are discussing all of these issues in order to build popular support for their campaigns ahead of the February 12^th primary. Whoever the candidate is, the opposition to Chavez hopes that the MUD coalition holds together and can carry over its momentum from the 2010 parliamentary elections to the October 2012 vote. At this point, we really don’t know if the upcoming election will be free of government interference because of the wild card that is Hugo Chavez. Known for consolidating power in the executive, stacking the judiciary, and having his party loyalists take to the streets on to intimidate people who might consider voting for the opposition, Chavez has also indicated that his government would respect free elections in October. Indeed, the fact that, Chavez’s own United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) lost its substantial majority in the 2010 parliamentary elections suggests on this last point he may be sincere. Yet Chavez often talks of respecting democratic practices.  A defeat at the polls, though, could spell the end of the one thing Chavez defends perpetually: his leftist social movement that he terms the Bolivarian Revolution. It remains to be seen how much “democracy” Chavez is willing to accept if it threatens those interests.

Any conversation about Chavez and the upcoming election would be incomplete, however, if it failed to entertain the possibility of an election without Chavez. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs during the Bush Administration, Roger Noriega, a noted hawk when it comes to Chavez, is on record saying that sources indicate the health of Hugo Chavez is much worse than the president admits. In fact, Noriega believes that Chavez will not survive to see next fall’s election. If that is the case, all bets are off. Before he reached a point where he would be unable to lead, Hugo Chavez would likely appoint a successor, perhaps turning to his brother, Adan Chavez. In the event of Chavez’s death, a more dire circumstance might involve a military coup. Bruce Bagley, a political scientist at the University of Miami, has suggested this possibility.  Ironically, the best thing for the opposition in Venezuela might be that Chavez survives his fight with cancer. Only then can the opposition legitimately rebuke the Chavez platform and, hopefully, achieve a popular mandate.

US foreign policy has a lot at stake come October. A Venezuela that no longer supports Iranian interests could be of great benefit to the United States if sanctions and increasing pressure from European powers don’t deter the Islamic Republic from continuing its pursuit of nuclear technology. A Venezuela without Chavez would be likely to drastically reduce aid to Bolivarian Alliance states, thereby improving the possibility of regime change in those countries due to public frustration over their governments inability to provide those things they have now become accustomed to. Furthermore, a Venezuela without Chavez would be more interested in oil exports to the United States, which has obvious benefits for the United States, as opposed to the current trend of reducing exports to the US and increasing exports to China and other nations. Venezuela could also be a US ally in its work with the Colombian government against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other paramilitary narcotics handlers, instead of an enabler of these groups, as the Chavez government seems to be.

The October elections in Venezuela hold the possibility of removing a big thorn in the side of American foreign policy while simultaneously advancing US goals of promoting democracy and ensuring American security regarding drug traffickers and a nuclear Iran. But it’s a long way from here to October.

Michael W Edghill earned a B.A. in History from the University of North Texas and teaches courses about the Caribbean and U.S. Government in Fort Worth, Texas. He can be reached at michaelw.edghill@gmail.com

Reviewed by Marc A. Sorel

The last four months have been a watershed period in US-Burma diplomacy.  It began two years prior, with Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell’s visit to Burma in November 2009 – at that time, the highest-ranking US official in nearly 14 years to visit the country.  Following the first visit to Burma by Obama’s coordinator for Burma policy Ambassador Derek Mitchell in October, and after speaking with Burmese political activist Aung San Suu Kyi, President Obama announced last month that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would visit Burma.  Clinton completed her three-day visit on December 2^nd, the first by a US Secretary of State in 50 years.

In response to these US overtures, the Burmese government established a National Human Rights Commission, embarked on a new round of peace talks with restive ethnic minority groups, eased media censorship laws, legalized labor unions, and reached an agreement with Suu Kyi to re-register her political party on the condition that she run for office in the next round of elections.  Together, these steps constitute the “flickers of progress” after “years of darkness” in Burma that President Obama noted in his announcement of Clinton’s visit.

As UN diplomat Thant Myint-U persuasively explains in Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia with an insightful, if at times excessively anecdotal account, the changes underway in Burma are as complex as the country’s political and economic future is undecided.  The central characters in Thant’s story are not people, but nation-states: China, India, and Burma -- past, present, and future.  Employing a style that weaves shoe leather reporting with travelogue anecdote, rich historical context, and political analysis, Thant recounts his travels in the three countries’ interiors and along their intersecting peripheries to answer a simply worded, yet daunting question: what will be Burma’s fate as India and China grow?

Thant’s book comes at an opportune time: Burma’s key exports -- jade, off-shore oil and gas, and hydroelectric power -- as well as its geopolitical position make the country of increasing importance to India and China.  For China, Burma could solve two strategic problems, Thant argues.  First, it could be China’s “California” -- a western sea coast that attracts tourists and their wallets as they transit Yunnan en route to Burma.  Second, hydroelectric dams, oil pipelines and train tracks laid from Burmese ports to Yunnan would ensure vital shipments of fuel and natural resources, circumventing the Malaccan straits and precluding the possibility that a future Indian or US naval blockade of Chinese maritime traffic would materially affect Chinese interests.  For India, whose “Look East” policy promised new avenues of economic engagement with Asian nations, trade has been largely limited to commodities and raw materials, constrained by the remoteness of the provinces east of Bangladesh and the lack of shipping capacity of Burmese ports.  Thailand is getting in on the action too, with a multi-billion dollar industrial park and tourist destination planned for the sliver of Burma that extends southward along the Andaman coast.  An explicit aim of the Thai government is for the park to house environmentally damaging industries currently situated in and around Bangkok.  The West, whose sanctions regime Thant suggests is becoming increasingly irrelevant, is largely absent from this picture.

Thant does well when describing Burma’s present geopolitical context, but he is at his best while unpacking the layers of historical, economic, political, and ethnographic complexity affecting the country’s future.  Although China leads on commercial diplomacy, India has stronger cultural ties through its dominance of the region for most of the last 2,000 years, epitomized by the fact that nearly 90% of Burma is Buddhist, and the Burmese elites speak English, not Mandarin.  But India’s historic influence is under threat.  Restive Burmese minorities such as the Wa, which control a semi-autonomous region the size of Belgium along the Chinese border with one of the largest private armies in the world, benefit from Chinese commercial influence.  Thant contemplates these contrasts when he vists Wa (sustained by its trade in methamphetamine, and “discreet” support from the Chinese), and recalls the still-struggling portions of Rangoon in the south.

Despite China’s growing presence in the country, Thant is careful to point out that the future trajectory of Chinese influence is anything but guaranteed.  His first example is the Kokang incident, a Burmese military operation against ethnic minorities in Shan state in 2009 that displaced nearly 30,000 refugees to neighboring Yunnan province.  This is precisely the kind of scenario China seeks to prevent along its border with North Korea.  Chinese foreign policy analysts cited the incident as a signal from the junta that it would not be a supplicant to Beijing’s interests.  Add to this the Burmese government’s decision in September, spurred in part by local protests, to suspend construction of a hydroelectric dam that would have carried energy to western China, and the future of Burma-Chinese relations is even less clear.

II.

Part history, political analysis, long-form travel feature, and economic analysis, Thant’s interdisciplinary narrative facilitates a compelling blend of historical, political, and economic perspectives, but it also results in anecdotal overload and conclusions implicitly drawn without factual confirmation.  By recounting what he observes, as he observes it, Thant imbues his text with an urgency that is absorbing when done well.  But when Thant mentions for a fourth time the television programming in his hotel room, the device wears thin.  Juxtaposed with his telling of Burmese, Chinese, and Indian history and his thoughtful political analysis, Thant’s notebook-emptying asides become more distracting than helpful.

Thant also occasionally gets his facts wrong, and goes a bridge too far in the conclusions he draws from anecdotal evidence.  Thant incorrectly translates “Beijing” to mean “Northern Peace” when in fact it means “Northern City” or “Northern Capital,” in contrast with Nanjing or “Southern Capital.” Perhaps Thant was thinking of the Chinese capital’s other name – Beiping – which does mean Northern Peace, but was last used officially from 1928 until 1949, and before that, during the Ming dynasty. Additionally, Thant assumes that a group of Chinese businessmen with whom he shares a plane ride in Burma are members of a senior-ranking delegation; he uses that assumption to buttress his point about China’s growing presence in Burma.  But he is either unable or unwilling to confirm his hunch, which raises doubts about his ability to back up his central conclusions with verified evidence.

III.

Between the lines of Thant’s book is a clear call to Washington to deepen its engagement with Burma.  He characterizes the competition among outside powers for commercial position in Burma as a new “Great Game,” invoking the contest between Russia and Britain for dominance in Central and South Asia during the 19^th and early 20^th centuries.  Thant also poses a persistent question throughout his descriptions of Chinese commercial influence in Burma: will the Burmese people benefit from China’s involvement?

The thrust of Thant’s argument is that Burma, through its commercial ties, political reforms, and geopolitical pressures from its ambitious neighbors, is reintegrating into the international system, and its pace of reintegration is accelerating.  Pick your metaphor --  wave, train, bus -- Thant’s point is that if the US fails to catch this momentous opportunity, it may lose the interest and favor of an emerging key player in the region, and fall behind in its competition for influence throughout Asia.  The appeal, as Thant presents it here, is persuasive from an economic perspective.

But is the opportunity as large, and the moment as significant, as Thant suggests it is?  Thant steers clear of articulating how the US can reconcile its necessary and legitimate calls for political reform in Burma with the urge for expanded commercial engagement and regional influence -- a wise choice for someone removed from the complexities of the policymaking process in Washington and Naypitaw, and presumably interested in maintaining his neutrality as a UN diplomat in New York.  Whether there is room for Burma amidst the panoply of Asian markets is an open question.  Instead of answering it definitively, though, Thant strangely suggests how the US may engage with Burma in part by reminding the reader that the country has been on the mind of past US Presidents: Franklin Delano Roosevelt detested it, Theodore Roosevelt once hunted near China’s border with the country, and Herbert Hoover visited one of its silver mines as a business executive before he became Commander in Chief.

The current US President is unlikely to visit Rangoon any time soon.  But that does not mean engagement is a dead-end.  Driven in part by its competition with China for influence in East Asia, the US under the Obama administration has pursued a dual track of engagement and sanctions with Burma.  During a press briefing at the end of his October trip before departing Rangoon, Burma Coordinator Mitchell enumerated the four focal points of US policy toward Burma: human rights, development, democracy, and national reconciliation.  Secretary Clinton elaborated on Mitchell’s principles during her recent trip, when she urged Burma to cut its ties to North Korea, end ethnic violence and internal conflict, and start talks regarding joint searches with the US for troops killed on Burmese soil in World War II.  The last of these items is key, mostly because it parallels an essential precondition of normalizing US-Vietnam relations in the mid-1990s.  Only after a series of Congressional investigations into POW-MIA status in Vietnam did then-President Bill Clinton normalize relations with the former pariah state.

How the US-Burma relationship evolves will have significant consequences for the US, Burma and the region.  Thant knows this, and his book could not have been better-timed, as western policymakers, diplomats, academics, journalists, and businesspeople try to make sense of a country that has been relatively closed to them for a generation.  As the US deepens its engagement with Burma, as China and India continue to pursue their commercial interests in the country, as the Burmese government undertakes serious political reforms, and as “the rest” continue to rise, Where China Meets India helps us understand a complex regional dynamic at a critical point in its development.  The end game is anything but pre-determined.

Marc A. Sorel is a graduate of Yale University, where he received his B.A. in History, and Georgetown University, where he received his J.D.-M.S.F.S. He has worked for the U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, and the United Nations.

Photograph by Bruce Briscoe © 1999-2011

Several countries in the world are or soon will be drafting new constitutions.  It is vital that these constitutions protect universal human rights, including the right to freedom of religion or belief.   Based on its experience analyzing constitutions against international standards,[1] the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) offers the following guideposts for the full protection of religious freedom consistent with international human rights law:

Freedom of Religion or Belief is a Universal Right

The 193 member states of the United Nations have agreed, by signing the UN Charter, to “practice tolerance” and to “promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”  These rights and freedoms include the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, which is protected and affirmed in numerous international instruments, including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 18 of the ICCPR similarly provides:

1.  Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.

2.  No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.

3.  Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

4.  The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

Freedom of Religion or Belief is a Broad Right for Every Individual

Respecting religious freedom consistent with international human rights law is not only a matter of protecting the freedom of religious communities, as groups, to engage in worship and other collective activities.  It also encompasses the freedom of every individual to hold, or not to hold, any religion or belief, as well as the freedom to manifest such a religion or belief, subject only to narrow limitations allowed under international law.

Thus, religious freedom is not only for religious minorities.  It affords members of a country’s religious majority the freedom to debate interpretations of the dominant religion, as well as to dissent or otherwise refuse to follow the favored interpretation.  In addition, religious freedom is not only for religious communities deemed “traditional.”  It also includes the rights of individuals or communities to hold new beliefs, polytheistic beliefs, non-theistic beliefs, or atheistic beliefs.[2]

Religious freedom also encompasses more than just a right to worship or to practice religious rites; its full enjoyment requires that other rights must also be respected.  The full scope of the right to manifest religion or belief includes the rights of worship, observance, practice, expression, and teaching, broadly construed, including property rights regarding meeting places, the freedom to manage religious institutions, and the freedom to possess, publish,  and distribute  liturgical and educational materials.

Finally, religious freedom is not only for a country’s citizens.  International human rights standards require a state to extend rights and equal status to “all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”[3]

Freedom of Religion or Belief Includes Freedom of Religious Choice and Expression

Religious freedom includes the freedom to keep or to change one’s religion or belief without coercion.[4]  It also includes the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief through public expression, including expression intended to persuade another individual to change his or her religious beliefs or affiliation voluntarily.  Any limitations on these freedoms must be prescribed by a narrowly-construed law, based on a ground specified in ICCPR Article 18, non-discriminatory, not destructive of guaranteed rights, and not based solely on a single tradition.

Permissible Limitations on Freedom of Religion or Belief Are Narrow

Under international law, the broad right to freedom of religion or belief, including the management of religious institutions, may be subject to only such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  Limitations are not allowed on grounds not specified in ICCPR Article 18, even grounds that may be permitted to restrict other rights protected in the Covenant.  For example, national security is not a permissible limitation, and States cannot derogate from this right during a declared public emergency.  Limitations also must be consistent with the ICCPR’s provisions requiring equality before the law for all and prohibiting any measures that would destroy guaranteed rights.[5]  Finally, limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief that rely on morality must be based on principles not deriving from a single tradition.[6]

Establishing an Official Religion Cannot Justify Rights Violations or Discrimination

Under international standards, a state may declare an official religion, provided that basic rights, including the individual right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, are respected for all without discrimination.  Thus, the existence of a state religion cannot be a basis for discriminating against or impairing any rights of adherents of other religions or non-believers or their communities.  Providing benefits to official state religions not available to other faiths would constitute discrimination, as would excepting state religions from burdensome processes required for faith communities to establish legal personality. Under the ICCPR,  the fact that “a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant.”[7]

*The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) is an independent, bipartisan federal commission created by the U.S. Congress to monitor and report on the status of freedom of religion or belief and give independent policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and members of Congress.