Transatlantic Perspectives on European Security in the Coming Decade

BY JOLYON HOWORTH

Since the end of the Cold War, Americans and Europeans have struggled to define a new security relationship. With the demise of the Soviet threat, U.S. security priorities have shifted away from Europe to Asia and the Middle East. European nations, galvanized by conflict in the Balkans, have grappled with the challenge of constructing their own security framework. European security cannot be detached from the transatlantic context, but in the future it will not necessarily be constructed exclusively by that context. It cannot be detached because the values and interests that bind the transatlantic community are stronger and more durable than the forces that generate friction. But the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) project is also acquiring a life of its own and, as it grows in capacity and in confidence, the policy will become more autonomous.

The transatlantic relationship was the direct stimulus for the ESDP, which derives from what I have called the Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma. European unity over EU security policy has been problematic because of a fundamental difference between two basic visions promoted by the United Kingdom and France. The original dilemma was about determining the most effective method for guaranteeing a U.S. commitment to European security. A key issue for NATO

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was the potential consequence of the advent of a serious European military capacity. While France expressed confidence that the United States would welcome a militarily robust “European pillar” that took itself more seriously, the UK worried that any such development would undermine NATO and encourage U.S. disengagement. Those contrasting visions lasted for fifty years—from 1947 until the election of Tony Blair in 1997. This explains why the European pillar never developed. Throughout the 1990s, however, U.S. demands that Europe improve and transform its military capacity became increasingly strident. In December 1998 France and the UK buried their differences, and the ESDP was born at the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo, France.

The original Euro-Atlantic security dilemma was transformed as the ESDP took shape. Europe gradually improved its military capacity and, although both sides demonstrated elements of schizophrenia about that process, the transatlantic alliance survived. However, the alliance was also transformed and, along with it, the security dilemma. By NATO's Prague summit in November 2002, the question of American commitment to European security had ceased to be the primary issue at the heart of the alliance. NATO, originally designed to deliver U.S. commitment to European security, was transformed—almost imperceptibly—into an alliance aiming to deliver European commitment to U.S. global strategy. As a result, the new Euro-Atlantic security dilemma is about how to relate to American global strategy without tearing apart the European Union. Iraq was the first major test, and Europe failed spectacularly. For genuine European and transatlantic harmony to emerge, this dilemma must be transcended. The challenge is for the United States and the EU to work together to steer the world in a new direction.

The Transatlantic Relationship

There are three distinct levels to the transatlantic relationship. The first is the systemic interplay of great power politics, the second is shaped by the specific circumstances of the post-Cold War era, and the third is the “Bush factor.”
At the first level, there is nothing automatic about transatlantic harmony. The EU and the United States share various values, cultural norms, historical experiences, and strategic interests. However, the reality is that each side constitutes a massive great power bloc and that historically, great powers have not perceived one another as natural allies. The period from 1776 to 1945 witnessed constant systemic Euro-Atlantic disputes involving many Euro-American wars. Because EU-U.S. harmony cannot be assumed and transatlantic interests can diverge, the two sides need to work hard at managing those divergences. The good news at this level is that, while disputes are unavoidable, serious confrontation is unthinkable. Wars between nuclear democracies do not happen. Moreover, the main reasons for U.S. involvement in past European wars have all disappeared.

The second dimension of the relationship stems from the end of the Cold War. It is only normal and expected that Europeans and Americans have squabbled in recent years given that the type of cozy relationship they shared during the Cold War was a historical aberration. For forty years the threat from the Soviet Union was so massive and so direct that the transatlantic family, while occasionally indulging in the odd spat, could not afford the luxury of a full-scale domestic row. Moreover, the relationship of hegemony and dependency that characterized the period was also aberrant. What the world has witnessed since 1989 is nothing more than a new chapter in a centuries-old process of adjustment. This jostling for position was rendered all the more dramatic because the emergence from the Cold War, which would have engendered jostling under any circumstances, coincided with the rise of Europe to quasi-superpower status. Under these conditions, a reordering of the transatlantic relationship was inevitable. A painful part of that reordering will be for the United States to accept a more balanced partnership.

Many academic theories predicted growing conflict between the United States and Europe. The collapse of the transatlantic alliance was even one hypothesis raised in a 2000 Central Intelligence Agency study on Global Trends 2015. The reality is quite different. Economic, commercial, and investment interdependence is at an all-time high. In the history of the world, never before have two entities been more inextricably interdependent than Europe and the United States today. However, the complicating aspect of that same story is that the EU has overtaken the United States in many areas: market size, population, GDP, world trade in services, and numbers and perfor-
mance of multinational corporations. The euro zone recorded a €74.4 billion trading surplus in 2004, while the U.S. trade deficit was close to $500 billion.\(^{12}\) Competition in critical sectors is intensifying, as witnessed in the unfolding row between airplane manufacturers Boeing and Airbus. If the two sides are to succeed in managing an increasingly competitive relationship, it will require a concerted and deliberate effort. They need a partnership, but partnership supposes rough equality. This will not be easy for the United States, which enjoys a military superiority of unprecedented proportions.\(^{13}\)

The United States’ overwhelming military dominance no longer affords it the leverage over Europe it enjoyed during the Cold War, however. Disengagement can no longer be dangled as a threat; with the *U.S. Global Posture Review*, it has become a fact.\(^{14}\) The EU has no problem with the progressive withdrawal of U.S. troops from the old continent. The EU is nudging toward something that looks suspiciously like security autonomy. This has three aspects. First, autonomy has emerged more through U.S. urging than through European aspiration. “Burden sharing” has been a U.S. demand for decades. Second, autonomy will operate more to promote complementarity than to foment rivalry. The EU does not aspire to intervene militarily in areas of strategic sensitivity to the United States. Potential EU interventions will likely occur in Europe’s own backyard, thereby relieving U.S. forces for duties in areas of more direct interest to Washington. The third point is that we cannot foretell today where EU autonomy will take us in twenty-five years. There is no point in trying to double-guess what Harold Macmillan called “events.”\(^{15}\) Both sides have been schizophrenic about European autonomy, but both sides will have to live with it.

A third level has entered the transatlantic equation, rendering what would have been a difficult adjustment in any event all the more difficult because of both the style and the substance of U.S. policy under the administration of President George W. Bush. In 2003 favorable impressions of the United States fell to all-time lows in most European countries. The leading determinant of this collapse was the Bush administration’s foreign policy. When French and German populations were asked if they thought the problem was “mostly Bush,”
74 percent of Germans and French agreed along with 59 percent of British respondents. In another poll, up to 58 percent of Europeans found strong U.S. leadership undesirable. A growing number of Europeans in all countries (77 percent in Poland; 71 percent in France, Italy, and Portugal; 61 percent in the Netherlands and Spain; and even 59 percent in the UK and Turkey) hope the EU will become a military power “in order to become more independent of the U.S.” Moreover, while almost 80 percent of Americans polled said they wanted the EU and the United States to become closer partners, the figure across Europe was only 46 percent—with more than 50 percent saying they actually wanted the two blocs to move further apart. In a BBC poll conducted in twenty-one countries after November 2004, huge majorities in European countries felt that Bush’s re-election was a negative factor for peace and security in the world. This is an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of the transatlantic relationship. While the second Bush administration has recently initiated damage control measures, the challenge ahead is considerable.

Transatlantic Friction

There can be no denying that damage has been done. One major source of harm was the shift from an explicit and constantly articulated belief that the unity of Europe was in the U.S. national interest to one which, through the mischievous differentiation between “old” and “new” Europe, sought to divide the EU internally. Right before President Bush’s first visit to Europe in the summer 2001, Timothy Garton Ash recorded him asking a not-so rhetorical question to a group of advisors: “Do we want the European Union to succeed?” Such a question would have been unthinkable in any other administration since the 1940s. Moreover, unilateralism has ridden roughshod over allied concerns. Iraq was “the first major crisis to take place in the Alliance in the absence of an agreed upon danger.” Perhaps most damaging has been the fact that the transatlantic alliance has been repeatedly short-circuited in favor of ad-hoc coalitions. The formula coined by Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. secretary of defense, and regularly repeated by Paul Wolfowitz, the former U.S. deputy secretary of defense, “the mission determines the coalition,” has serious consequences for the functioning of alliances.

Broadly speaking, most American officials and analysts, irrespective of their political persuasions, tend to believe that the attacks of September 11, 2001, marked a rupture in U.S. strategic thinking.
reasons of strategic urgency, political and military flexibility, and technological superiority, the U.S. will henceforth prioritize ad-hoc coalitions over treaty-based alliances regardless of who controls the White House. Europeans are less united in their views on coalitions, some believing the U.S. shift to be a temporary partisan diversion, others fearing—but few asserting—that it has in fact become U.S. policy. All Europeans, however, profess a preference for the security of fixed alliances. The experience of recent military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq based on coalitions of the willing does not augur well for the model. These coalitions, by any objective standards, have been essentially political. Initial military entry based on high-intensity warfare proved to be relatively straightforward. The complications of the coalition model arise in the post-conflict phase, when a different set of partners is required to carry out different military and civilian tasks.

In Afghanistan, the most successful coalition operation, there were two parallel missions. The United States conducted one, Operation Enduring Freedom, without NATO. The other, the International Security Assistance Force, was conducted by NATO with virtually no American participation. Coordination of these two separate operations under a NATO command only began when the U.S. forces were drawn down in spring 2005, having effectively completed the rout of the Taliban. Above all, the row over NATO training of Iraqi forces inside or outside the country illustrates the sensitivities of reaching political consensus, let alone unanimity. The solution adopted for the training programs amounted to the construction, from inside the alliance, of a coalition of the willing. Those who remained unwilling stood to one side. This could become the format for NATO activity over the next decade—the alliance as a pool from which can be recruited coalitions of the willing. Yet, as a 2004 report on the Atlantic partnership by Henry Kissinger and Lawrence Summers warns, “No alliance can function successfully in the absence of a common strategy or in the presence of competing strategies.”

Each side therefore needs to clarify its commitment to the transatlantic security partnership unequivocally. If that does not happen, then NATO may begin to unravel. Only the crafting of a genuine common security strategy and greater U.S. involvement in NATO forces can dispel European perceptions that the United States cares little for NATO. There are those who argue that NATO’s November 2002 Prague summit decision to embrace the global war on terrorism has
already backfired. Most Europeans do not see the “war on terrorism” primarily as a military task. They do not feel comfortable referring to it as a “war.” Tight EU-U.S. cooperation is needed in the fight against terrorism, but it remains unclear to many Europeans what role NATO could play in such an operation. Under these changing circumstances, it is more and more difficult to believe that NATO’s common strategy is the “collective defense” envisioned in Article 5: a collective defense against whom and with what? None of this is clear, and it needs to be made clear.

On the other hand, American perceptions that the European Union is plotting to become a counterweight superpower can only be dispelled by clear EU actions to the contrary. No number of statements or declarations can do the trick. Attempting to balance the United States as a counterweight superpower would indeed be incompatible with the transatlantic alliance. But working to exercise influence in Washington should not be construed as balancing. Most EU member states aim to exercise influence in Washington. That is normal and healthy within a partnership. None of them—including France—aims, on principle, to subvert or undermine U.S. policy. The allies need less talk of counterweights and more recognition that, in a more balanced alliance, there must be free and frank discussion. A useful analogy here is perhaps that of inter-agency rivalry within the U.S. administration. When the French president raises awkward objections to a U.S. proposal, this should not be seen as an attempt to balance U.S. power. It is arguably more akin to the action of a U.S. secretary of state arguing for a different course from that proposed by a U.S. secretary of defense, which happens all the time. Administrations can cope with inter-agency turf wars. True partnerships can cope with straight talk.

The United States needs to understand better what the EU has become. The European Security and Defense Policy is ample evidence of the fact that the EU is already much more than just another intergovernmental organization. American officials and analysts have adopted at least three different attitudes towards ESDP, and each of these attitudes is incompatible with the other. The first—the original desire—is positive, arguing that European military capacity will re-
lieve U.S. capacity and enhance the overall burden-sharing relationship. The second attitude is anxiety. There is a fear that European security autonomy will advance too far and eventually operate against U.S. interests, thereby undermining the Atlantic alliance. A recent paper in *Foreign Affairs* is symptomatic of this latter approach. Claiming that the EU Constitution “would seek to balance rather than complement U.S. power,” the author, Jeffrey Cimbalo, argues that this “presents the greatest challenge to continuing U.S. influence in Europe since World War II and U.S. policy must begin to adapt accordingly.”29 The third attitude is contempt: ESDP is a joke—too little, too late—and of the wrong sort. The ESDP cannot be all three of these. It cannot even be two of them. It can only be one. But which one?

The ambitions of the ESDP for the foreseeable future are modest. Although the security strategy paper by Javier Solana and the EU’s *Headline Goal 2010* both describe Europe as “a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security,” it is difficult to see how and where this might happen in any significant way—at a global level—in the medium term.30 The qualitative indicators envisaged under *Headline Goal 2010* include an EU operational planning cell, an armaments agency, strategic airlift command, up to thirteen multinational “battle-groups,” an aircraft carrier group, and certain network linkages. This constitutes significant progress. Above all, the *Headline Goal 2010* has been crafted into the new EU Constitutional Treaty in such a way as to facilitate inclusiveness and deeper integration as opposed to exclusivity or variable geometry. But, while far from insignificant, it is hardly a force that is going to have Uncle Sam quaking in his boots. For the foreseeable future, it is highly unlikely that this EU force will be used very far from Europe. Its main impact in transatlantic terms will be its facilitation of U.S. redeployment under the *U.S. Global Posture Review* process. This outcome was precisely what the U.S. aimed for all along.

**The EU Military and the Transatlantic Relationship**

The consequences of a growing EU military capacity will likely raise three issues. The first has to do with its direct effect on EU-U.S. military relations. The old adage about the United States fighting the wars and the EU “doing the dishes” has had some viability—in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, and, at least hypothetically, in Iraq—but it is not clear where this phenomenon might happen next. A huge ques-
tion raised by the re-election of President Bush is whether his team has learned any significant lessons from Iraq. Some U.S. analysts believe that the “unipolar moment” and the “neoconservative revolution” may have already run their course.\(^3\) Does a second Bush administration envisage military action in Iran, Syria, or North Korea? Regardless of the answers to these questions, the likelihood of EU forces following behind the United States in post-conflict reconstruction is minuscule. On the other hand, if a major lesson has been learned from Iraq, it is probably that the high-intensity combat entry phase and the post-combat reconstruction phase in any military operation need careful coordination before operations commence. That can only enhance whatever complementarities there might be between EU and U.S. forces. However, this issue cannot be disconnected from the problem of military capacity and interoperability. Certain European states have by no means accepted a role for their military as a simple “peace support army.” Countries like the UK and France aim to be able to fight high intensity wars alongside the Americans not only to demonstrate that they still count in international affairs, but also to avoid being relegated to what they perceive as a second division armed force. While it is possible, although awkward, for troops trained for high-intensity warfare to conduct peace-support missions, the reverse is not true. Forces only trained up to peace-support levels can forget high-intensity combat. This issue has the potential to divide the EU military forces internally but poses no challenge to the United States. Whatever the outcome, there are no signs that the advent of a “Euro-Army” will have adverse effects on the U.S. military.

The second, directly related issue has to do with the degree of civilian-military mix in the ESDP. This has always been an important part of the ESDP story—one that tends to be neglected. Since the September 2004 launch of the report *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, the issue of how the EU intends to deploy combat troops and how it will balance these with civilian instruments—police, judicial, administrative forces—has gained greater salience.\(^3\) Wherever the eventual balance is struck, it will be unlikely to be at a point that does anything other than increase the complementarity between EU and U.S. forces. Dropping smart bombs on targets is easy. Rebuilding war-ravaged nations and states is infinitely more difficult. The EU has already coordinated and refined a vast range of civilian instruments to complement its military capacity. The United States needs to make more open recognition of this.
This introduces the third issue: EU-NATO relations. Here, the picture is complicated by the Euro-Atlantic security dilemma mentioned above. As things stand today, it is hard to see where NATO might be deployed, either in the guise of the NATO Response Force or in some other form, with the unanimous blessing of its twenty-six member states. When American commitment to European security is no longer involved, but instead European commitment to U.S. global strategy, unanimity becomes even more problematic than it was during the earlier Euro-Atlantic security dilemma. Afghanistan may well be the exception that proves the rule, both because of the universal approval for the anti-Taliban and anti-Al Qaeda missions—even Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and, to some extent, the Iranians were in favor—and because of the limited mission objectives. Various analysts have projected distant scenarios for NATO intervention: Kashmir, Gaza, Darfur, and even Korea. However, none of these scenarios contains the elements of political consensus that would translate into a NATO operation. The requirements of unanimity, particularly in the current climate of friction, rule out most hypothetical scenarios.

On the other hand, the EU, which has a greater degree of internal political consensus, is emerging as a military actor. Washington should welcome this news. Militarily, the United States is heavily overstretched. In the spring of 2005, approximately 333,000 U.S. troops were deployed worldwide. With rotation, that means 1 million troops are needed, against a Congressionally mandated end-strength of 500,000. If the transatlantic alliance is to have a working future, at the very least agreement needs to be reached on a division of regional and geostrategic responsibilities. Where might the EU become involved militarily? A number of relatively ambitious current scenarios are outlined in the EU Institute for Security Studies’s European defence: A proposal for a White Paper:

- A large-scale peace support operation (30,000 troops sustainable for up to three years plus forty combat aircraft and six warships)
- A high-intensity humanitarian intervention (10,000 troops for up to one year, plus 100 aircraft and ten surface warships)
- Regional warfare in defense of strategic European interests (40,000 troops for up to one year, plus 360 aircraft, four aircraft carriers, twelve submarines, forty surface ships)
- Prevention of an attack by weapons of mass destruction (1,500 Special Operations Forces for up to three years, plus sixty combat aircraft, one aircraft carrier and ten warships).33
These are the types of operations envisaged in the framework of the original 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal force catalogue. It is unlikely that more than the humanitarian mission, for which Darfur might seem an appropriate model, would come into play within the next decade. Much more likely is the type of operation epitomized by Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003. If the battle-group format is successfully adopted, then several concurrent missions might be envisaged. In the transatlantic framework, the important question is which missions could be undertaken as EU-only and which might involve NATO forces? The latter question is more difficult to answer than the former. EU-only missions might be mounted in the Balkans to stifle resurgent unrest in localized pockets not requiring U.S. involvement; in sub-Saharan Africa, where potential scenarios are numerous and the likelihood of U.S. involvement minimal; in the Mediterranean, either to prevent civil war or to deal with a humanitarian emergency; in response to firm evidence of terrorist training activities, proliferation trafficking, or large-scale organized crime; and in unfriendly states—possibly beyond Europe’s periphery. With up to thirteen battle groups operational, it ought to be possible to envisage at least two concurrent operations without overstretching the EU forces. Deployment would be carried out with appropriate communication with the United States; however, it would not depend on a U.S. green light.

That leaves unanswered the big overlap questions, where EU and U.S. interests might both be involved: anywhere along the EU’s entire eastern border, in the Caucasus, and in the Middle East. Over the course of the next decade, the EU and the United States should work out a geostrategic division of labor that recognizes implicit responsibilities and obviates excessive bilateral iterations. Despite the EU’s aspirations to be a global actor, it is hard to foresee EU-only military activities within the 2015 timeframe anywhere in Asia. Assaults on reconstituted terrorist training camps in an Asian country would have to be conducted in tight coordination with the United States. This is certainly one potential scenario for NATO forces. Latin America is out of bounds to the EU for anything other than trade. Thus, the “global context” boils down once again to the EU’s near-abroad, which raises the immense issue of Turkey. It now seems likely that Turkey
will accede to membership of the EU some time after 2015. As such, Turkey will play a major role in, and contribute massively to, the ESDP project. This is directly in line with U.S. interests since even the staunchest U.S. realists do not believe that the United States has the resources to be a global hegemon. This is why, throughout the 1990s, the United States pleaded with Europe to get its military act together. The United States has to choose its strategic priorities and these clearly lie in Asia and in the Middle East. In the former, it can manage without the EU’s inputs, in the latter it cannot. The biggest alliance challenge for the coming decades is therefore the adoption of a comprehensive strategic partnership for the greater Middle East region.

The Future Transatlantic Agenda

A comparison of the September 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy and the December 2003 European Security Strategy reveals that there is essentially no real difference of opinion over conceivable threats. Differences are likely to arise almost exclusively over the appropriate strategy for dealing with them. This returns the debate to the current Euro-Atlantic security dilemma: how should the EU relate to U.S. grand strategy? The lessons of Iraq are clear. If the Europeans adopt several contradictory approaches to America policy, they will all prove equally ineffectual. The EU will only command the attention of a U.S. administration if it speaks with one voice. Constraints written into the EU’s Constitutional Treaty concerning the imperative of consultation before making national policy pronouncements are unlikely to be any more effective than they were in the past. Internal EU consultation needs to be permanent. The prospect of a genuinely common foreign and security policy must be at the forefront of EU diplomacy. Since November 2004 and the re-election of George W. Bush, three main issues have emerged that are likely to dominate the transatlantic agenda:

- How to return the confusing situation in Iraq to the initial objective of political and strategic stabilization. In addition to engaging a new policy toward Iraq, this will involve a fresh—potentially radical—review of relations with several Middle Eastern states. This is already occurring in Iran and is likely to happen with respect to Saudi Arabia. Such a review will demand urgent new political impetus for the Israeli-Palestinian Road Map.
How to combine the EU’s ideals of effective multilateralism with the United States’ ongoing desire for unilateral preemption of further terrorist attacks. This must involve a serious debate about the relationship between power and legitimacy, and cannot avoid confronting the issue of reforming the United Nations. It will also involve an effort to synergize both constructive engagement and coercive diplomacy with respect to regimes considered at risk, such as Iran and North Korea. One recent example of this is the U.S. policy shift in order to engage with the EU’s constructive diplomacy towards Iran.

How to create maximum synergy between the respective strengths and resources of both sides, via direct EU-U.S. bilateralism, NATO, and synchronized unilateralism. This will involve an ongoing effort to coordinate policy toward the world’s lumbering giants: China, Russia, India, Indonesia, and Brazil.

The successive charm offensives conducted in Europe by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President Bush in early 2005 appear to have opened up fresh perspectives for a new era in transatlantic cooperation. The coming discussions must be open-ended and continuous. Ideally, the exchanges will involve the establishment of a new bilateral EU-U.S. security structure facilitating permanent dialogue, open as appropriate to third parties, that subsumes rather than supersedes NATO but also offers the perspective of a genuinely global agenda. If the twenty-first century is not to become either a clash of civilizations or a descent into general chaos, the EU and the United States are condemned to working in tandem.

NOTES

1 This paper was delivered as a keynote speech at an October 2004 Anglo-Romanian Defense Seminar in Bucharest, co-sponsored by the UK Foreign Office and the Romanian Defense Ministry.

2 On the ESDP, see Jolyon Howorth and John Keeler, eds., Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy (New York: Palgrave, 2003).


5 “Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power.” John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 2.

6 Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Orga-

3 The United States traditionally found itself at odds with European nations either over European imperialism and a U.S. demand for “open door” trading policies, or over the advent, in continental Europe, of a regional hegemon such as Germany or the USSR. All those sources of conflict have been transcended historically.

4 There were frequent bouts of transatlantic blues: Suez in the 1950s; flexible response and France’s dissidence in the 1960s; the Yom Kippur War and the “Year of Europe” controversies in the 1970s; the INF crisis over intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the 1980s. None, however, proved to be unmanageable. See Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), Chapter 4.


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13 U.S. military spending, $404 billion in 2003, is the same as that of the next fourteen powers combined (Russia, China, France, Japan, the UK, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia, India, South Korea, Turkey, Australia, Israel, Spain: $408 billion).


15 In answer to a journalist’s question about the most difficult challenges facing world leaders, the former British prime minister answered: “Events, dear boy, events!”


18 Ibid.

19 For example, 77 percent in Germany, 75 percent in France, 64 percent in the UK, and 82 percent in Turkey. Large majorities also said that the Bush re-election made them feel more negative towards the American people. http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll.html.


23 Kissinger and Summers, 1.

24 Of the forty-five official members of the coalition involved in the Iraq war in 2003, only five sent combat troops. Of these, only the UK sent substantial numbers (45,000). Australia sent 2,000, Romania 278, Poland 200 and Albania 70. The remaining forty coalition partners lent essentially political support. By contrast, in the first Gulf War in 1991, allies sent or pledged more than 295,000 U.S. troops in the campaign to end the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

25 Ibid., 10.

26 In February 2005, fifty foreign policy and national security experts from both sides of the Atlantic proposed and signed the Compact Between the United States and Europe, which outlines the bases of such a partnership. http://www.brook.edu/comm/news/20050216compact.htm.


28 Such as the European Council Declaration on Transatlantic Relations of 12 December 2003.


30 Ibid.


Battle-groups are units of 1,500 troops for combat in jungle, desert, or mountain conditions, deployable within fifteen days and sustainable in the field for up to thirty days. At a meeting of the Council of Defense Ministers on November 21, 2004, it was announced that France, the UK, Italy, and Spain will each form a national battle-group. Others will be formed through the following combinations: France/Germany/Belgium/Luxembourg/Spain; France/Belgium; Germany/Netherlands/Finland; Germany/Czech Republic/Austria; Italy/Hungary/Slovenia; Italy/Spain/Greece/Portugal; Poland/Germany/Slovakia/Latvia/Lithuania; Sweden/Finland/Norway; UK/Netherlands.