Reluctant to Lead: The Lebanese Conflict and the EU's Common Security Policy

BY PATRYCJA PODRAZIK

Foreign and security policy have occupied an important place in the process of European integration since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its derivative, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which only a decade ago seemed like a distant and uncertain possibility, have produced in the last four years a remarkable array of civilian, military, and police missions in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa. All sixteen missions conducted as of fall 2006 have been EU-led, although many have been put together in cooperation with major international organizations. In this context, the backseat role that the EU chose to play during the war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 is surprising, and it raises several questions about the nature and scope of the common security project and its implications for the future.

The focus of this article is the conflict that started on July 12, 2006 when Hezbollah guerrillas raided northern Israel, kidnapping two Israeli soldiers. It rapidly degenerated into a full-scale war, with Israel bombing targets throughout southern Lebanon and beyond, including Beirut, and Hezbollah launching thousands of rockets into northern Israel. The humanitarian situation quickly became catastrophic with hundreds of civilians killed and many thousands displaced. From the point of view of the EU’s own security, as well as its interests and stated ambitions to become a global actor alongside the United States, it provided an opportunity to test the ESDP. Yet the ESDP mechanisms were not activated, and the CFSP framework produced little more than a string of carefully worded statements. An examination of possible reasons for the events that transpired will help to answer the ques-

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tion of where the ESDP stands right now and what its options for future development might be.

The Continent in Search of a New Strategy

To place this discussion in a larger perspective one needs to consider several factors that influence Europe’s strategic thinking today. The end of the Cold War produced major geopolitical shifts. Multipolarity has replaced bipolarity, and new threats such as international terrorism, failed states, and ethnic civil wars have emerged, suggesting that the theaters of future conflicts will be mainly outside Europe. Consequently, American strategic interests shifted away from the old continent. For Europe, especially the emergent EU, this change meant first and foremost a possible loss of American military support and defense guarantees. The inability of the EU to deal effectively with the bloodshed on its very doorstep in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s brought to focus another, but related, aspect of Europe’s post-Cold War strategic situation. Not only could it no longer take America’s protection for granted, but it was also unable to solve problems at or close to home. The obvious need to develop its own military muscle so it could play a serious role on the international scene led the EU to establish the CFSP as one of its three pillars following the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which established the Union in its present form. In 1998 the EU went further by launching what was to become the ESDP at the Anglo-French Summit in St. Malo, France. This new project was accompanied by concrete capacity and operability projections contained in the so-called “Headline Goal” approved at the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999. The Headline Goal specified that the EU would be able to conduct its first missions by 2003.

Since 1999 the debate about the exact nature of possible EU interventions, the type and range of missions, as well as the capabilities that would be best suited to conduct them, has been intense. In the early years, the goals were fairly modest in military terms, centering on peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue missions, human rights protection, and other relatively low-intensity “Petersberg tasks.” However, in stating that “we need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention,” the 2003 European Security Strategy indicated that the EU’s goals and ambitions were expanding beyond the limited objectives mentioned earlier.

This shift is also clear from the way EU policymakers talk about the military capabilities that the EU has been developing and already possesses. The idea of EU Battlegroups deserves particular attention here. During the 2004 review of the Headline Goal, the Europeans committed themselves to
creating thirteen 1,500-strong battalion-size forces deployable within ten days, either for stand-alone operations at the high end of the spectrum of conflict under the UN mandate, or for joint missions alongside UN peacekeeping forces. The first two Battlegroups (British and French) are to be fully operational by the first half of 2007, with partial operational capability of some of the groups already achieved in 2005-06. These objectives reflect the desire, expressed by the French and British leaders at their summit in Le Touquet in February 2003, to see the scope of the ESDP match the “world-wide ambitions” of the CFSP, in order for the EU to be more effective in promoting democracy, human rights, reform, and good governance. Consistent with this aim, the June 2006 “Presidency Report on ESDP” confidently states that “from January 2007 onwards the EU will have the Full Operational Capability to undertake two Battlegroup-sized rapid response operations, including the ability to launch two such operations nearly simultaneously.”

Indeed, the organization and conduct of missions that have taken place thus far demonstrate that the EU is developing its military muscle. For instance, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo was carried out within the framework of the ESDP as early as June-September 2003. Although the EU’s mandate was modest—its main goal was to protect the population around the town of Bunia in Ituri province, where numerous massacres had taken place in the context of violent clashes between Ugandan and Congolese armed forces—it showed that the EU was already capable of launching its own missions quickly and efficiently. As the situation in Bunia was rapidly deteriorating, France and the United Kingdom responded to the United Nations’ call for help by offering an EU force. It was put together within seven days of the Security Council Resolution 1484 (May 30, 2003) and deployed about 6,500 kilometers away in an entirely unfamiliar territory. The mission highlighted the fact that the EU forces were appropriately trained, able to communicate effectively, and could operate under a single command structure in a multinational context. In the summer of 2006 a violent conflict struck much closer to home. Surprisingly, however, none of the EU member states suggested an EU-led peacekeeping force in Lebanon, and it is worth asking why and what this absence signified.

In order to understand the EU’s apparent diffidence in Lebanon, it is also necessary to situate ESDP in the broader context of EU-US and EU-NATO relations. This involves an understanding of American reactions to ESDP. America plays a leading role in NATO, the main transatlantic security structure. It cannot, however, directly influence the course of the EU’s acquisition of greater military autonomy through the ESDP, the development of which could, theoretically, undermine that position. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the
initial American response, as exemplified by Madeleine Albright’s op-ed in the Financial Times in December 1998, was extremely nervous and centered around the fear of sidelining NATO and thus ‘decoupling’ the transatlantic security relationship.\(^9\) It took a great deal of clarification and reassurance on the part of the EU for America to accept—albeit rather unenthusiastically—the reality of the ESDP’s existence. In particular, the US has successfully insisted on the “right of first refusal” for NATO: the EU has committed itself to act when NATO as a whole chooses not to become engaged in a particular crisis.\(^10\) Yet what has given the ESDP a bigger boost among American policymakers and intellectuals than anything else has been the worsening trouble that the American-led coalition forces are experiencing in Iraq. The apparent unraveling of the whole campaign is making it clear that America needs allies who are not only capable of giving political support, but, far more importantly, concrete military aid. Therein lies the secret of the ESDP’s growing acceptance in America as a useful tool that can make tangible contributions to transatlantic security. That security still very much depends on America, not least because it owns key military assets, and as a result Washington’s opinion on this issue matters.

**A Call to Arms?**

So how would America, and the rest of the world, be able to judge whether the ESDP is just a lot of noise made by those in Europe who dislike America’s status as a superpower, or a useful tool that will make the EU a respectable and reliable strategic partner? The simplest answer is that this will become apparent based on its performance in crisis situations around the globe. Lebanon in the summer of 2006 may be considered here as a reasonable test case. With the exception of the two separate Palestinian intifadas, the Lebanese conflict was the most violent one in the Mediterranean Middle East in recent years, rapidly deteriorating into open warfare.\(^11\) Its interstate, albeit asymmetric, nature and the indirect involvement of Syria and Iran through their support for Hezbollah gave the conflict the potential to spill over and to engulf the whole region. During the rest of July and the early part of August, frantic mediations led by France and the United States took place at the UN in order to negotiate a ceasefire and put together a peace-enforcement mission on the ground. UN Resolution 1701 (2006), which ended the conflict, was approved by the Security Council on August 11 and a ceasefire took effect at 8 a.m. local time on August 14. Resolution 1701 also entrusted the peacekeeping role to an expanded and enhanced United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)—the same force that had been stationed in southern Lebanon, with little effect, since 1978.\(^12\) In this new incarnation, the UNIFIL has thus far managed to prevent a re-igniting of the hostilities that took place last summer.
Yet, in light of the EU’s development of its military potential, one might ask why Lebanon did not become the focus of a new ESDP mission? In fact, it is possible to argue that there were compelling reasons why the EU should have logically undertaken, or at the very least considered, its own mission in Lebanon with a UN mandate in hand when the hostilities began. The characteristics of and the conditions accompanying the conflict made it a perfect example of the kind of crisis for which the EU has been preparing itself, with a great deal of publicity and rhetoric, for nearly a decade through the ESDP.

The Lebanese crisis reflected the paradigm of a modern violent conflict in that it combined a mix of ethnic, intrastate, and interstate warfare, with a religious component, a failing state, and the presence of a non-state actor. The war also took place in Europe’s neighborhood and one of the world’s most volatile regions. The 2003 European Security Strategy, which can be seen as a roadmap for ESDP, states that, “It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed…Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict [and] weak states…pose problems for Europe.” The confrontation also exemplified the type of situation in which NATO’s involvement was strategically highly undesirable because of the Arab countries’ perception of America’s bias towards Israel. Thus the number of viable candidates to lead the peacekeeping operation was limited from the start.

Furthermore, as a peacekeeping mission, the task was going to be of a traditional type: it would not require special forces, sophisticated communications, or specialized high-tech equipment. In addition, a Security Council resolution was firmly in place within a month of the outbreak of the war. As already suggested, the EU’s official strategy documents emphasize many of these characteristics when discussing the nature of contemporary conflicts and therefore the challenges that the ESDP faces. In fact, the following passage from the European Defense Agency’s 2006 “Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defense Capability and Capacity Needs” reads almost exactly like a description of the Lebanese conflict:

The Headline Goal and European Security Strategy envisage a broad and significantly challenging set of potential missions. These include separation of warring factions by force…. They may also encompass stabilizing operations...
in a failed state in the face of a determined and capable asymmetric threat. So the demands of today’s ESDP are already potentially deep and comprehensive.\textsuperscript{15}

With this in mind it is time to ask: what did Europe do in Lebanon last summer? On one level, the EU and select EU member-states engaged in a significant diplomatic effort. However, the above distinction, odd as it seems, is thoroughly warranted. Within hours of the outbreak of hostilities, the EU High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, issued a joint statement with the UK’s Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, expressing their concern about the deterioration of the situation and its implications for the security of the region. They called on both sides to cease the hostilities and affirmed that Mr. Solana had been in contact with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.\textsuperscript{16} Throughout the crisis, Solana, as well as other top EU officials in charge of External Affairs, made numerous trips to the region, meeting with both Israeli and Lebanese leaders.

**Imagined Community, Fragmented Policy**

Yet a closer analysis of Europe’s diplomatic activities last summer reveals that under this surface of unity, there were considerable policy differences among key players, especially France and the United Kingdom, but also Germany. Concurrently with the High Representative’s efforts, they were also conducting diplomatic work on their own behalf based on significantly different visions of how the conflict should be ended. The most divisive issue, and at the same time one of the fundamental ones, was whether or not to call for an immediate ceasefire. France, the former colonial power in Lebanon, maintains a special relationship with that state and considers itself, in a sense, the country’s protector. President Jacques Chirac made a televised address to the nation on July 14 calling for a halt to all Israeli military operations with a view toward protecting Lebanon and its territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{17} French diplomacy swiftly took a leading role at the UN, pushing for an immediate ceasefire and a peacekeeping force, but it did not suggest that the operation be conducted as an EU mission. France was also the most vocal country to call for a condemnation of Israel for its “disproportionate” reaction and for the humanitarian catastrophe that its bombing campaign was causing.\textsuperscript{18}

Official condemnation of Israel was politically impossible in more than one EU state. The UK, traditionally torn between Europe and its transatlantic instincts, found itself backing the United States again, and the United States had ruled out such a condemnation from the outset. Many media commentators at the time suggested that the United States was giving Israel tacit approval
for “fighting out” that war and destroying Hezbollah, an organization that is included on the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. A condemnation and an immediate and unconditional ceasefire would have required Israel’s acceptance of widespread allegations that it had overreacted in its response to the Hezbollah provocation. In other words, it would have meant that Israel was wrong to have escalated the conflict by bombing southern Lebanon in the first place, and that it should step back. It would have thus humiliated one of the mightiest and proudest armies in the world by equating it, in effect, with the guerrilla force that it was fighting. Germany, for reasons of its Nazi past, initially opted to stay out of any political or military involvement, but it ultimately took the same stance as Britain and against the position of the majority of EU member states, with the exception of several Central and Eastern European countries.

Against the backdrop of the Franco-British differences on the question of an immediate ceasefire and the condemnation of Israel, Italy was quietly conducting its own work. It started off, unsuccessfully, with “phone diplomacy,” whereby Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi called his Lebanese counterpart, Fouad Siniora, in order to convey to him Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire. These conditions included a return of the kidnapped soldiers, Hezbollah’s retreat north of the Litani River, and an immediate deployment of the Lebanese Army in southern Lebanon. It was ultimately rejected because the Lebanese government could not openly take what would have amounted to an anti-Hezbollah stance without risking a re-ignition of the civil war that devastated Lebanon between 1975 and 1990. Subsequently, Italy organized an international conference of the “Core Group on Lebanon” which included the UN, the United States, Lebanon, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the World Bank. Participants of the conference, which took place in Rome on July 26, called for a UN-mandated international force to be sent to the region. Italy never suggested that the EU lead the force.

It took another two weeks of intense negotiations at the UN to decide on a ceasefire resolution acceptable to the major powers and to the parties involved in the conflict. During that time, the issue of leadership of the peacekeeping force was hotly debated. Throughout the war both the UN and NATO were considered as possible leaders of a peacekeeping mission, with various parties occasionally ruling out one or the other, only to reconsider them later. For example, UN leadership was at some point dismissed by Israel and the United States, while NATO’s involvement, though welcomed by Israel, was rejected by France and Germany, though later Germany reconsidered its stance. The EU’s candidacy was briefly floated by the Finnish Foreign Minister, Erkki Tuomiojaa, representing the Presidency of the EU for the second half of 2006, but his suggestion was never seriously considered. To
complete the picture, it may be worth noting Germany’s ambivalence when it came to pledging troops to the peacekeeping force. Angela Merkel’s government started by explicitly ruling out this possibility in the face of deeply divided public opinion in Germany over whether it was right for its troops to deploy anywhere near Israel’s borders. Over the course of several weeks, the government’s position softened, but it did so more because of an official Israeli request for participation than a desire to see greater policy coordination within the EU camp. In the end, eight German warships were sent to the eastern Mediterranean to patrol Lebanese waters and to prevent arms smuggling, while staying comfortably off the coast of Israel.

Clearly, politics, as well as the historical legacies of colonialism and World War II, played a role in the Lebanese conflict of 2006. Britain’s traditional alliance with America prevented it from pushing for an immediate ceasefire, while that was exactly what France demanded from the beginning on account of its special relationship with Lebanon. Furthermore, the historical guilt felt towards Israel put Germany in an uncomfortable position of reluctantly backing Britain against the position of France—normally its key continental ally—while trying to remain neutral until Israel asked for its involvement. Such factors dictated the policies in each of these major EU states and appeared to pull them in different directions, although they all shared the same goal of extinguishing the conflict raging in their neighborhood.

These difficulties in forging a common approach are, nevertheless, surprising since over the last seven years the attitude of EU leaders and top officials in charge of the ESDP has been assertive and enthusiastic. With respect to the war in Lebanon, all EU states agreed that it had to be brought rapidly to an end to prevent the region’s further destabilization and massive civilian suffering. Moreover, a lack of military capacity does not appear to have been a problem: it had taken only one week to mobilize and deploy 2,200 EU troops in Congo in 2003; some of the Battlegroups are already partially operational; and most importantly, the EU is providing half of the total number of troops for the new UNIFIL (7,000). Furthermore, an EU-led mission in Lebanon under the UN mandate would have had a great public relations effect, providing enormous boost to the EU’s reputation as a serious global security actor. All things considered, it would have been technically possible and definitely politically advantageous to send a force under the aegis of ESDP.

**Farewell to Arms?**

What prevented the EU from taking a leadership role in the peacekeeping mission in Lebanon? The CFSP framework has proven effective in many areas,
especially in trade negotiations. Clearly, however, it proved insufficient in helping the EU to speak with a single voice on the best way to resolve the Lebanese conflict. Having discounted insufficient military capacity as a factor, three other hypotheses seem plausible. One could be that the UN was the most appropriate choice to lead such a mission, due to its legacy of peacekeeping operations dating back to the mid-1950s. Indeed, the new UNIFIL seems to be performing reasonably well, especially when contrasted with the record of its predecessor. But this idea raises further questions of whether a robust ESDP is in fact what Europe, and the rest of the world, needs. Is there a place in the international system for two separate international organizations with an overlapping set of goals? If nothing else, serious calculations need to be made to decide whether an ever more ambitious ESDP capacity is indeed the most efficient use of manpower and material assets. From this point of view, it may turn out more advantageous for the EU to reconsider the scale of the ESDP and focus on specializing in lower-end tasks, such as civilian crisis management, including border assistance, law missions, police training, or post-conflict nation-building, while enhancing the UN’s capacities in the area of peacekeeping operations at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. Although this approach sounds reasonable, it has to be balanced against the reality of contemporary threats, such as international terrorism, which call for a robust ESDP as well as security autonomy, and provide an argument against specialization in softer tasks and against reducing the EU to the role of troop-supplier to the UN.

A second explanation for EU reluctance may be that a mission such as the one in Lebanon could not easily be “sold” to the European public. With a relatively recent history of catastrophic conflicts on their own soil, some Europeans are understandably uneasy about seeing their armed forces becoming involved in situations where there is a potential for sustained fighting and for serious casualties. The “Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defense Capability and Capacity Needs” recognizes this problem. It also adds that “societies increasingly concerned for internal security and social cohesion may be even more hesitant to undertake potentially controversial interventions abroad,” thereby acknowledging the growing domestic political clout of immigrant populations in Europe, many of them with roots in the Middle East. And although individual EU states have participated in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, it was against the preferences of the majority of their domestic constituencies.

Third, and perhaps most crucially, historical ties to the region as well as certain contemporary political calculations may have gotten in the way. The United Kingdom and France, the most powerful duet in the EU, could not
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agree on whether to call for an immediate ceasefire or whether to condemn Israel. Furthermore, it is clear that major EU states were guided in their action—or inaction—by obligations or fears that stemmed from their historical relationships with the parties involved. This applied particularly to France and Germany, which, along with the United Kingdom, are key decision-makers in the EU. If totalitarian past or colonial legacy make it politically difficult for the Europeans to send their troops where they may have to confront their former colonial subjects or genocide victims, then this will essentially exclude most of the Middle East from a viable ESDP military mission. At the same time, it is true that European troops have played a significant role in both Iraq and Afghanistan. However, one needs to notice that those military operations were conducted under the umbrella of the United States or NATO.31

Thus the role of historical legacies needs to be qualified. It appears that history not so much prevents the EU from undertaking certain missions as it makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the EU to lead them. At the same time, the capacity for autonomous action is the key issue that EU security and strategy documents strongly underscore. If that goal cannot be fulfilled, and the EU needs to concentrate on “softer” tasks, then the whole elaborate system of advanced communications, interoperability, rapid reaction mechanisms, and the ability to “quickly move strategic distances and enter directly into the theater of operations” will become somewhat redundant.32 If last summer’s events in Lebanon revealed once again how effective the European powers can be as multilateral negotiators, they also pointed to important current limitations of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Perhaps, though, the question should be posited differently: not what the EU should have done, but rather what it was realistic to expect, and what this means for the future. After all, factors such as history, politics, and public opinion, as well as the fact that the UN platform is the natural choice for handling sensitive conflicts, are really nothing new in global crisis management. It seems, however, that somewhere along the way from the small town of St. Malo, where the ESDP was born, political realities and historical legacies became lost amid the hype of the constantly updated and increasingly more ambitious Headline Goals, Force Catalogues, and Capabilities Commitment Conferences.

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POLITICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEND A FORCE UNDER THE AEGIS OF ESDP.
In the end, however, what has to be kept in mind is that the ESDP is still a work in progress, and the war in Lebanon was just one, albeit significant, test case. There are reasons for optimism: there are no fundamental strategic differences among EU members, and on many security and defense issues they are closer today than they were ten or fifteen years ago. Therefore, one cannot exclude the possibility that, at some point in the future, the EU will become comfortable launching its own autonomous military missions with a mandate to engage in high-intensity combat whenever a grave crisis arises in the Middle East. But it is also difficult to escape the impression that the Lebanese crisis exposed important limitations of the ESDP in terms of what can currently be expected. It seems that for all the apparent progress on CFSP/ESDP in the last decade, the EU still plays little more than a supporting role to the UN when it comes to global crisis management. Moreover, until it is able to speak with a single voice on controversial security issues, it cannot hope to become a global security actor and partner to the United States. It would be for the benefit and safety of EU citizens if the former were the case. However, if the lack of leadership in dealing with the Lebanese conflict is indicative of a permanent ceiling, then the EU will need to reconsider its ambitions, rhetoric, and, most importantly, the allocation of the resources that it is spending on the ESDP.

NOTES

1 Mainly the UN, but also NATO, African Union (AU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2 Here, I assume Europe as a continent since, in theory at least, it will all become EU at some future point. Given the fact that there is little chance of a failed state or an ethnic war breaking out within the EU, as it enlarges that will be true for more and more of Europe as we understand it geographically.
13 As of summer 2006 Lebanon could be defined as a failing state because its government did not have a monopoly on power within its borders: the Hezbollah militia acted outside of the government's control, and it was supported by outside actors such as Syria and very likely Iran.
18 Ibid. This was also reported in Le Monde “Jacques Chirac déplore que l’Europe ait été trop absente de la crise libanaise,” 29 August 2006. French-proposed references to the disproportionate use of force by Israel also appear in several EU press releases; for example “Presidency Statement on the Recent Developments in Israel and Lebanon,” European Union General Affairs and External Relations Council, 13 July 2006.
19 See, for example, The Economist, “Ending will be harder: Crisis in the Middle East; The crisis in Lebanon, Israel and Palestine,” 22 July 2006; and The Economist, “Stuck in Lebanon: Israel and Lebanon,” 29 July 2006. For a list of US State Department foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) see http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm.
21 Here a question arises about the capacity in which Italy undertook the organization of the conference. On the one hand, EU was of course represented, and by no less than three high-level officials: Javier Solana as the High Representative for CFSP; Benita Ferrero-Waldner as the External Affairs Commissioner, and the Foreign Minister of Finland Erkki Tuomiojaa representing the Presidency of the EU for the second half of 2006. At the same time, in all the declarations and background documents available on the Italian Foreign Ministry website, the EU is listed as one of many participants, and nowhere near the top of the list. In fact, in the section on the “multilateral organizations involved” it finds itself inserted between the UN and the World Bank, and after a long list of individual states, many of which are EU members (Italy, Germany, France, UK, Cyprus, and Greece). Similarly, the final declaration of the conference does not make any reference to the EU. It appears, therefore, that Italy did not organize the conference in the capacity of an EU member state, but rather on its own behalf. See, for example, “Conferenza internazionale per il Libano, Roma 26 luglio 2006. Elenco dei partecipanti,” Governo Italiano. http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma/Dossier/conferenza_libano/partecipanti.html; and “Dichiarazione congiunta finale,” Governo Italiano. http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma/Dossier/conferenza_libano/index.html.
23 “UN and EU prepare to step in; World leaders discuss new peacekeeping force; Israel says no,” International Herald Tribune, 18 July 2006. Poland’s main daily Gazeta Wyborcza reported extensively on the various projects for the leadership of the peacekeeping force. See, for example, Gazeta Wyborcza, “Izrael zaprasza NATO,” 24 July 2006; Condie chce rozjemu w Libanie,” 25 July 2006; and “Niemcy negocjują na Bliskim Wschodzie,” 27 July 2006.
26 Jürg Monar, “Institutional Constraints of the European Union’s Middle Eastern and North African Policy,” Sven Behrendt and Christian-Peter Hanelt, eds., Bound to Cooperate: Europe and the Middle East, (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 2000), 209-243. The EU’s common foreign security mechanisms have also been effectively used in rather minor political moves, such as banning the members of Belarusian President Lukashenko’s encouragement from traveling to the EU (April 2006).
27 That legacy, however, is far from stellar. Not only was the first UNIFIL mission a failure (see endnote 27), but the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia in 1992-1995 (UNPROFOR) has been widely criticized as deeply flawed. See, for example, Rosalyn Higgins, “The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia,” International Affairs 69:3 (1993): 468-469.
29 Clearly, civilian crisis management needs to include a military component, as well, but not as robust and specialized as high-end conflict management which may require the use of force to separate the warring factions; see
endnote 15. Law missions, also referred to as “rule of law missions,” are a type of civilian mission that aims to train judges, and investigate magistrates, senior police officials, and penitentiary officers in countries experiencing difficulties with revamping their criminal justice systems. They include an introduction of EU human rights standards, as well as monitoring and mentoring. Examples of recent law missions conducted by the EU include EUJUST Themis in the former Soviet republic of Georgia, as well as EUJUST-LEX in Iraq.


31 Africa, of course, is another continent that had been heavily colonized by the Europeans. However, from a rather cynical point of view, one could argue that Africa, with its myriad conflicts and wars too complex for most people to understand, is an easier—or at least less controversial—place in which to become militarily involved. Most Europeans likely never heard of operation Artemis in Congo, while the war in Lebanon was the focus of intense media coverage from day one.