Going Legit: Qaddafi's Neo-Institutionalism

By Dr. Dafna Hochman

This year, Libya finally achieved a decade-long goal—the chairmanship of the African Union. Since its détente with the West in 2003, Libya has sought a series of institutional leadership posts: Libya is representing Africa on the UN Security Council through the end of 2009 and reportedly will be elected president of the 64th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2009. Libya also chaired the 2003 session of the UN Commission on Human Rights. In its own neighborhood, Libya has emerged as a champion of regional organizations, including the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which it leads.

Though his foreign policy has pivoted numerous times in forty years as Libya’s head of state, Muammar Qaddafi’s twenty-first century zeal for international and regional institutions is a particularly paradoxical reversal. For decades, many of these organizations condemned Libya’s international behavior. Qaddafi in turn denounced them as constructs designed to bring down the developing world. Since Qaddafi overthrew the pro-Western king in 1969, Libya’s foreign policies have been notoriously dramatic. Whether he was supporting terrorism and revolutionaries in the 1970s and 1980s or seeking and then dismantling a fledgling WMD arsenal in the 1990s through 2003, Qaddafi’s idiosyncrasies and delusions of grandeur often appear to be the only common characteristic. Nonetheless, Qaddafi’s recent embrace of institutionalism should not be dismissed as simply the latest whim of a mercurial leader. To Qaddafi, institutions now offer what the promise of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal and support for international terrorism once did—regional leverage and international prestige. Qaddafi’s current embrace of institutions is likely genuine. As the former target of an exceptionally unified campaign of global condemnation, Qaddafi learned first-hand that multilateral cooperation around institutions such as UN Sanctions can exact a price.

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International relations scholars have spilled much ink debating whether institutions—sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should coexist and compete with each other—forge global cooperation.² Do they change the behavior of their member states by reshaping interests, or are they simply epiphenomenal, reflections of the extant power relationships among the states? Champions of institutions argue that such bodies, whether the European Union, the WTO, or anti-land mine treaties, provide a means for states to communicate, enforce agreements, build up their reputations, and link one issue area to another.³ Critics of institutions are skeptical about their ability to change basic state interests, and instead dismiss institutions as codifying existing power structures. Yet Libya’s recent preoccupation with institutions, especially regional ones, suggests that they also serve purposes unanticipated by either institutionalists or their critics. Rather than enable the accrual of military or economic power, institutions might also satisfy non-material state interests. Because they appeal to states’ desire for regional leadership, institutions channel nationalist and prestige-based ambitions with relatively few security costs. Therefore, Qaddafi’s recent interest in leading institutions, rather than pursuing a more dangerous course, can inform policymaking toward current pariah states. Like Libya, the rehabilitation of Iran and North Korea will most likely occur absent sudden regime change. Decision-makers confronting these states’ transformations might consider the role of institutions in satisfying rogue ambitions of nationalism, regional leverage, and prestige.

From Global Pariah to Rehabilitated Rogue

The 1985 hit Back to the Future begins with a zany inventor named “Doc” dodging Libyan hit men after he has sold them an ersatz plutonium device. Though the vilification of Libya in American popular culture now seems quaint, in the 1980s Libya was considered a dangerous international sponsor of terrorism. Muammar Qaddafi was “the mad dog of the Middle East,” at least according to Ronald Reagan.⁴ At home, Qaddafi oversaw an economic and political revolution. Abroad, he supported terrorist, separatist, and anti-colonial movements ranging from the Red Army Faction to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command to the Irish Republic Army. Libyan-trained fighters also led brutal rebel movements across Africa, from Sierra Leone to Liberia.⁵ These foreign policies derived from Qaddafi’s ideological commitments—first to an Arab nationalism suffused with quasi-Marxist motifs and later to an anti-Westernism focused on African liberation—as well as his self-image as the revolutionary leader of the post-colonial Arab and African states.
Terrorism sponsored by Libya grew increasingly lethal. In 1986, Libyan government agents exploded a bomb in a West Berlin discotheque frequented by American GIs, killing two and injuring over 80 others. On December 21, 1988, a bomb exploded on Pan Am Flight 103 en route from London to New York, killing all 259 passengers and crew on board and another eleven people in the town of Lockerbie in Scotland. Lockerbie represented the most deadly terrorist attack perpetrated against American civilians in history before 9/11. The next year, a mid-air explosion on a French UTA flight over Niger killed 171 passengers and crew. Libyan intelligence agents were accused of direct roles in both airline bombings, triggering international condemnation and prompting the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the early 1990s to enforce strict multilateral sanctions against Libya. Between 1992 and 1993, the UNSC passed three resolutions calling on Libya to extradite two Lockerbie suspects, banning Libyan aircraft flights and the sale of oil equipment to Libya, and placing a limited freeze on Libyan foreign assets. Full compliance with these resolutions also called for Libya to end its support of global terrorism, accept responsibility for the acts of Libyan officials, and compensate the families of the victims of the Lockerbie and UTA bombings. For a few short years in the early 1990s, the multilateral sanctions imposed by the UN against Libya were the most successful sanctions regime in modern history, largely because they were enforced by a rare global consensus.

By the late 1990s, plagued by a failing economy and increasingly isolated, Qaddafi agreed to comply with the UNSC resolutions in order to lift the punishing sanctions. In 1999, Libya surrendered two Lockerbie suspects to The Hague, and in 2002 Scottish judges found one of the Libyan defendants guilty. Continuing to proclaim his innocence, Qaddafi agreed to accept responsibility for Lockerbie in accordance with a carefully worded but vague script. In August 2003, the United States and United Kingdom agreed to permanently lift UN sanctions. Ending his support for terrorist groups, Qaddafi announced that the new century called for “new methods” of revolution. He promised to continue championing the cause of African independence as a “soldier for Africa.” (By this point, Qaddafi had given up on the Arab world, disenchanted with most Arab leaders and disappointed that they had not contested the UN sanctions against Tripoli.)

During the late 1990s through 2003, even as Qaddafi was negotiating with the West to lift the UN sanctions, he also expressed interest in putting Libya’s
non-conventional weapons programs on the table. He realized that full bi-
lateral ties with the United States - and the subsequent investment by U.S.
companies in the Libyan oil sector - would not resume while Libya possessed
WMD and the means to deliver them. Then, in October 2003, Libya was caught
red-handed when a Tripoli-bound boat was intercepted carrying thousands
of centrifuge parts necessary for uranium enrichment and manufactured by
the A.Q. Khan network. In December 2003 Qaddafi announced that he would destroy his
nuclear and chemical weapons and welcome international inspectors. This reversal has been
attributed to a combination of factors: Libya’s failing economy, the new economic pressures
of globalization, the domestic challenge from a cadre of elite technocrats and security con-
cerns related to Islamist groups within Libya. Qaddafi also recognized that despite decades
procuring non-conventional weapons material, Libya’s arsenal would never amount to much
absent sufficient technical know-how. After

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9/11, Qaddafi almost immediately offered himself as a reliable counter-terrorism partner to the U.S. and Europe. He was interested in counter-terrorism support to fight alleged Islamic extremist activity (i.e. his domestic opponents) although the threat was less serious than he initially contended. Libya’s voluntary dismantling of its WMD, its willingness to settle claims with the victims of its state-sponsored terrorism, and mend ties with the West—all while Qaddafi and his clique remained in power—was an unprecedented moment in modern international politics. A once-dangerous state had embarked on a grand strategy shift without any change of regime. Yet despite Libya’s 2003 WMD reversal, an ambitious leader remained in power. He was still determined to assume the mantle of leadership within the developing world.

Institutions Enthusiast

While Libya’s détente with the West was dramatic, even more unexpected has
been Qaddafi’s intensive efforts since 2003 to champion and seek leadership
roles in the multilateral institutions that once sustained his isolation. Even as
he renounced Libya’s non-conventional weapons in December 2003, Qaddafi
advocated the benefits of multilateral cooperation. Qaddafi urged his neigh-
bors to abide by international proliferation treaties such as the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic
Energy Agency, and the Convention on Biological Weapons. Clearly, such
strong normative beliefs had not been as salient during the 1970s and 1980s,
when Libya consistently violated its NPT obligations.
In addition to extolling the virtues of international treaties to his neighbors, since 2003, Qaddafi has shown enthusiasm for international and regional institutions. They have offered Qaddafi a soapbox from which he can hold forth on his political agenda as well as an outlet for his leadership ambitions. Ironically, Qaddafi now embraces many of the same organizations that he once denounced as part of the post-colonial infrastructure employed for purposes of subjugation by the West. Libya’s determination to serve on the UNSC is particularly ironic, given that this same body roundly condemned Libya for over ten years and imposed punitive sanctions on Tripoli said to cost Libya over $30 billion in oil revenue. Libya won the African caucus nomination to the rotating African seat the UNSC after allegedly paying off its neighbors—foreign assistance for some and Mig 23 aircrafts for others. Moreover, because of a system of rotating leadership among the 15 member states of the UNSC, determined alphabetically, in early 2007 Libya served as the UNSC president. Libya’s interest in representing Africa on the UNSC derived both from the triumphant symbolism of the position and a sense of entitlement. According to Giadallah Ettalhi, the Libyan ambassador to the UN, Libya “deserved” its seat on the UNSC. Serving on the UNSC, he said:

“...is very important and very significant... For us, you know, for a country that was for a decade under the sanctions of the Security Council... It means that we are back to normal, at least from the perspective of the others. We have considered ourselves always in the right way, but this is very, very important for us.”

Foreign Minister Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalghem attributed Libya’s selection to represent Africa on the UNSC to its WMD reversal, its role as mediator in several African conflicts, and Qaddafi’s “influence.”

Even before Libya had won a seat on the UNSC—and only months after the UN sanctions were formally lifted—it petitioned the UN’s Africa bloc to nominate it to the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), which has since been reconstituted as the UN Human Rights Council. Libya, a one-party state with no formal constitution or independent judiciary, holds political trials in secret, with no due process. According to Amnesty International, Libyan officials arbitrarily arrest and torture hundreds of political prisoners and have abducted and then assassinated political dissidents in exile. Yet despite its domestic record, Libya sought to chair the body investigating and condemning global human rights abuses. Though the United States and other Western states resisted Libya’s chairmanship of the UNCHR, calling for an unprecedented roll-call vote, Libya prevailed. The Libyan representative to the UNCHR called her country’s chairmanship a “deserved reward” for its policies at home and abroad. The Qaddafi regime greeted the victory as a vindication of Libya’s attempts to rehabilitate itself internationally. According to the Libyan Foreign
Ministry, the victory at the UNCHR proved global “recognition that Libya has a clean sheet with regard to human rights.”

A number of African states allegedly masterminded Libya’s selection for the UNCHR chairmanship, after heavy lobbying by Qaddafi. It is widely suspected that many African states voted for Libya as their regional candidate as a quid pro quo, after Libya pledged to finance the newly created African Union, which had been proposed in 2002 to replace the Organization of African Unity. For nearly a decade, Libya had set its sights on leading the African Union toward a “United States of Africa,” with a single African military, currency, and passport. The notion provokes mixed reactions among Libya’s neighbors. In February 2009, Qaddafi fulfilled a long-held aspiration when Libya was elected (with some dissent) to lead the African Union, a rotating position held by heads of state for one year. The chairmanship enables some influence over the continent’s politics, but it carries no real power. Yet Qaddafi seized on the symbolism, sparing no frills during his characteristically flamboyant inauguration. He attended the session dressed in a gold-embroidered green robe and flanked by “traditional kings of Africa,” seven extravagantly dressed men carrying four foot gold staffs.

In addition to promoting the idea of an unified African federation to enhance the continent’s global power, Qaddafi has used his platform at the AU to promote his own political views. For example, in March 2009, in a speech shortly after assuming the chairmanship, he diagnosed Africa’s most serious dilemma: multiparty democracy. Because African societies are based on tribal structures, Qaddafi argued that democratic multiparty elections lead to bloodshed. Instead, a system like Libya’s, where parties are banned, would be more suitable for African states. Qaddafi has also used his soapbox to argue for the inclusion of Caribbean islands such as Haiti and Jamaica in the AU, as a “bridge between Africa and Latin America.” He has excused the Somali pirates seizing vessels in the Gulf of Aden, claiming that they are simply “hitting back” against countries stealing maritime wealth from the region’s waters.

Within Africa, Qaddafi has shown a great interest in sub-regional organizations, establishing the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in Tripoli in 1998. CEN-SAD now includes a medley of Maghreb, Sahelian, and Saharan states. It is unclear to what extent such disparate states constitute an African “sub-region,” but they all seem to benefit from Libyan patronage. In 2003, a week before a CEN-SAD meeting, Libya pledged to invest $100 million in “micro-development projects” in Niger and in August 2002, Sudan was granted a $25 million loan from the African Bank for Development and Commerce through
CEN-SAD. Unlike other regional organizations or the African Union, CEN-SAD makes no claim to uphold human rights, democracy, or good governance (and often broadcasts support for regional leaders in breach of these principles). In March 2002, Qaddafi spoke out against “the blatant interference of foreign powers in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs under the guise of election monitoring” and hailed “the bold position of African delegations in favor of Zimbabwe.”

When the Scottish Court in the Netherlands upheld its verdict regarding the complicity of Libyan Abdel Basset al-Megrahi in the Lockerbie bombing, CEN-SAD issued a statement “rejecting the unfair hearing” and calling for the “release of the political hostage.” In short, CEN-SAD has thus far provided Qaddafi a platform for articulating his anti-colonialist (and often anti-Western) views and defending Libya’s foreign policy interests and ideology.

Finally, Libya has also shown interest in trade institutions, most notably when it submitted an application to join the World Trade Organization. In 2004, the WTO gave Libya the green light to begin accession talks with several member states. In 2007, France and Libya signed a memorandum outlining nuclear energy cooperation and the construction of a nuclear desalination plant in Libya. Qaddafi is still wary of trade treaties that he believes to be pro-Western, such as Sarkozy’s recently-reinvigorated Mediterranean Union commercial and trade compact. Qaddafi announced that Libya would withdraw from the Union because it imposed “humiliating” neo-colonialism on French terms, aiming to divide the African and Arab states.

Why Institutions?

What explains Qaddafi’s recent institutionalism? Africanists and Middle East regionalists often dismiss Tripoli’s foreign policy as the unreliable product of a mercurial and megalomaniacal president. To many, Libya’s international policies over the past forty years derive simply from the whims of its leader, rather than from rational state decision-making. Yet Libya is not unique in this regard. Historically, most states with erratic foreign policies have similarly “irrational” men at their helm, whether North Korea’s Kim Jong Il, Cuba’s Castro brothers, or Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Assessing only the military or economic interests of these states inadequately explains their leaders’ behavior. In this regard, Libya’s foreign policies, rather than being sui generis, resemble those of other pariah states, where charismatic leaders with inscrutable perceptions (and misperceptions) of international affairs make unpredictable policies. Foreign policy irrationality or inconsistency, therefore, is not a reason to eschew an analysis of Libyan statecraft.

Libya analysts have also emphasized Qaddafi’s recent interest in succession, particularly his concern for the stability and legitimacy of his regime when power inevitably transfers to one or both of his sons, Al-Mu’tassim Qaddafi.
and Seif el-Islam Qaddafi. The anticipation of succession likely contributed to Qaddafi’s decision to mend ties with the West—settling the fiduciary claims of the Lockerbie, La Belle disco, and UTA victims’ families and dismantling non-conventional weapons programs in exchange for the resumption of international economic and commercial ties. Seif, the Western-educated younger son, is said to have played a key role in convincing his father to normalize ties with the West by resolving these decade-long disputes. Concerns about the future of Libya’s economy might have also contributed to Qaddafi’s willingness, for the first time in three decades, to allow the cadre of technocrats in Tripoli to experiment with neo-liberal economic reforms from 2003-2006—an experiment that has been purportedly since been aborted or at least slowed. Seif, who is a well-known figure in Europe, was allegedly a proponent of the economic reforms and is a key actor in the current oil contracts Libya is negotiating with France and Russia. Yet Qaddafi’s sons have been noticeably absent from their father’s side at the UN and at the African Union meetings and official visits. Seif and his brothers do not seem to share their father’s ardor for institutions. Moreover, unlike improved political and economic ties with the West, institutions are less likely to protect Qaddafi’s successor from the domestic challenge sure to emerge after a transfer of power.

Qaddafi’s interest in institutions, therefore, is not simply the classic tale of a mafia-style father consumed by his legacy, wanting nothing more than to ensure that his sons can live a crime-free life. Nor is it the product of his sons’ (and putative successors’) worldview or a desire for a smooth succession. Instead, Qaddafi’s institutional zeal likely derives from two interconnected ambitions: his interest in serving as a power-broker within Africa and his quest for prestige.

The first ambition confirms the suspicion of those who argue that the UN, African Union, WTO, and other institutions are susceptible to exploitation by their most powerful (and persistent) members to serve national interests. Regional institutions within Africa and the UN Africa grouping indeed reflect the power relationships of the member states. Libya’s rise to leadership positions within the African regional institutions, and the frequency with which it has been nominated by other African states to represent the continent at the UN, are largely due to its disproportionate economic clout, thanks to oil revenue estimated to have reached $40 billion annually in 2008, showered generously in the form of foreign assistance to neighboring states. Such economic leverage enabled Libya’s chairmanship of the AU, an organization that has long received steady material support from Tripoli.
Therefore, as the cynics might predict, Qaddafi first views institutions as a means to expand regional power. Yet this power is not a simple economic or military calculation, but rather the ability to intervene in the domestic affairs of his neighbors to suit his political ends. Since Qaddafi fell out of favor with the Arab League in the late 1990s, he has looked toward Africa as his regional base.\(^4^4\) Today, Qaddafi believes that he can champion the cause of pan-African unity and play kingmaker, whether with regard to the region’s deadly conflicts in Darfur or in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in domestic standoffs such as those paralyzing Mauritania and Somalia, or in decades-long international disputes such as that over the Western Sahara or between Chad and Sudan.

Qaddafi is quick to criticize Western attempts at “imposing non-local solutions” by intervening in African conflicts. In response to what he calls the West’s “insolent policies,” Qaddafi has said: “We tell them: ‘Stop, do not intervene in African affairs. Africa is capable of solving its problems by itself. Your intervention will make these problems more complicated.’”\(^4^5\) Nonetheless, Qaddafi has used his chairmanship of the African Union to do just that—to intervene. To Qaddafi, regional power involves influencing the outcomes of domestic neighboring conflicts, largely to ensure friendly neighboring regimes that will do his bidding.

The second ambition generating Qaddafi’s interest in institutions involves the more abstract—yet real—drive for prestige and status, exacerbated by years of international condemnation and isolation. These goals are not traditionally considered when assessing national interest. Yet the quest for prestige has long driven Libyan foreign policy decisions. For example, the status endowed to states with nuclear weapons in part explains why Libya spent a considerable sum of money on off-the-shelf nuclear materials, even though it did not have the technical capacity to use them.\(^4^6\) In 2004, Qaddafi acknowledged that the “political motives” for pursuing nuclear weapons were more important to him than military concerns.\(^4^7\) In the 1970s and 1980s, Qaddafi imagined himself the putative leader of the revolutionary, anti-colonial bloc, rallying Arabs, Africans, and others subject to “Western aggression.” Yet the revolution (and its adherents) soon dissipated. To add to the insult, he watched other once-revolutionaries such as Nelson Mandela and Yasser Arafat feted at the White House in the 1990s, receiving global approbation for their national liberation movements. He was left an ambitious leader without a cause or following, and his prestige suffered.

Even today, Qaddafi’s self-image has not diminished. In March he stormed out of a meeting with Arab leaders, after being interrupted by the emir of Qatar. He proclaimed: “I am an international leader, the dean of the Arab rulers, the
king of kings of Africa and the imam [leader] of Muslims, and my international status does not allow me to descend to a lower level.”

That Qaddafi now sees institutions as a source of power and prestige is on one hand ironic, given that he (and fellow revolutionaries from the 1960s and 1970s) rejected the very same international order because it sustained global inequality and imperialism. Viewing international conventions, rules and organizations as the tools of Western subjugation, Qaddafi once believed he should be unfettered by them. He would liberate the Third World and then reconstruct independent political institutions. Today Qaddafi is embracing these very same institutions, particularly those in which he can easily rise to dominate, satisfying his nationalist desire for prestige and enabling his regional ambitions. Yet, on the other hand, the fact that Qaddafi takes institutions and their effects seriously follows from his personal experiences; for over a decade, he was the target of exceptionally strong and unified global condemnation. Qaddafi learned firsthand the power of institutional cooperation to achieve desired results (in his case, to exact an economic toll on Libya). It is logical that Qaddafi now holds out the hope that institutions will further Libya’s interests.

Implications for Policymakers

Institutions are not empty vessels, as their critics have contested, even if they are susceptible to exploitation by their strongest or richest members. Qaddafi’s enigmatic embrace of international and regional institutions reflects the emerging role of such organizations in enabling non-material ambitions that fall outside the traditional benefits advocated by institutionalists. Policymakers preparing post-normalization relations with current regional rogues should take note of Libya’s interest in institutions over the past five years. Libya’s determination to lead institutions offers insights useful to confronting current rogue states, particularly when domestic regime change is unlikely and charismatic and prideful (yet aging) leaders remain in power.

The notion that the “Libya model” of rehabilitation can be applied to North Korea or Iran has largely been discredited. It took two decades to bring Libya in from the cold; Qaddafi’s decision to give up WMD and renounce terrorism was the product of years of patient and quiet diplomacy, undergirded by punitive sanctions. This combination of tough diplomacy and unified, global isolation has not been thoroughly attempted with regard to other rogue states. Moreover, the international security threats posed by North Korea and Iran are more dangerous, given the greater success of both regimes in amassing non-conventional materials and building means of weapon delivery.

While the “Libya model” cannot be readily applied to transform the behavior of other rogue states, Qaddafi’s interest in institutions is nonetheless instructive.
His indefatigable ambition for regional influence and nationalist prestige are shared by the leaders of North Korea and Iran. Regional institutions might therefore offer a similar carrot to current rogue states, helping the regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran burnish their nationalist credentials while wielding influence in their regions and satisfying their sense of self-importance. A new regional institution in the Middle East—a beefed-up Organization of the Islamic Conference, for instance—might provide Iran with its desired regional influence and leadership. It might also allow Iran to assert Shiite nationalism, challenge the perceived Sunni hegemonic order in the Middle East, and protect its interests regionally—all goals currently expressed through military support for Shiite militias in Iraq, Hezbollah, and Hamas. North Korea’s inclusion and even leadership in Asian security organizations, perhaps a more permanent institution built upon the six-party talks, might assuage Kim Jong Il’s paranoia. Although the African, Middle Eastern, and Asian regions differ in terms of their internal balances of power, each region’s local rogue might respond to similar institutional carrots. Institutions could bestow the status, credibility, and legitimacy that the leaders of these states believe they deserve.

Ultimately, advocates of institutions and their critics, like most international relations scholars, have sidelined the role of emotional, psychological, and non-material state interests, which are particularly important but undervalued motivators of pariah states. Libya’s quest for institutional leadership should now focus policymakers’ attention. The drive for prestige and regional leadership has long compelled the pursuit of dangerous weapons arsenals and state-sponsored terrorism. Yet it could also lead to a more benign, though symbolic, embrace of institutions.

-Jason Warner served as lead editor for this article.

NOTES


Ibid.


Though Libya raised the issue of WMD as early as 1999, the Clinton and Bush administration were singularly focused on resolving the terrorism issue first, according to participants in the negotiations. See Leverett and Martin Indyk, “The Iraq War Did Not Force Gadaffi’s Hand,” Financial Times, March 9, 2004.


Libya became the ninth country since World War II to rollback its nuclear programs, but one of the few to do without a transition to democracy, the end of the Cold War, or an otherwise dramatic regime change.


“For the first time in the AU’s history, the selection of chair was contentious. Several countries vigorously opposed Qaddafi’s selection, seeking alternative leadership from Lesotho and Sierra Leone. Yet because the AU’s chairmanship rotates among Africa’s regions, and a North African country had not been chaired the continental body since 2000, Libya ultimately prevailed.”


“Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


For a discussion of these two sons’ complementary strengths, see Muhammed Ibrahim, “Libya: The Sons Also Rise,” Foreign Policy 139 (Nov.-Dec. 2003): 37-39.


See Al-Itiqal il al-Hasa hiwar ma Dr. Shukri Ghanem (‘Moving towards privatisation: An interview with Shukri Ghanem’) Al-Tijara 3 (July 2003) and Al-Qadhafi yedow ila Fatah Libia amam al-masarat al-ajnabia (Qadhafi calls for the opening of Libya to foreign banks), Middle East Online, January 5, 2006; available in Arabic on http://www.akhbarlibya.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=22980.


At the time, Qaddafi announced: “I have no time to lose talking with Arabs. ... I now talk about Pan-Africanism and African unity.” See Ray Takeyh, “The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold,” Foreign Affairs 80:3 (May/June 2001): 66-67.


“Qaddafi address to the Doha summit,” March 30, 2009, broadcast live on Qatar TV. See Also, “Official Meeting Between the Saudi Royal Family and Qaddafi Takes Place in Doha” (Translation mine) Al-Arabiya, March 20, 2009.