By Dr. Inna Mattei and Gilles Van Nederveen

With the passing of the 30th anniversary of the Falklands War between the United Kingdom and Argentina this year, and the recent flaring up of tensions between the two nations over the status of the Falkland Islands, an examination of the current force structure in the South Pacific is needed to realistically assess military contingencies. Drawing on a number of strategic and operational considerations, we believe that the Argentinean military is not prepared to fight in another conflict, although it may be pushed into one by the government’s nationalistic rhetoric.

Military Readiness and Posture 

Since the end of the Falklands War in 1982, both antagonists have upgraded and changed their defense posture. The latest round of diplomatic maneuvering in late 2011 and 2012 was interspersed with military movements to back up tough political sparring between Buenos Aries and London. The Argentinean forces had a large shopping list by the end of military rule, but economic crises forced all three services to make painful cuts. Presently, short term prospects for new equipment procurement remain limited and planned upgrades programs appear to be languishing.

Any future conflict over the Falklands would hinge on air and naval power. The Argentine Air Force often made costly and incoherent purchases of a wide array of equipment. Upgrading equipment in the inventory when Argentina rejoined the world community or acquiring used aircraft from abroad is often the only solution. It is cheaper and more practical to replace aging avionics than buying expensive new aircraft.[1] However, the air force’s plan for new fighters was shelved, and upgrades to its inventory of 32 older Mirage fighter jets were postponed as well due to lack of funds. The only modernization involved the A-4 fighter bomber force (36 aircraft in total), which was upgraded with an F-16 radar in 2000. Naval Aviation, which played a crucial role in the 1982 war, is down to only eleven aircraft from fourteen.[2] Argentinean press reported that Argentina is bidding to buy used Super Etendards from the French Navy, which is about to retire these planes and replace them with Rafaels.[3]  However, upgrade costs and a lack of funding cast doubts on whether such a procurement could occur. Some economists are saying that any Argentinean defense modernization procurements will probably have to wait until after 2025. [4] Years of austerity have reduced the effectiveness of the air force and the naval aviation as existing assets have deteriorated and their maintenance and supply costs have increased dramatically.

The Argentinean Navy has also not been able to upgrade or replace its ships and submarines. More worryingly, it has had to curtail, postpone, or cancel ship refits. The submarine force saw two retirements since 1982 while no replacement boats were procured.[5] The surface fleet consists of frigates and landing craft capable of operations, but it lacks the staying power necessary for a longer ocean engagement. Also, the force of German submarines does not possess the capability of British nuclear powered attack boats. The navy does, however, also control a 2,500 Marine force considered to be among the elite formations in the Argentinean military.

Finally, the Argentine Army has transitioned from a conscripted force to an all-volunteer one, but has not made the personnel changes necessary to match the overall force structure and the reduced budget. The other two branches have not managed this any better, and personnel costs (especially pension benefits) are consuming up to 75% of the budget.[6] However, the army does have the state of the art weaponry it would like. And while some units could serve well in an attack, the combat abilities of other units have been openly questioned in the parliament.[7]

Strategy would also be defined primarily in terms of air and naval power. The British force posture is geared towards using strategic naval assets to threaten the Argentinian homeland and thus deter any operations aimed against the Falklands. While soldiers are required to occupy territory, any conflict in the South Atlantic between the two states would be a combined air and sea campaign. Air power and the ability to project air power out to sea are the most critical components of any operation in the Falklands. Strategic seizure of airfields in the Falklands by Argentina, for example, would be a special operation geared to providing the Argentineans with a base for air power projection in order to keep approaching British fleet units far away from the Falklands.

The British forces in terms of their force posture are close to where they were in 1982. The then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had started to make defense cuts – including in the Falklands – when the Argentine forces invaded.  In 2011, current Prime Minister David Cameron was also forced to make defense cuts in a time of austerity. This time, however, the British government went to great lengths to signal to Argentina that the defense cuts have had no bearing on its force projection capabilities in the Falklands.

The British defense posture on the Falklands appears to be enough to deter Argentinean aggression. But the British forces would probably face serious problems if attacked in force and in inclement weather that occurs for at least eight months of the year in that part of the South Atlantic. The Royal Navy usually has a guided missile frigate or destroyer together with a refueling ship (to extend time and range at sea) stationed in the islands, as well as an in-shore patrol boat. As of February 2012 HMS Dauntless, a destroyer fitted for both anti-air and anti-missile operations is on patrol in the islands. Designed with stealth technology to give it the radar profile of a fishing vessel, the destroyer’s three-dimensional radar system can track up to 1,000 targets simultaneously and its anti-aircraft missiles can reach out to 80 miles from the ship. Since February 2012, the Royal Navy has had a Trafalgar-class nuclear attack submarine deployed to the South Atlantic. These submarines carry Tomahawk cruise missiles and wire-guided torpedoes, and were effective in keeping the Argentinean fleet bottled up in the 1982 war after the sinking of the Argentinean cruiser General Belgrano.

The British Army keeps an infantry company and support personnel at the Mount Pleasant base on the islands. This small 500-man unit also includes specialized logistics and communications support staff. Finally, the Royal Air Force maintains four Eurofighter Typhoons for air defense missions, which have a secondary role as ground attack fighter-bombers. A VC10 tanker provides air refueling to give the fighters longer sortie times, and a single Hercules C-130 flies air resupply and maritime patrol missions.[8] Sea King helicopters provide search and rescue.

However, the British face a real difficultly with the long resupply route from Britain conducted with leased commercial aircraft.[9] Landings in St Helena and Ascension islands are required to get the aircraft to the Falklands. Also, General Sir Michael Jackson and other British military commentators recently pointed out that after the Royal Navy cut its aircraft carriers from three to one,[10] mounting an operation similar to the one of 1982 might be impossible if the Argentinian forces were able to land and use runways on the Falklands.[11]

By February 7th, 2012, most of the British press had reported that the Royal Navy had sent two ships to the region: a nuclear powered attack submarine of the Trafalgar class and HMS Dauntless, a destroyer with a very capable and state-of-the-art air defense system. Adding to Argentinean displeasure, Prince William – second in line to the English throne – was send to the Falklands as an RAF Search and Rescue pilot for 45 days. Escalations in diplomatic rhetoric and military posturing could lead to miscalculations. Yet, even the most nationalist Argentineans realize that unless the military force balance tips in Argentina’s favor, such a military operation could be doomed to fail. On the diplomatic and political front, movements in Argentina’s favor can still occur. Unlike the previous war, the Argentinean government is now a democratically elected one. And the United States, once a staunch ally of Britain, now displays an ambivalent attitude. South American countries that had sided with Argentina in 1982 have done so again. Only Chile, as in 1982, seems to be walking a fine line between publically supporting Argentinean diplomatic and economic boycott efforts while maintaining air links and economic ties to the Falklands.

Options for the Future

Argentina has two possible attack options regarding the Falklands. In scenario one, the task would be to neutralize the British forces in their garrisons before British reinforcements arrive.  An amphibious assault fits the task. Yet, it is unlikely that the Argentinean Navy could assemble a force without the British discovering it via intelligence data. With the element of surprise lost, the British forces in the Falklands would be able to respond, while simultaneously requesting reinforcements.

In another possible scenario, Argentina could stage an assault by special forces on, for example, the four Eurofighter Typhoon jets since these can effectively keep any attacking Argentinean aircraft at bay. This scenario, if carried out well, is more likely to create a favorable outcome for the Argentine forces. However, with a British submarine on patrol, Argentina must also take into account the danger that Tomahawk cruise missiles could be fired at targets on the Argentinian mainland, effectively removing any sanctuary for the Argentinean regime.

As time passes, we are likely to see the continuation of the current trend: diplomatic posturing followed by the dispatch of deterring forces to the Falklands. We should expect the political and diplomatic exchanges to reach a high pitch as by-elections are held in both the nations. Never mind the economic situations in the two countries, nationalism is alive and well on both sides of the vast Atlantic Ocean.

About the Authors

Dr. Inna Mattei is a strategic futures expert and senior socio-cultural analyst working on behalf of government clients in the Washington DC area. Gilles Van Nederveen, is a 22-year United States Air Force veteran who works as a senior defense analyst.

Endnotes

1. In 2010 Argentina was reportedly trying to buy used Jordanian Mirage F1

2. Argentina has been able to keep their pilots current by utilizing the Brazilian carrier that is the former French carrier Foch. Argentina so far has not publically declared whether it will seek a new carrier for its navy.

3. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/argentinian-naval-aviation-command-seeks-pampa-deal-341913/   accessed 18 Feb 2012

4. http://defenceforumindia.com/americas/9953-argentina-intends-jordan-mirage-f-1ej-rent-dassault.html  accessed 18Feb 2012

5. Two TR-1700 and one Type 209 are German-designed and build submarines.

6. http://www.defenseworld.net/go/defensenews.jsp?id=3438&h=Economic%20uncertainity%20limit%20Argentina%20Military%20Modernization accessed 18 Feb 2012

7. http://en.mercopress.com/2010/12/18/conflicting-assessments-of-argentina-s-defence-policy-and-military-capabilities  accessed 18 Feb 2012

8. The C-130 carries out radar maritime reconnaissance plotting vessels around the Falklands, to prevent fish poaching and attack. The radar is capable of all-weather operations.

9. The Lockheed TriStar (L1011) is a seventies wide-body aircraft used by the RAF for transport and tanker duties, they are due to be replaced in 2012 by Airbus A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT); the reliability of the Tristars has varied and the RAF uses leased Boeing 767 and 777 on the trans-Atlantic runs. RAF Mount Pleasant on the Falklands has a runway to accommodate these long distance flights.

10. HMS Invincible is the only carrier in the Royal Fleet, there are two landing platform docks in the fleet and one amphibious assault ship. The Royal navy also currently lacks aircraft for its ships. The Harrier force was retired in 2010. Two new carriers will not join the fleet till 2020 and the F-35 will not join the fleet until the same time frame.

11. Britain faces ‘impossible’ battle if Argentina invades Falklands, warns General Sir Michael Jackson, The Telegraph 29 Jan 2012.