By Warren Ryan

“Under New START, America gives and Russia gets . . .. Every single provision favors Russia or is neutral; not one favors the United States . . .. The stronger we are relative to nations like Russia, the safer the world is.” [1] —Mitt Romney, former U.S. presidential candidate 

It is time to leave this cold war way of thinking behind. Russia is no longer the United States’ greatest enemy, and the U.S. nuclear posture should reflect this simple truth.

As long as other states hold nuclear weapons, maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent should be a national security priority for any U.S. president. However, there is no reason for the United States to match force levels with Russia, particularly when the two have not been enemies for over twenty years and when Russia itself is calling for bilateral nuclear force reductions.

Despite this fact, arms control critics continue to be suspicious of the Russian gov- ernment’s intentions, which is all the more reason why the United States should not rule out effective arms control treaties with Russia. A treaty such as New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), with solid verification procedures built in, allows for transparency and gives U.S. military leaders the information they need to plan for American security. However, New START is only a first step: the Obama Administration needs to find a way to cut some of the $620 billion[2] it will spend on its nuclear arsenal over the next decade while continuing to deter realistic threats to American security.

Now that President Obama has won a second term, his administration should take the following course of action:

One: Begin negotiations with Russia for further reductions not only of strategic weapons, but also tactical and non-deployed nuclear weapons. New START is an impor- tant treaty that gets both countries moving in the right direction, but strategic force levels are still too high, considering they are meant to balance two non-confrontational nations. Furthermore, tactical and stockpiled weapons are not covered under the treaty. President Obama and former Russian President Medvedev have both voiced support for reductions in all three areas in the past. Since then, Vladimir Putin has been reelected to the Russian presidency, and the Kremlin recently announced that it will not be renewing the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Treaty upon its expiration in 2013.[3] With these developments, it is incumbent upon a second-term Obama Administration to reengage with the Russians on arms control, at the very least to gauge their intentions, so that the U.S. military can properly plan.

Two: The United States and Russia should exchange information on the respective compositions of their nuclear arsenals beyond what is required by New START. This would reduce uncertainties and allow for military commanders to plan adequately, which would also reduce waste, as only necessary improvements to the U.S. arsenal would need to be made. Furthermore, information sharing would facilitate transparency and improve relations between the two powers, which could be helpful in future treaty negotiations.

Three: The United States should gradually and unilaterally take portions of its strategic forces off heightened alert status, a practice that remains one of the most visible holdovers from the Cold War. This step could be implemented immediately and would not require a new treaty. Not only would de-alerting U.S. strategic forces reduce the possibility of a miscalculation leading to nuclear war, but it would also aid the U.S. Strategic Command in more effectively utilizing its resources. In a time when the greatest threat to U.S. national security may be a staggering budget deficit, this step frees up billions of dollars and countless hours of time that warfighters could better use elsewhere. If U.S. leaders were to make such a move, it is likely that the Russians would reciprocate, as they did when George H.W. Bush implemented a similar policy in 1991. Even if they did not, the United States could always put strategic forces back on alert, if conditions warrant such a move. Very little would be lost by de-alerting the missiles, while much would be gained in demonstrating to the world that nuclear weapons do not enjoy the same status they once did in the American national security calculus.

By taking these steps, President Obama could move closer to fulfilling the pledge he made in Prague in April 2009: “To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same.”

About the Author

Warren Ryan is a graduate student at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, where he is concentrating in International Security & Conflict Management. Mr. Ryan’s writing has been featured by the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, State Magazine, FrontLines, and The Ploughshares Fund Online. Mr. Ryan has previously served with the U.S. Agency for International Development in Sudan, where he worked on issues ranging from democracy and governance to conflict mitigation and humanitarian assistance. The views expressed in this article are his alone. 

Endnotes

1. Mitt Romney, “Eight Problems with the New START, ”National Review Online, July 26, 2010, http://www.nationalreview. com/articles/243540/eight-problems-new-start-mitt-romney

2. Conservative estimate by Plough shares Fund (estimate ranges from approximately $620 billion to about $660 billion from FY13 to FY22). Ploughshares Fund, “What Nuclear Weapons Cost Us,” September 2012, http://www.ploughshares.org/sites/default/files/resources/What%20Nuclear%20Weapons%20Cost%20Us%20Final%20(100212).pdf

3. Washington Post Editorial Board, “Without U.S. aid, will Russia keep scrapping its nuclear arsenal?” The Washington Post, October 12 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-and-russia-need-a-successor-to-nunn- lugar/2012/10/12/4caafe5e-13b4-11e2-ba83-a7a396e6b2a7_story.html

View this op-ed as a PDF Jake Nelson served as Lead Editor for this op-ed.