By Alexandra Huggins

Introduction

The Rwandan genocide signified the height of an intractable social conflict that covered over a century. The long-running conflict was marked by sporadic periods of violence, shaped by opportunistic external actors, and concluded with a massacre that preventive diplomacy failed to avert. The aftermath of the 100 days of brutality and murder left a deeply divided and broken country, a split fostered by decades of political, social, and existential conflict, and exacerbated by the trauma endured. Yet, 30 years after the genocide, Rwanda is largely politically, economically, and socially stable, with a lack of renewed violence and an established democratic process.[1] What explains Rwanda’s relative success in comparison to other intractable conflicts internationally? What unique aspects did the Rwandan peacemakers implement in order to not only maintain a negative peace — preventing any further escalations — but begin to build a positive peace with a stable, functioning society, political system, and economy? 

While it would be remiss to credit Rwanda’s success in mitigating their intractable conflict to any one aspect or institution, the gacaca courts, a reconciliation instrument, addressed the recent victims and perpetrators of violence. This mechanism spoke to both the shared history and customs of the Rwandan people and individual experiences, loosening the knots of intractability and setting a precedent for further cooperation and societal stability. Through examination of the theoretical, thematic connection between the obstacles to conflict resolution in intractable conflicts and the benefits and processes of such reconciliation measures, in combination with its application to the gacaca courts in the Rwanda conflict, the necessity of local level, individualized reconciliation efforts in intractable conflicts becomes apparent. When approaching reconciliation in the case of intractable conflicts, the implementation of localized mechanisms, based on the experiences of individuals, is needed, as intractable conflict serves to dehumanize the “Other.” Institutions such as the gacaca courts not only provide catharsis and recognition for those involved, but humanize their former opposition, working to dismantle the notions of deeply-ingrained antagonism and establishing a basis for positive relationships going forward.

Conceptual Framework

Intractability

In the literature surrounding intractable and protracted social conflicts, arguments focus on the characteristics of the conflicts themselves: the nature of the relationships between the adversaries, the internal phenomena that contribute to the ongoing nature of the conflict, and the elements that resist resolution and defy reconciliation attempts, as well as the dynamics of the conflict and how they interact with each other in order to increase its longevity. Zartman, in his piece “Analyzing Intractability,” outlines five “internal characteristics” within a conflict that play off of each other and serve to elongate the conflict and hinder resolution efforts: “protracted time, identity denigration, conflict profitability, absence of ripeness, and solution polarization,” as well as the external context of the conflict. Particularly relevant to the Rwandan case are protracted time, identity denigration, and the external context.[2]

Protracted time is self-explanatory: it refers to the substantial length of time that a conflict has endured, ebbing and flowing in its severity and experiencing various stages, as explained by Louis Kriesberg. In his piece, “Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability,” Kriesberg identifies specific phases that a conflict goes through, consisting of “a series of relatively intense conflict episodes linked by dormancy or low-intensity fighting.”[3] Kriesburg determines six particularly important non-sequential phases, establishing that actors often regress back to earlier phases and experience phases differently throughout the progression of the lengthy conflict. These phases are, “(1) the eruption of conflict episodes with high potentiality of generating intractability, (2) escalation marked by destructive qualities, (3) failed peacemaking efforts, (4) institutionalization of destructive conflict, (5) de-escalation leading to transformation, and (6) termination and recovery from the intractable conflict.”[4]

In relation to the unique difficulties of intractable conflicts that reconciliation efforts must address, Zartman’s “identity denigration” characteristic and Kriesburg’s “institutionalization of destructive conflict” stage are particularly relevant. Both themes, Zarman’s as a characteristic and Kriesburg’s as an analytic phase, address the concept that, within an intractable conflict, the conflict itself becomes culturally and socially embedded in the respective sides. The view of the adversary as the “other,” a fundamental enemy that is existentially opposed to one’s identity group, becomes central to the identity of the group itself. Such attitudes lead, in their most extreme cases, to the dehumanization and villainization of the opposing side and can result in genocidal actions and purges, as exemplified by the ultimate escalation between the Hutu and Tutsi groups in Rwanda, according to Kreisberg.[5] As Zartman explains, the identities of the respective belligerents become dependent on, or even defined by, the repression of the other, stating, “You are either one of us or against us. The polarized conflict moves toward intractability when identities become zero sum and one identity actually depends on demeaning and demonizing the other.”[6] The socialization of the opposing side as inherently bad, cruel, or evil contributes both to the intractability of the conflict, as it dissuades potential for compromise or accord, and to the social divisions that have to be addressed when the conflict does come to an end.

Lastly, the external context that Zartman identifies, or actors and circumstances affecting the conflict outside of the belligerents, is an exacerbating factor in the continuation of intractable conflicts, especially when the process of colonialism is interspersed with the domestic conflict. Zartman recognizes three elements that occur within the external context that impact conflicts: embeddedness, bias, and buffering. In the context of the Rwandan conflict, embeddedness is the more applicable element. Zartman describes embeddedness as patrons, or colonizers, potentially furthering their own interests through the continuation of the conflict.[7] In the case of conflicts which involved the influence of a colonizing power, the external power in question often benefited by stoking internal conflict, favoring one party over another and institutionalizing the division. This often occurred through implementation of a foreign, non-native system of government, as was the case in African countries like Rwanda by European colonizers in the 19th and 20th centuries.[8]

Reconciliation

At the conclusion of intractable conflicts, when peace agreements have been signed and the leaders have completed negotiations, the deep divide between the population remains. The identities that depend on “demeaning and demonizing the other” continue to endure among the people most affected by the conflict.[9] Valerie Rosoux, in her chapter “Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process: Scope and Limits” in the SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, identifies three “main approaches” to reconciliation after a conflict: structural, social-psychological, and spiritual.[10] While structural reconciliation, described by Rosoux as “security, economic interdependence and political cooperation,” is incredibly important for a functioning state and society after the conclusion of a conflict, formerly intractable conflicts face a unique challenge when addressing the latter two, social-psychological and spiritual. Rosoux defines social-psychological reconciliation as the “cognitive and emotional aspects of the process of rapprochement between former adversaries,” and spiritual reconciliation as addressing the “collective healing based on the rehabilitation of both victims and offenders.”[11] Based on Zartman’s and Kriesburg’s assessment of the “identity denigration” and “institutionalization of destructive conflict” elements — the embedding of hatred and mistrust of the “other” into cultural and social identity — the social-psychological and spiritual reconciliations become increasingly important and difficult at the end of intractable conflicts. When the “other” beliefs become central to the identity of the groups themselves through the embedding process, it requires substantial deconstruction to resolve. 

In order to accomplish such reconciliation, Ramsbotham et al. in Contemporary Conflict Resolution identify three broad categories of means along a spectrum: amnesia, public justice, and vengeance, each with various effects and levels of success. Amnesia — forgiving and forgetting — does nothing to address the underlying divisions, breeding resentment and not taking action to prevent further conflict in the future. On the other end of the spectrum, vengeance, or seeking repayment and justice against those who have been wronged, may fulfill the need for justice but does not further peace, as the mechanisms for implementation, such as trials, can be seen as politically motivated, long, and expensive, and only serve to deepen the divides between the parties.[12] 

Public justice, “dealing with the past publically and collectively,” is presented as the most moderate means of reconciliation, addressing the wrongs of a conflict in a public forum rather than in the punitive measures of a trial. Ramsbotham et al. identify truth commissions and other such mechanisms as illustrative of this concept, referencing Andrew Rigby in stating, “Truth commissions lie somewhere in between forgive and forget (amnesia) and trials, purges, and the pursuit of justice.”[13] Critics of such methods argue that truth commissions, due to their lack of punitive measures, rob victims of justice and lack accountability for perpetrators. Valerie Rosoux, however, points toward restorative justice rather than retributive justice, referencing Assefa and Evenson. She argues that reconciliation entails not just justice, but also the methods in which it is carried out in order to promote future peace and coexistence, a sentiment that such measures as the truth commissions and public courts exemplify.[14] She further argues toward the effectiveness of such public justice measures as follows:

Whereas the aim of any criminal justice process is primarily to identify guilt and to administer the punishment required by the law, restorative justice tends to appease the bitterness and resentment that exist between the parties. To the partisans of this dynamic, the punishment of the offenders alone does not prevent them from continuing to hate the other side (Cobban, 2007). So, they seek to favor an environment where the offenders take the responsibility of acknowledging their offense and get motivated to change the relationship from destructive to constructive.[15]

While applicable to every conflict, the sentiment promoted by such measures is particularly relevant to intractable conflicts, where the resentment and bitterness are deeply inset into the identities of the former belligerents. 

The formation of such bodies, where victims can be heard and validated on a public level but offenders can also confess and take responsibility, serves not only the purpose of reconciling narratives and creating a common history of the conflict, but also humanizing and connecting the two sides over their experiences, establishing a precedent of cooperation and constructing a positive relationship. These measures facilitate the social-psychological and spiritual elements of reconciliation that Rousox establishes, helping to improve and strengthen the relationships between the parties while also allowing both sides to heal from the wrongs inflicted. By addressing the social-psychological and spiritual elements on a personal level, these mechanisms work to dismantle Zartman’s “identity denigration” characteristic and reverse Kriesburg’s “institutionalization of destructive conflict” phase of an intractable conflict. They address relationships at the local level, building a “forward-looking notion of justice” aimed at establishing a new relationship on the basis of equal respect between parties and preventing the recurrence of violence in the future based on such divisive beliefs that were embedded previously.[16]

Intractable conflicts present a unique challenge, as the animosity and belligerent attitudes of the opposing parties are deeply set into their respective identities, producing a deep and divisive split in society that reconciliation must address. Yet, through such “public justice” measures as truth commissions and public courts at the local level, the parties can reframe their relationship, come to an understanding, and resolve the differences between their conflicting historical perspectives, lessening the possibility of future escalation.[17] The effectiveness of such measures can be illustrated through the consideration of the gacaca courts after the decades-long conflict in Rwanda, showing the success of their reconciliation measures.

Case Analysis: Rwanda

The intractable conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi clans in Rwanda began long before the 100 days of genocide in 1994. The historical distinction between the two is largely socially constructed, according to Longman, as it was not primarily based on physical differences, language, or religion.[18] While these differences were not enforced within the then-Kingdom of Rwanda in the period before colonialism, the incorporation of Rwanda into the German empire in 1884 at the Berlin Conference led to the Germans enforcing the social structure, favoring the ruling Tutsis. The distinction was codified when Belgium took over during World War I, institutionalizing the divide and issuing identification cards for what they considered to be different races. This exacerbated the conflict, illustrating Zartman’s external circumstances “embeddedness” characteristic.[19]

In Rwanda’s case the implementation of “identity denigration” and “institutionalization of destructive conflict” described by Zartman and Kriesburg began prior to the escalation into violence itself, due to the pre-existing social structure that was exacerbated by opportunistic, external colonial powers. As a result, when violence broke out in 1959 with a Hutu revolt against the Tutsi monarchy, the “eruption of conflict episodes with high potentiality of generating intractability” that Kriesburg illustrates, the lines were clearly drawn.[20] Violence broke out sporadically for the next 30 to 40 years, with various periods of “escalation marked by destructive qualities,” which were exacerbated by the creation of new political movements through various revolts and coups, and rapid population growth which led to competition for resources. “Failed peacemaking efforts,” overseen by various international parties, occurred in 1992. While a peace accord was signed and a ceasefire implemented, the ceasefire broke down in 1994, and the ultimate escalation, the Hutu genocide against the Tutsi, began, killing around one million people in 100 days.[21] The decades-long intractable conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples concluded when the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front managed to consolidate control over the country, and was faced with the task of “termination and recovery from the intractable conflict” within a deeply divided country.[22]

Due to the longevity of the conflict and the deeply set, institutionalized divisions between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples, reconciliation, while initially focused on national-level prosecution for the perpetrators of the genocide, shifted to locally based “gacaca courts.” Such courts originated in pre-colonial Rwanda and aimed to restore social harmony within the community, reintegrate an offender into the community, or promote reconciliation between two disputing parties. according to Le Mon, with the process focused on the goal of truth-telling and reconciliation.[23] These courts, aside from appealing to the shared history and unity of the Rwandan people through the use of a historical means of reconciliation, worked to facilitate the social-psychological reconciliation and spiritual reconciliation established by Rosoux. Social-psychological reconciliation is achieved through the collaborative, restorative nature of the courts, focusing on rehabilitation and collectively working toward resolution, while spiritual reconciliation is addressed through the truth-telling mechanisms of the court, providing catharsis for both perpetrator and victim and establishing a common narrative of the events that transpired. 

Critics of the gacaca courts point to the lack of accountability and punitive justice of the courts’ outcomes, even though the most serious cases of genocide were addressed at the international level at the International Criminal Trubunal for Rwanda. However, defenders of the court argue that the courts provide an avenue for truth telling with the potential for reconciliation, which could become more important for solidifying social and political harmony than formal retributive justice following a genocide.[24] As Rosoux also points out, mechanisms like the gacaca courts, in focusing on restorative justice, open the possibility to positive relationships in the future. This is in contrast to retributive justice, which would only serve to deepen the divides between the population, as harsh punitive measures imposed on the Hutu population would do nothing to dissuade the “victimization” narrative that is perpetuated by both sides during an intractable conflict.[25] Restorative measures focus on moving forward, building a positive relationship between the parties, and setting the precedent for cooperation and peaceful interactions in the future. 

Conclusion

The gacaca courts were not the sole mechanism implemented in Rwanda in order to further reconciliation and stability, as there was also a UN-trained police force created and efforts to increase the number of women in security forces. Yet, the gacaca courts, based in pre-colonial culture and focusing on restorative justice and healing relationships, worked to further reconciliation at the local level, healing the deep cultural and social divisions among the population. In the years since the implementation of the courts and other peace-building measures, Rwanda has not only prevented any further outbreaks of violence or escalation, but established a democratic system and grown economically. The justice processes following the genocide have allowed the economy to grow and supported a stable political system that is somewhat democratic. The gacaca court system has managed to, if not resolve, then mitigate and stabilize a decades-long societal division ingrained into the culture of the Rwandan people, illustrating the effectiveness and necessity of local-level restorative justice measures in the aftermath of intractable conflicts. 

The unique and prevalent challenges faced by peacemakers at the conclusion of intractable conflicts, particularly in the Rwanda case, lie in the deep societal divisions in the population. The dehumanization and alienation of the “other” is ingrained into the very identity of the opposing sides, as indicated by Zartman’s “identity denigration” characteristic and Kriesburg’s “institutionalization of destructive conflict” stage. Yet, as illustrated in the Rwandan case, localized reconciliation measures such as the gacaca courts, rooted in the common history of the country and collectively addressing Rosoux’s social-psychological and spiritual reconciliation, begin to dismantle the concept of one’s former opposition as the “other,” and promote restorative justice rather than retributive justice. Such measures can facilitate the loosening of the knots of intractability and build a foundation for the creation of positive peace and a peaceful, cooperative relationship between the parties going forward after decades of animosity, conflict, and instability.

About the author

Alexandra Huggins is a M.A. candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a graduate of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her research interests center around international law, world order, multilateral diplomacy, and the intersection of supranational organizations and national security. She currently serves as the editor-in-chief of the SAIS Review of International Affairs and has worked at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on issues surrounding multilateralism and the future of global governance.

Endnotes

1. Jonathan M. Hansen, “Revisiting Rwanda 30 Years after the Genocide,” TIME, April 7, 2024, https://time.com/6964381/rwanda-genocide-anniversary-30-years/. 

2. William Zartman, “Analyzing Intractability,” in Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), p. 48.

3. Louis Kriesberg, “Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability,” in Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), p. 68.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid, p. 69.

6. Zartman, “Analyzing Intractability,” p. 50.

7. Ibid, p. 56.

8. Timothy Longman, “Identity Cards, Ethnic Self-Perception, and Genocide in Rwanda,” in Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World, ed. Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 351.

9. Zartman, “Analyzing Intractability,” p. 50.

10. Valerie Rosoux, “Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process: Scope and Limits,” in The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and William Zartman (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2009), p. 545.

11. Rosoux, “Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process,”referencing Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Tutu, 1999, p. 544.

12. Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (Oxford: Polity, 2005), p. 286.

13. Ibid, referencing Rigby.

14. Rosoux, “Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process,” referencing Assefa, n.d.; Evenson, 2004, p. 554.

15. Ibid.

16. Rosoux, “Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process,” p. 558.

17. Ibid.

18. Longman, “Identity Cards,” p. 351.

19. Ibid, p. 352.

20. Ibid, p. 353.

21. Ibid, p. 354.

22. Kriesberg, “Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability,” p. 68.

23. Christopher J. Le Mon, “Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts,” Human Rights Brief 14, no. 2, 2007, p. 16.

24. Timothy Longman, “An Assessment of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts,” Peace Review 21, no. 3, 2009, p. 307.

25. Rosoux, “Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process,” p. 558.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the editors or the journal.