By Darryl Alexander

Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine have been rightfully regarded as dangerous threats to the liberal international order, which encourages peaceful, multilateral dispute resolution. While the coordinated global response to the most recent invasion of Ukraine has been a promising sign for the future of the system, one cannot ignore the role the United States’ approach to the global war on terror has played in emboldening Russian aggression. U.S.-led interventions in the past 21 years have strained relationships with competitors and allies alike, particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The United States has invaded sovereign states without international consensus, conducted military activities that have killed thousands of civilians, detained foreign citizens without due process, and made unilateral decisions that have caught allies off guard, creating a global system where the United States seems to lead with a “do as I say, not as I do” doctrine. This difference between the aims of the international order and the actions of its leader has created an environment where illiberal actors feel justified in using force and ignoring human rights to advance their policy goals. Furthermore, these actors have not feared repercussions, since recent U.S. tensions with allies has given the appearance of a fractured alliance unable to respond in a unified manner. Fortunately, the united front shown by the West in support of Ukraine can serve as a foundation on which the international order can fulfill its multilateral aims. However, this future will only exist if the United States does not repeat the mistakes of the past two decades.

The “Bush Doctrine,” as it has come to be termed, was a policy framework that favored military action in the nascent war on terror. After intelligence confirmed Al Qaeda was behind the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided very quickly that they would go to war with Afghanistan. President Bush made his intent clear when he spoke to the nation, stating that the United States would bring the perpetrators of 9/11 to justice and “will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”[1] On September 14th, 2001 Congress indicated approval of this approach with the near unanimous passage of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). This legislation gave the President the power to use all necessary force against anyone deemed connected to the 9/11 attacks. The haste with which this bill passed, and the vast powers it awarded to the President, showed that the United States was not only prepared to use military force in response to the attacks, but was determined to do so.[2] Presidents would later use the AUMF to justify military activities such as the torture of detainees in the Guantanamo Bay detention center and a non-UN sanctioned invasion of Iraq --- actions that have harmed the United States’ credibility as a defender of human rights and international law.[3]

Having been granted the power to wage war, the Bush administration gave the Taliban an ultimatum to either give up Al Qaeda or “face their fate.” This ultimatum was not intended as an opportunity to avoid war. By precluding formal negotiations in his ultimatum, Bush torpedoed any opportunity there was to resolve this conflict diplomatically. Condoleezza Rice, who was National Security Advisor at the time, noted that the ultimatum was merely a procedural action to give advance notice of an invasion.[4] Given the failed negotiations with the Taliban to turn over Osama Bin Laden following Al Qaeda’s 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, it is easy to justify the harshness with which the Bush administration dealt with the Taliban.[5] However, with the global support the United States received after the 9/11 attacks and the very real threat of invasion, the Taliban may have been more willing to negotiate. Instead, negotiations lasted less than three weeks and were not conducted by the Secretary of State, but rather by Robert Grenier, the CIA station chief in Afghanistan.[6] It is unclear whether diplomatic efforts would have worked, but they should have been more seriously pursued before starting a war in Afghanistan that cost the lives of over 175,000 people, including 46,000+ civilians.[7]

Still, the United States’ war in Afghanistan gained widespread support from nations across the globe, which the Bush Administration took as tacit approval to relegate diplomacy in favor of military interventionism. The Bush Administration, seeking to take advantage of this new paradigm, began planning an unrelated invasion of Iraq to topple the government of Saddam Hussein.[8] While the United States gained some support from allies such as the United Kingdom, they faced resistance from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). France, Germany, and Russia advocated for and passed UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which avoided war and would bring weapons inspectors into Iraq to ensure that they did not have weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).[9] While inspectors never found any evidence of WMDs in Iraq, Secretary of State Colin Powell nevertheless addressed the UNSC to garner support for an invasion of Iraq. The evidence Powell presented hinged on weak, and later disproven, intelligence that the Iraqi government was linked to Al Qaeda and possessed WMDs that might be used in subsequent terrorist attacks.[10] Secretary Powell’s speech did not galvanize the support the United States hoped it would; rather, it undermined the trust of key allies.[11] Nonetheless, the U.S. invasion of Iraq proceeded, leading to at least 162,000 deaths between 2003 and 2011, 79% of those being civilians, according to Iraq Body Count.[12]

This American propensity to rely on military solutions to combat terror has had devastating human costs that raise questions about the effectiveness and legitimacy of the current global order. Afghanistan and Iraq were the major theaters of war for the United States, but all told, from drone strikes in Somalia to a U.S.-led intervention in Syria, counterterrorism activities associated with the war on terror are thought to have taken place in 85 different countries. Over 929,000 deaths (of which 387,000 were civilians) are attributable to these interventions. These conflicts have displaced 38 million people and left failed states facing economic and humanitarian crises in their wake.[13] The number of deaths that have been and continue to be caused by these conditions will dwarf the lives lost during the combat period of war. Moreover, people struggling in these social environments serve as promising recruits for violent terrorist organizations like those the United States started its wars to combat. ISIS grew out of the chaos that ensued after the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq, and evidence points to ISIS-K making a comeback following the American-led NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.[14] The United States’ contribution to widespread war and poverty in the Middle East and Central Asia contradicts the very human rights values it wishes to uphold.

Unsurprisingly, U.S. conduct in the war on terror has undercut its authority in addressing illiberal actors who violate international laws. Russia has adopted policies in opposition to international norms in response to the U.S. execution of the war on terror. Initially, following 9/11, Russia supported U.S. policy towards Afghanistan. They did not veto the UNSC Resolution authorizing use of force, and they offered use of their airspace to deliver non-lethal aid . This cooperative attitude towards the United States began to shift when the Bush administration ignored Russian objections to the invasion of Iraq. This invasion, which came on the heels of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in December of 2001, signaled that the United States’ foreign policy was becoming increasingly unilateral and militarized.[15] Given that the United States had toppled two governments in the previous two years, it is no surprise that relations further deteriorated after Russia blamed the United States for encouraging the 2003 and 2004 democratic revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine.[16] Vladimir Putin, wary of a world that seemed to be subservient to U.S. interests, increased the pace of Russian military development in an attempt to project power. In 2008, Russia showcased their military might through a disproportionate response to Georgian use of force against Russian-backed separatists in the breakaway enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While Russia’s reaction was unwarranted, especially in the eyes of the European Union,[17] the full support gained by the United States to overthrow the Taliban served as precedent for a strong country using overwhelming force against a significantly weaker foe.

After a short “reset” period between the United States and Russia following President Obama’s inauguration in 2009, relations began to further deteriorate following NATO-supported regime change efforts in Libya. This effort also came after ignoring Russian objections.[18] Following the gruesome death of Muammar Gaddafi, Putin stated, “What troubles me is not the fact of military intervention itself -- I am concerned by the ease with which decisions to use force are taken in international affairs…This is becoming a persistent tendency in U.S. policy.”[19] This particular episode cemented Putin’s distrust of the Western-led international order. 

In the following decade, Russia increased its use of force to counter the West and assert itself on the international stage. After the Revolution of Dignity overthrew the pro-Russian regime in Ukraine in 2014, Russia invaded, took control of Crimea, and supported separatists in the Donbas region.[20] In Syria, sensing another U.S.-led regime change effort, Russia decided to act militarily instead of channeling its efforts into multilateral institutions. Russian military support has been brutally efficient in defending Bashar Al-Assad’s government from being ousted. These efforts have culminated in Russia’s most brazen attempt at regime change since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marks its total abandonment of international norms and near-complete isolation from multilateral institutions.

Unfortunately, not only did U.S. actions in the war on terror encourage Russia to use force to advance its political aims, it also created tensions with allies which harmed the international community’s ability to serve as a deterrent. While the war in Afghanistan was initially popular, as evidenced by the only invocation of NATO’s Article 5, the decision to go to war in Iraq did not meet as strong support. The war in Iraq was supported by various European countries, including the United Kingdom, but it went against the wishes of France and Germany, causing a schism between major allies. The schism grew when European nations uncovered that the massive National Security Agency spying program, borne out of the war on terror, had targeted many U.S. allies in the European Union and NATO.[21] Later, the Trump presidency’s erraticism strained relations even more, but leaders of European nations hoped that President Biden’s election would lead to a mended relationship. However, the Biden administration’s abrupt, uncoordinated, and unilateral decision to pull out of Afghanistan forced allies to further question the reliability of U.S. partnership.[22] Fortunately, these fears seemed to have been misplaced, as the United States has led the world in a unified reaction to Russia’s most recent invasion of Ukraine. Still, had U.S. relations with allies in the preceding years not been so turbulent, Russia would not have had a gap to exploit. Whether this newfound Western unity is enough to stop Russia remains to be seen, but for the thousands of Ukrainians who have lost loved ones and the millions now displaced, it has to feel like too little, too late. 

While the war in Afghanistan and the accompanying war on terror engendered a global environment where the use of military force required little justification, the fault lies with those who choose to take that path. The United States cannot be blamed for Russian wars of aggression, but they do have a responsibility, as de facto leaders of the liberal international order, to act in accordance with the norms they wish others to follow. The September 11th attacks were shocking, and it would have been challenging for the United States to overcome its emotion to seriously pursue a diplomatic solution before resorting to force. Yet, those difficult decisions are precisely the ones that we need leaders to make if there is any hope of building a peaceful global society. Admittedly, the world has a long way to go to reach such ideals, especially since there is a possibility that ending Russian aggression may itself require force. However, the newfound global condemnation of unjustified military force provides the United States with an opportunity to reaffirm its dedication to a multilateral order that prioritizes diplomacy over militarism. 

About the Author

Darryl Alexander is a 2nd year MPP student and 2023 Kerry Fellow at Yale's Jackson School of Global Affairs. Prior to Yale, he spent time as a community organizer and Peace Corps Volunteer.

Endnotes

1. “Statement by the President in Address to the Nation.” Accessed November 5, 2022. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html. 

2. Armey, Richard K. “H.J.Res.64 - 107th Congress (2001-2002): Authorization for Use of Military Force.” Legislation, September 14, 2001. 2001/2002. https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-joint-resolution/64?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22H.J.Res.64+-+107th+Congress+Authorization+for+Use+of+Military+Force.%22%2C%22H.J.Res.64%22%2C%22107th%22%2C%22Congress%22%2C%22Authorization%22%2C%22for%22%2C%22Use%22%2C%22of%22%2C%22Military%22%2C%22Force.%22%5D%7D&s=4&r=1 

3. Weed, Matthew. “The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Background in Brief,” n.d., 4. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/aumf-071013.pdf 

4. Rice, Condoleeza. No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. Crown, 2011, pp. 90-92.

5. “CNN.Com - U.S. Repeatedly Asked Taliban to Expel Bin Laden - Jan. 30, 2004.” Accessed November 5, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/30/taliban.talks/.

6. Malkasian, Carter. The American War in Afghanistan. Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 58.

7. The Costs of War. “Human Costs of U.S. Post-9/11 Wars: Direct War Deaths in Major War Zones | Figures | Costs of War.” Accessed November 5, 2022. https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/WarDeathToll.

8. MSNBC.com. “‘Building Momentum for Regime Change’: Rumsfeld’s Secret Memos.” Accessed November 5, 2022. https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/building-momentum-regime-change-rumsfe-msna18940.

9. “Security Council Resolution 1441 - UNSCR.” Accessed November 5, 2022. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1441.

10. “Hussein’s Prewar Ties To Al-Qaeda Discounted.” Accessed November 5, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/05/AR2007040502263.html.

11. Borger, Julian. “Colin Powell’s UN Speech: A Decisive Moment in Undermining US Credibility.” The Guardian, October 18, 2021, sec. US news. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/oct/18/colin-powell-un-security-council-iraq.

12. “Civilian Deaths from Violence in 2003-2011 :: Iraq Body Count.” Accessed November 5, 2022. https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/.

13. “Costs of War.” Accessed November 5, 2022. https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/.

14. “Explainer: ISIS-Khorasan in Afghanistan | Wilson Center.” Accessed November 5, 2022. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/explainer-isis-khorasan-afghanistan.

15. Acton, James M. “The U.S. Exit From the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Has Fueled a New Arms Race.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed November 5, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/13/u.s.-exit-from-anti-ballistic-missile-treaty-has-fueled-new-arms-race-pub-85977.

16. “C.I.A. Judgment on Russia Built on Swell of Evidence - The New York Times.” Accessed November 5, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/11/us/politics/cia-judgment-intelligence-russia-hacking-evidence.html.

17. Reuters. “Georgia Started War with Russia: EU-Backed Report,” September 30, 2009, sec. World News. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-russia-report-idUSTRE58T4MO20090930.

18. “Nato Rejects Russian Claims of Libya Mission Creep | Nato | The Guardian.” Accessed November 5, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/15/nato-libya-rasmussen-medvedev-criticism.

19. “Putin Likens U.N. Libya Resolution to Crusades | Reuters.” Accessed November 5, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-russia-idUSTRE72K3JR20110321.

20. “Ukraine profile - Timeline.” 2020. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18010123.

21. Haynes, Jonathan. “EU Demands Clarification over US Spying Claims.” The Guardian, June 30, 2013, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/30/us-clarification-us-spying-nsa.

22. “UK Struggles for Influence as Afghan Crisis Strains US Ties | AP News.” Accessed November 5, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/europe-kabul-g-7-summit-a8967ceee9223ccc5915ed43a5527902.