By Graham Owens

Introduction

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was founded in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, to strengthen the new theocratic state. The guards served as a “people’s army” with distinction from the conventional military, and primarily aimed to prevent an internal revolution against Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, the recently instituted Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. [1] However, several developments over the following decades quickly transformed the IRGC from a basic military complex into an economic and political force unlike any other organization in the world.

In the years following 1979, the guards steadily and shrewdly consolidated their power. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), the IRGC aided in national defense against Iraqis and internal rebels, strengthening their national legitimacy as war heroes. Additionally, the guards worked directly alongside Khomeini to prevent a potential coup, thus forming a powerful alliance between the guards and Supreme Leader which would be continued by Khomeini’s successor, the still-ruling Ayatollah Ali Khameini. [2] In return for the aforementioned protection and legitimacy, Khameini offered the guards competitive economic opportunities and overlooked their various corruption practices. Later, the global boom in technology allowed the IRGC to intensely expand its surveillance and cyber capacities both domestically and internationally. In 2007, Iran conducted an official merger between the guards and the Basij, Iran’s morality police which had earned a similarly grim reputation for brutality. This move represented the IRGC’s acceptance as the primary enforcers of Shi’a values, a role which they maintain today. [3] 

All the while, the guards were building an economic empire, amassing monopolies over entire industries through government-sponsored holding groups called bonyads. This combination of financial wealth, political support, and military strength has made the IRGC a lethally powerful and uniquely autonomous player in Iranian society. Today, its military operations include a ground force, navy, air force, morality police, and cyberattack bureau, with 15,000 to (allegedly) 600,000 soldiers in each branch. [4] Its brutal tactics—ranging from civilian torture to widescale cyberattacks—ignite fear among Iranians and draw criticism from abroad.

Interestingly, the IRGC has performed an economic and political consolidation of the sports industry, which reveals both its priorities and insecurities. Iranian sports have historically been dominated by wrestling, the national sport of Iran (which has an extremely long history and rich legacy), followed by football (soccer), in which the Middle East has become increasingly prominent on the global stage. Since Supreme Leader Khomeini’s allowance of sports in 1987, these games have served as means and markers of freedom for Iranian people, particularly women and other marginalized groups. [5] However, Iranian sports is also marked by the harsh regulation of its athletes, stemming from the regime’s imposition of cultural and legal conservatism in all aspects of society. All Iranian athletes face extraordinary pressure, expectations, and potential consequences as representatives of their country. [6] The IRGC’s deep involvement in establishing the boundaries of national sports, through scrutinization of athlete conduct and multifaceted profiting from the industry, serves as a window into the complex struggles of power, traditionalism, and freedom across Iran.

Systematic Control of the Sports Industry

The IRGC is known for its widespread and often corrupt economic endeavors, with some experts estimating the corps’ market share as comprising one to two thirds of Iran’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). [7] Most notoriously, the guards control bonyads, the aforementioned holding groups which are often designated as nongovernmental charitable foundations, but in reality employ government support to take over profitable companies or win lucrative contracts. Many scholars have analyzed the IRGC’s ventures into the construction, petroleum, and smuggling industries, measures that have enriched senior officers, expanded domestic and international covert operations, and accumulated influence over the Iranian state. [8] Likewise, the guards have also utilized the Iranian sports industry as a means to the same ends.

The IRGC has assumed significant leadership positions in many prominent Iranian clubs and federations. In football alone, individuals with direct ties to the guards and little experience in sports management control the beloved Tehran clubs Persepolis and Esteghlal, as well as the Iranian Football Federation itself. [9] Through these clubs and countless others, the IRGC not only reaps enormous economic profits, which can be invested in other economic, intelligence, or military endeavors, but also shapes Iranian sports to align with its institutional priorities: Islamic conservatism, suppression of women, undisputed control over civilians, and more. The guards have also used their ties to sporting federations to recruit young men for its ground forces. Specifically, martial arts federations under the control of the Iranian Ministry of Sport and Youth, including Judo and Kick-Jitsu, serve as recruiting centers for IRGC special units, which are primarily tasked with suppressing protests through thug-like brutality. [10] Thus, the IRGC uses its grip over the sporting industry to strengthen itself both economically and militarily.

In addition to its ownership and influence over sporting clubs, federations, and athletes, the IRGC also leverages internally controlled media to further maximize power and profit from sports. The IRGC directly controls two prominent media outlets in Iran: Fars News Agency and Tasnim News Agency, both of which were sanctioned by the United States in 2023 for their ties to the guards. [11] These sources not only cover sports, drawing money and attention toward IRGC-controlled competitions, but also shape the public consensus on athlete-related controversies. In January 2023, Tasnim released a scathing report about the arrest of Iranian football players who had been out drinking alcohol, which is illegal in Iran. [12] Similarly, after rock climber Elnaz Rekabi competed without a hijab and faced uncertainty over her safety, it was Tasnim that published her brother’s dubious comments that she was happily returning to Iran. [13] This deft implementation of the media helps affirm IRGC dominance over athletes and the sports industry, while ensuring public conformity with state ideology.

Use of Sports to Control Women

The IRGC closely monitors sports to crack down on dissenters to the structural and cultural frameworks of the Iranian regime. The guards particularly scrutinize female athletes, who wield a unique power to publicly challenge Iranian gender norms. In 2019, Sadaf Khadem traveled to France and became the first ever Iranian female boxer to participate in an official match. She fought without a hijab or veil, following French sporting regulations but defying Iranian laws. Upon attempting to return home, she received threats and arrest warrants from the regime, forcing her to remain exiled in France for a year, whereafter she has chosen to remain ever since. [14]

Khadem’s story attracted considerable media attention and inspired a wave of Iranian women to try boxing. Consequently, less than two months after her fight, women’s boxing was banned in the Khuzestan Province: no woman would be allowed to train or compete, and any men working with them would face serious consequences. [15] The Iranian National Boxing Federation is heavily influenced by the IRGC, and even has IRGC officials as top-ranking members. Hossein Souri, the former head of the federation who defected to Spain in 2022, reveals that sports managers, “must follow whatever has been dictated [by the Islamic Republic and IRGC]…As heads of the federations, we had to do what they told us to do.” [16] Accordingly, observers understood this crackdown on women’s boxing as part of the IRGC’s aggressive condemnation of Khadem fighting without a hijab.

Such interference in women’s sports displays a desire to control not only female athletes, but all Iranian women. After all, sports offer a rare opportunity for self-expression and defiance of Iranian gender expectations, which include the widespread beliefs that physical activity may reduce a woman’s desirability and that physical strength may make them less controllable. [17] For the IRGC, to suppress women’s sports is to close the window for a larger paradigm shift regarding the status of women in Iran. However, this is not to say that the IRGC seeks the complete elimination of women’s sports; rather, the guards support its practice as a means of promoting existing norms. When female athletes use their platform to promote the regime’s values—through wearing hijabs, demonstrating national pride, and accepting their roles as obedient representatives of the Iranian state—they reaffirm gender expectations of submissiveness and solidify the power of the IRGC. However, it is only to this extent that the guards tolerate the existence of women’s sports. The slightest disobedience, such as competing in a boxing match without a hijab, represents a recognition of women’s sports’ potential for expression and resistance, and prompts its harsh suppression.

Sports and IRGC Intimidation on the Global Scale

The IRGC utilizes sports to control not only Iranians at home, but also those abroad. This connects to their broader vision of all Iranians, whether on home soil or not, as representatives of and potential threats to Iran. This practice was observed in the 2022 Qatar World Cup, arguably the biggest sporting event in the world, which took place amidst protests in response to the tragic death of Mahsa Amini, an Iranian woman arrested for not wearing a veil who died in police custody. [18] The IRGC followed the national team to Qatar, specifically to ensure their good conduct by any means necessary. After the team refused to sing the national anthem in Iran’s debut match, showing solidarity with protesters at home, the guards met with each player and threatened to harm their loved ones if they expressed any further dissent. [19] Clearly, the IRGC’s ruthlessness toward athletes does not ease up beyond national borders, or even in the global spotlight. 

In this way, sports serve as a microcosm of IRGC foreign operations, which are an integral part of the guard’s foundational responsibilities. Since its inception, the IRGC has amassed an infamous reputation for the transnational repression of Iranian expatriates. The guards make use of fake media, the kidnapping of exiles, and cyberattacks, to intimidate, silence, and terrorize dissenting emigrants. [20] The IRGC embraces this role autonomously, demonstrating both the Supreme Leader’s expectations and the guards’ institutional priorities to control Iranians abroad, further intimidating the national population. Athletes, even if only leaving Iran temporarily, fit into this description, and become subject to this effort.

Role of Global Criticism
The IRGC is already unpopular among the Iranian people and international community, and its repression of sports does not help with its public appeal. The guards do make some effort to reframe their involvement in sports, using controlled media to publish supportive propaganda. Regardless, their conduct toward sports seems to be counterproductively harsh: Iran faces intense criticism for its brutalization of athletes, which often strikes observers as egregious and unnecessary. However, the IRGC actually benefits from this international condemnation, which allows it to act with such swift violence, in sports and all other contexts.

To appreciate how and why the IRGC benefits from negative publicity, one must recall its heavy involvement in the Iranian economy, including its illegal activities. Indeed, the guards make a fortune from smuggling narcotics, alcohol, and oil through territorial borders. [21] This practice has become so widespread that it has drawn attention and criticism from within other sectors of the Iranian government, an extreme rarity which demonstrates the IRGC’s autonomy in this behavior. Furthermore, sanctions against the Iranian state drive up demand for smuggled goods, and fill the pockets of the guards through black market commerce. [22] For this reason, although criticism and sanctions isolate the national economy and weaken the government, the IRGC itself remains largely unbothered and often better off: the guards’ success, in many ways, is inversely correlated to the well-being of Iran as a whole. Their brazen corruption, along with their massive power over the sports industry, allows them to suppress athletes, discriminate against women, and manipulate sports for institutional profit amidst intense international criticism.

Looking Ahead: Potential Challenges to the Status Quo

At first glance, there is no major reason to expect a dramatic change in the Iranian sports industry in the near future. The IRGC boasts an enormous influence, if not outright ownership, over national sporting federations, and thus virtually determines the direction of the industry. Furthermore, it has proven extremely prolific in silencing and terrorizing dissenters, whether they be athletes, coaches, or onlookers. [23] Accordingly, a safe prediction would be that the current political landscape of Iranian sports will remain, as long as the IRGC wields anywhere near its current levels of power.

However, several important domestic and regional trends suggest that other outcomes are possible. Firstly, as Iran’s population is predominantly young, the IRGC has lost much of its public admiration as “defenders of the Islamic State,” which it largely acquired through the Iran-Iraq War some four decades ago. Its brutality and corruption render it largely unpopular amongst the Iranian public, who in the wake of Mahsa Amini’s tragic death have recently shown willingness to protest. [24] While the IRGC can expand its fear mongering tactics, contemporary waves of dissent are set to affect the political landscape of Iran, and may even challenge IRGC power. [25] This could open a dream for the autonomy, or at least self-sufficiency of the Iranian sports industry.

Additionally, recent years have seen an enormous redefinition of Middle Eastern sports, particularly in the Gulf States, which Iran has remained almost entirely removed from. Saudi Arabia has attracted world famous stars like Cristiano Ronaldo and Phil Mickelson to play in domestic leagues, while Qatar recently hosted the 2022 World Cup. Such actions, aimed to attract viewership and legitimacy from Western audiences, directly oppose the conviction of the Iranian state. However, it is important to consider that in less than four decades, the regime has evolved from labeling sports as an evil of the West, into embracing the industry as a source of national pride. While World Cup bids remain far off, globalization offers promise for Iranian sports to find some redefinition, and eventually even freedom.

About the authors

Graham Owens is a first year undergraduate student at the University of Pennsylvania. He plans on studying International Relations and is interested in working in law. Outside of academics, he enjoys rock climbing, exploring new music genres, and hanging out with friends.

Endnotes

1. Rampe, Will and Ibrahim, Sara. “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” Council on Foreign Relations, April 20, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards.

2. Wehrey, Frederic, Green, Jerrold D., Nichiporuk, Brian, Nader, Alireza, Hansell, Lydia, Nafisi, Rasool, and Bohandy, S.R. The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009.) p. 25.

3. Ibid. p. 27.

4. Rampe, Will and Ibrahim, Sara. “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” Council on Foreign Relations, April 20, 2023.

5. Hareuveny, Or and Blanga, Yehuda U. August 29, 2022. "Between the Sacred and the Profane: Conflicts between Football and Sharia in Iran." Middle Eastern Studies 59 (4): 640-664.

6. Rostampour, Mehdi. “Protests Are A Deadly Game For Iranian Sports Figures.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 7, 2023. Accessed November 28, 2023. https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-protests-sports-stars-execution/32400414.html#:~:text=Two%20athletes%20have%20been%20executed,themselves%2C%20according%20to%20rights%20groups.

7. Borger, Julian, and Tait, Robert. “The Financial Power of the Revolutionary Guards.” The Guardian, February 15, 2010. Accessed December 3, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/15/financial-power-revolutionary-guard.

8. Wehrey, Frederic, Green, Jerrold D., Nichiporuk, Brian, Nader, Alireza, Hansell, Lydia, Nafisi, Rasool, and Bohandy, S.R. The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009) p. 55.

9. Foroohar, Kambiz. “Political Football: How the Iranian Government Intervenes in Sports.” Middle East Institute, January 25, 2021. Accessed April 27, 2024. https://www.mei.edu/publications/political-football-how-iranian-government-intervenes-sports.

10. Shams, Omid. “Role Of Russia, Iranian Sports Ministry In Training Iran’s Repression Forces.” Iranwire, December 5, 2022. Accessed December 2, 2023. https://iranwire.com/en/politics/110879-russias-role-in-training-irans-repression-forces/.

11. “The IRGC’s Media Trifecta Part 1: The Case of Tasnim and Fars.” Tehran Bureau, July 18, 2023. Accessed December 3, 2023. https://tehranbureau.com/tasnim-fars/.

12. Ibid.

13. Kasulius Cho, Kelly, Dadouch, Sarah, and Berger, Miriam. “Iranian Climber’s Return Home After Not Wearing Headscarf Raises Safety Fears.” Washington Post, October 18, 2022. Accessed December 3, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/18/iranian-climber-elnaz-rekabi-hijab-protests/.

14. Sfeir, Sarah. “From Iran to France, how Sadaf Khadem became a boxer and champion of women’s rights.” Arab News, October 17, 2022. Accessed December 1, 2023. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2182426/sport.

15. Farda, Radio. “Khuzestan First Region In Iran To Officially Ban Women's Boxing.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, June 1, 2020. Accessed December 1, 2023. https://en.radiofarda.com/a/khuzestan-first-region-in-iran-to-officially-ban-women-s-boxing/30646185.html.

16. Younesipour, Payam. “Ex-Federation Boss: I Suffered Discrimination Because of My Ethnicity.” Iranwire, April 5, 2023. Accessed December 2, 2023. https://iranwire.com/en/sports/115224-ex-federation-boss-i-suffered-discrimination-because-of-my-ethnicity/.

17. Rahbari, Ladan and Mahmudabadi, Zeinab. 2022. "Women’s (Non)Participation in Sports: Gendered Attitudes, Biopolitics, and women’s Perceptions of Body and Sports in Iran." DiGeSt - Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies 9 (1): 89-105.

18. Adil, Hafsa. “‘Say her name, Mahsa Amini’: Iran protests arrive at World Cup,” Al Jazeera, November 21, 2022. Accessed January 5, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/21/say-her-name-mahsa-amini-iran-protests-arrive-at-world-cup#:~:text=Iran%20football%20fans%20use%20the,those%20protesting%20in%20their%20country.&text=Doha%2C%20Qatar%20%E2%80%93%20Chants%20of%20%E2%80%9C,World%20Cup%202022%20against%20England.

19. Kiley, Sam. “Iran Threatened Families of National Soccer Team, According to Security Source.” CNN, November 29, 2022. Accessed December 2, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/28/football/iran-soccer-family-threats-intl-spt/index.html.

20. “Iran Case Study: Understanding Transnational Repression.” Freedom House, 2021. Accessed November 29, 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/iran.

21. Wehrey, Frederic; Green, Jerrold D.; Nichiporuk, Brian; Nader, Alireza; Hansell, Lydia; Nafisi, Rasool, and Bohandy, S.R. The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009.) p. 64.

22. Batmanghelidj, Esfandyar. “Tougher U.S. Sanctions Will Enrich Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” Foreign Policy, October 4, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/04/irans-revolutionary-guard-corps-wont-suffer-from-stronger-u-s-sanctions-theyll-benefit-irgc-trump-sanctions/.

23. Rostampour, Mehdi. “Protests Are A Deadly Game For Iranian Sports Figures.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 7, 2023. Accessed November 28, 2023. https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-protests-sports-stars-execution/32400414.html#:~:text=Two%20athletes%20have%20been%20executed,themselves%2C%20according%20to%20rights%20groups.

24. Goldstone, Jack A. “The protests in Iran are not a revolution—yet. These events must occur first.” Atlantic Council, September 7, 2023. Accessed Jan 5, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-protests-revolution-goldstone/.

25. Bajoghli, Narges. Iran Reframed: Anxieties of Power In the Islamic Republic. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020.)

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the editors or the journal.