By Liram Stenzler-Koblentz

On June 30, 2013, two years after the first Egyptian revolution had ousted long-time President Hosni Mubarak, the protesters returned to Tahrir Square. This time they called for the resignation of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first freely elected president and first civilian president.

On July 1, 2013, after Morsi rejected these calls and following clashes between government and opposition supporters, the military delivered an ultimatum to Morsi, saying that he must satisfy the public’s demands within two days and reach an agreement with opposition groups in order to resolve Egypt’s political crisis, or else the military would execute its own solution.

On July 3, 2013, following continued protests and Morsi’s refusal to accept the ultimatum — claiming he was Egypt’s legitimate leader – a military coup began. The general commander of the armed forces, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, announced that Morsi was no longer president and that the army was taking control of Egypt.

This latest revolution raises important issues that are worth discussing, such as its effect on the Arab world and on Egyptian-American relations. But a very interesting question that needs to be addressed is: Why, in contrast to the 2011 revolution, did the army take a position so quickly? The answer to this question might help to predict what kind of president we can expect to see after the next elections will be held – will it be a civilian or a former military man?

In order to answer these questions we have to look back to the year 1952, the date of the Free Officers Revolution. Since then and until the fall of Mubarak’s regime, Egypt has been ruled by former military leaders and the army has had a major role in the military-political and economic fields.

Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak became civil leaders, but maintained the closest of ties with the military ranks and relied on their assistance. Mubarak, for instance, promoted the interests of the military while including military officials in government management. Under his regime, a position entitled Minister of Military Production was created; the former Defense Minister, Hussein Tantawi, served in this position.

The main part of the army’s strength derives from the role it plays in Egypt’s economy: for instance, the Egyptian military is the sole owner of the weapon production industry in the country. Its exclusive control over military production is assured by emergency legislation that prohibits the legislative authorities or the media from any type of supervision over the industry. In 2011, the Egyptian military industry was composed of dozens of companies and factories that, in addition to the production of weapons, manufactured products for the civilian sector, such as steel products, chemical products, and electronic components.[1]

When the first revolution started, army leaders stood aside and didn’t try to force Mubarak to resign from his position. We can assume they did so because they sought to maintain the status quo that matched their interests. Only after three weeks of protests and after the middle class and academics joined the protesters – a force that showed the unity of the population in their struggle against Mubarak — did the military stop supporting the president and dissociate itself from him by announcing that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) supported the legitimate demands of the people — ultimately forcing Mubarak to resign. All of his authorities were then transferred to Hussein Tantawi, Minister of Defense.

After the fall of Mubarak’s regime and until the first free elections were held in June 2012, we could have witnessed the desire of the army to maintain its strength: The power to govern Egypt was in the hands of the SCAF — the governing body of twenty-one officers in the Egyptian military.

Following  2012 elections, a new status quo emerged: contrary to the situation that held from 1952 until 2011 – Morsi and his regime not only didn’t depend on the army, but tried to challenge the generals’ power and gain more power themselves by weakening the army. On August 12, 2012, Morsi forced the retirement of the defense minister, the army chief of staff, and other senior generals. He also nullified the constitutional declaration, issued by the military after the resignation of Mubarak, which withheld many powers from the president’s office. This was replaced by a declaration that gave the president greater authorities, including the power to pass any decision or law unilaterally.

These and other acts produced anger towards Morsi. Thousands of protesters arrived at Tahrir Square. This revolution was different from the first one: this time the army issued Morsi with an ultimatum only two days after the revolution began, and when he didn’t agree to resign, the army took immediate control and arrested him and other Muslim Brotherhood leaders by a military coup.

The army’s stated justification for its actions was to end the clash between government and opposition supporters before it could spin out of control. However, we can assume that the implicit reason behind these reckless steps was the army’s yearning to reinstate the old social order and bring back the old status quo.

If the army is set on regaining power, we are likely not only to see the SCAF take the same steps as before, but even more radical ones. On August 14, following brutal clashes between Morsi’s supporters and the army that ended with approximately 149 people dead and more than 500 people injured, the army announced a month-long state of emergency throughout Egypt. It also announced that it would tighten supervision over the media.

The second revolution and these latest events can lead to a conclusion that this time, rather than allow a civilian leader to take power after the revolution, army leaders may prefer that one of their own be elected as Egypt’s next president.

About the Author

Liram Stenzler-Koblentz is a Ph.D. candidate at Tel-Aviv University, Israel, in the Department of Political Science. Her research deals with the issue of democratic countries’ war on terrorist organizations and guerrilla movements. She is currently a Visiting Assistant in Research at the Sociology Department, Yale University.

Endnotes

1. Goldstone, A. Jack. “Understanding the Revolution of 2011.” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2011): 9.