By Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Samuel Winegar

20th century English naval theoretician Sir Julian Corbett stated that the object of naval warfare is to control the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs).[1] Under the status quo, all Indo-Pacific states, including the United States, have long enjoyed unfettered access to the surrounding SLOCs. The increasing desire of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to secure its own SLOCs is a rational and predictable national interest given its rapid economic growth. However, unlike the United States, the PRC has recently demonstrated a tendency to aggressively assert illegal maritime claims (called the “nine-dash line”) against Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan.[2] By utilizing gray zone tactics such as maritime militias, a militarized coast guard, and prosecution of legitimate competing commercial vessels, the PRC is challenging the existing free-and-open maritime commons. During World War II, Admiral Ernest King famously dubbed Taiwan “the cork in the bottle” of Japanese SLOCs, given the island’s central position in the first island chain.[3] General Douglas MacArthur later called it “an unsinkable aircraft carrier.”[4] The PRC similarly refers to the island as “essential strategic space for China’s rejuvenation” and a “springboard to the Pacific” in official military writings.[5] Were Taiwan’s sovereignty ever so challenged as to question the security of these SLOCs, vital economic links could be severed by a revisionist and violent PRC. Speaking strictly from this perspective, and without regard for the political and moral considerations of continuing the status quo, it is decidedly in the national interest of the United States to deter a hostile PRC takeover of Taiwan, and maintain the kinetic (physical force) capabilities necessary to protect Taiwan if deterrence fails. How then, might the United States and its regional partners best prepare the battlefield for potential conflict? Better yet, to deter PRC aggression without fighting? A modern reading of Corbett’s classic foundational text will yield productive answers to these complex operational questions.

A prolonged high-end conflict with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N)) will prove difficult for the U.S. Navy (USN). China would first seek to sever the navy’s vulnerable supply networks by targeting resupply vessels and supply depots across the region.[6][7] While it is possible the United States will strengthen or otherwise diversify its logistics network, the confines of geography will endure. In a Taiwanese contingency, China would be fighting (and resupplying) in its strategic backyard.[8] The USN must therefore be prepared, if deterrence fails, to fight and win in a short timeframe. A Mahanian-style concentration of forces and winner-take-all battle is not necessary, though. As Corbett puts it, a battleforce need not be “huddled together like a drove of sheep, but distributed with regard to a single common purpose, and linked together by the effectual energy of a single will.”[9] In this regard, the Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept is clearly Corbettian. As described by Vice Admiral Phillip Sawyer, DMO is “geographically distributed naval forces integrated to synchronize operations across all domains.”[10]

How can Corbett further inform the DMO concept? In the age of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), it is difficult to further apply his famed dreadnought-era lessons. The theories espoused in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, however prophetic, simply cannot be applied 111 years later without significant modification. When Corbett wrote his seminal work in 1911, the unmatched guns of the British Battle Fleet had a maximum firing range of around ten miles.[11] Meanwhile, today’s basic anti-ship missiles enjoy effective ranges of hundreds if not thousands of miles. The remarkable disparity in the naked definition of range challenges many of Corbett’s fundamental assertions about naval warfare. Still, Corbett’s emphasis on cruisers remains an integral answer to the enduring question of naval warfare: who can shoot the farthest most effectively? These fast, lightweight ships served as “eyes of the fleet,” seeking out enemy combatants and reporting their position to more capable ships-of-the-line.[12] 

Of course, Corbett’s cruisers were a far cry from today’s models. The U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga class are arguably as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)-capable as their Arleigh Burke class destroyer compatriots, and the aircraft employed by a strike group.[13] Shipborne sensors offer individual units an unbelievable tactical horizon compared to the dreadnoughts of old. These advancements in ISR have been matched by the increasing range of shore-based and sea-based strike capabilities. For instance, China’s “carrier-killer” DF-21 ASBM has a range of 910 miles and could be positioned anywhere along China’s coastline or within its growing South China Sea island claims.[14] Organic shipboard sensors may not provide a safe enough range with which to engage a PLA(N) target within the first island chain without accepting undue risk from shore-based ASBMs. Even discounting the formidable shore-based assets of the PLA(N) and PLA Air Force, U.S. and partner assets would still be forced to position themselves at a significant range to detect and engage PLA(N) vessels at sea. China is winning the “range war.”[15] The “eyes of the fleet” must look farther over the horizon, move closer to the potential theater, or both.

As stated, the first shooter to strike effectively at range will have a massive advantage. However, it is unlikely that the United States or partner states would strike first. Given China’s record of provocations in the region, any strike would likely be in response to some Chinese aggression.[16] Therefore, the United States would then find itself in the unfavorable tactical position of having to respond effectively and near-instantaneously to a widespread and coordinated Chinese salvo against Taiwanese, Japanese, and American targets across the first island chain. Such a task would require abundant targeting data with which to guide a reciprocal strike.

Corbett’s “eyes of the fleet,” once cruisers, now also include satellites and other inorganic sensors that provide strike assets with increased battlespace awareness. New ISR capabilities extend individual tactical horizons to essentially global ranges. To overcome hypothetical operational challenges, ships and other strike resources must be able to incorporate distributed and diversified inorganic targeting systems at a moment’s notice. This represents an expansion of the shooter-to-target kill chain model. While range will always be relevant, the question is one of detection. How can the United States furnish its strike forces with sufficient and survivable inorganic targeting data sources to enable engagement at a more favorable range?

China’s close proximity to Taiwan is not the sole defining characteristic of regional geography. General Douglas MacArthur repeatedly used the term ‘chain’ to describe the islands extending “from the Aleutians to the Marianas” in his advocacy for an established American military presence there. [17] The importance of the first island chain has not waned since MacArthur’s time. Current USN plans for a “Taiwan contingency” involve deploying Marines to the Nansei Islands, armed with ASBMs.[18] The Japanese strategy supports the maintenance of a defensive “southwestern wall” along the Nansei Islands, including radar and intelligence-gathering stations alongside ASBMs.[19] While these plans represent a step in the right direction, neither would, in their current form, effectively utilize “shooters” outside of the first island chain. Thus, current plans exclude significant striking power less vulnerable to a Chinese first strike. 

The Ryukyu and Senkaku islands, sovereign Japanese territory, must be furnished with a combination of over-the-horizon radars, electronic warfare systems, and other sensors to provide positional data of PLA(N) units to U.S. and partner strike assets outside of the first island chain. These sensors could include mobile vehicle-based search radars such as the AN/TPS-80 and even fixed installations akin to Aegis Ashore. It is not sufficient or prudent to depend solely on the satellite-oriented or GPS-reliant data sources, regardless of how effective they have been employed against less-capable adversaries.[20] Chinese strategic writings make explicit reference to “the enemy’s even greater reliance on space systems” and that “select attacks against the critical node targets of the enemy space systems” would become necessary if facing “space strikes.”[21] Without uninterrupted ISR from U.S. or partner satellites, U.S. strike forces would be left with few inorganic options with which to guide strikes against Chinese forces. Also key is identifying and developing alternative and diverse means of data transmission, whether by undersea cables, or by a collection of wireless repeaters including waterborne and airborne nodes. While significant technical limitations exist in this field, foremost among them the ability to transmit sufficiently high-quality data over the horizon without satellites, investments in this area should constitute a research and development priority for the Department of Defense.

Of course, one obvious argument against the “sensorization” of the first island chain is that they could easily be targeted in the early stage of a high-end conflict. However, the presence of mobile sensors could complicate PLA(N) targeting efforts ahead of a first strike. Similarly, whether fixed or mobile, the presence of sensors along the first island chain would impose additional opportunity costs on the PLA(N) by forcing expenditure of their finite munitions. Before their destruction, these sensors could offer up-to-the-minute positional data on PLA(N) vessels prepositioning themselves in advance of an invasion of Taiwan. Furthermore, destruction of these sensors would clearly communicate Chinese intent without risking strike assets or personnel needed for the ensuing fight. Given that these sensors would also be placed on Japanese soil, striking them would trigger a Japanese response, politically and strategically complicating Chinese war plans. Lastly, current U.S. satellite-oriented targeting infrastructure is equally, if not more, vulnerable to attack early on in a conflict. This by itself does not justify the creation of additional vulnerable sensors, but does underline the importance of diversifying sensor sourcing and placement.

Another legitimate criticism pertains to how China might mold regional perceptions of the sensors. Though inherently harmless, they could be viewed as augmenting a force the United States and partners plan to use against China. However, this concern rings hollow in the context of China’s persistent and continued militarization of its legally-dubious territorial claims in the South China Sea. As noted, the first island chain consists almost exclusively of sovereign Japanese territory. Japan has made public its keen interest in Taiwan’s continued sovereignty. From a political-military perspective, the United States can expect that Japan would be willing to engage in a joint sensorization of the first island chain. The aggressor narrative crumbles if Japan (in concert with the United States), decides to construct a similar sensor network within its unchallenged sovereign territory. Additionally, sensors offer potential benefits well prior to the start of a kinetic exchange. Studies by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments on the concept of “deterrence by detection” argue China or other actors will be “...less likely to act if they know they are being watched constantly and that their actions can be publicized widely…”[22] As described, sensor networks can serve a valuable purpose in times of peace as well as war.

The placement of networked sensors along the first island chain would merely be a logical extension of current and planned U.S. and Japanese operational planning in the region. In fact, the destroyer USS John Finn recently executed a successful SM-6 strike on a target 250 miles away without the use of organic sensors.[23] Japan is actively aware of the importance of tactical data sharing between branches of its military, but as of 2018, cannot reliably exchange data between its (inorganic) sensors and shooters.[24] The United States and Japan are clearly aware of the geographical advantages offered by the first island chain, and have increasingly dedicated manpower and resources to constrain China’s malign activities in the region. However, over-reliance on satellite targeting sources and increased vulnerability to strike assets within the first island chain underscores the need for distributed maritime operations. The union of distributed inorganic sensors within the first island chain along with strike forces situated remotely outside of the chain will augment U.S. deterrence and responsiveness in defense of Taiwan and the SLOCs that it straddles. By securing these SLOCs, the United States enables unencumbered international trade and would effectuate a core theorem of naval warfare. Corbett would approve.

About the Author

Lt. Samuel Winegar graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 2020 with a BS in Political Science, and Georgetown University in 2021 with an MA in Security Studies. He currently serves as Ordnance Officer on board USS Momsen (DDG-92). He has operational experience in both the Arabian Gulf and South China Sea.

Endnotes

1. Julian Stafford Corbett, Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy (London: Longsman, Green, and Co., 1911), p. 94.

2. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.” January 20, 2022, p. 15. 

3. Iskander Rehman, “Why Taiwan Matters.” CSBA, January 9, 2022, https://csbaonline.org/about/news/why-taiwan-matters. 

4. John Bolton and Derik R. Zitelman, “Why Taiwan Matters to the United States.” The Diplomat, August 23, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/why-taiwan-matters-to-the-united-states/. 

5. Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Department, The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013). 

6. Christopher Woody, “In a War with China, the US Navy's Warships Might Not Be the First Target.” Business Insider, June 5, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/in-war-china-us-logistics-fleet-would-be-major-target-2020-6. 

7.  Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Conducts 1st Underwater Port Demolition Test Providing Data for Future Combat,” Global Times, October 25, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202110/1237185.shtml#.YXYGVhkgkYs.twitter. 

8. David Axe, “China's Huge Naval Forces Are Making U.S. Naval Logistics Vulnerable.” The National Interest, December 7, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/china%E2%80%99s-huge-naval-forces-are-making-us-naval-logistics-vulnerable-173902. 

9. Julian Stafford Corbett, Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy (London: Longsman, Green, and Co., 1911), p.131.

10. Edward Lundquist, “DMO Is Navy's Operational Approach to Winning the High-End Fight at Sea,” Seapower, February 2, 2021, https://seapowermagazine.org/dmo-is-navys-operational-approach-to-winning-the-high-end-fight-at-sea/. 

11. Robert K. Massie, Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany and the Winning of the Great War at Sea, (London: Head of Zeus, 2013), pp. 630–31.

12. Julian Stafford Corbett, Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy (London: Longsman, Green, and Co., 1911), p. 112.

13. David Axe, “The U.S. Navy Is Building Cruisers-It's Just Not Calling Them That,” Forbes, February 8, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/02/08/the-us-navy-is-building-cruisers-its-just-not-calling-them-that/?sh=5d56c2ff5e52. 

14. Andrew S. Erickson, “The China Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Bookshelf,” China Analysis from Original Sources. November 17, 2020, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2020/11/the-china-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-asbm-bookshelf-3/

15. David Lague, “Special Report: U.S. Rearms to Nullify China's Missile Supremacy,” Reuters, May 6, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-missiles-specialreport-idUSKBN22I16W. 

16. “Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges.” Department of Defense, May 2013, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf. p. 3.

17. Andrew Erickson, and Joe Wuthnow, “Why Islands Still Matter in Asia: The Enduring Significance of the Pacific ‘Island Chains.’” andrewerickson.com, February 5, 2016, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2016/02/why-islands-still-matter-in-asia-the-enduring-significance-of-the-pacific-island-chains/#:~:text=Tracing%20the%20origin%20of%20the,in%20the%20Northwest%20Pacific%20Ocean. 

18. Editorial, “Japan, U.S. Draft Operation Plan for Taiwan Contingency: Sources,” Kyodo News, December 23, 2021, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/12/f5ed60ab6502-japan-us-draft-operation-plan-for-taiwan-contingency-sources.html.  

19. Scott W. Harold, Koichiro Bansho, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Koichi Isobe, and Richard L. Simcock II, “U.S.-Japan Alliance Conference: Meeting the Challenge of Amphibious Operations.” RAND Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF387.html. 

20. Larry Greenemeier, “GPS and the World's First ‘Space War,’” Scientific American, February 8, 2016. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gps-and-the-world-s-first-space-war/.  

21. Project Everest, “In Their Own Words: Foreign Military Thought,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2013, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2021-02-08%20Chinese%20Military%20Thoughts-%20In%20their%20own%20words%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy%202013.pdf?ver=NxAWg4BPw_NylEjxaha8Aw%3d%3d, 259. 

22. Thomas G. Mahnken, Travis Sharp, Chris Bassler, and Bryan W. Durkee, “Implementing Deterrence by Detection: Innovative Capabilities, Processes, and Organizations for Situational Awareness in the Indo-Pacific Region,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, July 14, 2014,  https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8269_(Implementing_Deterrence_By_Detection)_FINAL_web.pdf. p. iii 

23. Sam LaGrone, “Unmanned Systems, Passive Sensors Help USS John Finn Bullseye Target with SM-6,” USNI News, April 26, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/04/26/unmanned-systems-passive-sensors-help-uss-john-finn-bullseye-target-with-sm-6. 

24. Scott W. Harold, Koichiro Bansho, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Koichi Isobe, and Richard L. Simcock II, “U.S.-Japan Alliance Conference: Meeting the Challenge of Amphibious Operations.” RAND Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF387.html. p. 36.