By Zhi Han Tan

In recent years, the term “Chinese privilege” has emerged as a concept in Singaporean society that refers to supposed exclusive benefits enjoyed by the ethnic majority Chinese Singaporeans, implying disadvantages faced by ethnic minorities. In this article, I introduce Singapore’s approach to managing ethnic relations among its citizens. I then argue that the term “Chinese privilege” undermines Singapore’s core identity as a multi-ethnic nation. I explain why the term must be denounced by discussing the negative implications of the term on Singapore’s foreign policy with China. I conclude with two other recommendations to further weaken the legitimacy of applying the term Chinese privilege to Singapore.

Singapore’s approach to managing ethnic relations is guided by multiracialism, which entails an equal treatment of all ethnic groups and presupposes a distinctive culture and identity within each group.[1] The Singaporean government’s decision to adopt multiracialism involved two ideological decisions. First, Singapore inherited a pluralist worldview concerning ethnic groups from the British colonial government that deemed ethnicity visible and categorically distinct.[2] The colonial government delineated ethnic groups by where the migrant settlers originated from and segregated ethnic communities spatially and economically via a divide-and-rule approach.[3] Singapore’s post-colonial government retained this worldview upon achieving self-governance in 1959 as it believed that ethnicity was an unerasable part of each person’s identity. Ethnicity was especially salient in a new nation that lacked a strong national identity.[4] Even today, the government is averse to adopting an ethnicity-blind policy stance, as this approach risks mis-recognizing a dominant ethnic culture as representative of the entire nation and would suppress minority ethnic cultures.[5]

Second, the Singaporean government is committed to treating ethnic groups equally, as opposed to awarding one group more rights under the law.[6] It would have been imprudent for the newly independent government to declare Singapore as a Chinese nation, as the majority immigrant Chinese had no indigenous, legitimate claim to the island.[7] Moreover, the Singaporean government could not risk affiliating its citizens with communist China at a time when the Malaysian Federation and the British were purging communists.[8] 

Singapore’s government also rejected the vision of a “Malay Malaysia” that “identified with the supremacy, well-being, and the interests of” indigenous Malays.[9] During Singapore’s merger with Malaysia from 1963–1965, the city’s leaders envisioned a “Malaysian Malaysia” where all ethnic groups are treated equally.[10] This divergence in the policy stance of managing ethnic relations was one of the major reasons for Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965.

The equality of ethnic groups is reinforced through two main types of laws in Singapore. The first type of laws is anti-discriminatory, which goes beyond current laws in the Penal Code that prohibit racism and the creation of enmity between ethnic and religious groups.[11] The second type of laws are constitutional amendments to ensure political representation among ethnic groups. The Group Representation Constituency (GRC) scheme for parliamentary elections guaranteed at least one ethnic-minority candidate in each electoral division to ensure representation from minority ethnicities in parliament.[12] Additionally, the Singaporean Constitution was amended to institute a reserved presidency that guarantees representation to every ethnic group as the head of state.[13] 

Therefore, the term Chinese privilege undermines the notion that all ethnic groups are treated equally in Singapore; the allegation of the existence of Chinese privilege is a severe accusation because equal treatment of ethnic groups is a cornerstone of Singapore’s national identity. Borrowed from the term “white privilege,” Chinese privilege in Singapore refers to an invisible set of advantages that the majority ethnic-Chinese group enjoys but might not be cognizant of.[14]

These advantages may not solely refer to overt preferential treatment favoring the dominant ethnic group. For instance, Chinese Singaporeans do not worry as much about the availability of food options, unlike Muslims who do not always have suitable food options everywhere in Singapore.[15] Chinese privilege has also been interpreted as a set of overt institutional advantages that ethnic-Chinese citizens possess, such as the “political power, advantages and benefits that Chinese parliamentarians […] enjoy that are closed off to those from ethnic minority groups” which are “unearned assets […] by virtue of being Chinese.”[16] For instance, incumbent political leaders have claimed that Singapore is not ready for a non-ethnic-Chinese prime minister as some Singaporeans still vote along ethnic lines[17]. Outside of the political realm, the establishment of the Special Assistance Plan school system is another commonly cited example of Chinese privilege, as these elite schools are exclusive to Mandarin speakers and are thereby inaccessible to non-Mandarin-speaking ethnic minorities.[18] Notwithstanding the question of whether Chinese privilege indeed manifests in Singapore, the emergence of this notion in and of itself destabilizes the social fabric and legitimacy of multiracialism. 

Thus, the Singaporean government has chosen to refute the existence of Chinese privilege, which serves two political functions. The first is to counter potential claims from China that Singapore is a Chinese nation by virtue of having an ethnic-Chinese majority.[19] The second is to clearly communicate that all ethnicities receive equal treatment and maintain the legitimacy of multiracialism in Singapore.[20] 

Official news sources have reported that Singapore is a prime target of China’s influence operations, which include a set of official and covert strategies to advance China’s interests in other countries.[21]  Singapore is especially targeted for its ethnic-Chinese majority. Thus, Singapore’s denouncement of Chinese privilege sends a signal to refute China’s claim that Singapore is a “Chinese country” and undermine China’s influence apparatus.[22] China has called for all ethnic Chinese abroad to help their “motherland” irrespective of their nationality.[23] By constructing and reinforcing a common ethnicity extending beyond the boundaries of the sovereign state, China’s strategy places pressure on ethnic Chinese communities who are not their own citizens to support them.[24] 

This appeal to the ethnic dimension of an individual’s identity undermines the national identity of some Singaporeans. Because Singapore formed as a union of migrant settlers from different parts of Asia, the identity of each Singaporean is multi-layered. Evidently, the term “Chinese Singaporean” already suggests a dual identity; the former is tied to one’s ethnicity while the latter is to the nation. The government is painstakingly aware that this duality is neither always compatible nor necessarily antagonistic. While the ideal outcome is for the question of where Singaporeans are to matter more than where they and their ancestors came from—for nationality to triumph over ethnicity—the government has asserted that its citizens have not become “post-racial” yet.[25]

Especially for Chinese Singaporeans, supporting China unguardedly could, in some cases, be antithetical to Singapore’s national interests. In China’s dispute with the Philippines in the South China Sea, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea ruled in favor of claims by the Philippines.[26] Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement endorsing the tribunal’s resolution that China rejected, in order to assert Singapore’s subscription to a rules-based international order and the principles laid out by international law.[27] Singapore itself claimed sovereignty over Pedra Branca—an island 24 nautical miles east of Singapore with strategic importance—via the arbitration of the International Court of Justice.[28] However, China expected the majority ethnic-Chinese Singaporeans to side with them and  attempted to influence them using an appeal to a common ethnicity.[29] Analysts interpreted China’s seizure of Singapore’s armored Terrex vehicles, an ostensibly unrelated incident shortly after the tribunal’s ruling on the South China Sea, as a form of intimidation.[30] Nonetheless, had Singapore sided with China, Singapore would have undermined the legitimacy of its own territorial claims and contradicted its own interests. After all, Singapore’s foreign policy stance is based on principles guided by international law and state sovereignty; Singapore does not naturally side with a particular country by virtue of close partnerships or economic interests.[31] Indeed, Singapore’s Prime Minister recently reaffirmed ties with China with a caveat that Singapore “will retain and defend our important interests.”[32]

Furthermore, if the Singaporean government does not speak out against claims that Chinese privilege exists in the country, it risks falsely signaling their acknowledgement or even condonement of Chinese privilege. This would lend credence to China’s claim that Singapore is indeed a “Chinese country” that grants their ethnic Chinese residents special rights or opportunities. Of course, China’s influence apparatus will not cease simply because of the Singaporean government’s denouncement of Chinese privilege.[33] However, Singapore’s official denunciation is an important declaration against the appellation that Singapore is a “Chinese country.” Notably, Singapore’s Prime Minister stated that claims that Chinese privilege exists in Singapore are “entirely baseless” during his Mandarin National Day Rally speech in 2021, which was targeted primarily at Chinese Singaporeans.[34] This reminder to Chinese Singaporeans of their national allegiance to Singapore warned them against ethnic chauvinism. In other words, it was a symbolic move to counter claims that ethnic chauvinism is permissible in Singapore. The denouncement of Chinese privilege, among others, signals the government’s stance that Chinese Singaporeans do not have special rights by virtue of being the majority ethnic group.

Although the subject of this article is the implications of Chinese privilege on Singapore’s foreign relations with China, the onus to invalidate Chinese privilege and resist foreign influence operations that run against Singapore’s interests falls largely on domestic policymakers and Singaporeans themselves. Despite laws against ethnic discrimination and overt preferential treatment of any ethnic group, Malay Singaporeans have persistently fallen behind socioeconomically.[35] Even Singapore’s Prime Minister has acknowledged that ethnic minorities face disadvantages tied to their ethnicity, such as exclusionary language criteria in job applications, as well as prejudice from Chinese Singaporeans.[36] Hence, the two recommendations below aim to further advance domestic ethnic equality between Chinese Singaporeans and ethnic minorities with the goal of rendering accusations of Chinese privilege unjustified while rectifying the grievances that some ethnic minorities indeed experience in Singapore. 

First, Singapore should dismantle institutions that provide exclusive opportunities and resources to Chinese Singaporeans, such as the Special Assistance Plan (SAP). The SAP scheme was established to “preserve the best Chinese-stream schools […] to develop effectively bilingual students […] inculcated with traditional Chinese values.”[37] By mandating that all students in these schools read Mandarin, the SAP is an institution that promotes social closure, where the resources of these high-performing schools are concentrated within ethnically homogeneous social networks, because few ethnic minorities in Singapore can speak Mandarin. As these schools are institutions where Singaporeans receive their secondary and pre-tertiary education, as well as support from well-resourced alumni networks, the SAP structurally disadvantages ethnic minorities by hampering their access to the better-resourced majority group.[38] Abolishing the SAP scheme would enable more ethnic minorities to gain access to these well-established schools and counter claims of favoritism or undeserved privilege exclusive to ethnic-Chinese Singaporeans.

Second, to avoid framing social problems as synonymous with ethnic problems, official discourse should minimize coupling a particular ethnicity with specific issues. Just as how “Chinese privilege” is not useful in advancing ethnic discourse, phrases like the “Malay problem” risks homogenizing all ethnic Malays with belittling traits.[39] Although such derogatory terms are not used by political leaders, Malays are still singled out as a community that has made “great progress but must now aim higher.”[40] While the intention is often to motivate further social advancement, the “uplift” narrative falsely reinforces stereotypes that a certain ethnic group is deficient to begin with and must therefore “close the gap” with others.[41] To clarify further, this recommendation is not synonymous with ethnicity-blind treatment of social problems and socio-economic trends, where inequalities between ethnic groups become censored or invisible. Instead, ethnicity-based data should be contextualized with more data for researchers to examine ethnic intersections with more socio-economic variables.[42] This would offer a more nuanced explanation that might improve the targeting of social policies and avoid ascribing essential characteristics on specific ethnic communities as an oversimplified account of social issues.

In conclusion, public policies should preserve a level playing field for members of different ethnic groups to compete fairly to refute accusations of Chinese privilege more convincingly. It is also crucial for official and public discourse to contextualize social issues beyond an ethnic lens and minimize the chances for opportunists to use monolithic claims that widen rifts between ethnic groups. After all, the most effective means to counter foreign influence is for citizens themselves to recognize and denounce its ungrounded arguments.

About the Author

Zhi Han holds a Master in Public Policy from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP) in Singapore, with a specialization in politics and international affairs. He is currently a researcher interested in socio-economic inequality, mobility, and identity.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the position of LKYSPP, the National University of Singapore, or any other organization that the author is affiliated with.

Endnotes:

1. Daniel Goh, “Multiculturalism and the Problem of Solidarity,” in Management of Success: Singapore Revisited, ed. Terence Chong (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), 561–78.

2. Daniel P.S. Goh, “From Colonial Pluralism to Postcolonial Multiculturalism: Race, State Formation and the Question of Cultural Diversity in Malaysia and Singapore,” Sociology Compass 2, no. 1 (January 2008): 232–52, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00065.x.

3. Goh, “Multiculturalism and the Problem of Solidarity.”

4. Goh, “From Colonial Pluralism to Postcolonial Multiculturalism.”

5. Yuen Sin, “Parliament: S’pore Has Become Less Race-Conscious, but Has Not yet Arrived at a ‘Post-Racial State’, Says Edwin Tong,” The Straits Times, September 3, 2020, https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/parliament-singapore-has-now-become-less-race-conscious-but-country-has-not-yet-arrived-at; Beng Huat Chua, “Governing Race,” in Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore, by Beng Huat Chua (Singapore: NUS Press, 2017), 58–77.

6. Justin Ong, “National Day Rally 2021: ‘Entirely Baseless’ to Claim There Is Chinese Privilege in S’pore, Says PM Lee,” The Straits Times, August 29, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/national-day-rally-2021-all-races-treated-equally-in-spore-with-no-special.

7. Beng Huat Chua, “Being Chinese under Official Multiculturalism in Singapore,” Asian Ethnicity 10, no. 3 (October 2009): 239–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/14631360903189609.

8. Chua, "Being Chinese under Official Multiculturalism in Singapore."

9. Chong Guan Kwa et al., Seven Hundred Years: A History of Singapore (Singapore: National Library Board, 2019).

10. Kuan Yew Lee and Singapore Ministry of Culture, The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia (Ministry of Culture, 1965).

11. Justin Ong, “Singapore’s New Race Law to Include Non-Punitive Sanctions to Shape Social Behaviour,” The Straits Times, September 4, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/singapores-new-race-law-to-include-non-punitive-sanctions-to-shape-social; Linette Lai, “NDR 2021: New Law to Deal with Racial Offences, Promote Harmony through Softer Approach,” The Straits Times, August 29, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/national-day-rally-2021-new-law-on-racial-harmony-to-encourage-moderation-send.

12. Chua, “Governing Race.”

13. Eugene K.B. Tan, “Squaring the Circle: The President as a Symbol of Multiracialism and National Unity,” in Constitutional Change in Singapore: Reforming the Electoral Presidency, ed. Jaclyn L. Neo and Swati S. Jhaveri (New York, NY: Routledge, 2020).

14. Peggy McIntosh, “White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies (1988) 1,” in On Privilege, Fraudulence, and Teaching As Learning, by Peggy McIntosh, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2019), 17–28, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351133791-3.

15. Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir, Alexius Pereira, and Bryan S. Turner, “Social Distancing: Halal Consciousness and Public Dining,” in Muslims in Singapore (Routledge, 2009), 54–69.

16. Humairah Zainal and Walid Jumblatt Abdullah, “Chinese Privilege in Politics: A Case Study of Singapore’s Ruling Elites,” Asian Ethnicity 22, no. 3 (July 3, 2021): 481–97, https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2019.1706153.

17. Pei Ting Wong, “Older Generation of S’poreans Not Ready for Non-Chinese PM: Heng Swee Keat,” TODAY, March 26, 2019, https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/older-generation-singaporeans-not-ready-non-chinese-pm-heng-swee-keat.

18. Zainal and Abdullah, “Chinese Privilege in Politics.”

19. Justin Ong, “Singapore particularly vulnerable yet resilient to Chinese influence operations: French report,” The Straits Times, October 2, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/spore-particularly-vulnerable-yet-resilient-to-chinese-influence-operations.

20. Justin Ong, “National Day Rally 2021.”

21. Justin Ong, “S’pore Is Second Most Influenced by China in the World, According to Taiwan Report,” The Straits Times, April 26, 2022, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/spore-is-second-most-influenced-by-china-in-the-world-according-to-taiwan-report; Charissa Yong, “Singaporeans Should Be Aware of China’s ‘influence Operations’ to Manipulate Them, Says Retired Diplomat Bilahari,” The Straits Times, June 27, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singaporeans-should-be-aware-of-chinas-influence-operations-to-manipulate-them-says. 

22. Albert Wai, “S’pore Should Guard against False Binary Choices in Chinese Public Diplomacy: Bilahari Kausikan,” TODAY, June 27, 2018, https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/spore-should-guard-against-false-binary-choices-chinese-public-diplomacy-bilahari-kausikan. 

23. Amy Qin, “Worries Grow in Singapore Over China’s Calls to Help ‘Motherland,’” The New York Times, August 5, 2018, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/05/world/asia/singapore-china.html.

24. Daniel P.S. Goh and Terence Chong, “‘Chinese Privilege’ as Shortcut in Singapore: A Rejoinder,” Asian Ethnicity 23, no. 3 (2022): 630–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2020.1869519.

25. Sin, “Parliament.”

26. Tom Phillips, Oliver Holmes, and Owen Bowcott, “Beijing Rejects Tribunal’s Ruling in South China Sea Case,” The Guardian, July 12, 2016, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china. 

27. Phillips, Holmes, and Bowcott; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “MFA Spokesmans Comments on the Ruling of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Philippines v China Case Under,” July 12, 2016, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2016/07/MFA-Spokesmans-Comments-on-the-ruling-of-the-Arbitral-Tribunal-in-the-Philippines-v-China-case-under. 

28. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Pedra Branca,” September 29, 2022, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/SINGAPORES-FOREIGN-POLICY/Key-Issues/Pedra-Branca.

29. Chong Guan Kwa, “China, Singapore and the South China Sea: Different Era, Different Visions,” in The South China Sea Disputes: Flashpoints, Turning Points and Trajectories, ed. Yang Razali Kassim (Singapore: World Scientific, 2017), https://www.worldscientific.com/page/9728-chap05_20.

30. Jonathan Lim and Martino Tan, “Are We Being ‘Bullied’ into Submission by China over This Terrex Incident?,” Mothership, November 29, 2016, https://mothership.sg/2016/11/are-we-being-bullied-into-submission-by-china-over-this-terrex-incident/.

31. “Full Speech: Five Core Principles of Singapore’s Foreign Policy,” The Straits Times, July 17, 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/five-core-principles-of-singapores-foreign-policy; See Kit Tang, “Singapore Has Chosen Principles, Not Sides, in Taking a Strong Stand against Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: PM Lee,” CNA, April 2, 2022, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/pm-lee-hsien-loong-ukraine-russia-singapore-chosen-principles-not-sides-strong-stand-2602976. 

32. Hui Yee Tan, “Scope for Singapore-China cooperation very wide, says PM Lee,” The Straits Times, November 19, 2022, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/scope-for-singapore-china-cooperation-very-wide-says-pm-lee.

33. Justin Ong, “ST CloseUp: The Rise of pro-China Singaporeans and What It Means for Singapore,” The Straits Times, March 20, 2022, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/st-closeup-the-rise-of-pro-china-singaporeans-and-what-it-means-for-singapore.

34. See Kit Tang, “NDR 2021: PM Lee Says ‘Entirely Baseless’ to Claim That ‘Chinese Privilege’ Exists in Singapore,” CNA, August 29, 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/ndr-entirely-baseless-claim-chinese-privilege-exists-singapore-lee-hsien-loong-2143026. 

35. Nursila Senin and Irene Y.H. Ng, “Educational Aspirations of Malay Youths from Low-Income Families in Singapore,” Asia Pacific Journal of Social Work and Development 22, no. 4 (December 2012): 253–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/02185385.2012.739473.

36. Lee, “NDR 2021.”; Tang, “NDR 2021.”

37. Cheryl Sim, “Special Assistance Plan Schools,” Singapore Infopedia, July 21, 2016, https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_2016-07-21_154021.html. 

38. Steve McDonald, “What’s in the ‘Old Boys’ Network? Accessing Social Capital in Gendered and Racialized Networks,” Social Networks 33, no. 4 (October 2011): 317–30, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2011.10.002. 

39. Goh and Chong, “‘Chinese Privilege’ as Shortcut in Singapore: A Rejoinder.”;  Kamaludeen Bin Mohamed Nasir, “Rethinking the ‘Malay Problem’ in Singapore: Image, Rhetoric and Social Realities1,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 27, no. 2 (August 2007): 309–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/13602000701536224. 

40. Yan Han Goh, “Malay/Muslim Community Has Made Great Progress but Must Now Aim Higher: PM Lee,” The Straits Times, October 1, 2022, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/malaymuslim-community-has-made-great-progress-but-must-now-aim-higher-pm-lee. 

41. Fook Kwang Han et al., “Tough Love,” in Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2009), 185–216.

42. Shannon Ang, “Race-Based Data: Friend or Foe?,” Academia SG, July 12, 2021, https://www.academia.sg/academic-views/race-based-data-friend-or-foe/; Vincent Chua, Mathew Mathews, and Yi Cheng Loh, “Social Capital in Singapore: Gender Differences, Ethnic Hierarchies, and Their Intersection,” Social Networks 47 (October 2016): 138–50, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2016.06.004.