By Christian Davenport and Molly Inman

From Volume 5, Issue 1 – Winter 2010: Spotlight on Development

By the end of 2006, it had become clear to most observers that the U.S. strategy in Iraq was rapidly deteriorating. During that year, Iraqi civilian fatalities began to approach 4,000 per month, and sectarian violence and al-Qaeda activity was spreading and intensifying.[i] What was the source of the physical threat? Civilians seemingly faced risks from all sides: Sunni insurgents targeted Shiites; Shia militias targeted Sunnis; both targeted Kurds from time to time; occasionally there was intra-sect violence; Al Qaeda in Iraq also fomented sectarian violence;[ii] U.S. forces raided houses looking for terrorists; security contractors overreacted to perceived threats, and civilians of all groups were caught in the middle. If ever the Hobbesian conception of all against all was applicable, it seems an appropriate description of what was happening within this context.

The Bush administration presented a plan of action on January 10, 2007 called “The New Way Forward in Iraq” to address this situation, and to counter mounting pressure from the American public and the U.S. Congress to reduce the bloodshed of civilians and U.S. soldiers. The plan increased U.S. forces by 20,000, with five brigades helping to secure Baghdad and 4,000 soldiers helping to put down al-Qaeda in Anbar Province. According to General David H. Petraeus, these forces were in place by mid-June, at which time they “launched a series of offensive operations focused on expanding the gains achieved in the preceding months in Anbar Province; clearing Baqubah, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining sanctuaries in Anbar Province, and important areas in the so-called ‘belts’ around Baghdad; and pursuing Al Qaeda in the Diyala River Valley and several other areas.”[iii] Petraeus went on to state that, following the initiation of the surge, the overall attacks against civilians decreased substantially and Iraqi civilian fatalities in all categories, less natural causes, decreased by 45% between December 2006 and September 2007.[iv] The data published by The Brookings Institution (see Figure 1) also shows this decline and its continuation until the first quarter of 2008, when an upward trend appears.

Figure 1[v]

This information prompted a rather clear and resounding response. According to U.S. and Iraqi officials and some analysts, the increased military presence and application of force decreased the number of Iraqi civilian fatalities in the country. In short, the U.S. strategy “worked” and peace was facilitated.[vi] There are, of course, important reasons why relevant officials highlighted the correlation between presence/force and decreased fatalities. Up to this point, there had been very little good news emerging out of the country and popular opinion in the U.S., Iraq and much of the world had significantly turned against the counter-insurgency effort.

Attention to the effectiveness of the surge in Iraq by the two 2008 presidential candidates reignited a hot debate that many had thought was fading into history: did the surge work? Senator John McCain answered with a resounding “yes!” He regularly pointed out that he was an early and strong advocate of the surge and that it had paid off.[vii] However, as a strong advocate he had similar incentives as the Bush administration to represent it as a success, regardless of other evidence. Senator Barack Obama, who did not support the surge, acknowledged that Iraqi civilian deaths decreased after the surge began, but argued that this result was also a consequence of other factors such as the decision of many Sunnis to turn against al-Qaeda, as well as a lull in Shia militia activity.[viii] However, given his anti-war stance and commitment to ending the war, as well as his opposition to the surge when it was initiated, Obama also had strong incentives to downplay its effectiveness.

Bob Woodard’s analysis in his book The War Within is more complicated. He contends that the increase in the number for U.S. forces on the ground and a renewed focus on counter-insurgency likely did contribute to the reduction in Iraqi civilian deaths. He also partially attributes this reduction in violence to a change in dynamics with the Sunnis and Shia militias. Finally, he posits that “the U.S. military and intelligence agencies launched a series of top-secret operations that enabled them to locate, target and kill key individuals…The operations incorporated some of the most highly classified techniques and information in the U.S. government.”[ix] However, these possibilities and the evidence supporting them must be explored to gain a clearer understanding of the potential causal relationships.

While it is possible that the increase in the number of U.S. ground forces and the behavior they engaged in should be credited with the reduction in Iraqi civilian fatalities, there are other explanations that have been ignored. The neglect of these alternative explanations is relevant because the differences among them are extremely important for social science, public policy and popular perception. Comparative evaluation is complex, however, because it requires a nuanced consideration of several factors that might account for variation in political violence. That is the objective of this research.

Researchers consistently point out that socio-political events are more complex than one would think. It should come as no surprise that policymakers continue to put forward simplistic characterizations of what transpires in the world. This will likely continue until individuals demand a more nuanced and accurate portrayal of what is taking place, what data exist to support it and what alternative explanations have been refuted. Unfortunately, this will not take place until individuals are ready for and interested in receiving such information. In short, all parties need to change: social scientists are needed in public discourse to invoke a strong reality check; policymakers are needed to communicate this information readily; and citizens are needed to keep everyone focused on what matters most: saving the lives of civilians. Without this, troop surges and reductions in civilian fatalities in the world will go misunderstood and misapplied.

In this article, we review available evidence and existing literature to establish some reasonable doubt regarding the pacifying influence of the surge. We then explore alternative explanations for why violence has decreased, bringing diverse forms of evidence to bear on each point. Our conclusion provides our assessment of what has taken place in Iraq and provides some suggestions for similar evaluations in the future.

Establishing Reasonable Doubt

While the correlation presented by U.S. and Iraqi officials as well as diverse commentators is compelling, the accuracy of the relationship between the surge and the decline of Iraqi civilian fatalities is questionable when viewed closely. Two challenges are discussed below.

Disaggregating Data

The first counter-argument regarding the effectiveness of the surge is that the data used to draw the conclusion about pacification were incorrectly examined.[x] When assessing trends, most evaluate Iraqi civilian deaths from August 2007 onward, but the decrease in the number of fatalities actually began in October 2006 and had been on a downward trend for the most part since that time, with volatile bounces up and down. In fact, one of the single biggest drops between months was from January to February 2007, when the fatalities per month decreased by 800 (from 3500 to 2700); this was well before the surge was in place.

In addition, the pattern following February 2007 is slightly more complex than suggested above. For example, the Iraqi civilian fatality rate increased again in March and April, dropped in May, increased in June, dropped sharply from August to September and continued to decline more slowly, but steadily, from that point forward, though spiking again in April 2008.  According to the data, the downward trend had already started before the surge began, and following the surge the impact was cumulative or alternatively somewhat unstable. At best, therefore, the increased presence/activity of U.S. forces simply continued a pre-existing trend.

While the data show a decrease in Iraqi civilian deaths, one must acknowledge that other factors could have been responsible for the decline. Just as it would be unfair to blame the upward trend in civilian deaths on the decrease in U.S. forces in 2006 (the number of soldiers decreased from approximately 136,000 in January 2006 to 126,900 in June while civilian deaths during that period increased from 1,778 to 3,590 per month), it is equally questionable to credit the increase in U.S. presence/activity with a decrease in fatalities without closer examination. This leads us to consider existing research in political science and sociology.

 

The Conflict-Repression Nexus

In attempting to examine whether the surge was responsible for the decrease or whether other factors are responsible, it is useful to draw on literature directly relevant to the topic. For this, we use what for the last forty years has been commonly referred to as “the conflict-repression nexus;” that is, scholarship directly interested in the impact of some form of domestic state coercion on subsequent societal violent activity.

Within existing research, it is relatively uncontroversial to say that state repression −efforts by authorities and/or their affiliates to curb dissident/rebellious activity− does not normally decrease violence enacted by challengers.  As Davenport states,

Sometimes the impact of repression on dissent is negative (Hibbs 1973); sometimes it is positive (Francisco 1996, Lichbach and Gurr 1981, Ziegenhagen 1986); sometimes it is represented by an inverted U-shape (Muller 1985); sometimes it is alternatively negative or positive (Gupta and Venieris 1981, Moore 1998, Rasler 1996); and sometimes it is nonexistent (Gurr and Moore 1997).[xi]

However, this raises the question: exactly when is repression effective? While this topic has not been examined explicitly, there are several arguments which allow us to begin such an inquiry. Some argue that in order to be effective in reducing conflict-related behavior, repression needs to be consistently applied. As Mark Lichbach notes “too much or too little repression, or repression that is inappropriate in its timing, even-handedness or context may even stimulate rather than deter violence.”[xii] While it is difficult to assess the consistency of U.S. repression of insurgent violence, given the high quality of training and discipline by which U.S. forces are characterized, there is no reason to believe that they are not responding consistently to acts of dissent, nor have there been reports to this effect.  Indeed, the U.S. response to the accommodation by the Sunni Awakening Councils and Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) or Sons of Iraq (SOI) with accommodation in kind would be at least one example of behavioral consistency (in the opposite direction), as it reveals that relevant actors reciprocated offers by these previous enemies to cooperate. However, when it comes to the Iraqi forces, there is broad agreement that on the whole they lack the discipline, training and professionalism to act with consistency. Here, it is possible that some inappropriate or uneven-handed repressive action could have taken place, rendering insurgent control efforts inconsistent.

Alternatively, some argue that in order for repression to be effective at reducing conflict-related behavior it needs to be specifically targeted. Here James Fearon and David Laitin point out that “effective counterinsurgency requires government forces to distinguish active rebels from non-combatants.”[xiii] While the U.S. surge has targeted areas under the control of one or another insurgent group (particularly in and around Baghdad), it has not been discriminating in its repression within these groups. In a November 2007 International Crisis Group (ICG) interview, a senior Sadrist leader pointed out that the Sadrist movement has many non-violent activities (including employment projects), but that the U.S. forces have prevented them from implementing many such projects on the ground. “Even civilian members of our movement, who are not in any way involved in military activities, are constantly targeted,” he continued.[xiv] Similarly, “draconian U.S. security measures” in Sunni neighborhoods largely cause residents to leave.[xv]

Alternate Explanations 

 

Given that both data and theory prompt us to question the successful application of repression, it is important to look at what other factors exist that might explain the decrease in Iraqi civilian fatalities.

 

Explanation 1: Iran’s Policy Shift

Regarding our first alternative explanation for the decrease in civilian deaths, we note that it has long been assumed that Iran was aiding Shia militias in Iraq, in particular supplying them with sophisticated weapons. In December 2007, the U.S. State Department admitted that there had been a decline in attacks using weapons from Iran and that the Iranian government had made a decision “at the highest levels” to reign in Shia militias.[xvi] U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker went even further and credited Iran with the Mahdi Army ceasefire as it would have required the approval of the Iranian government.[xvii] It is thought that, while Iran has deep and long-term interests in Iraq, the Shia militias’ appalling attacks on civilians and against each other were not serving those interests.

In this context, the ceasefire declared by Muqtada al Sadr is seen as one of the main reasons that the civilian fatality rate went down, but credit is usually given instead to the surge. If it is true that Iran is part of the reason for the ceasefire, however, then it would weaken the support for those adhering to the effectiveness of the surge, and it would compel those interested in internal violence to focus on international relations.

Explanation 2: Waiting out the Surge 

A second explanation for the decrease in Iraqi civilian fatalities is behaviorally equivalent to the Bush administration’s conclusion, but the underlying reason is fundamentally different and has distinct predictions for the future. Here we entertain a simple question: what if the challengers to the government were not defeated or dissuaded – at least, not permanently? It is possible that challengers were simply waiting out the surge before they resumed violence against civilians whom they do not trust and whom they view as obstacles to political and territorial control. This would technically mean that the surge could be credited with the reduction in the civilian death rate, but it suggests that in the future, warring factions can pick up where they left off, refreshed and resupplied after the U.S. forces leave and activities cease.

Many have argued this point, and statements by the U.S. military and the Bush administration about “pausing” the withdrawal of forces support this reasoning. For example, a February 2008 Washington Post story cited several officials who wanted to reassess the situation and were concerned “that some groups simply have been biding their time, waiting for the U.S. counteroffensive to end.”[xviii] Indeed, the withdrawal of U.S. forces slowed substantially from spring 2008 through the end of the Bush administration, with 145,000 U.S. soldiers remaining in Iraq through December 2008.   This biding-time scenario would potentially be the most troublesome, because it would mean that the effort of the U.S. forces, while dropping the civilian death rate temporarily, really was not able to accomplish its goal of increasing security in Iraq in any durable fashion.

Explanation 3: Co-opting Combatants

Those that examine political violence cross-nationally are attentive to the fact that different actors engage in relevant behavior. Understanding this, it is possible that violence is diminished when the configuration of combatants is altered. This seems to be directly relevant to the CLCs (Concerned Local Citizen Groups) or SOIs (Sons of Iraq) – Iraqi citizens who have voluntarily decided to work with the Coalition forces to combat Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

The concept of CLC/SOIs developed in Anbar province when, at the end of 2005, local Sunni tribes became frustrated with AQI’s violence, manipulation and imposition of strict Islamic law. This was known as the Awakening Movement. By late May 2007, the CLC/SOI idea had grown and seems to have been put in place more broadly.[xix] There is little data available about the CLC/SOIs before December 2007, but at that time there were approximately 72,000 registered with the U.S. military, 60,000 of whom were receiving a $300 per month salary from the U.S. military.[xx] These CLC/SOIs vary in their duties from area to area: some man checkpoints, some patrol neighborhoods and many provide intelligence on AQI to U.S. forces.  Many credit these CLC/SOIs with a reduction in violence against civilians, in that they have forced AQI underground if not out of the country entirely. Others argue that violence has been reduced because those involved with the CLC/SOIs themselves no longer engage in violent activity against civilians or U.S. forces.[xxi]

While cultivation of CLC/SOIs has likely impacted the reduction in the violence in the short-term (the period attributed to the surge), the use of former insurgents and even former AQI fighters could facilitate more conflict in the long-term. Related to this, some worry about what will happen when the U.S. stops funding the CLC/SOIs and whether they will simply return to being allied with AQI and/or fighting the government and U.S. forces, likely increasing non-state violent activity. To avoid such a situation, one proposal is to integrate the CLC/SOIs into the Iraqi Security Forces; however, the Shiite-dominated government has been reluctant to accept these primarily Sunni citizens into the armed forces or police. The government is also worried that the CLC/SOIs are becoming a Sunni paramilitary force that will be unified and could eventually challenge the government, especially when the U.S. military withdraws.[xxii] Now a force for peace or at least less violence, it is possible that these coercive agents could return to old habits once the context shifts.

Explanation 4: Ethno-Sectarian Cleansing

Our final explanation for the reduction in the Iraqi civilian fatality rate is ethnic cleansing. This explanation attributes the decrease in casualties to a lower number of potential victims rather than to military effectiveness.

Is this explanation plausible? During 2007 alone, there were an estimated 790,000 newly displaced people, either within the country or abroad.[xxiii] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates the total number of Iraqi displaced persons and refugees as of the end of 2007 at well over 4 million, approximately 2.4 million of whom are displaced internally.[xxiv] When displaced persons flee in an ethno-sectarian conflict, they go to areas they consider safer, where people from their group are a majority and/or are in control. A briefing slide from the Multi-National Force in Iraq showing the decline in ethno-sectarian violence during 2007 in Baghdad acknowledges that the reduction in violence is “partly from ethnic shifts.”[xxv] These “ethnic shifts,” however, were the direct results of explicit policies by armed groups to force the civilian population of opposing groups out of their homes using violence. Now that Baghdad and the rest of Iraq are effectively partitioned, there is less opportunity for inter-group violence against civilians. Paradoxically, this suggests that insurgent and militia violence was itself at least partially effective, in that the goal of some of the violence in Iraq was to terrorize the population so that it would leave. Once this goal was accomplished, there was no longer a need for the violence. A recent study using satellite imagery also provides support for the suggestion that ethnic cleansing explains the reduction in civilian deaths. It combines nighttime light satellite imagery of Baghdad and other cities with data on the ethnic mixture of neighborhoods and finds that neighborhoods with mixed populations prior to the period of the surge had a greatly reduced nighttime light signature during the surge and throughout 2008 as compared to ethnically homogenous neighborhoods.  This indicates that the populations in these neighborhoods were reduced.[xxvi] While it is a common pattern for houses of a fleeing group to be occupied by the aggressor group, this process takes some time. Whether the timing of the ethnic cleansing was coincidental or whether it was actually intensified in anticipation of the increased U.S. forces presence is difficult to determine without further study and analysis.

Regardless of whose violence prompted movements in the population, the outcome is still the same: the people are now divided. Is this a good thing? Partition on ethnic, racial or sectarian grounds is controversial and generally not desirable or sustainable in the long-term, but it can reduce conflict-related deaths in the short-term, especially violence directed toward civilians of other groups. However, research has shown that partition does not prevent the recurrence of war (particularly an ethnic one), indicating that, while partition may account for the recent drop in the civilian death rate, it is not a long-term solution to the conflict.[xxvii] One need look no further than the former Yugoslavia, from which the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was coined, for evidence that the attempted “un-mixing” of peoples is not only a bloody process but one that produces unstable, under-developed states that are continually dependent on the international community for the maintenance of security and for economic assistance.  Divided, this generation of civilian deaths is currently reduced, but the marshalling of distinct camps does not bode well for future peace or stability in the country.

On Surges and Pacification

The outcome of our brief analysis − that the reduction in Iraqi deaths is not simply to be attributed to increased U.S. presence and activity − should come as no surprise. The simplistic, mono-causal explanation for the reduction in Iraqi civilian deaths is likely misleading. Crediting the increase in U.S. forces and activity with the decrease in Iraqi civilian fatalities without examining other possible factors does nothing to increase our understanding of conflict and its repression. If the lesson learned from the surge in Iraq is that more force used against insurgents works, then one must fear for future counterinsurgency operations. A closer analysis of insurgent and militia activity should be given more attention. For example, if insurgents are no longer taking part in killings, what are they doing?  Arming and storing weapons? Training? Working civilian jobs? Or, have they left for Afghanistan to fight the Americans there, as some have suggested? With regard to the CLC/SOIs, in which activities do they engage in to keep peace? And, with regard to displaced persons, what have been the demographic shifts and the precipitating events? Where are the concentrations of displaced, and under what conditions might they plan to return home? All of these questions must be asked in order to fully assess the reasons for the decrease in civilian deaths in Iraq and just as importantly, to try and ensure that they continue to decrease.

 

Cristina Killingsworth served as the lead editor of this article.

About the Authors

Christian Davenport is a Professor of Peace Studies and Political Science at the Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame as well as Director of the Radical Information Project and Stop Our States. His research includes political violence, state-dissident interactions and democracy.  Davenport’s most recent book Media Bias, Perspective and State Repression: The Black Panther Party was published by Cambridge University Press in November 2009.

Molly Inman is a Ph.D. student in international relations at the University of Maryland.  Her primary research interests regard inter-communal conflict, refugees and displaced persons and state-sponsored violence.

Endnotes 

[i] President George W. Bush, “President’s Address to the Nation,” January 10, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html(accessed February 16, 2007).

[ii] International Crisis Group, “The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict: Middle East Report N°52,” February 27, 2006, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/52_the_next_iraqi_war_sectarianism_and_civil_conflict.pdf (accessed February 18, 2008).

[iii] General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq,  “Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq,” September 10, 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony20070910.pdf. p. 2.

[iv] Ibid.  p. 3.

[v] The Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” posted October 2, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx (accessed October 18, 2008).

[vi] The leadership in Iraq and the US administration were quick to credit the recent decline in the rate of civilian deaths in Iraq to the increase in US forces in Iraq from approximately 132,000 in January 2007 to 171,000 at their largest in October 2008.

[vii] McCain-Palin Candidacy website, http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/Issues/ fdeb03a7-30b0-4ece-8e34-4c7ea83f11d8.htm (accessed October 14, 2008).

[viii] Obama-Biden Candidacy website, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/iraq/(accessed October 14, 2008).

[ix] Bob Woodard, “Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn’t Just the Surge,”  The Washington Post, September 8, 2008, p. A09.

[x] For the sake of argument, we accept the validity of the information put forward.

[xi] Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 8.

[xii] Mark Lichbach, “An Economic Theory of Governability: Choosing Policy and Optimizing Performance,” Public Choice 44, 2 (1984): 308.

[xiii] James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, 1 (2003): 75-90.

[xiv] International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge: Middle East Report N°72 – 7 February 2008,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/72_iraq_s_civil_war_the_sadrists_and_the_surge.pdf (accessed February 16, 2008)

[xv] Ibid., p. 4

[xvi] Karen DeYoung, “Iran Cited In Iraq’s Decline in Violence: Order From Tehran Reined In Militias, U.S. Official Says,” The Washington Post, December 23, 2007.

[xvii] Ibid.

[xviii] Thomas E. Ricks, “U.S. Commanders in Iraq Favor Pause in Troop Cuts,” The Washington Post, January 31, 2008.

[xix] Guy Raz, “Military Officials Disagree on Impact of Surge,” Morning Edition, National Public Radio, January 8, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543 (accessed  February 16, 2008).

[xx] Ibid.

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] Karen DeYoung and Amit R. Paley, “U.S. Plans to Form Job Corps For Iraqi Security Volunteers, Shiite-Led Government’s Slow Hiring of Sunnis Prompted Change,” Washington Post, December 7, 2007.

[xxiii] The Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” posted October 2, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx (accessed October 14, 2008).

[xxiv] “UNHCR Global Report 2007, Iraq Situation,” p. 307, June 1, 2008,  http://www.unhcr.org/484908962.html.

[xxv] Institute for the Study of War, “Iraq Statistics Reference,” posted December 2007, http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Iraq%20Statistics%20Reference%20December%202007.pdf (accessed February 16, 2008).

[xxvi] John Agnew, “Baghdad nights: evaluating the US military `surge’ using nighttime light signatures.”

Environment and Planning A, Volume 40, (2008): 2285-2295.

[xxvii] Nicholas Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature,” World Politics 52 (2000): 439.