An Exercise in Futility: U.S. Engagement of the Taliban
"Afghanistan landscape" by The U.S. Army is licensed under CC BY 2.0
By Adityamohan Tantravahi
In the wake of the botched U.S. occupation of Afghanistan and the ensuing Taliban takeover, one thing is clear: continuing direct engagement with the Taliban is a colossal mistake.
As the United States prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan, it struck a deal with Taliban forces in February 2020. In exchange for a permanent ceasefire, withdrawal, and the release of Taliban prisoners, the Taliban promised Afghanistan would prevent any terrorist organization from using Afghan soil to harm the United States.[1] The Taliban also promised to begin a dialogue with the various factions and government in Afghanistan to achieve a political settlement reflective of the Afghan people's desires.[2] Now, three months after the U.S. withdrawal, the nature of the United States’ relationship with the Taliban is undefined, and its direction remains unclear. The United States can offer the group legitimacy and assistance beyond what is available on humanitarian grounds in exchange for a quasi-inclusive government, or it can go the smarter route: support a coalition to negotiate with the Taliban and shape a government that checks the Taliban's power and forces it to contend with the Afghan people’s wishes.
The Taliban has already reneged on its end of the withdrawal deal, showing itself to be a recalcitrant and violent political group that continues to force its ideologies upon those it rules. Despite repeated promises to moderate itself, it has persisted in following its 1990s playbook: suppressing women’s rights, almost immediately banning girls from school, and limiting press freedoms, and torturing journalists covering protests.[3] By directly engaging the Taliban and only securing symbolic concessions, the United States legitimizes the Taliban government—a legitimacy that the Afghan people alone can grant—while making America and its allies less safe.
The stakes are high, not only for Afghans, but also for U.S. security interests. To begin with, a powerful Taliban contributes to regional instability in South Asia. Nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan, already high, could further rise if Pakistan continues to use Taliban fighters for ‘strategic depth’ in the contested Kashmir region.[4] By offering international legitimacy to Taliban through engagement, the United States also risks encouraging Pakistan’s strategy of repeatedly protecting and sponsoring terror groups and extremists, as it did with the Taliban.[5]
The United States faces increased risks of an emboldened Taliban re-enabling and protecting terrorist groups based in Afghanistan. In particular, the threat of the return of al-Qaeda is genuine, and U.S. intelligence reports predict it could rebuild to threatening levels within the next two years.[6] While the Taliban has repeatedly assured the United States that it will work to stamp out terrorist groups, such promises ignore fundamental cultural realities on the ground. Al-Qaeda fighters, Taliban fighters, and other Islamist groups are connected through three decades of partnership and even intermarriage.[7] Although the Taliban finds itself in open conflict with terrorist groups such as ISIS-K, it is mainly an ideological conflict that doesn’t concern the use of terrorism as a tactic. Broadly indifferent to their method, the Taliban may again choose to harbor terrorists.
Of course, the United States cannot unilaterally decide that the Taliban will not be part of the Afghan political landscape; the Afghan people must decide the Taliban’s role in their country’s politics. With this in mind, the United States should facilitate a coalition-building process with the will, know-how, and power to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. One possible strategy is for the United States to support the newly formed National Resistance Front, a military alliance of former Mujahideen and anti-Taliban fighters in the Panjshir Valley, in building a coalition strong enough to bring Taliban leadership to the negotiating table.[8] Once formed, the United States should arm and financially support it.
Critics who argue the United States should wash its hands of the “Afghanistan situation” ignore the role the United States played in its creation.[9] Afghanistan was brought to its knees in the 1980s by a civil war fought by CIA-backed warlords that helped create the conditions for the Taliban’s rise to power.[10] Abandoning the Afghan people now, after four decades of contributing to the country's ills, is a significant moral floundering and a stain on the U.S. reputation. Other critics contend that continuing to meddle in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs risks worsening the situation or that backing militants is a “dead end.”[11] These arguments ignore the fact that the United States has the choice to align itself with factions that share American values of freedom and democracy. It can put in place safeguards to ensure rules of engagement, such as aid contingencies and robust institutional structures that ensure accountability, are maintained—choices that were not made in the past.
The United States must now work toward finding a coalition of parties that the United States can justify supporting, which will force the Taliban to negotiate with other Afghan factions—not just the international community. Though developing humanitarian crises in Afghanistan necessitate a response, the United States should not fall into the trap of providing the Taliban with legitimacy through easing sanctions on the regime and providing strategic aid. Instead, the United States should explore alternative avenues to support vulnerable Afghans, such as unfreezing assets belonging to private Afghan citizens or initiating direct cash transfers programs.[12] Engaging the Taliban through strategic aid in an attempt to make them more moderate in the eyes of the West, or even for meaningful humanitarian purposes, is an exercise in futility.[13]
About the Author
Adityamohan Tantravahi is a Research Specialist in the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton University. He earned his B.A. from The University of Texas at Austin. His research and policy interests include international security, conflict, and development.
Endnotes
1. United States Department of State, “US-Afghanistan Joint Declaration,” February 29, 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf.
2. Ibid.
3. “Taliban Says Will Respect Women’s Rights, Press Freedom,” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2021, , https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/17/taliban-says-will-respect-womens-rights-press-freedom;
“Taliban Broke Promises on Rights: Outgoing Afghan Envoy to UN,” Al Jazeera, September 14, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/14/taliban-broke-promises-on-rights-outgoing-afghan-envoy-to-un; Ali M. Latifi, “‘We Could Hear Screams’: Journalists Accuse Taliban of Torture,” Al Jazeera, September 9, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/9/talibans-violence-against-women-reporters-intensifies
4. Stratfor Worldview, “Nuclear War? How Kashmir Could Still Cause an Indo-Pakistan War in 2020,” The Center for the National Interest, January 24, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/nuclear-war-how-kashmir-could-still-cause-indo-pakistan-war-2020-116866.
5. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Why Pakistan Supports Terrorist Groups, and Why the US Finds It so Hard to Induce Change,” Brookings (blog), January 5, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change/.
6. Courtney McBride and Warren P. Strobel, “U.S. Spies See Signs of al Qaeda Fighters Returning to Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, September 14, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/antony-blinken-continues-defense-of-afghanistan-drawdown-before-senate-panel-11631631702. ;
Julian E. Barnes, “Al Qaeda could rebuild in Afghanistan in a year or two, U.S. officials say,” New York Times, September 14, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/14/us/politics/al-qaeda-afghanistan.html
7. Dan De Luce, Dilanian, Ken, and Yusufzai, Mushtaq, “Taliban Keep Close Ties with Al Qaeda despite Promise to U.S.,” NBC News, February 16, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/taliban-keep-close-ties-al-qaeda-despite-promise-u-s-n1258033.
8. Ahmad Massoud, “The Mujahideen Resistance to the Taliban Begins Now. But We Need Help,” Washington Post, August 8, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/18/mujahideen-resistance-taliban-ahmad-massoud/.
9. Todd Greentree, “Afghanistan: Remembering the Long, Long War We Would Rather Forget,” War on the Rocks, February 5, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/afghanistan-remembering-the-long-long-war-we-would-rather-forget/.
10. John F. Burns, “Afghans: Now They Blame America,” The New York Times, February 4, 1990, https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/04/magazine/afghans-now-they-blame-america.html;
Steve Coll’s Pulitzer prize winning book Ghost Wars provides an authoritative history of the CIA’s covert war in Afghanistan
11. Kai Thaler, “Afghan Insurgents Are a Dead End,” Foreign Policy (blog),November 23, 2021. http://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/23/afghanistan-taliban-national-resistance-front/.
12. P. Michael McKinley, “Afghanistan’s Looming Catastrophe,” December 3, 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-12-03/afghanistans-looming-catastrophe.
13. Desha Girod, “Can the West Make the Taliban Moderate?,” Foreign Policy (blog), August 31, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/31/can-the-west-make-the-taliban-moderate/.