An Iranian woman in front of a mosque during Iraqi invasion to Khorramshahr. Photo Credit: Unknown (1980) Image source: Wikimedia Creative Commons.

By Kailash Prasad

With the occupancy of the White house determined, there seems a better chance of reaching a negotiated settlement on Iran’s nuclear program. However, if expectations remain ossified - with Tehran insisting on its right to enrichment and America and Israel contending that Iran’s opacity disqualifies it from provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty – such a settlement will prove elusive.

The present course of action against The Islamic Republic - sanctions, talks, cyber attacks and assassinations - has resulted in a slump in oil exports, a Rial-USD exchange rate of 37,500 to 1, setbacks at Bushehr and Natanz and more recently, protests. But whether this will make Tehran more pliant is uncertain. Much depends on whom average Iranians find responsible for their distress – an unreasonable West that is seeking to browbeat Tehran into submission or an intransigent clique of mullahs whose priorities no longer match those of the people.

Unfortunately, the answer is unclear. But one reason the present strategy might prove inadequate is that Tehran may perceive that compliance in the face of such pressure will rob the regime of any credibility. And a choice between acquiescing and staying credible might not be very hard – especially if the regime believes an Israeli strike will cause little harm and that America is unlikely to drag itself into yet another attack on a Muslim-majority country.

Assurances of long-term immunity from the firepower of NATO are unlikely to prod Iran to conform for another reason. Considering that opening Libya’s program to scrutiny did not insulate Gaddafi from NATO for very long, the regime might conclude that opaque nuclear ambitions and belligerent rhetoric offer a better chance of survival and are worth courting isolation and the risk of a pre-emptive strike.

Also, considering sanctions often inhibit other power centers from emerging, such as Saddam’s Iraq and North Korea today, the clerical regime might find itself very comfortable with a set of constraints that preserve the present political hierarchy in Tehran, and it is hard to see how more sanctions will change this.

Failing to reach a consensus soon is a worrying prospect. The threats and sanctions have not stopped Iran’s efforts, and Iranian inflexibility has not had an effect on America or Israel’s stance. If the status quo persists, Tehran could eventually
discount the threats of force as vacuous rhetoric. If it decides to build a nuclear weapon, the security guarantees the U.S. extends to those in the vicinity will become of questionable value, and some in the region might find it prudent to re-think their present inclinations or, more worryingly, try building weapons of their own. This is hardly a palatable prospect for Israel, but a targeted strike from Tel Aviv would push Tehran’s nuclear program further underground; and more indiscriminate use of force will only bolster their resolve to weaponize.

If the U.S. uses force to stop Iran, success is more likely but the costs will be significant. Another attack on a Muslim majority country would make it much harder for America to convince the Ummah that its brand of liberal democracy is compatible with Islam. It would also affect oil prices and strain a fragile global economy.

Trust and flexibility, more than the use of force or coercion, could potentially facilitate a resolution. Unfortunately, owing to a lack of will, or perhaps inability, none of the three parties seem particularly adept at building trust with one another.

Considering none of the three are likely to walk away the clear victor (at least not without an unreasonable investment of blood and treasure), lowering expectations would prove more advantageous. In a charged atmosphere this might be only slightly easier, but if the west can recognize that success does not depend entirely on whether or not Iran can be persuaded to halt all enrichment, adopt a policy of complete transparency, or accede to the IAEA’s demands for inspection of any facility with a 24-hour notice – Tehran might be more willing to talk. If Tehran can recognize that success does not depend on convincing the West to live with a nuclear program with whatever level of transparency the clerical regime sees fit - the West might be more willing to talk. However, if rigid expectations persist, the three will find themselves locked into courses of action that are far from ideal. Ultimately, the sooner Iran, Israel and the U.S. realize that half-victories are substantially better than total failure, the sooner the international community can hope for resolution.

About the Author

Kailash K. Prasad is a Research Associate at the Delhi Policy Group. All views are his own. He tweets at @ridersonthestrm.

Scott Ross was the lead editor for this op-ed.

Iran and the Hazards of Rigid Foreign Policy