Islamic Militancy and The Uighur of Kazakhstan: Recommendations for U.S. Policy
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By Andreas Borgeas
Abstract—The spread of Islamic militancy amongst the Uighur of Kazakhstan is of particular importance to understanding Kazakhstan’s security and economic relations with China, Russia, and the United States, and, ultimately, to the advancement of U.S. strategic interests in the region. Significant scholarship has been developed in the last decade oriented toward the Uighur in neighboring Xinjiang, China, but relatively little has been devoted to an in-depth examination of the Uighur dynamic in Kazakhstan. This paper investigates this topic through original research that examines the extent to which Uighur extremists in Kazakhstan pose a realistic threat to Kazakhstan’s national security. It specifically asks whether the prevailing Islamic practice amongst the Uighur in Kazakhstan has been made fundamental, and, if an Uighur identity exists, whether it is bound by Islamic ambitions that may manifest in widespread terrorist activity. This study finds that militant Islam amongst the Uighur in Kazakhstan remains a fringe and localized presence, which will struggle to gain sufficient popular support for historical and contextual reasons. Even so, the United States can take specific steps to help Kazakhstan ensure that Islam remains a moderate—rather than extremist—force in the country.
Kazakhstan’s Uighur Minority
The Uighur represent an ancient Turkic civilization that evolved from a confederacy of early Tiele tribes around Mongolia into a prominent empire known as the Uighur Khaganate. At its height in the eighth and ninth centuries, the Uighur Khaganate spanned from Central to Eastern Asia, but, as the empire diminished in power, most Uighur settled in the historic lands of the central Silk Road network.
In more recent times, the Uighur people have been circumstantially separated between Kazakhstan and China. With a population of ten to eleven million, modern Uighurs generally identify themselves as ethnically, culturally, and sometimes politically sepa- rate from Han Chinese and even from their steppe cousins in Central Asia. Unknown thousands fled from their historical homeland in China’s Xinjiang province during the 1950s and 1960s to neighboring Soviet Kazakhstan where they remained for decades during the Sino-Soviet split. In the wake of the Soviet collapse and Central Asia’s Islamic revival in the early 1990s, many Uighur-Kazakhs actively sought to re- connect with Xinjiang. While that reconnection with Xinjiang held different familial, historical and religious meanings, some Uighur have resorted to violence as a means toward achieving, with Xinjiang, an independent Islamic Uighuristan or East Turkestan.[1] Counterterrorism cooperation, therefore, is a major component of Kazakh-Chinese relations and Kazakh state security policy.
Kazakhstan’s Counterterrorism Framework
Kazakhstan is a secular republic. It neither identifies nor recognizes religion within its constitution. While followers of the Muslim faith comprise a majority of the population, President Nazarbayev fashioned the country as one tolerant of all religions and ethnicities. Even during the post-Soviet Islamic revival when Central Asia reconnected with its Islamic identity after seventy years of containment and foreign-sponsored Islamic missionaries showered the region with religious investments, Kazakhstan experienced far less activism premised on the Islamic faith than did other Central Asian republics, especially Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Many political theorists attribute this tempered response to the tolerant traditions of Kazakhstan’s nomadic culture, moderate Sufi practices, cultural Russification, and sizeable Christian population. At the turn of the century, however, Kazakhstan began to perceive Islamic radicalism as a destabilizing element in the region as well as a domestic threat. Islamic terrorism, as it soon became known, emerged as an unconventional and asymmetric security challenge that would require comprehensive measures to prevent potentially destructive acts perpetrated by a few.
Nazarbayev recognized that the cultivation of foreign investment in Kazakhstan was premised on a secure and stable state. He therefore made counterterrorism efforts a top state priority. The hallmark of Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism policy is evident in its multi-vectored approach toward international relations. After independence, Nazarbayev received much needed assistance and foreign investment from China, which he later formalized into a strategic partnership. Nazarbayev even conceded land in previously disputed borders to China in hopes of courting a powerful ally to bal- ance Russian influence. He also aimed to solidify Kazakhstan’s security posture and exert influence through its roles in international organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC), and the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS). Since then, security relations have included extensive border, intelligence, and military cooperation through the SCO, especially involving the Uighur. In particular, Kazakhstan has designated the Islamic Party of East Turkestan, Home of the East Turkestan Youth, and other similar organizations as terrorist groups, prosecuted Uighur militants at the behest of Beijing, denied Uighur asylum protections, and extradited suspected Uighur militants to China.
While the United States is a relative newcomer to Kazakhstan, it has managed to achieve important diplomatic and security partnerships, including the negotiated dismantling of Kazakhstan’s nuclear complex and, most recently, cooperation in the war on terror. Kazakhstan entered into a military co- operation agreement with the United States that included overflight permission, counterterrorism training, intelligence sharing, and security infra- structure upgrades. Kazakhstan even dispatched peace-keeping support to Iraq. A striking characteristic of Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism framework is the manner in which it has developed. As a result of close coordination with Russia, China, and the United States, its sister republics in Central Asia, and international organizations, Kazakhstan has been able to synchronize its articulated understanding of terrorism, the groups, and types of activities. Until the late 1990s, Kazakhstan, like many other countries, lacked a modernized legal and security framework to combat terrorism. It therefore built upon and borrowed initially from the Russians and the CIS to form the basis of its parallel legislation. For instance, Kazakhstan’s Criminal Code and Law on Measures to Combat Terrorism borrowed heavily from their Russian counterparts. Kazakhstan continued to develop its legal framework convention through UN and regional organization resolutions that introduced new categories of offenses, including advocacy, participation, and financing. In doing so, Kazakhstan’s security framework developed more legal consistency with its regional and foreign allies.
Like those of Russia and China, Kazakhstan’s security policies are more suppressive than they are preventive, such as those promoted by the United States and NATO. Suppression policies are oriented toward eliminating the opportunity for terrorists to carry out attacks, while prevention is oriented toward mitigating social, religious or economic factors that motivate of terrorism. For example, the revised Law on Counter- action to Extremism sought to reduce religious freedoms, including the requirement for the registration of religious groups and missionaries, and the means to delegitimize selected religious elements. Countermeasures such as these can compound sentiments of extremism by exacerbating the underlying grievances that drive terrorism. While some of these security policies have been rebuked by the West, Kazakhstan’s security prerogatives still take precedence over its gradual incorporation of democratic principles. These circumstances suggest Kazakhstan’s security practice can only be sustained if its capabilities continue to exceed terrorist threats, meaning the possibility of domestic terrorism and more transnational problems with neighboring China involving the Uighur remains high.
Research Process and Results
To better understand how the extremist Islamic threats may develop in Kazakhstan and to determine the best way to develop policies that can effectively staunch these threats, I conducted field work focused on the Uighur community in Kazakhstan as a researcher at the U.S. Embassy in Astana. My research consisted of analyses focused on religious ideology, political process, and context opportunity theories and drew significantly on in-person interviews with private citizens and government officials. Personal inter- views of members of Kazakhstan’s Uighur community, included questionnaire polling based on three categories (peasant, merchant, and professional) with third-party inter- pretation and translation services. Polling combined both quantitative and qualitative aspects of data collection. My research also incorporated earlier scholarship, including field research on the Uighur in China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Findings can be categorized as answers to a series of related questions:
Is the Islam commonly practiced in Kazakhstan considered fundamental?
The prevailing practice of Islam in Kazakhstan is not considered one of the sects commonly associated with fundamentalist beliefs (e.g., Hanbali [Salafi]). Kazakhs and Uighur-Kazakhs are predominantly Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, and more particularly adhere to Sufi traditions. The Hanafi school is a moderate interpretation of Islam and Sufism is known for its tolerance of other forms of worship along with assimilating elements of mysticism from the region’s pre-Islamic past. Kazakhs also practice customary law (adat) less so than Sharia Islamic law, and incorporate that into their common version of Islam.[2]
How have the different interpretations of Islam developed in Central Asia?
Islam was introduced into Central Asia by the Arabs in the seventh century. Here it developed in two markedly different directions, one being the more tolerant and mystical Islam of the nomads (i.e., Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribes), and the other the more traditional and institutional Islam of the settled oasis communities (i.e., Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). “[B]eyond the oasis towns and valleys, the spread of Islam on the Central Asian steppe was slow and sporadic. Islam did not come to the Kazakh steppe until the 17th century.” [3] The nomadic way of life did not lend itself to established institutions and clergy, opting instead for Sufism’s more personal communion without strong reliance on priests and scholars. Islam has been described as an “urban religion,” which is why “[e]ven today the nomadic Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen tribes are far less Islamized—and much less susceptible to Islamic radicalism—than their counterparts in the settled oasis areas.” [4]
Where do the strict interpretations of Islam originate and where are they practiced?
The more radical versions of Islam were introduced into Central Asia from a variety of foreign sources, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.[5] For example, Wahhabism and Deobandism of the Hanbali (Salafi) school of jurisprudence originate from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, respectively, and their introduction into Central Asia came about as a result of the Soviet-Afghan campaign and during the region’s Islamic revival.[6] These strict interpretations of Islam are known to be practiced in Uzbekistan, the Ferghana Valley (apportioned by the Soviets into Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), and small portions of Southern Kazakhstan.
Can Islamic institutions reduce the appeal of radicalism in Kazakhstan?
Kazakhstan is known for having few political, educational, and financial Islamic institutions.[7] Kazakh policy is to deny registration to Islamic political parties and, despite recent improvements, the country is still underserved by Islamic educational institutions. Both of these practices foster strong underground foreign-influenced activities and they encourage students to study abroad, which may increase their chances of encountering radical strands of Islam. Further, liberalization allowing for Islamic bank and religious endowment projects, while promising benefits for communities, is suspected of unintentionally attracting financing from elsewhere in the Islamic world with more radical religious tendencies. Finally, Kazakhstan does not fund any religious institution, including the state’s Spiritual Association of Muslims, and the religious administrators (muftiyats) are highly dependent on the support of foreign, and often fundamentalist, donors from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey.[8] Stable democracies, as they do come about in Central Asia, will be fundamentally different than those of the West, but still must be anchored in institutions that promote the rule of law, civil liberties, and freedom of expression. The development of institutions, whether of domestic or foreign origin, will therefore have a deep impact on Kazakhstan. Significant scholarly research indicates that state-sanctioned Islamic institutions that promote civil liberties inversely impact Islamic radicalism principally on the basis that government sanctions on organized groups can cause those groups to institutionalize underground. And what lies beneath more often becomes distorted without the scrutiny of public dialogue and accountability.
Central Asian Muslims commonly understand the principles of worship, but often lack an intimate appreciation of the social aspect of political Islam and Sharia law. Accordingly, if young, impressionable students without formal education on Islam are first taught the conservatively interpreted principles of Sharia by an unaccredited teacher in an underground setting, the implications are as remarkable as much as they are predictable. One must only look at the phenomena of the madrassa culture that flourished in Pakistan following the Soviet-Afghan campaign that facilitated the rise of the Taliban to see how extremism can arise out of grassroots, unofficial Islamic educational institutions. Thus, state-sanctioned Islamic educational institutions are central in facilitating opportunities for the public to learn various compatibilities of Islam within a modern and moderate context.
Can Uighur activism premised on the Islamic faith gain popular traction in Kazakhstan?
Uighur activism premised on the Islamic faith will likely not gain popular traction in Kazakhstan for two main reasons: (1) the moderate brand of Sufism popularly practiced in Kazakhstan is generally incompatible with Islamic fundamentalism; (2) Uighur in Kazakhstan are divided along identity lines beyond those of religion.[9]
The Islamic belief popularly practiced amongst the Uighur in Kazakhstan is the moderate brand of Sufism, in contrast to conservative Wahhabism. Sufism is influenced by ancient mysticism and is tolerant of other forms of belief. It is not only accepting of other religious expression but incorporates other non-Islamic elements from the Uighur’s ancient past. The Islamic faith amongst the Uighur in Kazakhstan, therefore, is neither conservative nor fundamental. Second, local conceptions of identity are too diverse for the creation of an overarching Uighur identity bound by Islam. Polling and interviews conducted by this author in a number of Uighur communities in southeast Kazakhstan provide evidence for these claims. Three categories of people—peasant, merchant, and professional [10]—were asked to rank the order in which they identify to the following groups: Uighur, Kazakh, Muslim, pan-Turk, local identifier. The study revealed that what it means to be Uighur is significantly different among the three social groups. The local identity is stronger than the state identity because local traditions and community loyalty likely yield stronger ties. While this has not lead to the wholesale opposition to the Uighur label, local loyalties periodically prove incompatible with the concept of greater allegiance. It was found that peasants, whose sphere of interaction and travel is limited to the region, identify more strongly with Islam and make little distinction between Uighur and Muslim. In contrast, they strongly distinguish themselves from Turks, because Turks are from Turkey while they are Uighur from Kazakhstan. Merchants, however, who trade throughout the area and rely upon the existing economic system, identify themselves first as citizens of the Kazakh state. Finally, Uighur professionals identify more with notions of pan-Turkism or Turkestan, but tend to support a secular social system.
Of the three, peasants identified most strongly with Islam and appear to be most likely to create religious alliances. Yet because most peasants remain isolated and exhibit strong local loyalties, they are unlikely to mobilize into a national or transnational Islamic movement, let alone a radical one that resorts to terrorism to affect change. Merchants, especially those reliant on trade, view positive relations with the state as essential to their financial security. It is unlikely these commerce-dependent merchants would involve themselves in Islamic activities that might threaten the state or bring its security instruments to bear on them. While the professional community remains the most vocal, its agenda considers Islamic fundamentalism an obstruction to the form of secular nationalism to which it is oriented. It is therefore highly unlikely that professionals would participate in militant activism in the name of Islam. These findings suggest that Uighur in Kazakhstan are a divided people and have interests too diverse to be unified by Islam. The message of militant Islam, therefore, will likely not gain popular appeal among the Uighur in Kazakhstan.
Conclusions
The threat of Islamic militancy amongst the Uighur in the Republic of Kazakhstan will likely remain a fringe and localized threat, and does not have sufficient appeal for popular support. The historically moderate Sufism of the Hanafi sect is unlikely to be compatible in Kazakhstan with the imported strains of fundamentalist Islam. While significant sympathies may exist with their Xinjiang counterparts, Uighur-Kazakhs do not largely identify themselves in an actionable way with part of any unrealized Uighuristan or East Turkestan community, in part because Uighur-Kazakhs are divided by deep ideological and identity differences. Finally, it is likely China’s massive investment into the Kazakh energy market will inevitably force a long-term security alignment with Beijing. Yet Kazakhstan’s economic capabilities, and the multi-vectored balance it attempts to seek with its neighbors and other powers, means it will likely not allow itself to become a subordinate of Beijing.
U.S. engagement in Kazakhstan, as much as it should be encouraged for purposes of spreading Western democratic principles, will not reasonably have equal standing with neighboring Russia and China. Their respective commercial and strategic opportunities will remain more significant. The key for the United States, then, is to maintain a strong economic and political presence to make certain President Nazarbayev’s multi- vectored foreign policy continues with his successor and to ensure the country remains positioned to serve as a reliable ally and alternative to Kazakhstan amidst their still unfolding political agendas. U.S. policy interests are well served by promoting a healthy Kazakh economy, strengthening the capacity of its people and civil institutions, and helping implement measures to avoid the radicalization of segments of its society. With these considerations, the following recommendations are made to U.S. policy makers.
Recommendations for the U.S. Policy Community
1. Encourage the legalization in Kazakhstan of political parties associated with the Islamic faith.
U.S. foreign policy places a premium on promoting democracy and the rule of law. In the case of Kazakhstan, the state denies registration to any potential Islamic political parties and in doing so risks disenfranchising moderate Muslim elements from the political process, forcing political activities underground and increasing the potential appeal of more radical Islamic thought. Islam will undoubtedly continue to play an important role in Kazakhstan’s future, especially after Nazarbayev’s tenure, and the opportunity for sanctioned Islamic parties would likely not be antithetical to a secular democracy. Kazakhstan’s tradition of a tolerant form of Islamic belief and practice should provide an adequate basis for this experiment to provide a much needed democratic outlet.
2. Encourage Kazakhstan to sponsor the study of Islam by financially supporting officially sanctioned Islamic educational institutions.
Studies have indicated that the significant shortage of formal Islamic educational institutions in Kazakhstan may have serious implications for Kazakhstan’s security by promoting the formation of underground, fundamentalist schools. Having more accredited institutions decreases the likelihood of students learning in informal underground madrassas by unaccredited instructors and with questionable curricula. Further, since Kazakhstan does not offer financial support to religious schools, the muftiyats become highly dependent on public support and foreign donors, thus becoming susceptible to foreign influences that perhaps even dictate the kind of religious instruction provided. By increasing formal religious schooling opportunities, it will also decrease the demand for students to study abroad who may return to promote an imported strain of radical thought.
3. Encourage Kazakhstan to initiate a more accountable process for the extradition of Uighur-Kazakhs to China.
A common sentiment among the Uighur is the fear that Kazakhstan will oblige the security demands of China, irrespective of the merits for extradition, and that Uighur prisoners will be subjected to torture and other inhumane treatments. The question that arises, therefore, is why Kazakhstan has not yet demanded more prisoner safety guarantees as well as heightened demonstrations of proof that are normally associated with foreign extraditions. Without such protections Uighur-Kazakhs may be categorically swept into the dragnet of China’s larger “blowback” counteraction practices, which date back to the Afghan campaign when China trained Uighur fighters to wage jihad against the Soviets only to have their returning nationals take aim at the Chinese state. In this security context, Uighur-Kazakhs may fear that Islam and militancy are viewed as one and the same in China, and to be a Uighur in China is suspiciously close to being an Islamic militant. In effort to assuage those fears under the guise of promoting sovereignty, Kazakhstan needs to implement a more factually justifiable process with detailed legal procedures before extradition could be effected. Prisoner safety guarantees should also be pursued. Both should help establish better confidence building measures in the practice of extradition and partially help disassociate the radical Islamic factor from the Uighur equation.
4. Encourage Kazakhstan to implement more preventive tactics in its efforts to combat terrorism.
Terrorism will likely never be eradicated by solely suppressive or preventive policies, if at all, but gains should be significantly higher if a comprehensive approach is used that incorporates both. Repressive state tactics that target religious groups and freedom of expression often alienate moderate elements, which are the very segments that can discourage extremism. Kazakhstan’s security policies, therefore, should focus on the underlying causes of radicalism, which are known to be unemployment, limited professional and educational opportunities, religious and social repression, and an exclusionary political process.
Continuing Research
Areas ripe for future research include: how migration patterns, and the manner in which Uighur groups came to Kazakhstan, have shaped the Uighur identity and to what extent loyalties may exists toward their brethren in Xinjiang; how the larger Kazakh population view the Uighur, their suspected ties to militant groups, and what role they should play in the future of Kazakhstan; and how the larger Kazakh population would view plans for the State to legalize the existence of political parties associated with the Islamic faith.
About the Author
Andreas Borgeas conducted research for this article while a Policy Specialist Fellow at the U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan. He is the Professor of International and Comparative Law at the San Joaquin College of Law.
Endnotes
John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror In The Name of Islam (Oxford University Press, 2002).
Mariya Y. Omelicheva, Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia, Central Asian Study Series (Routledge, 2011).
Ahmed Rashid, Jihad—The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
Ibid.
Emmanuel Karagiannis, Political Islam in Central Asia—The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Central Asian Study Series (Routledge, 2010).
Mohamed H. Al-Hoshan & Maren Hanson, “Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia,” California International Practitioner, vol. II, no. 2 (2001–2002).
Dilshod Achilov, Islam and Democracy: Can Islamic Institutions Promote Civil Liberties and Diminish Radicalism in the Muslim Central Asia? (IREX Research Report, 2009).
Jonathan Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan (Continuum, 2009).
Andreas Borgeas (field polling and anonymous interviews, notes on file with author).
Peasant (i.e., laborer, agriculture, livestock); Merchant (i.e., manufacturing, shopkeeper, trades); Professional (i.e., academia, medicine, law) (most individuals in government related services such as tourism, oil/hydrocarbon, and military were excluded from poll).