Malaysia: Securing sovereignty in the South China Sea through ASEAN centrality

Photo by Dennis S. Hurd on Flickr

By Seow E Kin Zane Ryan

Malaysia’s destiny is maritime. Geographically divided into two by sea, 63 percent of the federation’s borders are maritime borders; its coastline stretches 4,675 km.[1] Peninsular Malaysia—the western portion of the federation—is situated on the eastern shore of the Malacca Strait, a strategically important waterway which ferries approximately 60 percent of global maritime traffic.[2] The territory of the strait is divided between Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and, to a smaller extent, Thailand.

Looking east, the Malaysian regions of Sabah and Sarawak are situated on the island of Borneo. Malaysia claims a 334,671 km² exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in the southern part of the South China Sea near offshore Sabah and Sarawak, though this entire area is disputed between overlapping claims with various justifications by Malaysia, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Malaysia’s claims cover ten atolls in the Spratly Islands near Sabah waters and the oil-rich Luconia Shoals (known in Malay as Beting Patinggi Ali) close to Sarawak.[3] Malaysia maintains an active military presence in five of the ten atolls situated in the southern portion of the Spratly Islands.[4]

However, China’s growing aggression in the South China Sea in recent years is a sign that Malaysia should not be complacent with its current foreign policy arrangements. As Malaysia alone cannot realistically compete with China in military diplomacy due to the vast disparity in their naval capabilities and assets, strengthening the existing Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) system, and presenting a united front, is the best path Malaysia can pursue to dampen Chinese aggression in its EEZ.

Malaysia’s offshore territorial claims include an estimated five billion barrels of oil reserves and 80 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves, making it a lucrative target for disputing countries, particularly, China.[5] The Royal Malaysian Navy stationed in the EEZ continues to face challenges in defending their strategic interests from the Chinese navy and coast guard, who trespassed into the EEZ 89 times between 2016 and 2019 alone.[6] The Malaysian Government Audit Report for 2020 revealed Chinese vessels repeatedly exhibiting belligerent attitudes toward the Royal Malaysian Navy during standoffs within the Malaysian EEZ.[7]

In January 2023, China’s largest coast guard ship intruded into Malaysia’s EEZ, along with the EEZs of several other Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines.[8] Oil exploration and drilling in the Malaysian EEZ were interrupted as a result. Greg Poling, Director of the Southeast Asia and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, expects the trend of increased Chinese patrols, harassment, and militia deployments in the Spratlys to continue in 2023.[9]

Despite repeated Chinese incursions into Malaysian airspace and waters, Malaysian policymakers prefer to designate China as a non-threat to minimize bilateral friction and diminish the potential for a regional arms race.[10] The then Malaysian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hishammuddin Hussein, exemplified this policy position during a two-day working visit to China in April 2021, where he openly called China a “Big Brother” in a joint press conference with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi.[11] This comes as no surprise, given that China has been Malaysia’s largest trading partner since 2009—the value of their bilateral trade was a 17.1 percent share of Malaysia’s total trade in 2022.[12] The no-threat assertion also ensures Malaysia stays officially neutral, and away from the crossfires of regional and global conflicts.

The current ASEAN system is fragmented, and its nations are prone to being singled out by China for individual bilateral negotiations in which China has more leverage to strongarm them. Unlike the European Union’s parliamentary system, the ASEAN approach to regional diplomacy is based on consultation and consensus. The often passive and neutral tone of the ‘ASEAN Way’ has, more often than not, limited the substance ASEAN nations can bring to the table for discussion and action. The flaws of the ASEAN approach were evident in 2012, when ASEAN countries failed to reach a consensus and issue a joint statement regarding contested Chinese claims on disputed territory in the South China Sea, in part due to the continued disputes on maritime territorial claims within the ASEAN community.[13] China in fact often takes advantage of the frictions caused by those disputes as it looks to advance its diplomatic agenda in the South China Sea.

The ASEAN Charter engraves the idea of “ASEAN centrality” as one of its key principles, with Article 41 encouraging member states to reach common ground and pursue collective action as a bloc in their foreign policy. As it stands, however, its approach toward regional and global diplomacy has failed to demonstrate ASEAN centrality to be anything more than a political talking point. Malaysia stands to benefit by playing its part to strengthen the reality of the concept—a Southeast Asia with a robust, unified ASEAN bloc is pivotal in keeping Chinese and Western ambitions to the region in check.

From China’s perspective, the mature development of ASEAN centrality would be antithetical to its long-preferred bilateral approach to diplomacy with ASEAN member states. A fragmented ASEAN allows China the space to engage with those states individually, maximizing its diplomatic and military leverage in the negotiation process.[14] A unified ASEAN with better policy coordination and a common strategic outlook could impose formidable diplomatic pressure on Beijing, balancing out its influence in the South China Sea.

Malaysia, by working within the ASEAN system to advance its diplomatic agenda, will not only limit the diplomatic leverage available to Beijing but also exploit the strategic potential of its geography (and that of its neighboring countries) on the Malacca Strait. Malaysia’s control of the Malacca Strait, through which over 70 percent of China’s petroleum and LNG exports (and 60 percent of its trade flows) are ferried, acts as effective economic leverage to encourage peaceful diplomacy from China, lest it push these countries toward the Western bloc.[15]

The importance of the Malacca Strait to China was exemplified by a statement from then Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2003, in which he noted the attempts by some “major powers” to influence trade routes through the Strait, and called for the formulation of new strategies and petroleum development policies to secure Chinese national interests.[16] Thus cognizant of its “Malacca Dilemma” and facing rising political tensions with the United States, China’s newly-minted foreign minister, Qin Gang, began his tenure in late 2022 with a series of diplomatic phone calls to geostrategically important countries to advance their overseas interests. Qin Gang’s first official call was to his Malaysian counterpart, Zambry Abdul Kadir, which was followed by an in-person visit to Indonesia shortly after. Both countries lie on the Malacca Strait; Indonesia is the current chair of ASEAN.[17]

In addition to shifting the balance of power between ASEAN and China, the development of ASEAN centrality can also minimize the geostrategic consequences of the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States (AUKUS) pact in Southeast Asia. Political observers point to the 2021 development of the AUKUS pact as a byproduct of ASEAN’s inertia and lack of unified direction in response to China’s encroaching influence in the region.[18] The raison d’etre of AUKUS—to contain China—has the potential to destabilize the regional security of Southeast Asia, as China pushes back against perceived AUKUS encroachment into its sphere of influence. The AUKUS presence in the Southeast Asian region will also call into question the relevance of ASEAN in Southeast Asian affairs, suggesting to observers an inability on the part of the organization to manage its own regional security issues.[19] An ASEAN that’s seen to hold diminishing global relevance in the management of its own affairs will hinder the ability of its member states to reach consensus on various transnational issues (e.g. climate action, humanitarian protections) whilst exposing the region to the influence of other power blocs. 

ASEAN's long-standing commitment to nuclear nonproliferation in the region, for instance, will be at stake as a result of its waning influence. Shortly after the inception of AUKUS, Malaysia and Indonesia voiced concerns over the possibility of nuclear proliferation and intensified arms race in the region.[20] Under the AUKUS pact Australia is slated to purchase nuclear-powered submarines through its technology-sharing agreement.[21] The future deployment of nuclear submarines in the Southeast Asian region will agitate China, who in return might do the same. ASEAN has long held a consistent stance on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, its member states being signatories to the Bangkok Treaty of 1995 which established a nuclear moratorium for the bloc.[22] The failure to prevent a potential escalated arms race and nuclear proliferation will only further diminish the relevance of the already-fragmented Southeast Asian bloc.

It is therefore important for Malaysia—as a founding member of ASEAN—to double down on its work toward ASEAN centrality to ensure the bloc’s continued relevance. ASEAN is the only effective mechanism to secure Malaysia’s sovereignty in the South China Sea both without military confrontation and without being aligned to either the Chinese or American superpower bloc. Malaysia is a middle-income maritime nation that stands to benefit from preserving the ASEAN system, especially when its maritime defense capabilities remain underfunded and its procurement ridden with high-profile corruption scandals.[23]

Working within a bloc of ten member states (with Timor-Leste’s accession on the way) and a total population of over 633 million, the main challenge for Malaysia is advancing the concept of ASEAN centrality in a meaningful way. To do so, it must establish consensus on myriad regional issues, including border disputes, human rights protection, environmental protection, and disparities in economic development.[24]

Now is the right time for Malaysia to act as a connective link between ASEAN member states. It can leverage its unique geographical centrality in the region to promote proactive regional activism and reach a definite consensus on the list of protracted problems surrounding ASEAN. The current Malaysian Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, has made a positive step in establishing a culture of ASEAN centrality by suggesting the suspension of Myanmar as an ASEAN member state in response to the atrocities committed by its military junta (atrocities that will negatively impact the ASEAN region as a whole).[25] The Malaysian Prime Minister’s stance on Myanmar—although zealous—is a breath of fresh air compared to the usual passive approach of ASEAN. For the bloc to maintain relevance and stand as a formidable, independent third bloc, it can no longer remain passive toward protracted problems occuring in the region to the detriment of its member states.

As Southeast Asia becomes a flashpoint amidst rising superpower tensions, a fragmented ASEAN bloc might jeopardize the national interests of Malaysia and its neighbors. Reinforcing the system of ASEAN centrality is both a visible and a secure way to safeguard the collective interests of the region. It is only by facilitating cooperation between member states and presenting a unified stance on various regional issues that Malaysia can secure its strategic interests in the South China Sea, leveraging its geographical advantage to consolidate its standing as a formidable maritime nation in Southeast Asia.

About the author

Seow E Kin Zane Ryan is an MPP student at the University of Malaya. He is also the research lead of YPolitics for the international relations and defense portfolio. Zane holds a BA in Communications and Global Studies from Monash University, Malaysia and is interested in various issues, including institutional reform, foreign affairs, and geopolitics.

Endnotes

  1. Evers, Hans-Dieter, Nusantara: Malaysia and the Geopolitics of the South China Sea (Selangor: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2016), 4.

  2. Seyedi, Seyedmohammad, “Strategic Importance of Strait of Malacca in Southern Asia”, Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies, January 31, 2022, https://www.ankasam.org/strategic-importance-of-strait-of-malacca-in-southern-asia/?lang=en

  3. Storey, Ian, “Malaysia and the South China Sea Dispute: Policy Continuity amid Domestic Political Change”, ISEAS Yusof-Ishak Institute Perspective 2020, No.18 (March 2020): 1-10, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_18.pdf

  4. “Malaysia Island Tracker”, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Accessed February 23, 2023, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/malaysia/

  5. “South China Sea: Overview”, US Energy Information Administration, Accessed February 25, 2023, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/South_China_Sea

  6. Jabatan Audit Negara, Laporan Ketua Audit Negara: Aktiviti Kementerian/Jabatan Kerajaan Persekutuan dan Badan-badan Berkanun Persekutuan Tahun 2018 Siri 3 [Auditor-General’s Report: Activities of Ministry/Federal Agencies and Federal Statutory Bodies, Year 2018 Series 3] (Putrajaya: National Audit Department of Malaysia, 2020), 366, https://www.parlimen.gov.my/ipms/eps/2020-07-14/CMD.8.2020%20-%20CMD%208.2020.pdf

  7. Ibid.

  8. “Report: China Coast Guard ‘more robust than ever’, Radio Free Asia, January 31, 2023, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/southchinasea/china-coast-guard-01312023020626.html

  9. Ibid.

  10. Syailendra, Emirza Adi, “Why Don’t Malaysian Policymakers View China as a Threat?”, The Diplomat, February 24, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/why-dont-malaysian-policymakers-view-china-as-a-threat/

  11. Annuar, Azril, “Hishammuddin hails China as ‘elder brother’, miffed academics demand explanation”, The Vibes, April 3, 2021, https://www.thevibes.com/articles/news/22696/hishammuddin-hails-china-as-elder-brother-miffed-academics-demand-explanation

  12. “Malaysia's exports rise 25 pct in 2022”, Xinhua News, January 18, 2023, https://english.news.cn/asiapacific/20230118/8f528fcad1a64037a37428b8355fd6f5/c.html#:~:text=In%202022%2C%20China%20has%20remained,15.6%20percent%20year%20on%20year

  13. “Asean nations fail to reach agreement on South China Sea”, BBC News, July 13, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18825148

  14. Zhuoran, Li, “What Does ASEAN Centrality Mean to China?”, The Diplomat, June 2, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/what-does-asean-centrality-mean-to-china/

  15. Paweł Paszak, “China and the “Malacca Dilemma”, Warsaw Institute, February 28, 2021, https://warsawinstitute.org/china-malacca-dilemma/

  16. Shi, Hong Tao, "中国的“马六甲困局”" [China's "Malacca Dilemma"], China Youth Daily, June 15, 2004, http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2004-06/15/content_888233.htm

  17. Schochet, Nathaniel and Earl Carr, “China’s New Foreign Minister Is on a Diplomatic Blitz”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/chinas-new-foreign-minister-is-on-a-diplomatic-blitz/

  18. Pongsudhirak, Thitinan, “AUKUS raises temperature in Southeast Asia”, GIS Reports, December 10, 2021, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/aukus-asean-risks/

  19. Ibid.

  20. “Indonesia, Malaysia concerned over AUKUS nuclear subs plan”, Reuters, October 18, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-malaysia-start-work-travel-corridor-2021-10-18/

  21. Pager, Tyler and Anne Gearan, “U.S. will share nuclear submarine technology with Australia as part of new alliance, a direct challenge to China”, The Washington Post, September 16, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/09/15/us-will-share-nuclear-submarine-technology-with-australia-part-new-alliance-direct-challenge-china/

  22. “Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ)”, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Accessed February 26, 2023, https://asean.org/our-communities/asean-political-security-community/peaceful-secure-and-stable-region/southeast-asia-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-seanwfz/#:~:text=On%2015%20December%201995%2C%20ASEAN,known%20as%20the%20Bangkok%20Treaty.

  23. Rahmat, Ridzwan, “Malaysian navy makes rare appeal for more funds in 2023 defence budget”, Janes, October 5, 2022, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/malaysian-navy-makes-rare-appeal-for-more-funds-in-2023-defence-budget; Ganesan, Reshna Reem, “LCS scandal: A summary of the events”, Free Malaysia Today, August 14, 2022, https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2022/08/14/lcs-scandal-a-summary-of-the-events/

  24. O’Neill, Aaron, “Total population of the ASEAN countries from 2017 to 2027”, Statista, Accessed February 27, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/796222/total-population-of-the-asean-countries/#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20the%20total%20population,Singapore%2C%20Thailand%2C%20and%20Vietnam

  25. Annuar, Azril, “Asean must ‘carve’ Myanmar out for now: Anwar”, The Vibes, February 10, 2023, https://www.thevibes.com/articles/news/85064/asean-must-carve-myanmar-out-for-now-anwar

ArticleYale Journal of International AffairsChina, Asia, Spring 2023