Meeting the Moment in Sudan's Revolutionary Politics

Photo by ammar nassir on Unsplash

By Sarah Stortz

Against a backdrop of mass strikes, anti-coup demonstrations, and sit-ins, October 25, 2022 marked the one-year anniversary of the military coup in Sudan that halted the country’s democratic transition.[1] This milestone is an important inflection point for a nation facing a looming hunger emergency, political instability, and persistent economic crises—one that demands a different strategic approach from the international community.

The coup shattered the fragile transition to democracy that began after the “December Revolution” ousted longtime dictator Omar Al-Bashir in 2019. Under international pressure, the Transitional Military Council, headed by Lt. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, signed a power-sharing agreement with the Forces for Freedom and Change (FCC) civilian coalition. The agreement established a goal of holding elections by 2023 and forming a fully civilian government. It was this fraught military-civilian alliance that collapsed in October 2021 with the coup. Yet the military junta's inability to consolidate power since then prompted General Burhan to reverse the coup in July 2022. He did so with an abrupt announcement of the military's withdrawal from both UN talks with civilian opposition groups and politics more broadly, thereby allowing a fully civilian government to be formed.[2]

General Burhan’s announcement was a political gambit to redirect blame for the crumbling economy and increasing insecurity to a civilian government. Yet four months after General Burhan’s announcement, de facto political and economic control remains in the military's hands. It’s clear that military commanders are uninterested in ceding their lucrative stake in the economy and becoming accountable for corruption and violence against protesters.[3]

It’s also clear that Sudan's pro-democracy opposition has stayed remarkably resilient in the face of violent repression. Protesters, including children, have been driven off roads, tortured, and executed, all at the hands of security forces.[4] Local grassroots groups known as Resistance Committees have become more organized since the 2019 December Revolution, becoming a powerful mobilizing force and voice of the street.[5] Organized by neighborhood, committee membership is diverse. It comprises students, parents, doctors, lawyers, and laborers, although many groups have been criticized for not being inclusive of women. Resistance Committees maintain a flat, assembly-style structure that has kept them nimble in the face of repression from the security apparatus. They are found across the country, although Committees from urban areas dominate their numbers. The bravery of these Committees has won them a strategic victory, denying the military much-needed international legitimacy. 

At the heart of the continued protests is deep distrust toward the military from their opposition, even after General Burhan announced their exit from the political process in July. Opposition leaders certainly have grounds for skepticism.[6] The military has been committed to undermining the democratic gains of the December Revolution at every turn throughout the last three years. They have killed scores of protestors. They enacted their coup not long after the civilian-led transitional council made inroads in anti-corruption investigations into the security forces.[7] And after the coup, the military supported the same Bashir-era political agents and bolstered the same institutions the December Revolution rose up against.[8]

While activists have openly rejected the military's July announcement as a transparent "ruse" and continued weekly protests, they have also tentatively taken the political opening to coordinate among themselves and form a new civilian government.[9] Most recently, the Sudan Bar Association drafted a constitution, which was praised internationally as an important step forward. Yet Sudan has been here before. The country has drafted four constitutions since its independence in 1956, all negated by subsequent coups and popular uprisings. Constitutions, while important, won't in and of themselves transform the status quo.[10] International stakeholders must use every tool at their disposal to support a path toward a transformative political settlement in Sudan, without being manipulated by a military hell-bent on spoiling the process.

For example, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) has publicly championed a "civilian-led" transitional government. Volker Perthes, Special Representative for Sudan and Head of UNITAMS, has urged the country’s grassroots movements to come to the negotiating table with the military.[11] Perthes' appeal to broaden the negotiating table coincides with a broader push to make peace and political transition negotiations more inclusive toward grassroots actors. There is some evidence that this could lead to a more enduring durable political settlement, but only if those included have influence in the process.[12]

But whereas UNITAMS has been urging cooperation from grassroots actors at the negotiation table, the Resistance Committees, to great effect, have made their entire platform “no negotiation, no partnership, no compromise.”[13] Indeed, the military retreat came on the heels of a boycott of UN-led consultations by Resistance Committees and Friends for Freedom and Change-Central Council (FCC-CC), a prominent umbrella association for professional groups and trade unions.[14] Their boycott was based on the premise that any negotiation of sub-issues only further legitimizes the coup’s leaders, and the main priority should be ending the coup. “Dialogues” were also part of the playbook Bashir used to enter into negotiations with various members of the opposition in years past, only to then divide and conquer them.[15] The opposition also takes issue with UNITAMS’ continued calls for a “civilian-led” transitional government, since it obscures the military’s role in such a government. Dania Atabani, a Khartoum-based Resistance Committee spokesperson, stated during an interview: “This term ‘civilian-led’ is in itself a form of manipulation by the international community. Any political power for the military makes it no longer a civilian government. This is something the Western countries know and understand well when it comes to their countries.”[16]

Perthes and other international stakeholders should avoid pushing protestors to dilute their demands by negotiating with coup leaders. Not only because it alienates protestors from UNITAMS but, more importantly, because the opposition is right about the immediate risks of accommodating the military and reimplementing the same type of failed democratic transition. By virtue of ignoring the "resistance" in Resistance Committees, it puts the onus on the committees to undermine their key demands for civilian oversight of the military and security sector reform—prerequisites for any lasting democratic rule in Sudan—instead of gaining concessions from the military.

Instead of pushing the democratic movement back to the same ill-fated political transition, the international community needs to support a more sustainable political arrangement. Part of the issue is that UNITAMS' mandate was renewed in 2022 with the same text from before the coup, which calls for a “civilian-led” transition. The United Kingdom, as the UN Security Council penholder on Sudan, tried to re-write the mandate to more accurately reflect the new political dynamic, but Sudanese representatives protested against language condemning the military's lethal use of force against protestors.[17] 

Given the UN's institutional constraints, other countries and multilateral organizations need to take a broader view of tools at their disposal. Yet right now they too are overwhelmingly and uncritically committed to the "civilian-led" approach. One recent communiqué issued by nine Western countries and the EU stated: "As Sudan faces economic security and humanitarian crises and the anniversary of the 25 October 2021 military takeover approaches, we emphasize the need for all Sudanese actors – including Sudan’s military [emphasis added] – to constructively engage in a political process to restore a civilian-led transition to democracy."[18]

One area all international stakeholders need to reassess is the speed with which they react to events on the ground. The United States refused to take Sudan off the State Sponsor of Terrorism list for more than a year after Bashir was ousted. This designation blocked the civilian-led transitional council from receiving desperately-needed debt relief and funding from the IMF and World Bank which would have helped consolidate its credibility and authority.[19] The United States was also slow to acknowledge that a coup even occurred last October, even though Resistance Committees began demonstrations against the impending coup as early September 2021.[20] Similarly, the UN Security Council was silent for several days after the coup before issuing a public statement, only expressing “serious concern” about the situation.[21] While the African Union did quickly denounce the coup, it failed to rescind its endorsement of Sudan's bid to the UN Human Rights Council for a full year.[22] As with the case of UNITAMS’ mandate renewal, it should be obvious to the African Union that the UN Human Rights Council is an institution the military would use to conceal its abuses and further legitimize itself in the international arena.

The international community should be full-throated in their condemnation of the Sudanese military's violence against protestors. Perthes is admittedly in a particularly difficult position. The Sudanese foreign ministry reportedly summoned Perthes this past June to express his dissatisfaction after Perthes made a blanket condemnation of any violence used against anti-coup protesters.[23] Yet at key moments the UN Security Council, UNITAMS, and the United States have refrained from fully condemning the military's violence, effectively condoning it in order to keep the military at the negotiating table. They have all called on security forces to refrain from "excessive violence" against peaceful protesters, thereby implicitly accepting some violence against protestors.[24] This diluted rhetoric and lack of consequences signals to the military that the UN’s bureaucracy allows them to act with impunity. 

Diplomatic concessions in the name of negotiations have proven myopic, as the military has repeatedly demonstrated that they are not willing to compromise to any great degree unless the cost of not compromising outweighs the benefits of holding onto power. Military leaders are in a weakened position, after bungling their own coup and subsequently retreating. They are desperate for international legitimacy in order to avoid scrutiny of their use of violence and to unlock international funding. Without international legitimacy, Sudan's military junta has had to forgo debt relief negotiations that were suspended in response to the coup at the exact point in time they needed that relief to bolster a worsening economy. This issue was explicitly stated by the head of Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Lt. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. In a statement after the coup’s failure, he conceded that “the situation now is worse than before. True there are some positive aspects [of the military takeover] but there are also negative results. The support of the international community is crucial for Sudan.”[25]

While it is tempting for the international community to convene all actors to the table, it must do so with the utmost understanding of the political constraints and historical context it is operating in. The international community needs to take the demands of peaceful grassroots organizers seriously, as they put their physical safety at risk each and every time they protest. Sudan will have a higher chance of realizing a true civilian democracy if powerful actors on the global stage keep pressure on the military junta, and back up stronger rhetoric with swift consequences. 

The stakes are high. A stronger pro-democracy alliance and a military junta on the defensive could trigger further instability, as pre-existing fissures within the various state security forces widen. And while the military and pro-democracy movement make competing claims for the government, the state itself is deteriorating. Sudan's rising fuel and food prices, conflicts heating up in periphery states, and a split military could easily set off a civil war. However, this moment can also be an opportunity for pro-democracy actors to bring more discontented parties into their alliance as well. But no matter what, the international community shouldn't put its faith in the same military that orchestrated a coup specifically to stop a democratic transition. 

About the Author

Sarah Stortz received her M.A. in Conflict, Security, & Development from King's College London, and B.A. in International Affairs from the George Washington University. She currently works in humanitarian aid and peacebuilding at the Near East Foundation. Views expressed are her own.

Endnotes

  1. “Protesters injured in first of several Sudan coup anniversary protests” October 7, 2022, Dabanga Sudan. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/protesters-injured-in-first-of-several-sudan-coup-anniversary-protests.

  2. Khalid Abdelaziz, Mahmoud Mourad, Aidan Lewis, Frank Jack Daniel, Josie Kao. “Sudan's army won't take part in political talks, leader says” Reuters .July 4, 2022 https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-burhan-says-army-withdraw-political-talks-2022-07-04/.

  3. Salah Ben Hammou “Sudan’s leader says the military will step aside. That’s not likely.” Washington Post, July 8, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/07/08/sudan-coup-leaders-burham-tripartite-talks-/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=wp_monkeycage.

  4. According to Human Rights Watch, the Sudanese military rotates military units and tactically deploys forces intentionally to obfuscate their involvement in repressing protests. Burhan has placed blame on police forces in instances when the military was involved. Mohamed Osman, “Sudan’s Military is Brutally Suppressing Protests,” Human Rights Watch. March 23, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/23/sudans-military-brutally-suppressing-protests.

  5. Alan Boswell, “A Breakthrough in Sudan’s Impasse?” International Crisis Group. August 12, 2022. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/breakthrough-sudans-impasse.

  6. Hammou, “Sudan’s leader says the military will step aside. That’s not likely.” 

  7. “Why is Sudan so unstable?” The Economist, January 4, 2022, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/01/04/why-is-sudan-so-unstable.

  8. Yezid Sayigh “Sudanese Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok Has Resigned” Malcom H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center. January 27, 2022. https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/86146.

  9. “Sudan activists reject army offer as ‘ruse’, urge more protests” Al Jazeera. July 5, 2022 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/5/sudan-civilians-reject-army-offer-as-ruse-urge-more-protests.

  10. Aida Abbashar “Sudan’s misguided fixation with finding a transformative constitution” African Arguments. October 5, 2022. https://africanarguments.org/2022/10/sudan-misguided-fixation-with-finding-a-transformative-constitution/.

  11. Volker Perthes “Sudan and prospects of seeing light at the end of the tunnel” Sudan Tribune, August 7, 2022. “https://sudantribune.com/article262433/.

  12. Thania Paffenholz and Nicholas Ross “Inclusive peace processes – an introduction” Development Dialogue, 2015, pg. 29. https://www.daghammarskjold.se/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/DHF_DD63_p28-37.pdf

  13. Congressional Testimony. Joseph Tucker, “Sudan's Imperiled Transition: U.S. Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup” U.S. Institute of Peace. February 1. 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/02/sudans-imperiled-transition-us-policy-wake-october-25th-coup.

  14. Susan Stigant “In Sudan, a Narrow Opportunity to Get the Democratic Transition Back on Track” U.S. Institute of Peace. July 7, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/sudan-narrow-opportunity-get-democratic-transition-back-track.

  15. Jihad Mashamoun, “Buying time: Burhan’s strategy in Sudan.” Responsible Statecraft. January 31, 2022. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/01/31/buying-time-burhans-strategy-in-sudan/. 

  16. Pavan Kulkarni “Sudanese Resistance Committees reject UN calls to negotiate with coup leaders” People’s Dispatch. March 14, 2022. https://peoplesdispatch.org/2022/03/14/sudanese-resistance-committees-reject-un-calls-to-negotiate-with-coup-leaders/.

  17. “September 2022 Monthly Forecast” Security Council Report. August 31, 2022. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-09/sudan-14.php.

  18. Royal Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum “Joint statement on the SBA initiative and transitional arrangement” September 12, 2022. https://www.norway.no/en/sudan/norway-sudan/news-events/joint-statement-on-sba/.

  19. Benjamin Oestericher, “Helping Put Sudan’s Democratic Transition Bank on Track” Foreign Policy Research Institute. October 3, 2022. https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/10/helping-put-sudans-democratic-transition-back-on-track/.

  20. Muzan Alneel, “Resistance Committees: The Specters Organizing Sudan’s Protests” The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, November 26, 2021. https://timep.org/explainers/resistance-committees-the-specters-organizing-sudans-protests/.

  21. “Why the UN Security Council Stumbles in Responding to Coups” International Crisis Group. January 24, 2022. https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/why-un-security-council-stumbles-responding-coups.

  22. Hassan Shire, Estella Kabachwezi and Nicolas Agostini. “UN Members Should Reject Sudan Junta’s Membership on the Human Rights Council” Just Security, October 5, 2022. https://www.justsecurity.org/83354/un-members-should-reject-sudan-juntas-membership-on-the-human-rights-council/.

  23. “Sudan sommuns UNITAMS head over calls to refrain from violence” Sudan Tribune, June 29, 2022. https://sudantribune.com/article260921/.

  24. Tweet. U.S. Embassy of Khartoum, June 3, 2022. https://twitter.com/USEmbassyKRT/status/1532572907435659271?s=20&t=o8kV0Dvy0V9zanRNY7XhfQ; “UNITAMS head calls to refrain from using excessive force against Sudanese protesters” Sudan Tribune, June 3, 2022 https://sudantribune.com/article259716/; UN Security Council Meeting Minutes, “S/PV.9041” May 22, 2022, pg. 4 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/N2235937.pdf.

  25. “Sudan’s Hemetti admits coup failure to achieve goals” Sudan Tribune. August 21, 2022. https://sudantribune.com/article262178/.

ArticleYale Journal of International AffairsAfrica, Fall 2022