Real Names and Responsible Speech: The Cases of South Korea, China, and Facebook

By Tarale (http://www.flickr.com/photos/tarale/3104102190/) [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

By Tarale (http://www.flickr.com/photos/tarale/3104102190/) [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons


By David Caragliano

Abstract—For at least a decade, governments have considered requiring web users to register their real names and identification numbers with online service providers before posting comments on providers’ websites. The idea is that real names contribute to responsible speech. Real name registration is also used as a strategy to silence dissenting voices. In authoritarian as well as democratic contexts, governments have attempted to mandate real name registration, but implementation has been uneven and generally ineffective. Human psychology and market incentives make real name registration an unpalatable proposition both to netizens and to online service providers charged with implementing the policy. In time, this article argues, internet policy makers will conclude that real name registration is more trouble than it is worth.

 Information spreads farther and faster than ever before due to the global expansion of online social media. An online mirror of social interaction, personal identity, and network building has created more opportunities for expression. The pervasiveness of online interactions has also presented new channels to monitor citizens and manage information. Democratic and authoritarian regimes alike employ methods to exorcise “bad speech” from the internet—although they differ on the definition and scope of proscribed speech. The tools of the trade are keyword deletion algorithms and human censors that remove online content. For at least a decade, governments have considered moving beyond these measures by mandating systems that require web users to register their real names and identification numbers with online service providers before posting comments on providers’ websites. The idea is that real names will contribute to responsible speech and aid law enforcement in identifying bad actors.

While ruling parties tend to endorse a real name internet policy as a means of silencing criticism and thereby maintaining their grip on power, private online service providers are motivated to expand their user base and turn a profit. Facebook, an online platform with more than one billion users worldwide, has consistently argued that its real name policy is fundamental to an atmosphere of civility and trust. Facebook’s Director of Policy for Europe, Richard Allan, put it this way: “there is no discretion here as the creation of fake accounts threatens the integrity of our whole system.” [1] Citing similar rationales about the need to deter fraud, slander, and rumor, South Korea and China have implemented systems mandating real name registration.

At some point, liberal political theory holds, enforcement actions outing anonymous web users reach a certain level of frequency and severity that they have a chilling effect—and not just on bad speech. Critics of the wealthy and powerful, advocates of unpopular views, and whistleblowers often reconsider speaking up, knowing that disclosure of their identity may lead to ostracism, imprisonment, or worse. Indeed, real name registration is designed to complement censorship tools and incentivize citizens to self-censor.

How have real name policies affected online speech? So far, the answer is: not very much. While evidence from South Korea, China, and Facebook is insufficient to draw conclusions about the long-term impacts of real name registration, the cases do provide insight into the formidable difficulties of implementing a real name system. Human psychology and, often, economic incentives tend to make real name registration an unpalatable proposition both to netizens and to online service providers charged with implementing the policy. Given these difficulties, in time, internet policy makers, regardless of political ideology, will likely conclude that real name registration is more trouble than it is worth.

I. The Cases: South Korea, China, and Facebook

The cases in this article analyze events leading up to and following the enactment of real name registration laws in South Korea and China, as well as Facebook’s policy. This comparison is not meant to suggest that Facebook has—or should have—duties analogous to a government. Nor is it meant to equate the distinct political and legal systems of South Korea and China. Each of the three cases focuses on different kinds of social media. For example, the microblogs popular in China are more similar to Twitter than to Facebook. In South Korea, Cyworld, the leading social network until recently, functions as a hybrid of a blog and a personal homepage. State-imposed real name registration has allowed users to maintain pseudonymous handles or screen names, while Facebook has not. The unifying thread is that these cases deal with dominant online platforms that require real names as a condition of use.

A. South Korea: The Future of the Internet?

South Korea is a digital trendsetter. The country is one of the most wired in the world, both in terms of internet usage levels and connection speed. Today, eighty-four percent of the country’s forty-nine million people use the internet.[2] In part due to the country’s legacy of authoritarianism and longstanding national security concerns, South Korea’s free speech protections are relatively weak compared with many other democracies.[3] Article 21 of the South Korean constitution guarantees that “all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press,” but contains the qualification that “neither speech nor the press shall violate the honor or rights of other persons nor undermine morals or social ethics.” [4] This caveat has empowered the government to impose restrictions on a broad range of expression.

As early as 2003, the Ministry of Information and Communication sought cooperation from South Korea’s four major web portals (Yahoo Korea, Daum Communications, NHN, and NeoWiz) in developing real name registration systems.[5] A real name system was first adopted in 2004 as an amendment to the Public Official Election Act.[6] Incumbent politicians worried about the impact of unregulated online speech on election outcomes. The law required web users to verify their identities by submitting their Resident Registration Numbers (a national identification number) before posting to election-related websites.[7]

Over time, the scope of the real name policy widened beyond election-related sites. In July 2007, the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) passed legislation requiring real name registration for all websites with over 300,000 visitors per day, and two years later, after a spate of celebrity suicides reportedly resulting from web slander,[8] the GNP lowered the threshold to websites with over 100,000 visitors per day.[9] South Korean law obligated online service providers to disclose the personal information of alleged offenders if victims sued for libel or infringement of privacy.[10]

In July 2008, the GNP passed legislation criminalizing “cyber defamation” and initiated a crackdown against activist bloggers.[11] In one high profile case, Park Dae-sung, using the pseudonym Minerva, posted nearly 300 entries on Daum’s Agora Internet Forum between March 2008 and January 2009. He criticized economic policy, predicted the demise of Lehman Brothers, and anticipated the crash of South Korea’s currency, the won (KRW). The South Korean government claimed that his blog posts riled the financial markets, costing the country billions of dollars.[12] Prosecutors filed suit against Park, seeking penalties up to five years in prison or fines of up to KRW 50 million.[13] Park was arrested and tried but acquitted in April 2009.[14]

From the start, uneven application of the real name registration law undermined its effectiveness. Google refused to comply with South Korea’s real name registration system. The U.S. company disabled video upload and comment functionalities on the platform’s Korean YouTube site and redirected Korea-based users to YouTube. com. By changing their country setting, users took advantage of a major loophole and were able to upload and comment on YouTube sites based in other countries.[15] The Korea Communications Commission did not block access to YouTube.com or impose penalties on Google.[16] Although Korean online service providers held on to their dominant market position vis-à-vis foreign competitors, they complained that the law caused them to incur additional web development, monitoring, and security costs and put them at a competitive disadvantage.[17]

Academic findings analyzing the effects of the Korean real name policy on online speech show mixed results. One study suggested that malicious speech, defined as the number of posts deleted by censors on major portal sites, Daum and Naver, remained the same (around five percent) before and after the real name policy came into force.[18] Other studies observed a decline in online participation and a reduction in the number of violent comments in the immediate aftermath of South Korea’s 2008 real name policy but no long-term change.[19]

One consensus across these studies was that the real name registration policy did not deter wild and unfounded positions from being promoted online. Rather than promoting internet security, the real name policy actually introduced new hazards. After recording millions of users’ identification details, websites subject to the real name policy became treasure troves for hackers. According to a report by Korea IT Times, the number of hacking incidents reached “momentous” proportions in 2011.[20] In one notorious incident, thirty-five million users of SK Communications’ social network Cyworld had their personal details stolen.[21]

In August 2012, the Korean Constitutional Court unanimously struck down the law requiring websites to verify the identifications of users posting comments.[22] The Court reasoned that the real name policy infringed netizens’ rights to freedom of speech, an individual’s right to determine her own personal identity, and online service providers’ rights to freedom of speech. The Court held that the public interest must clearly justify restrictions on speech, and the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate a decrease in hateful comments, defamation, and insults on the internet following the real name policy.[23] Moreover, the Court reasoned that online service providers could rely upon alternative means to remedy malicious posts, and authorities could track web users though their IP addresses.[25] Notwithstanding the poor performance of real name registration in South Korea, however, Chinese proponents of real name registration have cited South Korea’s experience as a positive example.[26]

B. China: Witnessing an Unprecedented Platform for Speech

Over twenty-two percent of the world’s internet users reside in China, and social media is fast becoming a dominant mode of interaction and information gathering among China’s citizens. Overall, China had 513 million web users, equivalent to roughly thirty-eight percent of the country’s population in 2011,[27] and nearly half of that population used microblogs (weibo).[28] Given the Chinese government’s heavy hand in managing the content of established print and broadcast media, microblogs offer a unique space for netizens to obtain and share relatively unfiltered news and gossip with a national audience.

As early as 2006, the Ministry of Information and Industry considered implementation of a real name registration system,[29] and the China Internet Trade Association actively encouraged internet service providers to require customers to provide identification details in exchange for service.[30] Advocates of the real name policy hoped the law would help prevent “destabilizing” online rumors from going viral. Particularly over the two years leading up to the Chinese Communist Party’s (“CCP”) leadership transition at the 18th Party Congress, several incidents highlighted how online rumors could get in the way of the party’s official narrative.

In the summer of 2011, for example, when former president and party elder Jiang Zemin failed to show up at celebrations marking the ninetieth anniversary of the founding of the CCP, the online rumor mill predicted Jiang’s death.[31] Online service providers, such as Sina, attempted to rein in the rumors by blocking searches for keywords related to Jiang.[32] Human censors also hand-deleted posts that mentioned the leader. Microbloggers evaded the controls, employing euphemisms and images.

Beyond the speculation swirling around the highest-ranking party officials, online discussion has become an outlet for pent-up social frustrations. In 2011, the blogosphere fixated on several cases with an eerily similar plotline: the children of wealthy and powerful elites—often in sports cars—cavalierly violating the rights of average citizens. The meme “my father is mayor!” which one privileged youth was rumored to have said after assaulting a shopkeeper over a parking spot, captured the anxieties and resentment of a highly unequal society.[34]

Online social networking has also fueled offline collective action. Thousands of local citizens took to the streets to protest chemical plants that allegedly posed risks to public health. During demonstrations in Dalian (August 2011), Shifang (July 2012), and Ningbo (October 2012), among others, residents flooded microblog sites with images and descriptions of street marches and battles with police.[35] In contrast, news coverage of these incidents in mainstream media was scant.

Against this backdrop, Beijing Municipality promulgated provisions governing administration of microblogs in December 2011 (“Beijing Provisions”).[36] These provisions became effective in March 2012. They required users to register their real identity details in order to post or forward content on a microblog.[37] Because two of the main microblogging platforms, Sina and Sohu, were registered in Beijing, they became subject to the real name policy. In late 2012, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed legislation giving the real name policy national applicability and the full force of law.[38] The system allows pseudonyms to continue to serve as screen names or handles, but requires users to register with their real name, home address, and national identification number in order to use an online platform’s comment functions.[39]

Since enactment of the Beijing Provisions in March 2012, enforcement has been spotty. One month prior to the deadline for compliance, Sina threatened to suspend anonymous users accounts if they failed to register, but on the date the Beijing Provisions became effective, only about nineteen million of 300 million Sina Weibo users had registered with their real names.[40] Following the deadline, the company initially prevented anonymous users from utilizing certain social networking functions; then after a few days, Sina restored the original service.[41]

Despite these disruptions, netizens continued to use online forums to shine a light on local government corruption, a trend dating back at least four years.[42] The blogosphere has also remained a vibrant forum for the most persistent kind of mass dissent: parody and sarcasm directed against censorship itself.

It is too soon to assess the full impact of China’s real name registration system. Prominent online commentators have suggested that real name registration has driven users away from Sina Weibo (and onto other platforms such as Tencent’s WeChat).[43] At the same time, mainstream news outlets, including the Communist Party mouthpiece People’s Daily, have articulated the value of an independent microblogosphere.[44] In the months following the 18th Party Congress, official reporting showcased eight city and provincial-level government officials under internal investigation for improprieties and alleged illegal conduct.[45] The reports highlighted the fact that online networks of citizens exposed corruption in a number of these cases.[46] Official coverage touted citizen whistleblowers.[47]

Even so, the reports noted that “authenticity and accuracy” cannot be guaranteed when coming from an anonymous whistleblower,[48] and efforts must be made to further “systemize” and “standardize” online anti-corruption.[49] Elites at the nation-level recognize that online whistleblowers can be politically useful, so long as netizens know their boundaries. Online anti-corruption may deter some corruption at the local level and bolster claims of a benevolent central government willing to intervene to safeguard citizen rights and interests.

C. Facebook: The Global Behemoth

Facebook presents an interesting contrast to the Chinese and Korean cases because it is a large, transnational network. There are around 2.5 billion internet users globally. As of September 2012, more than one billion of them were on Facebook.[50] It has become the most popular social networking service in the vast majority of countries.[51] In the handful of remaining countries, Facebook is a strong competitor against local social networks or is blocked by state authorities. While netizens can choose whether to open an account on Facebook or another social networking service, no other service offers a network with the same international and, often, national breadth.

Given its massive scope, Facebook has had relative success instituting a real name policy. Users are required to provide their name as it appears on their credit card or student ID.[52] The official policy states: “We remove fake accounts from the site as we find them.” [53] Facebook’s internal estimates reveal that approximately 8.7 percent of all user accounts are fake.[54]

According to research on U.S. Facebook users, the ability to create and maintain relationships is the main benefit of Facebook.[55] Building and preserving a network based on interpersonal relationships requires disclosure of private information to a virtually unlimited audience. For this business model to work, users must feel that their private information is secure and trust that the identities of “friends” online are genuine. Facebook uses technology to track profile behavior and relationships, and when a “fake” profile is found, pages that have links to it are also checked. In fact, Facebook regularly removes everything from fake celebrities to pages representing pets in the name of safety and security.[56]

Critics of Facebook’s policy point to widening external exposure of users’ personal information to third parties without adequate notice or the ability to opt-out. Private information amassed by Facebook offers opportunities for microtargeted marketing and advertising, particularly when profiles are combined with functions that track user behavior. The demand for this information is the most viable way for the company to monetize its free social networking service. For this reason as much as safety and civility online, real names are essential to Facebook’s business model.

Facebook’s variant of the real name rule has not prevented false impersonation and scams to defraud,[57] fake pages amounting to libel,[58] malicious messages, or trolling.[59] In a 2009 statement, Facebook told CNN that impersonation schemes affected less than one percent of the social network’s 150 million users.[60] But according to an independent survey of U.S. users, almost 18 percent of respondents reported negative experiences on Facebook, including unwanted advances, stalking, harassment, damaging gossip, rumors, or data theft.[61] The social network has mitigated some of its enforcement costs by letting users flag spam and identify inappropriate content.

Facebook’s adherence to its real name policy has led to the deletion of profiles and fan pages of political activists. Hostile governments use the Facebook terms of service against users. A government agent may discover that the administrator of a page uses a pseudonymous account and report this violation to Facebook. In the past, Facebook’s automated servers responded by shutting down the account, an action sometimes amounting to permanent removal because the appeals process to have a closed account reinstated is not well defined.[62]

During the revolution in Egypt, Facebook removed the “We are all Khaled Said” page in November 2010 after discovering that the administrator used a pseudonym.[66] The popular page was named in remembrance of an Alexandria man killed by police and had become one of Egypt’s most activist sites with more than 400,000 fans. The page sought to coordinate citizen election-monitoring activities in the lead up to parliamentary elections, expected to be heavily rigged. The page encouraged fans to document illegal and fraudulent elec­tion activities, but on Election Day the page was taken down. The case drew the attention of international civil society and the media. Facebook belatedly allowed a proxy administrator in the United States to stand in for the page’s pseudonymous ad­ministrator in Egypt and allowed the page back up. By requiring all users to disclose their real names, however, Facebook has periodically put itself in the awkward position of either taking sides against an activist who maintains an interest in remaining anonymous or undermining the authority of its own rules.

II. Why Real Name Registration Has Not Silenced Netizens in South Korea or China

Both democratic and authoritarian governments have employed real name registration to manage online speech. These governments have framed their real name policies as an effort to eliminate bad speech, such as harassment, fraud, or subversive rumors. However, the cases of South Korea, China, and Facebook suggest that real name registration can also be part of a strategy to silence dissenting voices.

Real name registration policies are often enacted during sensitive times like elections and leadership transitions, when politicians may feel particularly threatened by new media that disrupts longstanding messaging and information control mechanisms.

Real name registration in South Korea originated in an electoral law, and in China, the real name law coincided with the succession of the fifth generation of party leadership. In Egypt and elsewhere, government forces have taken advantage of Facebook’s real name policy to shut down pages coordinating election-related activism. In liberal democracies, with protections on free speech, governments and law enforcement agencies seek access to web users’ identities and materials published on social media to the fullest extent the law will allow.[67]

And yet, real name registration has not silenced South Korean or Chinese netizens. Nor has it changed the fact that Facebook remains a forum for activism in political contexts across the globe. States’ self-serving justifications for real name registration feed into how citizens perceive such rules and help explain the broad lack of cooperation by online service providers. Larger market dynamics are also in play. Examining the motivations of online service providers and citizens helps explain why real name policies have been so difficult to implement.

A. From the Perspective of Online Service Providers

An online real name registration system is costly. It requires human administrators and technical safeguards to protect personal information of users. Real name registration brings the administrative burden of verifying whether the identification details of each account are genuine. Industries offering fake identities, and allowing web users to pump up their online popularity though the purchase of “zombie” followers or friends, further aggravate the burden.

There are also costs related to information security. In addition to gaining entry to thirty-five million Cyworld accounts in South Korea, hackers disclosed the personal account information of more than six million users from China Software Developer Network, China’s largest online community for programmers in 2011.[68] Facebook collects a substantial amount of private data, and Facebook systems have been subject to sophisticated hacking attacks.[69] If an online service provider vigorously enforces a real name policy, users’ fears that their personal information may be compromised could prove a deterrent to their continued use. Profit-driven service providers, like NASDAQ-listed Sina, prefer to avoid these additional costs.

Social-Driven vs. Content-Driven Media

The nature of the particular internet platform’s service affects a provider’s propensity to enforce a real name policy. Online social media can be understood as existing along a spectrum, with social-driven social media on one end and content-driven social media on the other. Instant messaging services like WhatsApp or WeChat are examples of highly socially-driven platforms—that is, structured around interpersonal relationships. These services tap into users’ mobile phone address books and allow users to chat with friends. Facebook, Cyworld, and Renren are also on the socially-driven end of the spectrum, although slightly less so. Microblogs like Twitter and Sina Weibo, on the other hand, are more content-driven. Users check accounts for breaking news, gossip, as well as personal developments.

Generally, users of socially-driven platforms, designed to facilitate interpersonal connections and friendships, place a higher premium on knowing their online counterparts’ true identities. In contrast, users of content-driven services are more concerned with what is being tweeted rather than who is doing the tweeting. This helps explain why many Weibo users do not care that information is coming from unknown sources. In fact, anonymously generated content may be exactly the kind of juicy information that microblog users have signed on to see. By the nature of their service, socially-driven media like Facebook will generally have an easier time getting users to comply with real name policies than content-driven platforms like microblogs.

The “First Mover” Problem

Service providers’ willingness to enforce a real name policy also depends on their market position. The Chinese government’s decision to deny market access to foreign social media platforms has opened the door for domestic “clones,” such as Renren (for Facebook), Sina Weibo (for Twitter), and WeChat (for WhatsApp).[71] Shielded from foreign competition, Chinese social networking service platforms have proliferated, and the sector is heavily fragmented.[72] Domestic competitors are locked in fierce competition for market share.

In a fractured market, service providers face a “prisoner’s dilemma,” where each has an incentive to shirk its enforcement responsibilities. Weeding out anonymity can negatively affect content in the eyes of netizens—particularly for content-driven web services like microblogs. These providers have an incentive to drag their feet in enforcement. If one competitor enforces the law first, the provider may capture some of that competitor’s market share. The result is inaction and general reluctance to enforce the policy across the board.

In South Korea, regulators did not penalize or block foreign internet service providers like Google that redirected web users so that they could circumvent the real name requirement. The Korean Constitutional Court found that, during the period the law was in effect, the number of Korean users of foreign online service platforms increased, and Korean companies created domains in foreign jurisdictions.[73] The threat of losing market share to foreign competition unified an influential domestic constituency against real name registration.

Reputational Risk

When online service providers insist upon real names, they risk entanglement in thorny ethical issues, which carry reputational risk. Even as people adjust to new norms of privacy online, anonymity will continue to be essential for activists and whistleblowers. If Facebook, for example, shuts down a person’s page because the account uses a pseudonym, that person has few remedies. In theory, netizens can choose to join another social network. Unlike government mandated real name policies with general applicability, as in South Korea, company policies will probably not be overturned by a court or administrative agency. One can expect for-profit companies to shield activists or whistleblowers only insofar as that furthers their commercial goals.

However, corporate policies are susceptible to criticism that can harm their brand or image. Senator Richard Durbin, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Human Rights and the Law Subcommittee, publicly criticized Facebook for its inability to adequately protect the identities of Arab Spring activists.[74] Liberal Hong Kong media outlets have warned web users in Hong Kong and Taiwan not to migrate to Chinese web platforms, including Weibo and WeChat, because market consolidation by these mainland-based platforms will enhance China’s national security monitoring and surveillance capabilities.[75] Social media platforms seeking to expand in a particular market must consider local consumers’ perceptions of responsible corporate citizenship.

B. From the Perspectives of Citizens

For citizens living in areas with internet penetration like South Korea or China’s more developed municipalities, life without online social interaction is almost unimaginable. Social media pervades users’ everyday lives and provides intense psychological gratification. This is particularly captured in anecdotes of college-age web users returning to Facebook even after suffering repeated humiliations of having their profiles hacked and manipulated.[76]

The ability to connect to a broader network is meaningful to people because it affirms their individual dignity. Individuals with unconventional views can see that they are not alone. For example, the website aibai.cn has become one of the best known Chinese language websites dedicated to the LGBT community with more than 55,000 daily visits.[77] The website offers several advice columns, including a legal advice question and answer page. In societies where governments have restricted traditional media, online social media offers netizens a particularly eye-opening and unique atmosphere.

Real name registration and the consequential degree of targeted monitoring diminish this unique and liberating experience. While a relatively small number of netizens relies upon online anonymity to express themselves, the imposition of real name registration broadly affects a web platform’s overall atmosphere. A country’s most creative, scholarly, and technically innovative population is disproportionately affected. Besides stifling dialogue and the development of new—sometimes controversial—ideas, real name registration makes people feel infantilized.[78]

III. More Trouble Than It Is Worth?

Real name registration is a cost center. The policy alienates web users and degrades the appeal of content-driven social media. The South Korean and Chinese cases suggest that web users will flee from platforms that adopt real name registration, and foreign service providers or new market entrants will answer web users’ demands with new platforms allowing unfettered discussion — fracturing the market. Yet, paradoxically, governments adopting real name registration are ideally seeking to draw users together onto one or two pliant domestic platforms in order to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma of a fractured market. This is a negative feedback loop that makes real name registration (and other web controls) difficult to implement.

For these reasons, a government seeking to enforce real name registration has to deliver swift and harsh punishment to online service providers that drag their feet in enforcing the policy. But what options do governments have at their disposal? Authorities could, of course, shut down a platform that is not fully cooperating. In Egypt, Facebook, Twitter, and several other networking websites were blocked on January 26, 2011 and days later the government shut down the internet almost entirely.[79] For three days in late March and early April 2012, Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo shut down their comment functions, ostensibly to prevent rumors after the sacking of Chongqing party boss Bo Xilai.[80] A prolonged shutdown, however, could produce widespread discontent, further fracture the market, and probably force the government to deal with new or different service providers, who may be even less cooperative than the devils that they know.

Many governments and their regulatory regimes do not have the capacity to force real name registration upon online service providers. Some regimes like China, for example, will continue to try. However, without a credible threat that service providers’ lackluster enforcement will trigger some harsher alternative, a government’s ability to implement real name registration is limited. Even in regimes historically committed to management or control of information, internet policymakers will likely conclude that real name registration is more trouble than it is worth.

About the Author

David Caragliano is a lawyer and international development professional based in Washington, D.C.  He tweets from @DCaragliano.

Endnotes

  1. Mike Giglio, “Middle East Uprising: Facebook’s Secret Role in Egypt,” The Daily Beast, Feb. 24, 2011, available at http:// www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/02/24/middle-east-uprising-facebooks-back-channel-diplomacy.html

  2. ”Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2012, South Korea,” (hereinafter “Freedom House Report”) available at http:// www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/south-korea

  3. Ibid.

  4. Republic of Korea Const. Article 21, Oct. 29, 1987, available at http://english.ccort.go.kr/home/att_file/download/ Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Korea.pdf

  5.  Supra, note 4 at 358.

  6. Public Official Election Act, art. 82, provision 6. See also Freedom House Report.

  7. Ibid.

  8. Choe Sang Hun, “South Korea Links Web Slander to Celebrity Suicides,” New York Times, Oct. 12, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/technology/12iht-kstar.3.16877845.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

  9. Freedom House Report, Byongil Oh, “Global Information Society Watch: Republic of Korea,” Korean Progressive Network Jinbonet (2010), www.jinbo.net

  10. Ibid.

  11. Ser Myo-ya, “GNP Files Bills to Alter the Nation’s Media Landscape,” JoongAng Daily, Dec. 4, 2008, http://joongangdaily. joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2898166

  12. Ibid.

  13. Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Frees Blogger Who Angered Government,” New York Times, Apr. 20, 2009, http://nytimes. com/2009/04/21/world/asia/21blogger.html ; Oh Byung-sang, “After Minerva: Gaining Balance,” JoongAng Daily, Apr. 24, 2009, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2903946

  14. Jack Kim, “South Korea’s ‘Prophet of Doom’ Blogger Acquitted,” Reuters, Apr. 20, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/ article/2009/04/20/us-korea-blogger-idUKTRE53J1IW20090420

  15. Eric Pfanner, “Naming Names on the Internet,” New York Times, Sept. 4, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes. com/2011/09/05/technology/naming-names-on-the-internet.html

  16. Oiwan Lam, “South Korea: Internet ‘Real Name’ Law Violates Constitution,” Global Voices Advocacy, Aug. 28, 2012, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2012/08/28/south-korea-internet-real-name-law-violates-the-constitution/

  17. Ibid.

  18. Areum Kang, “Have Malicious Comments Really Decreased in the Aftermath of the Real Name Policy? Well . . .” Sportsseoul, Jan. 6, 2008, http://news.sportsseoul.com/read/life/506278.htm (in Korean).

  19. Daegon Cho, “Real Name Verification Law on the Internet: A Poison or Cure for Privacy,” Working Paper, (2011) available at http://weis2011.econinfosec.org/papers/Real%20Name%Verification%20Law%20on%20the%20Internet%20-%20 A%20Poison%20or%20Cu.pdf

  20.  Supra, note 16

  21. Ibid.

  22.  Decision of Constitutional Court of South Korea on Real-Name Policy for Internet Use, Aug. 23, 2012 available at http://search. ccourt.go.kr/ths/pr/ths_pr0101_P1.do (in Korean) [hereinafter “Korean Constitutional Court Decision”]

  23. “Internet ‘Real Name’ Law Violates the Constitution, Of Course,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, Aug. 24, 2012, available at http://english.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=201208241354087&code=790101 DAVID CARAGLIANO 24 Yale Journal of International Affairs

  24. Korean Constitutional Court Decision.

  25. Ibid.

  26. Lin Yongqing, The Debate Over Pros and Cons of Real Name Registration, Chinese Communist Party News Network, Apr. 13, 2010, available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64099/11351960.html (in Chinese).

  27.  China Internet Network Information Survey, Vol. 31 (2012) [hereinafter “China Internet Survey”] (in Chinese).

  28. Ibid.

  29. Lu Jun, “Ministry of Information Industry Considers Real Name Registration: Industry Claims there Are Even More Sleeping Blogs,” People’s Daily, Oct. 20, 2010 available at http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40641/4939119.html (in Chinese).

  30. “China Internet Associations Has Determined that It Will Push Real Name Registration for Blogs,” Tencent QQ News, Oct. 20, 2006, available at http://view.news.qq.com/a/20061020/000004.htm (in Chinese).

  31. Josh Chin, “Following Jiang Death Rumors, China’s Rivers Go Missing,” WSJ China Real Time, July 6, 2011, http:// blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/07/06/following-jiang-death-rumors-chinas-rivers-go-missing/

  32. Ibid.

  33. Ibid.

  34. David Bandurski, Why Do Rumors Explode in China, China Media Project, Sept. 27, 2011, http://cmp.hku. hk/2011/09/27/15703/

  35. See e.g., “China Protest Closes Toxic Chemical Plant in Dalian,” BBC, Aug. 14, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-asia-pacific-14520438 ; David Bandurski, Shifang Protests: Permission Denied, China Media Project, July 4, 2012, http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/07/04/25048/ ; Andrew Jacobs, “Protests Over Chemical Plant Force Chinese Officials to Back Down,” New York Times, Oct. 28, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/29/world/asia/protests-against-sinopec-plant-in-china-reach-third-day.html

  36. Beijing Municipality, Several Provisions of the Beijing Municipality on the Administration and Development of Microblogs, issued Dec. 16, 2011, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=9215&CGid= [hereinafter “Beijing Provisions”].

  37. Beijing Provisions, art. 9.

  38. Nat’l People’s Cong. Standing Comm., Decision Regarding Strengthening Network Information Protection, issued Dec. 28, 2012, available at http://blog.feichangdao.com/2012/12/translation-decision-regarding.html (English translation) [hereinafter “Information Protection Law”]

  39. Information Protection Law, art. 6.

  40. Phil Muncaster, “China’s Police Ignore Real Name Rules . . . So Far,” The Register, Mar. 19, 2012, available at http:// www.theregister.co.uk/2012/03/19/china_weibo_real_name/

  41. Oiwan Lam, China Introduces New Rules to Tighten Government’s Grip over the Internet, Global Voices Advocacy, Dec. 30, 2012, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2012/12/30/china-introduces-new-rules-to-tighten-governments-grip-over-the-internet/

  42. Yueran Zhang, How Online Sleuths Are Transforming Chinese Officialdom, Tea Leaf Nation, Oct. 2, 2012, http://www. tealeafnation.com/2012/10/how-online-sleughts-are -transforming-chinese-officialdom/

  43. C. Custer, Kaifu Lee: Rumor’s of Weibo’s Death Are Exaggerated, Techinasia, Apr. 17, 2013, http://www.techinasia.com/ kaifu-lee-rumors-weibos-death-exaggerated/

  44. David Caragliano, “Is China Really the 80th Most Corrupt Country On Earth?” The Atlantic, Dec. 12, 2012, http://www. theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/12/is-china-really-the-80th-most-corrupt-country-on-earth/266172/

  45.  After 18th Party Congress Eight High Level Officials Under Investigation, Strong Anti-Corruption Raises Confidence of the People, Renmin Wang, Dec. 6, 2012, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2012/1206/c1001-19815058.html (in Chinese).

  46. “Online Anti-Corruption Survey: Quality and Speed of Netizen Groups on the Up,” China Youth Daily, Dec. 6, 2012, available at http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2012/1206/c1026-19808115.html (in Chinese).

  47. Supra note 43.

  48. Ibid.

  49.  Xinhua Comment: ‘Online Anti-Corruption’ To Cleanse Cadres, Xinhua Wang, Dec. 5, 2012, http://politics.people.com. cn/n/2012/1205/c70731-19804595.html (in Chinese).

  50. Geoffrey A. Fowler, “Facebook: One Billion and Counting,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 4, 2012, available at http://online. wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443635404578036164027386112.html

  51. Emil Protalinski, World Map of Top Social Networks Shows Just Five Left, Facebook Dominates 127 Out of 137 Countries, The Next Web, Jan 2. 2013, http://thenextweb.com/facebook/2013/01/02/world-map-of-top-social-networks-shows-just-five-left-facebook-dominates-127-out-of-137-countries/

  52. http://www.facebook.com/help/292517374180078/

  53. http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=280449051973283&_ft_=fbid.391454210877718

  54. Dominique Mosbergen, “Facebook Has 83 Million ‘Fake’ Or Duplicate Users, About 8.7 Percent of All Active Users,” Huffington Post, Aug. 2, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/02/facebook-83-million-fake-users-active-accoutns_n_1733111.htmlREAL NAMES AND RESPONSIBLE SPEECH Spring 2013 25

  55. Bernhard Debatin et al., “Facebook and Online Privacy: Attitudes, Behaviors, and Unintended Consequences,” 15 J. of Computer Mediated Communications. 83, 87 (2009) [hereinafter “Facebook Study”].

  56. Shiv Malik, “Facebook Accused of Removing Activists’ Pages,” The Guardian, Apr. 29, 2011, available at http://www. guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/apr/29/facebook-accused-removing-activists-pages

  57. John Sutter & Jason Carroll, Fears of Imposters Increase on Facebook, CNN.com, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/ TECH/02/05/facebook.impostors/index.html

  58. “Payout for False Facebook Profile,” BBC News, Jul. 24, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7523128. stm

  59. “Jade Goody Website ‘Troll’ from Manchester Jailed,” BBC News, Oct. 29, 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/uk-england-manchester-11650593

  60. Supra note 56.

  61. Facebook Study at 93.

  62. Supra, note 1.

  63. Ibid.

  64. See e.g., Russ Buettner, “Judge Orders Twitter to Release Protester’s Message,” City Room Blog, New York Times, July 2, 2012, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/judge-orders-twitter-to-release-protesters-messages/

  65. “Six Million Chinese Internet Users’ Data Leaked,” People’s Daily Online, Dec. 26, 2011, available at http://english.people. com.cn/90778/7688084.html

  66. Tim Reid, “Facebook Hacked, Social Media Company Says,” Reuters, Feb 18, 2013, available at www.reuters.com/ article/2013/02/16/net-us-usa-social-facebook-idUSBRE91E16O20130216

  67. Katerin Hille, “Social Media in China: Be Everywhere,” FT, Sept. 15, 2011, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/09/15/ exploiting-social-media-in-china-be-everywhere/#axzz1e3k0TVry

  68. Bin Yue, China SNS: The ‘Open’ Platforms, IDG Accetel, 2012 China Internet White Paper (2012), 4.

  69. Korean Constitutional Court Decision.

  70. Sen. Dick Durban, “Tyrants Can Use Facebook, Too,” Politico, Mar. 7, 2011, available at http://www.politico.com/news/ stories/0311/50739.html

  71. Fang Jun, “Internet Stability Maintenance Close at Hand: Expanding the Web into Hong Kong,” iSun Affairs Weekly, Feb. 21, 2013, at 27 (in Chinese).

  72. Facebook Study at 101.

  73.  Gay Group Tries for a Second Time to Project its Voice In China, China Development Brief, Apr. 6, 2006, http://www. chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/536

  74. James Fallows, China Airborne, 213–214 (2012).

  75. “Confusion over Egyptian Blocks on Web Protest Tools,” BBC News, Jan. 26, 2011 http://www.bbc.com/news/ technology-12291982

  76. See http://www.weibo.com/z/notice20120331/

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