The Myth of Eurasia: the Disintegration of the Region or Intensified Regional Crisis?
Source: Eurasian Economic Union.
By Nazerke Mukhlissova
Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has not abandoned its hopes for regaining regional domination. For the last thirty years, Russia has propagated the myth of Eurasian integration through the tools of regional cooperation bodies. Before using military aggression against Ukraine in both 2014 and 2022, Russia attempted to establish regional hegemony through more diplomatic agreements with other former Soviet states, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This paper investigates legal and regulatory documents of these regional organizations in the Russian language, the majority of which are legally binding to member nation-states. But due to their intentional vagueness, it is essential to situate those agreements in their political context with the aid of secondary scholarly articles. It further examines the legal, economic, and political effects of the Russo-Ukrainian war on the Eurasian region, arguing that Russia’s war is leading to the disintegration of Eurasia, breaking ties between Russia and other Eurasian states.
The history and politics of Eurasian states are a constant subject of controversy and negotiation. When the Soviet Union was established in 1922, its borders shifted constantly. When it collapsed in 1991, the often arbitrary borders between former Soviet republics acquired new significance. Borders became more than bureaucratic and administrative features now that the republics were independent nation-states. Situating Russia’s war in Ukraine in the context of the broader political dimensions of Eurasia triggers wider questions on regional security and economic issues.
Regional Security Concerns
On May 15, 1992, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed a Collective Security Treaty (CST) agreement that ensured the regional stability of the countries involved. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus later joined the agreement as well. In 2002, during a convention held in Moscow, the countries reformed the agreement into an international organization titled the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The structure of the CSTO consists of four bodies. The body of highest importance is the Collective Security Council, composed of the presidents of the member nation-states. Point 2 of the organization’s general regulations states that, “The decisions of the Council are binding on the Member States of the Organization and are executed in accordance with the procedure established by national legislation [emphasis added].”[1] The organizational goals presented in the rest of the general regulations are quite vague; they include the joint fight against terrorism along with coordination and cooperation between member states on questions of international and regional security, illegal migration, drug trafficking, and peacekeeping activities. The regulatory and legal framework sets out several aims of the organization, yet it does not provide the definitions for terms in the general provisions.
In most post-Soviet states, the rule of law and the rule of politics are merged. Therefore, how the vaguely defined CSTO concept and its obligatory resolutions fit into actual national and domestic frameworks of member states at a given point in time is a question of political compatibility determined by often-authoritarian heads of state.
Russia’s intention in creating the CSTO was to serve as the exclusive provider of regional security as a new opposition to NATO. Ironically, the CSTO repeatedly proposed collaborating with NATO back in 2006, but the latter rejected those propositions.[2][3] The CSTO was weakened when Uzbekistan withdrew from the organization in 2012, subsequently followed by Georgia and Azerbaijan, leaving its current membership at just Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus.[4]
In 2009, the CSTO members established joint military forces that were subject to a new central military bureaucracy.[5] One of the potential applications of collective security could be traced to Article 4 of the treaty, which states:
If one of the Member States undergoes aggression (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty), it will be considered by the Member States as aggression (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) to all the Member States of this Treaty.
In case of aggression (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) to any of the Member States, all the other Member States at request of this Member State shall immediately provide the latter with the necessary assistance, including military, as well as support by the means at their disposal in accordance with the right to collective defence pursuant to article 51 of the UN Charter [emphasis added].[6]
There are two important concepts of Article 4 that remain ambiguous. First, what is considered an “armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty?” Moreover, what is the role of international law, particularly Article 51 of the UN Charter, in the CSTO?
The CSTO’s collaboration with international organizations has been modest; therefore, quoting the UN charter is merely a rhetorical exercise rather than actual compliance. Back in 2010, Nikolay Bordyuja, then the head of CSTO, declared jointly with the then secretary-general of the United Nations that the CSTO and UN “...will take into account the specific mandate, terms of reference, procedures, and capabilities of each organization in the interests of coordinating international efforts to address global challenges and eliminate global threats.”[7] No actual steps have been taken since then to coordinate efforts and thus, the UN articles are simply guiding principles of the organization rather than obligations.
The CSTO launched its first operation in Kazakhstan in January 2022. What started as peaceful protests in Kazakhstan quickly erupted into a guerilla-style war, resulting in the deaths of around 242 civilians.[8] Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Toqayev personally asked Russian President Vladimir Putin and members of the CSTO to deploy the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF) to suppress the protesters.[9] The true nature of instabilities in Kazakhstan’s “Bloody January” is unknown. The event points toward important questions: could the Kazakh operation set a precedent for the abuse of joint military battalions to undermine Eurasian states’ sovereignty? What are the official premises on which the CSTO armies could be deployed? And lastly, could Russia’s military move through neighboring Kazakhstan and other CSTO member states to menace other Eurasian countries? Russia’s invasion of Ukraine followed in February 2022, just a month after the CSTO’s capabilities were deployed.
These two key events have altered the CSTO fundamentally. The CSTO’s participation in the “Bloody January” events of 2022, marked the first ever exercise of its military capability. It remains unclear as to why the CSTO took action in Kazakhstan, but not during the clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 and 2022 or during clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2022.[10]
The second key event was Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. On September 30, 2022, President Putin signed “agreements” that absorbed the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions of Ukraine into the Russian Federation.[11] A justification used for this annexation was the results of referenda run by the Russian government in the areas of those regions under its control. The Russian state media outlet RBC reported the following results:
LPR - 98.42% voted to join Russia
DPR - 99.23% for joining Russia
Kherson region - 87.05% for joining Russia
Zaporozhye region - 93.11% for joining Russia
The total turnout in the LPR, according to the local CEC, was 92.6%. In the DPR in the DPR - 97.51%, in the Kherson region - 76.86%, and in Zaporozhye - 85.4%.[12]
This is part of attempts by the Russian Federation to frame the war in Ukraine as a reunification of Russian territories rather than as an invasion of a neighboring country. Nevertheless, it is not clear that the rest of the CSTO agrees. While it has declined to support Russia in Ukraine, pro-Russian figures argue that the CSTO should do so. For instance, Belarusian President Lukashenko claimed that “without a unified front, the collective West will build up pressure on the post-Soviet space.”[13] Similarly Ramzan Kadyrov, the president of the Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation, argues, “If there is a state, if there is an ally, it must decide and take his step. When there was a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Putin played a key role. When Kazakhstan began to lose sovereignty, who helped? Russia! And when Russia needs it, everyone is silent - you are afraid of sanctions …”[14] Margarita Simonyan, the infamous Russian propagandist from Russia Today, argues that the CSTO member states that are not willing to send military troops to Ukraine are “ungrateful” and are “becoming traitors.”[15]
This pro-Russian frustration with the passivity of other CSTO members demonstrates that the CSTO members are not fully committed to Russia, which harms the organization’s reputation in the region. Furthermore, Russian media calling for the CSTO to support Putin’s war in Ukraine demonstrates desperation over the unfolding of the war, which was expected to be a quick victory by Russian forces. From February to September of 2022, 1.7 million Russians fled to Kazakhstan, some staying in the country and others migrating further.[16] Partial mobilization of the population (which was not partial, in fact) signals that the Russian armed forces are running out of personnel. Despite the war’s unpopularity, post-Soviet politicians in Central Asia have maintained their neutrality regarding the conflict. The Central Asian heads of state do not support Russia, yet they do not condemn Russia’s actions. The majority of these leaders have found themselves in difficult positions politically as a result of the pandemic and its economic repercussions. Therefore, supporting Russia would be politically unwise in post-Soviet Eurasia, considering that most of the population of those countries are either Ukraine-leaning or neutral. A case that exemplifies these behaviors is Kazakhstan’s refusal to send Kazakh troops to Ukraine, despite Russia’s recent support to Kazakh President Toqayev in quelling civil unrest during “Bloody January.”[17] Additionally, Kyrgyzstan declined requests to organize training for CSTO central forces in 2022.[18]
The CSTO is also organized around the concept of security; however, this term can be best understood as “regime security” for leaders of authoritarian states in Eurasia. For example, CSTO efforts to support “cybersecurity,” are directed around propping up the current regimes of its member states. For example, the Russian Federation proposed a UN resolution to prevent any internet activities that “...distort the perception of the political system, social order, domestic and foreign policy, important political and social processes in the state [or] spiritual, moral, and cultural values of its citizens.”[19] Such a broad definition of harmful internet activities could endanger any criticisms against current leaders and regimes. Instead of simply promoting shared internal country policies on cybersecurity, the CSTO agreement’s vagueness unlocks possibilities of controlling information transnationally within the bloc because of “collective information security concerns.” While such control over the Internet would be useful domestically for authoritarian regimes in other CSTO states, applying this ambiguous language to security concerns effectively serves to control the public sphere internationally. Given Central Asian countries’ reluctance to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, this constitutes an important liability which may turn CSTO members away from greater cooperation within the Russian-dominated organization.
Eurasian Economic Integration
In addition to collective security, Eurasian countries are also enmeshed in economic ties with Russia. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a prototype to a European Union (EU)-style political and economic union, was established in 2014 to ensure the free movement of capital, services and people across Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. Prior to 2014 there were a variety of different economic and customs agreements between these member countries. These were collectively formalized to become a separate organization in 2014. The EAEU also established many institutional bodies replicated from the European Union, such as the Eurasian Court. Although the EAEU tries to copy the supranational nature of the EU, it has faced limitations because it currently focuses solely on economics and has no political structure like the European Parliament. As a result, there have been several rulings of the Eurasian court that were incompatible with the domestic laws of member countries.[20] Still, EAEU agreements do create legally binding commitments for member states.
But the EAEU has been troubled since its inception. The main argument for the establishment of EAEU, as well as its previous versions, was to alleviate customs and goods bottlenecks in the region. In reality, there have always been some issues with compliance within the EAEU. For example, the unequal imposition of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on foreign products in contrast to domestic ones has been a topic of heated debate.[21] A possible explanation is that the absence of formal economic and political conditions for accession to the EAEU has blighted the organization, morphing it into a peculiar tool that supports Eurasian authoritarian regimes and insulates them from pressure to reform politics or improve other economic development conditions.[22] Meanwhile, there is limited interest in the EAEU from outside the organization. Thus, Ukraine and Moldova agreed to be only observers of the EAEU without making formal commitments to the agreement. Similarly, the EU was hesitant to establish links with the EAEU despite the EU’s claims to support regional organizations.
Furthermore, some scholarship has shown that the EAEU serves Russian geopolitical interests rather than regional economic integration inclusive of all interests.[23] Russia is the only state in the EAEU that has set a clear direction toward increasing both political and economic integration among the member states.[24] Russia hopes to transform the EAEU into a more general Eurasian Union resembling the Soviet Union with its republics. However throughout the EAEU’s history, Russian efforts to enforce economic integration have been economically counterproductive in reality. For example, Russia has offered preferential loan interest rates and gas prices for its EAEU allies to entice them to participate in integration efforts, and thus itself bearing an economic cost, while also using interest rates and gas prices as negative conditionalities that have punished states like Ukraine in the case of non-accession.[25]
The EAEU’s institutions exist, not to level the economic playing field, but to serve as a façade for a new Russian foreign policy to be used against adversaries. Western agents and international organizations often set conditions for aid, including democratic and economic reforms, resulting in a slower bureaucratic process. In contrast, Russian sponsorship, loans and negotiations to join the EAEU came with far fewer up-front requirements, increasing Russia’s influence. Russia offered EAEU membership to countries like Belarus, as these countries would not qualify to join entities like the World Trade Organization (WTO).[26] Rulings and decrees of the WTO and EAEU are often incompatible. In these cases, the member states needed to choose between an international and a regional system dominated by Russia. While Russia has been able to exercise influence over these regional organizations, for how long might it sustain such influence after its unpopular invasion of Ukraine?
Since the war began, even the limited strength and unity of the EAEU that remained has disintegrated. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, a large coalition of countries enacted punitive economic sanctions against it. Russia’s ally, Kazakhstan, a country which was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the EAEU, decided to uphold the international sanctions against Russia rather than sacrifice its own economic well being for the sake of the Union. Politically, several Eurasian states have tried to stay neutral in the conflict, as they face competing pressure from Russia, who remains one of the most powerful players in the region, and the rest of the international community, which threatens to level sanctions against countries that support Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Russia’s attacks on Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 reminded the world of Russian intentions to become a regional hegemon through military force and terrorism. But this war has also jeopardized the intricate security and economic relations that Putin has been trying to cultivate with Central Asian states. When sanctions targeted Russian businesses and service providers, Eurasian states felt stuck. They had joined the EAEU out of hopes for a more stable future that contrasted with a tumultuous Soviet past, yet their EAEU membership and ties to Russia placed them once again in an undesirable position. The reaction of EAEU members to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was peculiar. On the one hand, there was no discussion of evading the sanctions against Russia. On the other hand, there was no complete severance of ties to Russia. Eurasian states are juggling several interests at once; with sanctions against Russia, political experts in some of those countries are realizing the unsustainability of the current system.[27]. However, EAEU member states have not acknowledged the economic losses as a result of the war. The Prime Minister of Belarus Roman Golovchenko stated:
As we all see, 2022 is passing in the context of unprecedented and large-scale geopolitical events, which, of course, also affect our cooperation within the EAEU. Fortunately, and probably to the displeasure of enemies, this influence does not go according to their scenario at all. The relevance of Eurasian economic integration is growing, our union continues to gain international prestige and dynamically develop despite gross interference and sanctions pressure. Economic ties between our countries are only getting stronger [emphasis added].[28]
Golovchenko then cited how the statistics of employment and logistics have greatly improved in the past year, painting an attractive depiction of the EAEU. Crucially, Golovchenko references the juxtaposition of “them” and “us.” How should Western organizations respond to this geopolitical and economic scenario? Should they sanction Eurasian countries for being allied with Russia in the same Union, or should the West seize the chance to attract Eurasian countries into a new geopolitical realm, away from Russia?
Policy Recommendations
Western countries and alliances, instead of interfering in the region for economic gains, should encourage Eurasian internal cooperation by empowering economic and political freedoms without Russia as the central unifying actor. First, they should avoid imposing sanctions on travel and business rights in Eurasia. The economic situation in the region is tied to Russia’s economy. Since Russia is less economically viable, this is an opportunity for Eurasian economic emancipation. Second, they ought to provide more international aid with fewer binding conditionalities. Eurasia, as a region, cannot only be understood through the viewpoints of only the West or Russia. Another rising power in the region is China, which demands few, if any, binding conditions on international aid and investment to Eurasian states. More of these states opt for Chinese economic cooperation versus international or Western funds.
Third, they must encourage a cultural and educational presence in the region. The Eurasian region lacks resources when it comes to social needs. Instead of enforcing Western liberal values or education in the region, it is more efficient to support locally existing bodies of cultural and educational institutions. The myth of Western intervention as a destabilizing and exploitative force is still quite strong in the region, which is why Western governments need to be aware of the risks of alienating the local population.
Conclusion
The CSTO and EAEU are highly dependent on the political context of the Eurasian region. Today, we can already see the crumbling of Eurasian unity. Although the majority of Eurasia’s regimes are autocratic, akin to Russia’s political system, authoritarian leaders will not risk supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine at the expense of domestic support. In general, authoritarian regimes in Eurasia are susceptible to any expressions of civil disobedience. Countries that have traditionally been considered allies of the Russian Federation have now announced that they will comply with sanctions against Russia and will not hide Russian companies and products from sanctions.[29]
The CSTO, an organization that was supposed to be the guarantor of security, has also lost its influence in the region. Throughout the CSTO’s history, Russia has taken an opportunistic stance and applied the the joint military force toward interventions that benefit its own interests first.[30] Troubles between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been systematically ignored, perhaps because Russia did not perceive it politically beneficial for the CSTO to be involved.[31] Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that Russia barely holds to its commitments to the security of Eurasia, potentially placing any member in the CSTO at risk.[32] During his visit to the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, Kazakh President Toqayev, sitting beside President Putin, called the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics “quasi-governments” artificially created by Russia.[33] After his comments, Kazakhstan received verbal attacks and accusations of being “Nazified” by Russian media, with some commentators saying that Kazakhstan would come next after Ukraine.[34] Moreover, none of the members of the CSTO recognized the independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk Republics before their annexation into Russia in September 2022.[35] Despite the existence of organizations like the EAEU and the CSTO, Russia has lost its grip in the Eurasian region when it decided to unleash terror in Ukraine. Post-Soviet countries tend to sympathize far more with Ukraine than with Russia. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 caused a chain reaction, where the people and governments of Eurasia, traditionally considered as Russian allies, started to reconsider their relations with their powerful neighbor.
About the author
Nazerke Mukhlissova is a European & Russian studies M.A. student at Yale University, with a focus on the political history of the Soviet Union as well as Eastern European and Central Asian states. She is especially interested in memory politics, intellectual history, and nation and tradition building. Nazerke was born and raised in Kazakhstan, where she received a bachelor’s degree from Nazarbayev University with a double major in history and political science.
Endnotes
[1] “ПОЛОЖЕНИЕ О СОВЕТЕ КОЛЛЕКТИВНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ДОГОВОРА О КОЛЛЕКТИВНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ,” CSTO, 2022, https://antiterror.odkb-csto.org/framework/polozhenie-o-skb/#loaded.
[2] Richard Weitz, “Assessing the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Capabilities and Vulnerabilities,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2018. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20082;
[3] “Ivanov For NATO-CSTO Interaction in Fighting Terrorism,” RIA Novosti, February 5, 2006, available from https://sputniknews.com/russia/2006020543344211/.
[4] Marlène Laruelle, “Factoring the Regional Impact of Uzbekistan’s Withdrawal from the CSTO,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18654.
[5] “‘Независимая газета’ получила информацию о численности и составе спецвойск ОДКБ,” Lenta.ru, June 3, 2009, https://lenta.ru/news/2009/06/03/ksor/.
[6] “Collective Security Treaty, Dated May 15, 1992,” CSTO, 2022, https://en.odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/dogovor_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/#loaded.
[7] “Совместная декларация о сотрудничестве между секретариатами Организации Объединенных Наций и Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности,” CSTO, 2022, https://odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/sovmestnaya_deklaratsiya_o_sotrudnichestve_mezhdu_sekretariatami_organizatsii_obedinennykh_natsiy_i_/#loaded.
[8] “‘Кровавый январь’: список погибших,” Radio Azzatyk, May 30, 2022, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/zhertvy-yanvarskikh-sobytii-2022/31874935.html.
[9] “Токаев попросил страны ОДКБ помочь с решением ситуации в Казахстане,” Ведомости, Ведомости, January 5, 2022, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2022/01/05/903755-tokaev-poprosil-strani-odkb-pomoch.
[10] Matthew Mpoke Bigg, “Understanding the Fight between Armenia and Azerbaijan,” The New York Times, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan-clashes.html; Syinat Sultanalieva, “Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan Border Clashes Prove Deadly for Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, September 21, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/21/kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-border-clashes-prove-deadly-civilians.
[11] “Подписание договоров о принятии ДНР, ЛНР, Запорожской и Херсонской областей в состав России,” Президент России, September 30, 2022, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465.
[12] “Как закончились референдумы о присоединении к России четырех регионов,” РБК, September 28, 2022, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/28/09/2022/6332fded9a794742db2baab8.
[13] Trevor Filseth, “Eastern NATO? Lukashenko Calls for CSTO Alliance to Unite against the West,” The National Interest, May 17, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/eastern-nato-lukashenko-calls-csto-alliance-unite-against-west-202491.
[14] “‘Одэкабэшники, вы почему молчите?’ Кадыров потребовал от стран ОДКБ ‘сказать свое слово’ о войне в Украине — Meduza,” Meduza, 2022, https://meduza.io/news/2022/06/18/odekabeshniki-vy-pochemu-molchite-kadyrov-potreboval-ot-stran-odkb-skazat-svoe-slovo-o-voyne-v-ukraine.
[15] “Что думают союзники. Казахстан уже практически не скрывает, что не поддерживает Россию в конфликте с Украиной. Кыргызстан, по мнению Москвы, за нее” Novaya Gazeta, Feb 26, 2022. https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2022/02/26/chto-dumaiut-soiuzniki
[16] Рабига Дюсенгулова, “Сколько россиян прибыло в Казахстан с объявления мобилизации,” Главные новости Казахстана - Tengrinews.kz, September 27, 2022, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/skolko-rossiyan-pribyilo-kazahstan-obyyavleniya-mobilizatsii-478864/.
[17] Peter Alexander, “One of Russia's closest allies denies request for troops,” NBC News, February 26, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/russia-ukraine-live-updates-n1289976#ncrd1289985.
[18] “Отказ от ‘Нерушимого братства’. Кому, кроме России, нужна ОДКБ?” BBC News, October 10, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-62929715.
[19] Khatuna Mshvidobadze, “Russia’s Military Alliance Tackles Cyber Crime,” The Potomac Institute Cyber Center, November 26, 2012), https://pipscyberissues.wordpress.com/2012/11/26/russias-military-alliance-tackles-cyber-crime/.
[20] Nikitin, Alexander. “RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FRAGMENTED POST-SOVIET SPACE.” International Journal on World Peace 25, no. 2 (2008): 7–31. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20752831.
[21] “Досым Сатпаев: Казахстан загнал себя в ловушку, выход из которой может стоить очень дорого,” kaztag.kz, 2018, https://kaztag.kz/ru/interview/dosym-satpaev-kazakhstan-zagnal-sebya-v-lovushku-vykhod-iz-kotoroy-mozhet-stoit-ochen-dorogo.
[22] Laure Delcour, Hrant Kostanyan, Bruno Vandecasteele, and Peter Van Elsuwege, “The Implications of Eurasian Integration for the EU’s Relations with the Countries in the Post-Soviet Space,” Studia Diplomatica 68, no. 1 (2015): 5–34. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26531635.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Sergey Glazyev and Svitlana P Tkachuk, “Eurasian Economic Union: Achievements and Prospects,” 2015, https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Eurasian-Economic-Union%3A-Achievements-and-Prospects-Glazyev-Tkachuk/cda988d28bbb7d64760c034b27a102b5e74551ad.
[25] Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Eurasian Economic Integration: Implications for the EU Eastern Policy,” Elgar Online: The Online Content Platform for Edward Elgar Publishing, October 31, 2013, 179–203, https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781782544753/9781782544753.00021.xml; “Trading with Moscow: The Law, the Politics and the Economics,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, May 18, 2017, https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/trading-moscow-law-politics-and-economics; Aleksandra Jarosiewicz and Ewa Fischer, “The Eurasian Economic Union – More Political, Less Economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015 - Archive of European Integration,” Pitt.edu, 2015, https://doi.org/http://aei.pitt.edu/60973/1/commentary_157.pdf.
[26] Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Eurasian Economic Integration: Implications for the EU Eastern Policy,” Elgar Online, October 31, 2013, 179–203, https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781782544753/9781782544753.00021.xml.
[27] “ЕАЭС нужен только Москве. Почему остальным в Союзе плохо,” Информационно-аналитический портал Orda.kz, June 30, 2021, https://orda.kz/eajes-nuzhen-tolko-moskve-pochemu-ostalnym-v-sojuze-ploho/.
[28] “О чём договорились лидеры евразийской ‘пятерки,’” Dknews.kz. October 24, 2022, https://dknews.kz/ru/politika/257300-o-chem-dogovorilis-lidery-evraziyskoy-pyaterki.
[29] “ЕАЭС не поможет России обойти санкции,” Eurasianet, 2022, https://russian.eurasianet.org/%D0%B5%D0%B0%D1%8D%D1%81-%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B6%D0%B5%D1%82-%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B9%D1%82%D0%B8-%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BA%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8.
[30] Кирилл Кривошеев, “Договор о коллективном бездействии. Есть ли будущее у ОДКБ,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021, https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/84825.
[31] Chris Rickleton, “Russia’s Unhappy Club: The CSTO,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, October 12, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-club-csto-ukraine-military-alliance/32079498.html.
[32] Федор Крашенинников, “Война РФ в Украине лишила ОДКБ будущего,” Deutsche Welle, November 25, 2022, https://www.dw.com/ru/kommentarij-vojna-rf-v-ukraine-lisila-odkb-budusego/a-63883206.
[33] “Токаев в присутствии Путина назвал ДНР и ЛНР ‘квазигосударствами’, которые Казахстан не признает,” Медиазона Центральная Азия, 2022, https://mediazona.ca/news/2022/06/17/tokaev.
[34] Anton Gerashenko, Twitter, 2022, https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1595041154202058752?s=20&t=1qxS_G6cdpwHvHWUXX567Q.
[35] Alexander E. Gale, “Has Russia’s War in Ukraine Killed the CSTO?,” The National Interest, October 24, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/has-russia%E2%80%99s-war-ukraine-killed-csto-205466.