By Aiden Warren

Abstract: While the core thrust of the Obama Administration’s nuclear policy and threat assessment calculi is predominantly focused on North Korea and Iran, the state of Pakistan has presented significant challenges that will require ongoing attention during Obama’s second term. In its drive to produce fissile material for weapons, augment its weapons production facilities, deploy additional delivery vehicles, construct additional nuclear reactors, and expand its reprocessing capabilities, Pakistan has clearly placed the expansion and improvement of its nuclear weapons arsenal at the heart of its overall security strategy. When this trend is considered in light of Pakistan’s volatile domestic trajectory and ongoing regional complexities, it highlights the need for the Obama Administration to embolden its capabilities in assessing and monitoring the threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

The Rising Pakistani Nuclear Stockpile

The United States’ relationship with Pakistan has veered between necessary coexistence to periods of strain in the post 9/11 era. As the world’s fastest nuclear proliferator, Pakistan will continue to present some significant challenges to U.S. policy makers in the years ahead.  It is well documented that it has been constructing two new plutonium production reactors, a new reprocessing facility in which it will be able to manufacture more nuclear weapons fuel, as well as new deliverance systems. Additionally, improvements to Pakistan’s nuclear forces have been evident with the development of its suite of new nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), two new nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles, and two new nuclear-capable cruise missiles. For nuclear weapon expert Hans Kristensen, it is estimated that Pakistan has increased its nuclear weapons stockpile from an estimated seventy to ninety warheads in 2009 to approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads (as of February 2013). This has been a marked increase from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency’s 1999 projection which placed the number at 60-80 by 2020. As the Pakistani government has not defined the number and type of nuclear weapons that is necessary for it to “attain” its minimum deterrent, the state remains an ambiguous entity for both the U.S. government and the international community.[1]

The motivation behind Pakistan’s apparent penchant for increasing its stockpile is deep and complex. There is no doubt that losses to India in three conventional wars over the past six decades were a driving factor in its determination to develop and maintain its arsenal, particularly should its military or civilian leaders still perceive there to be a risk of conventional war with India. Another complicating issue pertains to what has been the effective control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons by the military, the military’s reluctance to hand over that control to the civilian government, and its tendency to emphasize the threat from India as the core rationale for retaining such weapons. In essence, it seems that for this region to get to Obama’s “zero” goal, India has to be removed as a perceived threat to Pakistan, which therefore means the risks of war due to subversion, low-intensity operations in Kashmir, and terrorism must be, for all intents and purposes, eliminated. This would also necessitate that the Pakistani military play a less dominant role in the political system and concede civilian control over the state’s nuclear weapons. But before even considering what some would refer to as the grandiose notions of “zero,” the greatest challenge to Pakistan is the securing of its weapons and associated materials. As stated by Charles Blair of the Federation of American Nuclear Scientists, “there has long been concern over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. The killing of Osama bin Laden [presented] questions about Pakistan’s sympathies to terrorist groups that target the United States and its ongoing civil war against many of these same groups have only exacerbated these apprehensions.”[2] Indeed, as the following section will illustrate, the make-up, size and expansionary nature of the Pakistani stockpile has seen the issue of weapon/material security and stability become a key plank in defining the Obama Administration’s policy towards Pakistan.

While conclusive nuclear weapon estimates are hard to ascertain, they have in essence been based upon several strands of information, namely: the quantity of weapon-grade fissile material produced; warhead design adeptness; production pace; operational nuclear-capable delivery vehicle numbers; and statements from government officials. Based on analyses from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the International Panel of Fissile Materials, it is likely that the Pakistan’s current nuclear weapons stockpile (of 90-110 warheads) will increase to 150-200 within the next decade. A recent Congressional Research Service report cited similar trends, stating “Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal.”[3]  This development will be precipitated by the anticipated introduction of several new nuclear delivery systems over the next few years, including cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles; and the capabilities of such systems will significantly change the composition and nature of Pakistan’s nuclear posture.  Additionally, as of the end of 2012, Kristensen reports Islamabad has spent approximately $2.5 billion annually to develop nuclear weapons, may currently boast a stockpile of 2,750 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU, and may be producing about 150 kilograms of HEU per year.[4]  It also has 100 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium.   This supply would enable the production of 160-240 warheads, assuming of course that the solid core of each warhead used 12-18 kilograms of HEU or 4-6 kilograms of plutonium.[5]

The amplification of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons research, development, and production infrastructure has translated into more provocative testing. This was clearly on display in late in November 2012 when it test-launched a medium-range ballistic missile capable of being armed with nuclear warheads in a user trial. As the eighth missile test conducted in 2012, the operational liquid-fueled Ghauri Hatf 5 nuclear-capable missile has a range of some 800 miles and has already engendered security concerns on a regional level.[6] According to several analysts, the Pakistani drive to accelerate its atomic arsenal is likely motivated by the United States seeking to deepen defense ties with India in order to counteract the growing military might of China, and “may tie the future of Pakistan and India’s nuclear weapons to the emerging contest between the United States and China.”[7]  Similarly, Pakistan’s “quantitative and qualitative improvements” to its nuclear arsenal is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement.[8]  As Islamabad does not have a detailed and public nuclear doctrine, its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as a design to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, while also ensuring that the bilateral relationship between the United States and India will always have to take Pakistan into account when formulating their respective nuclear related policies.[9]

 

Security of the Pakistani Nuclear Stockpile and Impact on U.S. Policy Makers

While there is no doubt that the actual expansion, composition, make-up, and capability of the Pakistan arsenal has presented a significant concern for the Obama Administration, it has been the persistent political instability and Islamabad’s struggles with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, that have posed significant concern for the Administration. Even more concerning has been the extent to which such scenarios could impinge on Pakistan’s capacity to maintain security and control of its arsenal. Some commentators have pointed to extreme examples in which some of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of sub-national actors or be used by dissenters within the Pakistani government. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen expressed such concerns as far back as September 22, 2008: Even if Pakistan’s weapons were secure, “they are their weapons. They’re not my weapons. And there are limits to what I know.” For Mullen, the worst-case scenario would be such weapons being attained by terrorists “and either being proliferated or potentially used.” Therefore, stability and control of such weapons were a key concern that “the Pakistani leadership… on both the military and civilian side [need to] understand.”[10] In the public context, Obama has attempted to be optimistic, maintaining that the United States “can make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily, initially because the Pakistani army… recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands. We’ve got strong military-to-military consultation and co-operation.”[11] Additionally, he pointed to the complexity of the issue for Pakistan in that while his Administration respected “their sovereignty… we also recognize that we have huge strategic interests, huge national security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don’t end up having a nuclear-armed militant state.”[12]

Again, reflecting the Administration’s balance between diplomacy and apprehension, Department of State Spokesperson Mark Toner stated that while “the safeguard and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are of concern… it’s an issue that we discussed with the Pakistani government, and we’re sure that they’re under safeguard.”[13] Similarly, then-Director of U.S. National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, informed the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on February 3, 2010, that “from what we see of… measures that they take,” Pakistan has been keeping its nuclear weapons secure.[14] While Lieutenant General, Ronald Burgess, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated in a March 10, 2011 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that “Pakistan is able to safeguard its nuclear weapons, including protecting important segments of its nuclear program in underground facilities,” he also emphasised that “vulnerabilities still exist.”[15] In expanding on Burgess’s last qualifying point, General Petraeus, the former Commander of U.S. Central Command, argued that should the Pakistani state collapse, “transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations [would have] an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks.”[16]

In an attempt to quell what has at times been alarmist sentiments towards the Pakistani arsenal, Gary Samore, National Security Council Coordinator for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, argued that the Pakistani government was serious in managing a potential nuclear security threat and had put extensive resources into trying to ensure that their nuclear facilities, materials and weapons were well secured. As stated, “there’s no lack of recognition that this is a very important issue, and there’s no lack of incentive on the part of the Pakistani government to maintain control.” What did concern Samore, however, were the “broader tensions and problems within Pakistani society and polity,” including sectarian violence and acrimony between the government and the military. Therefore, while the situation may be reasonably secure now, over a period of time “even the best nuclear security measures might break down.”[17] Despite having programs in place, the question remains on as to whether these can work while the aforementioned tensions and conflicts are present. As Samore concluded, “You’re dealing with a country that is under tremendous stress internally and externally, and that’s what makes me worry.”[18] Similarly, former Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, stated that if “Pakistan disintegrates, then it can be dangerous. Otherwise, if Pakistan’s integrity is there, and which I’m sure it will be there as long as the armed forces of Pakistan are there, there is no danger of the nuclear assets or strategic assets falling in any terrorist hands.”[19]

Indeed, the extent to which Pakistan can actually maintain control of its weapons and materials has been a source of tension and contested debate amongst policy makers, commentators and analysts. As the above sentiments illustrate, the Obama Administration has veered between notions of “nuclear weapons are currently under firm control” to “with warheads disassembled, technology could be sold off by insiders during a worsened crisis.”[20] On the one hand, there have been views such as those conveyed by former Deputy Secretary of State, John D. Negroponte, who argued that there is “plenty of succession planning going on in the Pakistani military” and that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “effective technical control.”[21] Similarly, Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, told a Washington audience that the Pakistani military’s management of the nuclear weapons has been “a good thing because [the military is] an institution in Pakistan that has, in fact, withstood many of the political changes over the years.”[22] Admiral Mullen echoed this assessment during a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, while Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in a January 21, 2010 interview that the United States was “very comfortable with the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.”[23] Then State Department spokesperson, Philip Crowley, informed the media on April 9, 2010 that Pakistan “has demonstrated that it can secure its own nuclear weapons program,”[24] and in similar fashion Under Secretary of Defense, Michele Flournoy, stated during an April 29, 2010 hearing that “we believe that Pakistan has a very solid command-and-control system for their nuclear weapons [and that] they have made a great deal of investment in the security of their nuclear arsenal.”[25] This confidence has been expressed throughout the first term of the Obama Administration, particularly evident when DNI Clapper informed the House Intelligence Committee that nuclear weapons in Pakistan remained “secure.”[26]

 

Theft and Non-State actor concerns for the Obama Administration

Despite these qualified assurances, however, the Administration’s knowledge of Pakistan’s arsenal cannot be deemed as one-hundred percent conclusive. As a means to increase surety, the United States has spent more than $100 million helping the state erect fences, install sensor systems, and train personnel to manage the weapons. However, notwithstanding such actions, senior officials have continued to be uneasy that weapons-usable fuel—which is kept in laboratories and storage centers—was more susceptible to “extraction” and could be diverted by insiders in Pakistan’s largest nuclear complex. In State Department cables released by WikiLeaks in 2011, Anne Patterson, then the American ambassador to Pakistan, articulated her concerns that nuclear material in Pakistan’s laboratories were susceptible to gradual theft from people within. The cables also highlighted an Administration decision to deny certain types of technology that could be appropriated to upgrade its arsenal to plutonium weapons.[27] As Matthew Bunn—an analyst who compiles an annual report called Securing the Bomb for the group Nuclear Threat Initiative—conveyed, “…the biggest concern of major production, to my mind, is theft from the places where the material is being handled in bulk—the plants that produce it, convert it to metal, fabricate it into bomb parts, and so on.” More alarmingly, he continued, “All but one of the real thefts” of HEU and plutonium “were insider thefts from bulk-handling facilities—that’s where you can squirrel a little bit away without the loss being detected.”[28]

While internal theft has been a serious concern, the greatest threat to Pakistan’s nuclear security has, and will continue to be, non-state actors. For the Obama Administration, the asymmetrical nature and at times uncertain links between the Pakistani military—particularly with the ISI—and non-state entities have proven to be a significant challenge. Although much attention has focused on senior components of Pakistan’s military that aid and abet the Afghan Taliban, elements of al Qaeda, and other jihadist groups that vigorously oppose the United States, recent developments were a stark reminder that Pakistan continues to be in a civil war against many of these same forces. While it was evident that certain senior Pakistani officials may have known bin Laden’s location in Abbottabad prior to the U.S. mission, the reality is that Pakistan’s own war against terrorism has cost it “some 30,000 men, women, and children and more than 5,000 armed forces personnel [and] billions of dollars lost as economic costs,”[29] and this needs to be taken into account when making any sort of assessment of the government’s due diligence. Still, there are some within the Obama Administration who believe Pakistan has at times attempted to play all sides with its Janus-faced policies. While Pakistani leaders believe their policies are commensurate with their primary goals of thwarting Indian influence in Central Asia and ensuring the geopolitical endgame in Afghanistan conforms with their perceived interests, the balance between stability and insecurity teeters on a fine line.

Leadership and due diligence issues aside, non-state actors in the form of Pakistan’s “Talibanized Pashtuns” and their allies—referred to as the Pakistani Neo-Taliban (PNT)[30]—challenge not only the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan but have presented a distinct threat to Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure.[31] Collectively, PNT-linked forces have conducted dozens of highly sophisticated terrorist operations. Attacks include three sophisticated assaults on Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Regional Headquarters in Lahore, a massive bombing at Islamabad’s Marriott Hotel (“Pakistan’s 9/11”), an ambush of the Sri Lankan Cricket Team, attacks on Lahore’s Police Academy and ISI Provisional Headquarters, partial seizure of Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi (“Pakistan’s Pentagon”), the likely assassination of Benazir Bhutto, a shocking assault in Afghanistan that was the second deadliest attack against the United States’ CIA in its history, and dozens of other complex operations.  Indeed, the PNT is clearly the greatest non-state threat to Pakistan’s overall security and, more specifically, its nuclear assets. Its combination of ideology, strategic objectives, organizational structure, relations with other groups (including elements of the Pakistani state), and general resources and capabilities make it unique among the global milieu of violent non-state actors. As stated by General Petraeus, the PNT is now a “threat to the very existence of Pakistan… supplanting even India.”[32]

 

Further Balancing Requirements for the Obama Administration

While the U.S. relationship with Pakistan during the Obama Administration has been focused on thwarting the Taliban and al Qaeda, the Administration has also understood that it can no longer afford to reduce efforts to hinder Pakistan’s advancement and must encourage not only Pakistan itself, but India and China to implement some semblance of nuclear balance and restraint. The key to Obama’s platform in pursuing such “balance” has pertained to slowing and ideally stopping the production of fissile material for weapons, while also pursuing the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Extending back to 1998, the United States supported a UN Security Council resolution that denounced India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear explosions and called on both states to sign (and ratify) the CTBT and stop fissile production for weapons. Of course, the assertiveness in this regard has been somewhat tempered as other commercial and strategic priorities—including the 2008 civil nuclear trade exemption for India and the U.S.-led offensive against the Taliban—have come to the fore and pushed non-proliferation opportunities to the sidelines. [33]

President Obama has pledged during his tenure in office to “lead a global effort” in placing the non-proliferation movement back onto the negotiating table. One such development has been his call at the 65-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) for negotiations to be stepped up on a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Given that France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all confirmed their preparedness to stop fissile material production for weapons, a formal global fissile production treaty would certainly have a significant impact on Pakistan, India, and possibly China. However, in referring to India’s greater fissile production potential—from the plutonium in the spent fuel of its unsafeguarded power reactors, which could provide enough material for several hundred more bombs—Pakistan has continued to obstruct the starting process of the negotiation. During the CD on February 28, 2011, this prompted Secretary of State Clinton to make an assertive call for work to move forward on a FMCT. In the interim, the Administration has urged for other (and even alternative) informal technical talks as a means to keep the issue “alive.” This is not to say that Pakistan has been isolated in the Administration’s press on the FMCT; India and the major nuclear suppliers—France, Russia, and the United States itself—must also continue to move towards instituting a “circuit breaker.” In this regard India can and should declare that it will not increase its rate of fissile production and will place additional non-military reactors under safeguards. This could potentially embolden Indian security by pressuring Pakistan and China to undertake comparable assurances.[34]

So as to not increase tensions and heighten Pakistani concerns that it is “indirectly preparing” to secure the weapons in an emergency and/or or a government collapse, the Obama Administration has been cautious in its public discussion on Pakistan’s arsenal. However, in November 2011, Gary Samore criticized Islamabad for seeking to block FMCT discussions, which, if concluded—and the treaty actually implemented—could seriously impede many states’ nuclear programs. But perhaps this extends back to the Washington deal that enables the U.S. to provide civilian nuclear fuel to India, which some Pakistani officials have argued has merely facilitated India’s ability to free up its homemade fuel and potentially produce new weapons. In this regard, Pakistan believes they have had no choice but to increase their own production and oppose any treaty that would cut into their capacity to compete with India’s arsenal. In a statement in December 2011, Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which oversees the arsenal, said that it would reject “any effort to undermine its strategic deterrence,” adding, “Pakistan will not be a party to any approach that is prejudicial to its legitimate national security interests.”[35] A spokesperson for the National Security Council, Tommy Vietor, maintained the diplomatic line by stating that President Obama was still “confident” about the security of Pakistani weapons and would “continue to encourage all nations to support the commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.”[36] In reality, however, in the year since such concerns were expressed, key Administration officials have attempted to move such efforts away from the CD and outside of Pakistani influence.[37]

If one is to subscribe to a pessimistic view, he or she would conclude that it could be years before a FMCT is completed—not to mention its actual entering into force. It is here that assertive action by the five original nuclear-weapon states should be undertaken in which an agreement by all states with facilities not subject to safeguards voluntarily suspend fissile material production and place stocks in excess of military requirements under IAEA inspection. While the Obama Administration has in many instances been forthright in its rhetoric, it needs to strengthen its “action leverage.” That is, the Administration and Congress should press for an investigation of the IAEA technical support programs in Pakistan, which undoubtedly have aided its bomb production program. For two decades, Pakistan has received extensive funding from the IAEA for operational upgrades and control systems for its safeguarded reactors, yet it has simultaneously been constructing and operating reactors of the same design outside safeguards for its military program. In essence, such steps if applied together could persuade Pakistan to relinquish its opposition to negotiations to halt the further production of nuclear weapon material and contribute to impeding the expensive and dangerous South Asian arms race.[38]

Recent U.S. intelligence assessments, however, have only reaffirmed that the required actions of the Administration may not be necessarily easy, given that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal has steadily increased since Obama came to office. For the Administration, the evaluation presents a direct challenge to a core pillar of its security policy of reducing nuclear stockpiles around the world. As articulated by a senior U.S. military official, “We’ve seen a consistent, constant build-up in their inventory, but it hasn’t been a sudden rapid rise… We’re very, very well aware of what they’re doing.”[39] White House officials share the assessment that the increase in actual weapons has been what one termed “slow and steady.”[40] However, as the above discussion illustrates, regardless of diplomatic rhetoric, it has been the production of nuclear material that has presented one of the greatest concerns to the Administration. Indeed, based on figures from the International Panel on Fissile Materials, experts say Pakistan has now produced sufficient material for 40 to 100 additional weapons—including a new class of plutonium bombs. If such figures are close to accurate, it places Pakistan on a level with some long-established nuclear powers.[41] As stated by Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer and the author of Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad, “…if not now, Pakistan will soon have the fifth largest nuclear arsenal in the world, surpassing the United Kingdom… and judging by the new nuclear reactors that are coming online and the pace of production, Pakistan is on a course to be the fourth largest nuclear weapons state in the world, ahead of France.”[42]

 

Reducing tensions

Aside from tension around the production of fissile material and the increasing Pakistani stockpile, U.S.-Pakistan relations took a downward turn in 2011 when it was revealed that the United States had kept Pakistani officials outside the operational proceedings to kill Osama bin Laden. Additionally, when U.S. forces killed 24 Pakistani military personnel in November (in what the United States described as a case of mistaken identity), Pakistan broke off high-level ties with the United States and launched a debate about new terms of engagement, including the sensitive issue of CIA drone strikes on targets inside Pakistani borders. While making no reference to the bin Laden raid nor the escalation of U.S. drone strikes, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani of Pakistan said he was pleased with Obama’s reference to sovereignty.[43] Overall, the meeting broke a four-month moratorium on direct upper level contact between the United States and Pakistan.[44]

Outside of tension surrounding fissile material, nuclear weapon development and “transgressions” of sovereignty, Pakistan  remains a key U.S. counterterrorism partner and its co-operation has been significant for drawing down the American-led war in neighboring Afghanistan. The diplomatic gesture by Obama in Seoul was no doubt an attempt by the President to resolve the Pakistan stand-off so as to re-open the movement of Afghanistan war supplies through Pakistan, as opposed to alternative routes through Central Asia. Likewise, the supply line through Pakistan will also be crucial in enabling the movement of equipment out of Afghanistan as the U.S. seeks to withdraw most of its combat forces by the end of 2014.[45] It is with this in mind that the Administration has had to undertake a policy of balance that somewhat enables it to inhibit excessive fissile material and nuclear weapon developments in Pakistan, but that also addresses pending and ongoing security issues pertaining to the concluding stage of the war in Afghanistan and broader security concerns of the South Asia region.

 

Conclusion

Since the 1998 Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, the international community has increased its focus on trying to reduce the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. The two states became precariously close to a full-fledged war in 1999 and 2002, and have since acknowledged some of the extreme dangers that could potentially arise and developed some risk reduction measures. Since the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan, as well as possible links between Pakistani nuclear scientists and sub-national groups, Pakistan has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. However, as this article has discussed, key security challenges for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal have related to maintaining the integrity of the command structure, improving physical security, and impeding illegitimate proliferation from insiders and sub-national actors. Moreover, as Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons and augment its weapons production facilities, as well as deploy additional delivery vehicles, together with the construction of additional nuclear reactors and expansion of its reprocessing capabilities, it is evident that plans to increase and improve its nuclear weapons arsenal will remain a firm component of its short-to-medium security agenda. With Pakistan’s domestic stability likely to continue on a rocky trajectory, the Obama Administration will increasingly need to assess and monitor the threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets in its policy response calculi. During a crisis, U.S. reliance on the extant assessments and their related flawed methodologies could lead to unnecessary and calamitous overreaction or tragic inaction.

For policy makers who have been concerned within the Obama Administration, the risk has expanded and the safety and security of nuclear weapons materials in Pakistan could very well be compromised or “extracted” at some point in the future. During the Bush Presidency and the Obama tenure, there have been demands by some policy makers and analysts to destroy, temporarily secure in place, or “exfiltrate” Pakistani nuclear assets—its nuclear weapons and fissile materials—should there be an excessive internal “event” or a governmental coup led by Islamist extremists. Conversely, policy optimists and those maintaining the diplomatic line have argued that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure is secure and the threat posed by terrorists is exaggerated and at times bordering on “alarmist.” Moreover, those who are more positive in their assessments argue that notions of vulnerability do not sufficiently take into account the implementation of various technical precautions and advances in Pakistan’s personnel reliability program. The policy that the Obama Administration has pursued has been both concerned and, at varying internals, optimistic.

It has had to consider, on the one hand, the pessimists’ assessments in which the “tipping point” of domestic instability would see some form of conflict and with that, the possible seizure of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. On the other hand, Obama has had to consider the positive view, perceived by some as a “torpid response to dynamic changes in Pakistan’s domestic milieu, [it] could facilitate military collusion with terrorists and [is] a disastrously slow Western reaction to an Islamist seizure of power in Pakistan.”[46] Only by means of thorough and robust threat assessments going beyond the limits of current threat assessments can American decision makers pursue policies that cogently address the threat posed by Pakistan’s growing nuclear infrastructure.[47] In essence, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are either on the verge of successful seizure by terrorists or they are secure. Based on the above discussion, neither the optimistic nor the concerned position is conclusively defensible. It is with this in mind that Obama will no doubt veer between both ends of the spectrum in trying to attain a balance that monitors Pakistani fissile development / stockpile expansion, while maintaining the geo-strategic imperative needed to end conflict in the region.

About the Author

Aiden Warren is a lecturer at Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies. His research interests are in the areas of International Relations, International Security, U.S. Foreign Policy, and nuclear proliferation and arms control.

Endnotes

Abstract: While the core thrust of the Obama Administration’s nuclear policy and threat assessment calculi is predominantly focused on North Korea and Iran, the state of Pakistan has presented significant challenges that will require ongoing attention during Obama’s second term. In its drive to produce fissile material for weapons, augment its weapons production facilities, deploy additional delivery vehicles, construct additional nuclear reactors, and expand its reprocessing capabilities, Pakistan has clearly placed the expansion and improvement of its nuclear weapons arsenal at the heart of its overall security strategy. When this trend is considered in light of Pakistan’s volatile domestic trajectory and ongoing regional complexities, it highlights the need for the Obama Administration to embolden its capabilities in assessing and monitoring the threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

The Rising Pakistani Nuclear Stockpile

The United States’ relationship with Pakistan has veered between necessary coexistence to periods of strain in the post 9/11 era. As the world’s fastest nuclear proliferator, Pakistan will continue to present some significant challenges to U.S. policy makers in the years ahead.  It is well documented that it has been constructing two new plutonium production reactors, a new reprocessing facility in which it will be able to manufacture more nuclear weapons fuel, as well as new deliverance systems. Additionally, improvements to Pakistan’s nuclear forces have been evident with the development of its suite of new nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), two new nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles, and two new nuclear-capable cruise missiles. For nuclear weapon expert Hans Kristensen, it is estimated that Pakistan has increased its nuclear weapons stockpile from an estimated seventy to ninety warheads in 2009 to approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads (as of February 2013). This has been a marked increase from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency’s 1999 projection which placed the number at 60-80 by 2020. As the Pakistani government has not defined the number and type of nuclear weapons that is necessary for it to “attain” its minimum deterrent, the state remains an ambiguous entity for both the U.S. government and the international community.[1]

The motivation behind Pakistan’s apparent penchant for increasing its stockpile is deep and complex. There is no doubt that losses to India in three conventional wars over the past six decades were a driving factor in its determination to develop and maintain its arsenal, particularly should its military or civilian leaders still perceive there to be a risk of conventional war with India. Another complicating issue pertains to what has been the effective control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons by the military, the military’s reluctance to hand over that control to the civilian government, and its tendency to emphasize the threat from India as the core rationale for retaining such weapons. In essence, it seems that for this region to get to Obama’s “zero” goal, India has to be removed as a perceived threat to Pakistan, which therefore means the risks of war due to subversion, low-intensity operations in Kashmir, and terrorism must be, for all intents and purposes, eliminated. This would also necessitate that the Pakistani military play a less dominant role in the political system and concede civilian control over the state’s nuclear weapons. But before even considering what some would refer to as the grandiose notions of “zero,” the greatest challenge to Pakistan is the securing of its weapons and associated materials. As stated by Charles Blair of the Federation of American Nuclear Scientists, “there has long been concern over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. The killing of Osama bin Laden [presented] questions about Pakistan’s sympathies to terrorist groups that target the United States and its ongoing civil war against many of these same groups have only exacerbated these apprehensions.”[2] Indeed, as the following section will illustrate, the make-up, size and expansionary nature of the Pakistani stockpile has seen the issue of weapon/material security and stability become a key plank in defining the Obama Administration’s policy towards Pakistan.

While conclusive nuclear weapon estimates are hard to ascertain, they have in essence been based upon several strands of information, namely: the quantity of weapon-grade fissile material produced; warhead design adeptness; production pace; operational nuclear-capable delivery vehicle numbers; and statements from government officials. Based on analyses from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the International Panel of Fissile Materials, it is likely that the Pakistan’s current nuclear weapons stockpile (of 90-110 warheads) will increase to 150-200 within the next decade. A recent Congressional Research Service report cited similar trends, stating “Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal.”[3]  This development will be precipitated by the anticipated introduction of several new nuclear delivery systems over the next few years, including cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles; and the capabilities of such systems will significantly change the composition and nature of Pakistan’s nuclear posture.  Additionally, as of the end of 2012, Kristensen reports Islamabad has spent approximately $2.5 billion annually to develop nuclear weapons, may currently boast a stockpile of 2,750 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU, and may be producing about 150 kilograms of HEU per year.[4]  It also has 100 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium.   This supply would enable the production of 160-240 warheads, assuming of course that the solid core of each warhead used 12-18 kilograms of HEU or 4-6 kilograms of plutonium.[5]

The amplification of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons research, development, and production infrastructure has translated into more provocative testing. This was clearly on display in late in November 2012 when it test-launched a medium-range ballistic missile capable of being armed with nuclear warheads in a user trial. As the eighth missile test conducted in 2012, the operational liquid-fueled Ghauri Hatf 5 nuclear-capable missile has a range of some 800 miles and has already engendered security concerns on a regional level.[6] According to several analysts, the Pakistani drive to accelerate its atomic arsenal is likely motivated by the United States seeking to deepen defense ties with India in order to counteract the growing military might of China, and “may tie the future of Pakistan and India’s nuclear weapons to the emerging contest between the United States and China.”[7]  Similarly, Pakistan’s “quantitative and qualitative improvements” to its nuclear arsenal is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement.[8]  As Islamabad does not have a detailed and public nuclear doctrine, its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as a design to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, while also ensuring that the bilateral relationship between the United States and India will always have to take Pakistan into account when formulating their respective nuclear related policies.[9]

 

Security of the Pakistani Nuclear Stockpile and Impact on U.S. Policy Makers

While there is no doubt that the actual expansion, composition, make-up, and capability of the Pakistan arsenal has presented a significant concern for the Obama Administration, it has been the persistent political instability and Islamabad’s struggles with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, that have posed significant concern for the Administration. Even more concerning has been the extent to which such scenarios could impinge on Pakistan’s capacity to maintain security and control of its arsenal. Some commentators have pointed to extreme examples in which some of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of sub-national actors or be used by dissenters within the Pakistani government. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen expressed such concerns as far back as September 22, 2008: Even if Pakistan’s weapons were secure, “they are their weapons. They’re not my weapons. And there are limits to what I know.” For Mullen, the worst-case scenario would be such weapons being attained by terrorists “and either being proliferated or potentially used.” Therefore, stability and control of such weapons were a key concern that “the Pakistani leadership… on both the military and civilian side [need to] understand.”[10] In the public context, Obama has attempted to be optimistic, maintaining that the United States “can make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily, initially because the Pakistani army… recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands. We’ve got strong military-to-military consultation and co-operation.”[11] Additionally, he pointed to the complexity of the issue for Pakistan in that while his Administration respected “their sovereignty… we also recognize that we have huge strategic interests, huge national security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don’t end up having a nuclear-armed militant state.”[12]

Again, reflecting the Administration’s balance between diplomacy and apprehension, Department of State Spokesperson Mark Toner stated that while “the safeguard and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are of concern… it’s an issue that we discussed with the Pakistani government, and we’re sure that they’re under safeguard.”[13] Similarly, then-Director of U.S. National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, informed the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on February 3, 2010, that “from what we see of… measures that they take,” Pakistan has been keeping its nuclear weapons secure.[14] While Lieutenant General, Ronald Burgess, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated in a March 10, 2011 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that “Pakistan is able to safeguard its nuclear weapons, including protecting important segments of its nuclear program in underground facilities,” he also emphasised that “vulnerabilities still exist.”[15] In expanding on Burgess’s last qualifying point, General Petraeus, the former Commander of U.S. Central Command, argued that should the Pakistani state collapse, “transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations [would have] an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks.”[16]

In an attempt to quell what has at times been alarmist sentiments towards the Pakistani arsenal, Gary Samore, National Security Council Coordinator for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, argued that the Pakistani government was serious in managing a potential nuclear security threat and had put extensive resources into trying to ensure that their nuclear facilities, materials and weapons were well secured. As stated, “there’s no lack of recognition that this is a very important issue, and there’s no lack of incentive on the part of the Pakistani government to maintain control.” What did concern Samore, however, were the “broader tensions and problems within Pakistani society and polity,” including sectarian violence and acrimony between the government and the military. Therefore, while the situation may be reasonably secure now, over a period of time “even the best nuclear security measures might break down.”[17] Despite having programs in place, the question remains on as to whether these can work while the aforementioned tensions and conflicts are present. As Samore concluded, “You’re dealing with a country that is under tremendous stress internally and externally, and that’s what makes me worry.”[18] Similarly, former Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, stated that if “Pakistan disintegrates, then it can be dangerous. Otherwise, if Pakistan’s integrity is there, and which I’m sure it will be there as long as the armed forces of Pakistan are there, there is no danger of the nuclear assets or strategic assets falling in any terrorist hands.”[19]

Indeed, the extent to which Pakistan can actually maintain control of its weapons and materials has been a source of tension and contested debate amongst policy makers, commentators and analysts. As the above sentiments illustrate, the Obama Administration has veered between notions of “nuclear weapons are currently under firm control” to “with warheads disassembled, technology could be sold off by insiders during a worsened crisis.”[20] On the one hand, there have been views such as those conveyed by former Deputy Secretary of State, John D. Negroponte, who argued that there is “plenty of succession planning going on in the Pakistani military” and that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “effective technical control.”[21] Similarly, Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, told a Washington audience that the Pakistani military’s management of the nuclear weapons has been “a good thing because [the military is] an institution in Pakistan that has, in fact, withstood many of the political changes over the years.”[22] Admiral Mullen echoed this assessment during a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, while Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in a January 21, 2010 interview that the United States was “very comfortable with the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.”[23] Then State Department spokesperson, Philip Crowley, informed the media on April 9, 2010 that Pakistan “has demonstrated that it can secure its own nuclear weapons program,”[24] and in similar fashion Under Secretary of Defense, Michele Flournoy, stated during an April 29, 2010 hearing that “we believe that Pakistan has a very solid command-and-control system for their nuclear weapons [and that] they have made a great deal of investment in the security of their nuclear arsenal.”[25] This confidence has been expressed throughout the first term of the Obama Administration, particularly evident when DNI Clapper informed the House Intelligence Committee that nuclear weapons in Pakistan remained “secure.”[26]

 

Theft and Non-State actor concerns for the Obama Administration

Despite these qualified assurances, however, the Administration’s knowledge of Pakistan’s arsenal cannot be deemed as one-hundred percent conclusive. As a means to increase surety, the United States has spent more than $100 million helping the state erect fences, install sensor systems, and train personnel to manage the weapons. However, notwithstanding such actions, senior officials have continued to be uneasy that weapons-usable fuel—which is kept in laboratories and storage centers—was more susceptible to “extraction” and could be diverted by insiders in Pakistan’s largest nuclear complex. In State Department cables released by WikiLeaks in 2011, Anne Patterson, then the American ambassador to Pakistan, articulated her concerns that nuclear material in Pakistan’s laboratories were susceptible to gradual theft from people within. The cables also highlighted an Administration decision to deny certain types of technology that could be appropriated to upgrade its arsenal to plutonium weapons.[27] As Matthew Bunn—an analyst who compiles an annual report called Securing the Bomb for the group Nuclear Threat Initiative—conveyed, “…the biggest concern of major production, to my mind, is theft from the places where the material is being handled in bulk—the plants that produce it, convert it to metal, fabricate it into bomb parts, and so on.” More alarmingly, he continued, “All but one of the real thefts” of HEU and plutonium “were insider thefts from bulk-handling facilities—that’s where you can squirrel a little bit away without the loss being detected.”[28]

While internal theft has been a serious concern, the greatest threat to Pakistan’s nuclear security has, and will continue to be, non-state actors. For the Obama Administration, the asymmetrical nature and at times uncertain links between the Pakistani military—particularly with the ISI—and non-state entities have proven to be a significant challenge. Although much attention has focused on senior components of Pakistan’s military that aid and abet the Afghan Taliban, elements of al Qaeda, and other jihadist groups that vigorously oppose the United States, recent developments were a stark reminder that Pakistan continues to be in a civil war against many of these same forces. While it was evident that certain senior Pakistani officials may have known bin Laden’s location in Abbottabad prior to the U.S. mission, the reality is that Pakistan’s own war against terrorism has cost it “some 30,000 men, women, and children and more than 5,000 armed forces personnel [and] billions of dollars lost as economic costs,”[29] and this needs to be taken into account when making any sort of assessment of the government’s due diligence. Still, there are some within the Obama Administration who believe Pakistan has at times attempted to play all sides with its Janus-faced policies. While Pakistani leaders believe their policies are commensurate with their primary goals of thwarting Indian influence in Central Asia and ensuring the geopolitical endgame in Afghanistan conforms with their perceived interests, the balance between stability and insecurity teeters on a fine line.

Leadership and due diligence issues aside, non-state actors in the form of Pakistan’s “Talibanized Pashtuns” and their allies—referred to as the Pakistani Neo-Taliban (PNT)[30]—challenge not only the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan but have presented a distinct threat to Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure.[31] Collectively, PNT-linked forces have conducted dozens of highly sophisticated terrorist operations. Attacks include three sophisticated assaults on Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Regional Headquarters in Lahore, a massive bombing at Islamabad’s Marriott Hotel (“Pakistan’s 9/11”), an ambush of the Sri Lankan Cricket Team, attacks on Lahore’s Police Academy and ISI Provisional Headquarters, partial seizure of Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi (“Pakistan’s Pentagon”), the likely assassination of Benazir Bhutto, a shocking assault in Afghanistan that was the second deadliest attack against the United States’ CIA in its history, and dozens of other complex operations.  Indeed, the PNT is clearly the greatest non-state threat to Pakistan’s overall security and, more specifically, its nuclear assets. Its combination of ideology, strategic objectives, organizational structure, relations with other groups (including elements of the Pakistani state), and general resources and capabilities make it unique among the global milieu of violent non-state actors. As stated by General Petraeus, the PNT is now a “threat to the very existence of Pakistan… supplanting even India.”[32]

 

Further Balancing Requirements for the Obama Administration

While the U.S. relationship with Pakistan during the Obama Administration has been focused on thwarting the Taliban and al Qaeda, the Administration has also understood that it can no longer afford to reduce efforts to hinder Pakistan’s advancement and must encourage not only Pakistan itself, but India and China to implement some semblance of nuclear balance and restraint. The key to Obama’s platform in pursuing such “balance” has pertained to slowing and ideally stopping the production of fissile material for weapons, while also pursuing the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Extending back to 1998, the United States supported a UN Security Council resolution that denounced India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear explosions and called on both states to sign (and ratify) the CTBT and stop fissile production for weapons. Of course, the assertiveness in this regard has been somewhat tempered as other commercial and strategic priorities—including the 2008 civil nuclear trade exemption for India and the U.S.-led offensive against the Taliban—have come to the fore and pushed non-proliferation opportunities to the sidelines. [33]

President Obama has pledged during his tenure in office to “lead a global effort” in placing the non-proliferation movement back onto the negotiating table. One such development has been his call at the 65-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) for negotiations to be stepped up on a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Given that France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all confirmed their preparedness to stop fissile material production for weapons, a formal global fissile production treaty would certainly have a significant impact on Pakistan, India, and possibly China. However, in referring to India’s greater fissile production potential—from the plutonium in the spent fuel of its unsafeguarded power reactors, which could provide enough material for several hundred more bombs—Pakistan has continued to obstruct the starting process of the negotiation. During the CD on February 28, 2011, this prompted Secretary of State Clinton to make an assertive call for work to move forward on a FMCT. In the interim, the Administration has urged for other (and even alternative) informal technical talks as a means to keep the issue “alive.” This is not to say that Pakistan has been isolated in the Administration’s press on the FMCT; India and the major nuclear suppliers—France, Russia, and the United States itself—must also continue to move towards instituting a “circuit breaker.” In this regard India can and should declare that it will not increase its rate of fissile production and will place additional non-military reactors under safeguards. This could potentially embolden Indian security by pressuring Pakistan and China to undertake comparable assurances.[34]

So as to not increase tensions and heighten Pakistani concerns that it is “indirectly preparing” to secure the weapons in an emergency and/or or a government collapse, the Obama Administration has been cautious in its public discussion on Pakistan’s arsenal. However, in November 2011, Gary Samore criticized Islamabad for seeking to block FMCT discussions, which, if concluded—and the treaty actually implemented—could seriously impede many states’ nuclear programs. But perhaps this extends back to the Washington deal that enables the U.S. to provide civilian nuclear fuel to India, which some Pakistani officials have argued has merely facilitated India’s ability to free up its homemade fuel and potentially produce new weapons. In this regard, Pakistan believes they have had no choice but to increase their own production and oppose any treaty that would cut into their capacity to compete with India’s arsenal. In a statement in December 2011, Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which oversees the arsenal, said that it would reject “any effort to undermine its strategic deterrence,” adding, “Pakistan will not be a party to any approach that is prejudicial to its legitimate national security interests.”[35] A spokesperson for the National Security Council, Tommy Vietor, maintained the diplomatic line by stating that President Obama was still “confident” about the security of Pakistani weapons and would “continue to encourage all nations to support the commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.”[36] In reality, however, in the year since such concerns were expressed, key Administration officials have attempted to move such efforts away from the CD and outside of Pakistani influence.[37]

If one is to subscribe to a pessimistic view, he or she would conclude that it could be years before a FMCT is completed—not to mention its actual entering into force. It is here that assertive action by the five original nuclear-weapon states should be undertaken in which an agreement by all states with facilities not subject to safeguards voluntarily suspend fissile material production and place stocks in excess of military requirements under IAEA inspection. While the Obama Administration has in many instances been forthright in its rhetoric, it needs to strengthen its “action leverage.” That is, the Administration and Congress should press for an investigation of the IAEA technical support programs in Pakistan, which undoubtedly have aided its bomb production program. For two decades, Pakistan has received extensive funding from the IAEA for operational upgrades and control systems for its safeguarded reactors, yet it has simultaneously been constructing and operating reactors of the same design outside safeguards for its military program. In essence, such steps if applied together could persuade Pakistan to relinquish its opposition to negotiations to halt the further production of nuclear weapon material and contribute to impeding the expensive and dangerous South Asian arms race.[38]

Recent U.S. intelligence assessments, however, have only reaffirmed that the required actions of the Administration may not be necessarily easy, given that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal has steadily increased since Obama came to office. For the Administration, the evaluation presents a direct challenge to a core pillar of its security policy of reducing nuclear stockpiles around the world. As articulated by a senior U.S. military official, “We’ve seen a consistent, constant build-up in their inventory, but it hasn’t been a sudden rapid rise… We’re very, very well aware of what they’re doing.”[39] White House officials share the assessment that the increase in actual weapons has been what one termed “slow and steady.”[40] However, as the above discussion illustrates, regardless of diplomatic rhetoric, it has been the production of nuclear material that has presented one of the greatest concerns to the Administration. Indeed, based on figures from the International Panel on Fissile Materials, experts say Pakistan has now produced sufficient material for 40 to 100 additional weapons—including a new class of plutonium bombs. If such figures are close to accurate, it places Pakistan on a level with some long-established nuclear powers.[41] As stated by Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer and the author of Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad, “…if not now, Pakistan will soon have the fifth largest nuclear arsenal in the world, surpassing the United Kingdom… and judging by the new nuclear reactors that are coming online and the pace of production, Pakistan is on a course to be the fourth largest nuclear weapons state in the world, ahead of France.”[42]

 

Reducing tensions

Aside from tension around the production of fissile material and the increasing Pakistani stockpile, U.S.-Pakistan relations took a downward turn in 2011 when it was revealed that the United States had kept Pakistani officials outside the operational proceedings to kill Osama bin Laden. Additionally, when U.S. forces killed 24 Pakistani military personnel in November (in what the United States described as a case of mistaken identity), Pakistan broke off high-level ties with the United States and launched a debate about new terms of engagement, including the sensitive issue of CIA drone strikes on targets inside Pakistani borders. While making no reference to the bin Laden raid nor the escalation of U.S. drone strikes, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani of Pakistan said he was pleased with Obama’s reference to sovereignty.[43] Overall, the meeting broke a four-month moratorium on direct upper level contact between the United States and Pakistan.[44]

Outside of tension surrounding fissile material, nuclear weapon development and “transgressions” of sovereignty, Pakistan  remains a key U.S. counterterrorism partner and its co-operation has been significant for drawing down the American-led war in neighboring Afghanistan. The diplomatic gesture by Obama in Seoul was no doubt an attempt by the President to resolve the Pakistan stand-off so as to re-open the movement of Afghanistan war supplies through Pakistan, as opposed to alternative routes through Central Asia. Likewise, the supply line through Pakistan will also be crucial in enabling the movement of equipment out of Afghanistan as the U.S. seeks to withdraw most of its combat forces by the end of 2014.[45] It is with this in mind that the Administration has had to undertake a policy of balance that somewhat enables it to inhibit excessive fissile material and nuclear weapon developments in Pakistan, but that also addresses pending and ongoing security issues pertaining to the concluding stage of the war in Afghanistan and broader security concerns of the South Asia region.

 

Conclusion

Since the 1998 Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, the international community has increased its focus on trying to reduce the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. The two states became precariously close to a full-fledged war in 1999 and 2002, and have since acknowledged some of the extreme dangers that could potentially arise and developed some risk reduction measures. Since the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan, as well as possible links between Pakistani nuclear scientists and sub-national groups, Pakistan has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. However, as this article has discussed, key security challenges for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal have related to maintaining the integrity of the command structure, improving physical security, and impeding illegitimate proliferation from insiders and sub-national actors. Moreover, as Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons and augment its weapons production facilities, as well as deploy additional delivery vehicles, together with the construction of additional nuclear reactors and expansion of its reprocessing capabilities, it is evident that plans to increase and improve its nuclear weapons arsenal will remain a firm component of its short-to-medium security agenda. With Pakistan’s domestic stability likely to continue on a rocky trajectory, the Obama Administration will increasingly need to assess and monitor the threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets in its policy response calculi. During a crisis, U.S. reliance on the extant assessments and their related flawed methodologies could lead to unnecessary and calamitous overreaction or tragic inaction.

For policy makers who have been concerned within the Obama Administration, the risk has expanded and the safety and security of nuclear weapons materials in Pakistan could very well be compromised or “extracted” at some point in the future. During the Bush Presidency and the Obama tenure, there have been demands by some policy makers and analysts to destroy, temporarily secure in place, or “exfiltrate” Pakistani nuclear assets—its nuclear weapons and fissile materials—should there be an excessive internal “event” or a governmental coup led by Islamist extremists. Conversely, policy optimists and those maintaining the diplomatic line have argued that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure is secure and the threat posed by terrorists is exaggerated and at times bordering on “alarmist.” Moreover, those who are more positive in their assessments argue that notions of vulnerability do not sufficiently take into account the implementation of various technical precautions and advances in Pakistan’s personnel reliability program. The policy that the Obama Administration has pursued has been both concerned and, at varying internals, optimistic.

It has had to consider, on the one hand, the pessimists’ assessments in which the “tipping point” of domestic instability would see some form of conflict and with that, the possible seizure of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. On the other hand, Obama has had to consider the positive view, perceived by some as a “torpid response to dynamic changes in Pakistan’s domestic milieu, [it] could facilitate military collusion with terrorists and [is] a disastrously slow Western reaction to an Islamist seizure of power in Pakistan.”[46] Only by means of thorough and robust threat assessments going beyond the limits of current threat assessments can American decision makers pursue policies that cogently address the threat posed by Pakistan’s growing nuclear infrastructure.[47] In essence, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are either on the verge of successful seizure by terrorists or they are secure. Based on the above discussion, neither the optimistic nor the concerned position is conclusively defensible. It is with this in mind that Obama will no doubt veer between both ends of the spectrum in trying to attain a balance that monitors Pakistani fissile development / stockpile expansion, while maintaining the geo-strategic imperative needed to end conflict in the region.

About the Author

Aiden Warren is a lecturer at Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies. His research interests are in the areas of International Relations, International Security, U.S. Foreign Policy, and nuclear proliferation and arms control.

Endnotes

Abstract: While the core thrust of the Obama Administration’s nuclear policy and threat assessment calculi is predominantly focused on North Korea and Iran, the state of Pakistan has presented significant challenges that will require ongoing attention during Obama’s second term. In its drive to produce fissile material for weapons, augment its weapons production facilities, deploy additional delivery vehicles, construct additional nuclear reactors, and expand its reprocessing capabilities, Pakistan has clearly placed the expansion and improvement of its nuclear weapons arsenal at the heart of its overall security strategy. When this trend is considered in light of Pakistan’s volatile domestic trajectory and ongoing regional complexities, it highlights the need for the Obama Administration to embolden its capabilities in assessing and monitoring the threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

The Rising Pakistani Nuclear Stockpile

The United States’ relationship with Pakistan has veered between necessary coexistence to periods of strain in the post 9/11 era. As the world’s fastest nuclear proliferator, Pakistan will continue to present some significant challenges to U.S. policy makers in the years ahead.  It is well documented that it has been constructing two new plutonium production reactors, a new reprocessing facility in which it will be able to manufacture more nuclear weapons fuel, as well as new deliverance systems. Additionally, improvements to Pakistan’s nuclear forces have been evident with the development of its suite of new nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), two new nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles, and two new nuclear-capable cruise missiles. For nuclear weapon expert Hans Kristensen, it is estimated that Pakistan has increased its nuclear weapons stockpile from an estimated seventy to ninety warheads in 2009 to approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads (as of February 2013). This has been a marked increase from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency’s 1999 projection which placed the number at 60-80 by 2020. As the Pakistani government has not defined the number and type of nuclear weapons that is necessary for it to “attain” its minimum deterrent, the state remains an ambiguous entity for both the U.S. government and the international community.[1]

The motivation behind Pakistan’s apparent penchant for increasing its stockpile is deep and complex. There is no doubt that losses to India in three conventional wars over the past six decades were a driving factor in its determination to develop and maintain its arsenal, particularly should its military or civilian leaders still perceive there to be a risk of conventional war with India. Another complicating issue pertains to what has been the effective control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons by the military, the military’s reluctance to hand over that control to the civilian government, and its tendency to emphasize the threat from India as the core rationale for retaining such weapons. In essence, it seems that for this region to get to Obama’s “zero” goal, India has to be removed as a perceived threat to Pakistan, which therefore means the risks of war due to subversion, low-intensity operations in Kashmir, and terrorism must be, for all intents and purposes, eliminated. This would also necessitate that the Pakistani military play a less dominant role in the political system and concede civilian control over the state’s nuclear weapons. But before even considering what some would refer to as the grandiose notions of “zero,” the greatest challenge to Pakistan is the securing of its weapons and associated materials. As stated by Charles Blair of the Federation of American Nuclear Scientists, “there has long been concern over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. The killing of Osama bin Laden [presented] questions about Pakistan’s sympathies to terrorist groups that target the United States and its ongoing civil war against many of these same groups have only exacerbated these apprehensions.”[2] Indeed, as the following section will illustrate, the make-up, size and expansionary nature of the Pakistani stockpile has seen the issue of weapon/material security and stability become a key plank in defining the Obama Administration’s policy towards Pakistan.

While conclusive nuclear weapon estimates are hard to ascertain, they have in essence been based upon several strands of information, namely: the quantity of weapon-grade fissile material produced; warhead design adeptness; production pace; operational nuclear-capable delivery vehicle numbers; and statements from government officials. Based on analyses from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the International Panel of Fissile Materials, it is likely that the Pakistan’s current nuclear weapons stockpile (of 90-110 warheads) will increase to 150-200 within the next decade. A recent Congressional Research Service report cited similar trends, stating “Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps could enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal.”[3]  This development will be precipitated by the anticipated introduction of several new nuclear delivery systems over the next few years, including cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles; and the capabilities of such systems will significantly change the composition and nature of Pakistan’s nuclear posture.  Additionally, as of the end of 2012, Kristensen reports Islamabad has spent approximately $2.5 billion annually to develop nuclear weapons, may currently boast a stockpile of 2,750 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU, and may be producing about 150 kilograms of HEU per year.[4]  It also has 100 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium.   This supply would enable the production of 160-240 warheads, assuming of course that the solid core of each warhead used 12-18 kilograms of HEU or 4-6 kilograms of plutonium.[5]

The amplification of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons research, development, and production infrastructure has translated into more provocative testing. This was clearly on display in late in November 2012 when it test-launched a medium-range ballistic missile capable of being armed with nuclear warheads in a user trial. As the eighth missile test conducted in 2012, the operational liquid-fueled Ghauri Hatf 5 nuclear-capable missile has a range of some 800 miles and has already engendered security concerns on a regional level.[6] According to several analysts, the Pakistani drive to accelerate its atomic arsenal is likely motivated by the United States seeking to deepen defense ties with India in order to counteract the growing military might of China, and “may tie the future of Pakistan and India’s nuclear weapons to the emerging contest between the United States and China.”[7]  Similarly, Pakistan’s “quantitative and qualitative improvements” to its nuclear arsenal is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement.[8]  As Islamabad does not have a detailed and public nuclear doctrine, its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as a design to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, while also ensuring that the bilateral relationship between the United States and India will always have to take Pakistan into account when formulating their respective nuclear related policies.[9]

 

Security of the Pakistani Nuclear Stockpile and Impact on U.S. Policy Makers

While there is no doubt that the actual expansion, composition, make-up, and capability of the Pakistan arsenal has presented a significant concern for the Obama Administration, it has been the persistent political instability and Islamabad’s struggles with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, that have posed significant concern for the Administration. Even more concerning has been the extent to which such scenarios could impinge on Pakistan’s capacity to maintain security and control of its arsenal. Some commentators have pointed to extreme examples in which some of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of sub-national actors or be used by dissenters within the Pakistani government. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen expressed such concerns as far back as September 22, 2008: Even if Pakistan’s weapons were secure, “they are their weapons. They’re not my weapons. And there are limits to what I know.” For Mullen, the worst-case scenario would be such weapons being attained by terrorists “and either being proliferated or potentially used.” Therefore, stability and control of such weapons were a key concern that “the Pakistani leadership… on both the military and civilian side [need to] understand.”[10] In the public context, Obama has attempted to be optimistic, maintaining that the United States “can make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily, initially because the Pakistani army… recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands. We’ve got strong military-to-military consultation and co-operation.”[11] Additionally, he pointed to the complexity of the issue for Pakistan in that while his Administration respected “their sovereignty… we also recognize that we have huge strategic interests, huge national security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don’t end up having a nuclear-armed militant state.”[12]

Again, reflecting the Administration’s balance between diplomacy and apprehension, Department of State Spokesperson Mark Toner stated that while “the safeguard and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are of concern… it’s an issue that we discussed with the Pakistani government, and we’re sure that they’re under safeguard.”[13] Similarly, then-Director of U.S. National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, informed the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on February 3, 2010, that “from what we see of… measures that they take,” Pakistan has been keeping its nuclear weapons secure.[14] While Lieutenant General, Ronald Burgess, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated in a March 10, 2011 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that “Pakistan is able to safeguard its nuclear weapons, including protecting important segments of its nuclear program in underground facilities,” he also emphasised that “vulnerabilities still exist.”[15] In expanding on Burgess’s last qualifying point, General Petraeus, the former Commander of U.S. Central Command, argued that should the Pakistani state collapse, “transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations [would have] an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks.”[16]

In an attempt to quell what has at times been alarmist sentiments towards the Pakistani arsenal, Gary Samore, National Security Council Coordinator for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, argued that the Pakistani government was serious in managing a potential nuclear security threat and had put extensive resources into trying to ensure that their nuclear facilities, materials and weapons were well secured. As stated, “there’s no lack of recognition that this is a very important issue, and there’s no lack of incentive on the part of the Pakistani government to maintain control.” What did concern Samore, however, were the “broader tensions and problems within Pakistani society and polity,” including sectarian violence and acrimony between the government and the military. Therefore, while the situation may be reasonably secure now, over a period of time “even the best nuclear security measures might break down.”[17] Despite having programs in place, the question remains on as to whether these can work while the aforementioned tensions and conflicts are present. As Samore concluded, “You’re dealing with a country that is under tremendous stress internally and externally, and that’s what makes me worry.”[18] Similarly, former Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, stated that if “Pakistan disintegrates, then it can be dangerous. Otherwise, if Pakistan’s integrity is there, and which I’m sure it will be there as long as the armed forces of Pakistan are there, there is no danger of the nuclear assets or strategic assets falling in any terrorist hands.”[19]

Indeed, the extent to which Pakistan can actually maintain control of its weapons and materials has been a source of tension and contested debate amongst policy makers, commentators and analysts. As the above sentiments illustrate, the Obama Administration has veered between notions of “nuclear weapons are currently under firm control” to “with warheads disassembled, technology could be sold off by insiders during a worsened crisis.”[20] On the one hand, there have been views such as those conveyed by former Deputy Secretary of State, John D. Negroponte, who argued that there is “plenty of succession planning going on in the Pakistani military” and that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “effective technical control.”[21] Similarly, Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, told a Washington audience that the Pakistani military’s management of the nuclear weapons has been “a good thing because [the military is] an institution in Pakistan that has, in fact, withstood many of the political changes over the years.”[22] Admiral Mullen echoed this assessment during a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, while Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in a January 21, 2010 interview that the United States was “very comfortable with the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.”[23] Then State Department spokesperson, Philip Crowley, informed the media on April 9, 2010 that Pakistan “has demonstrated that it can secure its own nuclear weapons program,”[24] and in similar fashion Under Secretary of Defense, Michele Flournoy, stated during an April 29, 2010 hearing that “we believe that Pakistan has a very solid command-and-control system for their nuclear weapons [and that] they have made a great deal of investment in the security of their nuclear arsenal.”[25] This confidence has been expressed throughout the first term of the Obama Administration, particularly evident when DNI Clapper informed the House Intelligence Committee that nuclear weapons in Pakistan remained “secure.”[26]

 

Theft and Non-State actor concerns for the Obama Administration

Despite these qualified assurances, however, the Administration’s knowledge of Pakistan’s arsenal cannot be deemed as one-hundred percent conclusive. As a means to increase surety, the United States has spent more than $100 million helping the state erect fences, install sensor systems, and train personnel to manage the weapons. However, notwithstanding such actions, senior officials have continued to be uneasy that weapons-usable fuel—which is kept in laboratories and storage centers—was more susceptible to “extraction” and could be diverted by insiders in Pakistan’s largest nuclear complex. In State Department cables released by WikiLeaks in 2011, Anne Patterson, then the American ambassador to Pakistan, articulated her concerns that nuclear material in Pakistan’s laboratories were susceptible to gradual theft from people within. The cables also highlighted an Administration decision to deny certain types of technology that could be appropriated to upgrade its arsenal to plutonium weapons.[27] As Matthew Bunn—an analyst who compiles an annual report called Securing the Bomb for the group Nuclear Threat Initiative—conveyed, “…the biggest concern of major production, to my mind, is theft from the places where the material is being handled in bulk—the plants that produce it, convert it to metal, fabricate it into bomb parts, and so on.” More alarmingly, he continued, “All but one of the real thefts” of HEU and plutonium “were insider thefts from bulk-handling facilities—that’s where you can squirrel a little bit away without the loss being detected.”[28]

While internal theft has been a serious concern, the greatest threat to Pakistan’s nuclear security has, and will continue to be, non-state actors. For the Obama Administration, the asymmetrical nature and at times uncertain links between the Pakistani military—particularly with the ISI—and non-state entities have proven to be a significant challenge. Although much attention has focused on senior components of Pakistan’s military that aid and abet the Afghan Taliban, elements of al Qaeda, and other jihadist groups that vigorously oppose the United States, recent developments were a stark reminder that Pakistan continues to be in a civil war against many of these same forces. While it was evident that certain senior Pakistani officials may have known bin Laden’s location in Abbottabad prior to the U.S. mission, the reality is that Pakistan’s own war against terrorism has cost it “some 30,000 men, women, and children and more than 5,000 armed forces personnel [and] billions of dollars lost as economic costs,”[29] and this needs to be taken into account when making any sort of assessment of the government’s due diligence. Still, there are some within the Obama Administration who believe Pakistan has at times attempted to play all sides with its Janus-faced policies. While Pakistani leaders believe their policies are commensurate with their primary goals of thwarting Indian influence in Central Asia and ensuring the geopolitical endgame in Afghanistan conforms with their perceived interests, the balance between stability and insecurity teeters on a fine line.

Leadership and due diligence issues aside, non-state actors in the form of Pakistan’s “Talibanized Pashtuns” and their allies—referred to as the Pakistani Neo-Taliban (PNT)[30]—challenge not only the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan but have presented a distinct threat to Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure.[31] Collectively, PNT-linked forces have conducted dozens of highly sophisticated terrorist operations. Attacks include three sophisticated assaults on Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Regional Headquarters in Lahore, a massive bombing at Islamabad’s Marriott Hotel (“Pakistan’s 9/11”), an ambush of the Sri Lankan Cricket Team, attacks on Lahore’s Police Academy and ISI Provisional Headquarters, partial seizure of Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi (“Pakistan’s Pentagon”), the likely assassination of Benazir Bhutto, a shocking assault in Afghanistan that was the second deadliest attack against the United States’ CIA in its history, and dozens of other complex operations.  Indeed, the PNT is clearly the greatest non-state threat to Pakistan’s overall security and, more specifically, its nuclear assets. Its combination of ideology, strategic objectives, organizational structure, relations with other groups (including elements of the Pakistani state), and general resources and capabilities make it unique among the global milieu of violent non-state actors. As stated by General Petraeus, the PNT is now a “threat to the very existence of Pakistan… supplanting even India.”[32]

 

Further Balancing Requirements for the Obama Administration

While the U.S. relationship with Pakistan during the Obama Administration has been focused on thwarting the Taliban and al Qaeda, the Administration has also understood that it can no longer afford to reduce efforts to hinder Pakistan’s advancement and must encourage not only Pakistan itself, but India and China to implement some semblance of nuclear balance and restraint. The key to Obama’s platform in pursuing such “balance” has pertained to slowing and ideally stopping the production of fissile material for weapons, while also pursuing the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Extending back to 1998, the United States supported a UN Security Council resolution that denounced India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear explosions and called on both states to sign (and ratify) the CTBT and stop fissile production for weapons. Of course, the assertiveness in this regard has been somewhat tempered as other commercial and strategic priorities—including the 2008 civil nuclear trade exemption for India and the U.S.-led offensive against the Taliban—have come to the fore and pushed non-proliferation opportunities to the sidelines. [33]

President Obama has pledged during his tenure in office to “lead a global effort” in placing the non-proliferation movement back onto the negotiating table. One such development has been his call at the 65-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) for negotiations to be stepped up on a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Given that France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all confirmed their preparedness to stop fissile material production for weapons, a formal global fissile production treaty would certainly have a significant impact on Pakistan, India, and possibly China. However, in referring to India’s greater fissile production potential—from the plutonium in the spent fuel of its unsafeguarded power reactors, which could provide enough material for several hundred more bombs—Pakistan has continued to obstruct the starting process of the negotiation. During the CD on February 28, 2011, this prompted Secretary of State Clinton to make an assertive call for work to move forward on a FMCT. In the interim, the Administration has urged for other (and even alternative) informal technical talks as a means to keep the issue “alive.” This is not to say that Pakistan has been isolated in the Administration’s press on the FMCT; India and the major nuclear suppliers—France, Russia, and the United States itself—must also continue to move towards instituting a “circuit breaker.” In this regard India can and should declare that it will not increase its rate of fissile production and will place additional non-military reactors under safeguards. This could potentially embolden Indian security by pressuring Pakistan and China to undertake comparable assurances.[34]

So as to not increase tensions and heighten Pakistani concerns that it is “indirectly preparing” to secure the weapons in an emergency and/or or a government collapse, the Obama Administration has been cautious in its public discussion on Pakistan’s arsenal. However, in November 2011, Gary Samore criticized Islamabad for seeking to block FMCT discussions, which, if concluded—and the treaty actually implemented—could seriously impede many states’ nuclear programs. But perhaps this extends back to the Washington deal that enables the U.S. to provide civilian nuclear fuel to India, which some Pakistani officials have argued has merely facilitated India’s ability to free up its homemade fuel and potentially produce new weapons. In this regard, Pakistan believes they have had no choice but to increase their own production and oppose any treaty that would cut into their capacity to compete with India’s arsenal. In a statement in December 2011, Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which oversees the arsenal, said that it would reject “any effort to undermine its strategic deterrence,” adding, “Pakistan will not be a party to any approach that is prejudicial to its legitimate national security interests.”[35] A spokesperson for the National Security Council, Tommy Vietor, maintained the diplomatic line by stating that President Obama was still “confident” about the security of Pakistani weapons and would “continue to encourage all nations to support the commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.”[36] In reality, however, in the year since such concerns were expressed, key Administration officials have attempted to move such efforts away from the CD and outside of Pakistani influence.[37]

If one is to subscribe to a pessimistic view, he or she would conclude that it could be years before a FMCT is completed—not to mention its actual entering into force. It is here that assertive action by the five original nuclear-weapon states should be undertaken in which an agreement by all states with facilities not subject to safeguards voluntarily suspend fissile material production and place stocks in excess of military requirements under IAEA inspection. While the Obama Administration has in many instances been forthright in its rhetoric, it needs to strengthen its “action leverage.” That is, the Administration and Congress should press for an investigation of the IAEA technical support programs in Pakistan, which undoubtedly have aided its bomb production program. For two decades, Pakistan has received extensive funding from the IAEA for operational upgrades and control systems for its safeguarded reactors, yet it has simultaneously been constructing and operating reactors of the same design outside safeguards for its military program. In essence, such steps if applied together could persuade Pakistan to relinquish its opposition to negotiations to halt the further production of nuclear weapon material and contribute to impeding the expensive and dangerous South Asian arms race.[38]

Recent U.S. intelligence assessments, however, have only reaffirmed that the required actions of the Administration may not be necessarily easy, given that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal has steadily increased since Obama came to office. For the Administration, the evaluation presents a direct challenge to a core pillar of its security policy of reducing nuclear stockpiles around the world. As articulated by a senior U.S. military official, “We’ve seen a consistent, constant build-up in their inventory, but it hasn’t been a sudden rapid rise… We’re very, very well aware of what they’re doing.”[39] White House officials share the assessment that the increase in actual weapons has been what one termed “slow and steady.”[40] However, as the above discussion illustrates, regardless of diplomatic rhetoric, it has been the production of nuclear material that has presented one of the greatest concerns to the Administration. Indeed, based on figures from the International Panel on Fissile Materials, experts say Pakistan has now produced sufficient material for 40 to 100 additional weapons—including a new class of plutonium bombs. If such figures are close to accurate, it places Pakistan on a level with some long-established nuclear powers.[41] As stated by Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer and the author of Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad, “…if not now, Pakistan will soon have the fifth largest nuclear arsenal in the world, surpassing the United Kingdom… and judging by the new nuclear reactors that are coming online and the pace of production, Pakistan is on a course to be the fourth largest nuclear weapons state in the world, ahead of France.”[42]

 

Reducing tensions

Aside from tension around the production of fissile material and the increasing Pakistani stockpile, U.S.-Pakistan relations took a downward turn in 2011 when it was revealed that the United States had kept Pakistani officials outside the operational proceedings to kill Osama bin Laden. Additionally, when U.S. forces killed 24 Pakistani military personnel in November (in what the United States described as a case of mistaken identity), Pakistan broke off high-level ties with the United States and launched a debate about new terms of engagement, including the sensitive issue of CIA drone strikes on targets inside Pakistani borders. While making no reference to the bin Laden raid nor the escalation of U.S. drone strikes, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani of Pakistan said he was pleased with Obama’s reference to sovereignty.[43] Overall, the meeting broke a four-month moratorium on direct upper level contact between the United States and Pakistan.[44]

Outside of tension surrounding fissile material, nuclear weapon development and “transgressions” of sovereignty, Pakistan  remains a key U.S. counterterrorism partner and its co-operation has been significant for drawing down the American-led war in neighboring Afghanistan. The diplomatic gesture by Obama in Seoul was no doubt an attempt by the President to resolve the Pakistan stand-off so as to re-open the movement of Afghanistan war supplies through Pakistan, as opposed to alternative routes through Central Asia. Likewise, the supply line through Pakistan will also be crucial in enabling the movement of equipment out of Afghanistan as the U.S. seeks to withdraw most of its combat forces by the end of 2014.[45] It is with this in mind that the Administration has had to undertake a policy of balance that somewhat enables it to inhibit excessive fissile material and nuclear weapon developments in Pakistan, but that also addresses pending and ongoing security issues pertaining to the concluding stage of the war in Afghanistan and broader security concerns of the South Asia region.

 

Conclusion

Since the 1998 Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, the international community has increased its focus on trying to reduce the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. The two states became precariously close to a full-fledged war in 1999 and 2002, and have since acknowledged some of the extreme dangers that could potentially arise and developed some risk reduction measures. Since the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan, as well as possible links between Pakistani nuclear scientists and sub-national groups, Pakistan has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. However, as this article has discussed, key security challenges for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal have related to maintaining the integrity of the command structure, improving physical security, and impeding illegitimate proliferation from insiders and sub-national actors. Moreover, as Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons and augment its weapons production facilities, as well as deploy additional delivery vehicles, together with the construction of additional nuclear reactors and expansion of its reprocessing capabilities, it is evident that plans to increase and improve its nuclear weapons arsenal will remain a firm component of its short-to-medium security agenda. With Pakistan’s domestic stability likely to continue on a rocky trajectory, the Obama Administration will increasingly need to assess and monitor the threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets in its policy response calculi. During a crisis, U.S. reliance on the extant assessments and their related flawed methodologies could lead to unnecessary and calamitous overreaction or tragic inaction.

For policy makers who have been concerned within the Obama Administration, the risk has expanded and the safety and security of nuclear weapons materials in Pakistan could very well be compromised or “extracted” at some point in the future. During the Bush Presidency and the Obama tenure, there have been demands by some policy makers and analysts to destroy, temporarily secure in place, or “exfiltrate” Pakistani nuclear assets—its nuclear weapons and fissile materials—should there be an excessive internal “event” or a governmental coup led by Islamist extremists. Conversely, policy optimists and those maintaining the diplomatic line have argued that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure is secure and the threat posed by terrorists is exaggerated and at times bordering on “alarmist.” Moreover, those who are more positive in their assessments argue that notions of vulnerability do not sufficiently take into account the implementation of various technical precautions and advances in Pakistan’s personnel reliability program. The policy that the Obama Administration has pursued has been both concerned and, at varying internals, optimistic.

It has had to consider, on the one hand, the pessimists’ assessments in which the “tipping point” of domestic instability would see some form of conflict and with that, the possible seizure of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. On the other hand, Obama has had to consider the positive view, perceived by some as a “torpid response to dynamic changes in Pakistan’s domestic milieu, [it] could facilitate military collusion with terrorists and [is] a disastrously slow Western reaction to an Islamist seizure of power in Pakistan.”[46] Only by means of thorough and robust threat assessments going beyond the limits of current threat assessments can American decision makers pursue policies that cogently address the threat posed by Pakistan’s growing nuclear infrastructure.[47] In essence, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are either on the verge of successful seizure by terrorists or they are secure. Based on the above discussion, neither the optimistic nor the concerned position is conclusively defensible. It is with this in mind that Obama will no doubt veer between both ends of the spectrum in trying to attain a balance that monitors Pakistani fissile development / stockpile expansion, while maintaining the geo-strategic imperative needed to end conflict in the region.

About the Author

Aiden Warren is a lecturer at Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies. His research interests are in the areas of International Relations, International Security, U.S. Foreign Policy, and nuclear proliferation and arms control.

Endnotes

1.  Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2011 67(91), available at <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/4/91>.

2. Charles D. Blair, Anatomizing Non-State Threats to Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure: The Pakistani

3. Neo-Taliban, Federation of American Scientists, Terrorism Analysis Report No. 1, June 2011, 1, available at <http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/Terrorism_Analysis_Report_1-lowres.pdf>.

4. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, Congressional Research Service report, February 13, 2013, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf>.

5. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, available at “Pakistan Nuclear Forces” FAS Blog, July 7 2011, <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/07/pakistannotebook.php>.

6. These estimates for kilograms of fissile material used per warhead are conservative; amounts may be less.

7. “Pakistan Holds User Trial of Nuke-Ready Missile,” Nuclear Security Initiative, November 28 2012, available at <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistan-holds-user-trial-nuke-ready-missile/>.

8. Palash R. Ghosh, “Pakistan Rapidly Expanding Nuclear Weapons Arsenal,” International Business Times, November 5 2012, available at <http://www.ibtimes.com/pakistan-rapidly-expanding-nuclear-weapons-arsenal-859260>.

9. Kerr and Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues.

10.  Ibid.

11. Michael Mullen, “Remarks by Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Town Hall, Los Angeles, September 22, 2008, available at <http://www.townhall-la.org/>.

12. Barack Obama, “President Obama’s 100th-Day Press Briefing transcript,” printed in The New York Times, April 29 2009, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/us/politics/29text-obama.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print>.

13.  Ibid.

14. Mark Toner quoted in Paul K. Kerr, and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, Congressional Research Service report, February 13 2013, 1, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf >.

15. Dennis Blair quoted in Kerr and Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 1.

16. Ronald L. Burgess, “World Wide Threat Assessment: Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,” Jr. Lieutenant General, US Army Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, March 10 2011, available at <http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2011-03-10.html>.

17. David H. Petraeus quoted Malik Qasim Mustafa, “Are Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Safe?” The Institute of Strategic Studies, 2009, available at, <http://www.issi.org.pk/old-site/ss_Detail.php?dataId=510>.

18. Peter Crail, Daniel Horner, and Daryl G. Kimball, “Pursuing the Prague Agenda: An Interview with White House Coordinator Gary Samore,” Arms Control Today, May 2011, available at <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_05/Samore>.

19.  Ibid.

20. “Interview with Pervez Musharraf,” Piers Morgan Tonight, CNN, May 26 2011.

21. Also see comments by David Albright in “Pakistan in Crisis: Interview with Benazir Bhutto,” CNN, November 5 2007, available at <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0711/05/sitroom.02.html>.

22. John D. Negroponte, “Democracy, Authoritarianism and Terrorism in Contemporary Pakistan,” House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, US Department of State, November 7 2007, available at <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/pakistan/State/94741.pdf>.

23. Donald M. Kerr, “Remarks by the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Soref Symposium, The Ritz Carlton , Washington DC, May 29 2008, available at <http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20080529_speech.pdf>.

24. Robert M. Gates, “Express TV Interview,” transcript on US Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), January 21 2010, available at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4542>.

25. Philip J. Crowley quoted in Kerr and Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons.

26. Michèle Flournoy, “Security and Stability in Pakistan: Developments in US Policy And Funding,” Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, April 29 2010, available at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg62161/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg62161.pdf.>

27. James Clapper quoted in Kerr and Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, 16-17.

28. Mattew Bunn quoted in Davide E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy,” The New York Times, January 31 2011, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/world/asia/01policy.html?pagewanted=all>.

29. Davide E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy,” The New York Times, January 31 2011, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/world/asia/01policy.html?pagewanted=all>.

30. Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, “The Prime Minister of Pakistan’s Speech on the Abbottabad Operation and the Death of Osama bin Laden,” Transcript, Centre for Research on Globalization, May 10 2011, available at <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=24701>.

31. A precise definition of the Pakistani Neo-Taliban (PNT) is elusive and will likely remain so. As regional expert Qandeel Siddique has observed, the word “Taliban” is being used “indiscriminately by the media, to describe just about any act of terrorism in Pakistan’s context.” The delineation of the PNT’s intra-group characteristics can also be achieved by highlighting the ebb and flow of alliances, hostilities, betrayals and competition for resources that exist between its component organizations. In some cases, elements of the PNT are principally  linked to the establishment of a Pashtun state, or emirate, in the Afghan Pakistani tribal areas—compelling violent actions to obtain full independence  from rulers in Islamabad, expel all NATO – International Security Assistance Forces [ISAF] and U.S. forces (henceforth  U.S.-led coalition) from Afghanistan, and  return a Taliban government to Kabul. Other elements of the PNT fundamentally seek to revoke the rights of Shi’ite and  Barelvi (i.e. Sufi) Muslims, and blunt and  roll back Indian influence in South and  Central Asia. Still others within the PNT  primarily endeavor to enforce their perception of Shāri‘a in all of Pakistan and, in some cases, may arguably seek to  establish a global caliphate.41 Despite these varied aspirations, collectively the  PNT can be seen as a violent, often Islamized network rooted in the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam, strongest in the south-central areas of Asia that historically have been beyond the yoke of centralized powers: what is today Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province [NWFP]), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), northern Balochistan, northern areas of the Punjab province, and sections of southern and eastern Afghanistan.

32. Blair, Anatomizing Non-State Threats to Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure, p. i

33. “Petraeus Sees Deal in South Waziristan,” Dawn, January 28, 2010. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/12-petraeus-sees-deal-in-south-waziristan-810–bi-08

34. [33] Ibid.

35.  Ibid.

36. “Pak Rejects Biased Policies Harmful to its National Security,” Daily Times, December 15 2010, available at <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010/12/15/story_15-12-2010_pg7_1>.

37. Tommy Vietor, quoted in Sanger and Schmitt, “Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy.”

38. Sanger and Schmitt, “Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy.”

39. Kimball, “Ending Pakistan’s Nuclear Addiction.”

40. Sanger and Schmitt, “Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy.”

41.  Ibid.

42.  Ibid.

43. Bruce Riedel quoted in Sanger and Schmitt, “Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy.”

44. Anne Gearan, “Obama: Pakistan-US Relations Strained, Balanced Approach Important,” The Huffington Post, July 22 2012, available at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/obama-pakistan-relations-strained_n_1381948.html>.

45.  Ibid.

46.  Ibid.

47. Charles P. Blair, “Fatwas for Fission: Assessing the Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets,” The Bulletin, November 11 2011, available at <http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/fatwas-fission-assessing-the-terrorist-threat-to-pakistans-nuclear-assets>.

48.  Ibid.