Un-Planning Development
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An Interview with William Easterly
YJIA: In The White Man’s Burden, you make a distinction between ‘Planners’ and ‘Searchers,’ dismissing planners as grand scale, one-stop-shop anti-poverty efforts that are inefficient and stifling at best, and pernicious and patronizing at worst. Why has the ‘Big Plan’ approach gained so much purchase in the West in recent years?
WE: Many people incorrectly think that the historical escapes from poverty were consciously planned by some leaders and experts at the top, whereas actually they happened spontaneously from below when societies allowed freedom for individual entrepreneurs, technological innovators, social reformers, and civic movements. Or even if they know this history, they think “spontaneous” development is too slow, and think that a Big Plan will speed things up. Unfortunately, the evidence fails to show any support for Big Plans speeding things up. They are either irrelevant distractions, or if taken too seriously, they slow things down (such as a lot of the state-centered approaches in Africa that failed for so long).
YJIA: Who are some of the searchers you most admire today? On balance, do you see more searchers or planners in positions of influence at present?
WE: I admire people like Mohammad Yunus and Santiago Levy, who discover new approaches, even though I don’t think microcredit or conditional cash transfers are panaceas. Planners of course would like to turn anything discovered by Searchers into exactly such a panacea and organize a Big Plan around it, and that has happened to some extent with microcredit being oversold. This is a sign amidst many other obvious ones that Planners still rule the roost in aid.
YJIA: How can aid agencies be re-structured around a searcher mentality? What would this look like? Is there real potential for serious reform or are practices too embedded?
WE: I am trying to change the mindset from “we already know the answer, just spend the money on pre-determined things” to “we’ve got to find things that work in each circumstance by trial and error.” The latter would require a more decentralized structure where loan officers had the power to adapt, as opposed to the current centralized structure that imposes the same “best practices” everywhere. Also, there would be a radically more power given to independent evaluators who give feedback, without which the trial and error approach obviously could not work.
YJIA: What do you say to those who argue that project-specific aid to disparate non-governmental organizations might exacerbate government dysfunction in poor countries? How would an aid landscape dominated by searchers avoid undermining the state?
WE: This question bedevils all aid approaches. I think it is easier to resolve for searchers because they have more modest goals – to just make some people better of – than planners, who seek to transform societies.
YJIA: In what ways can improved evaluation promote increased accountability among aid organizations? What have been the limits and shortcomings of evaluation approaches by Western aid agencies to date?
WE: The problem is not so much the technology of evaluation as it is the incentive to take evaluation seriously. If negative evaluations have no consequences for the aid agents, then there is no incentive to change and to fix problems. The political environment has to change so that evaluation does have consequences.
YJIA: In what ways, if any, is the academic debate on aid reform relevant to the field? Where can the lessons and suggestions generated in academia enter practice? What evidence do you see that academic critique is affecting the way that aid organizations operate?
WE: I am not so naïve (as some others) to think that politicians just follow research recommendations. I think politicians choose the development ideas that are most useful for them politically. However, politicians also respond to what the voters and influential interest groups want. I hope that the voters and interest groups are gradually getting more educated by the academic literature that aid money does not automatically reduce poverty, and they need to demand accountability in order for aid money to reach the poor.
YJIA: What are the essential questions that those interested in aid reform should be asking? What is your research agenda for the next generation of development economists and policymakers?
WE: We need to be getting more and more creative about systems of decentralized evaluation and more informal kinds of feedback on aid projects, taking into account the real challenges such systems face so that they are accurate and representative of beneficiaries. The internet and cell phones make such systems much more feasible now. Some NGOs are already experimenting, like my pals at globalgiving.com. As far as development research, I have a lot of interests there, but I think that’s a separate subject than aid reform.
YJIA: People have labeled you a pessimist and anti-aid. How do you respond?
WE: People are afraid that criticism of aid will destroy the support for funding aid. They should be more afraid that failing to address criticism will hinder increased support for aid.
YJIA: If you were appointed head of USAID tomorrow, what would be your top five priorities for reform (assuming that eliminating USAID is not an option)?
WE: Every aid organization should go through an exercise based on both internal review and consultation with evaluators and beneficiaries to figure out the areas in which the organization performs best and worst. Then it should eliminate its presence in what it does worst, and increase its specialization in what it does best. This sounds obvious, but the current political climate fosters a ridiculous lack of specialization in which USAID and every other aid agency are trying to do everything. Then, more items on the list for USAID: movement towards complete transparency on what its doing where, systematic evaluation of aid efforts with rewards for achieving good results for beneficiaries, eliminating tying of food aid and any other aid tying, and reducing dependence on “Beltway Bandit” contractors.
YJIA: Some say that recent global changes like the election of Barack Obama and the international financial crisis provide a unique opportunity for re-thinking aid. Do you agree?
WE: Not really. I don’t see how those events strengthened the hands of those demanding accountability. I think our work is still cut out for us to change the culture from “just spend the aid money and feel good” to “we won’t rest until we know the money has reached the poor.”