“We Don’t Wanna Put In:” A Case Study of Georgia at the 2009 Eurovision Song Contest

Vladimir Putin visiting the Olimpysky Stadium to survey the preparations for Eurovision-2009. Source: Government of the Russian Federation.

By Branson Gillispie

The 54th edition of the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC), which took place in Moscow after Russia took home the ESC trophy at the 2008 contest, was characterized in part by numerous controversies, including protests centered around Russia’s treatment of LGBTQ people. However, one of the most notable controversies that overshadowed the 2009 contest was the disqualification and withdrawal of the Georgian Eurovision entry, “We Don’t Wanna Put In” by Stephane & 3G. As the title not so subtly suggests, this controversy took place in the context of Putin’s invasion in August 2008, when Georgia lost a devastating and short war over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Six months later, after initially vowing to boycott the Russian-hosted edition of the ESC, the Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) reversed its decision to not compete and held a national selection contest, where the disco protest song was selected by nearly 70% of Georgians who tuned in to vote.[1] One month later, in March, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) rejected the Georgian entry over its not-so-subtle reference to then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.[2] This marked the first time in the contest’s history that a song would be banned for being too political and, despite the EBU’s ban, the Georgian case set the example for political protest against (Russian) authoritarianism within the ESC.[3]

As the ESC’s stated non-political status has been called into question by scholars and past events alike, and given that politics and protest have become fundamental components of the competition, the case of the 2009 Georgian Eurovision entry serves as an interesting case study of Eurovision as a body through which the politics of protest are materialized. While the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) did indeed disqualify Georgia for violating the contest’s non-political status, the Georgian case and the surrounding context of the banning serve as a lens through which to analyze the dynamics of politics and protest on an entertainment stage. Given the context surrounding the 2009 ESC, the ban itself was political, as will be discussed later in this paper. By exploring the context leading up to the contest and the intentions behind the song, this paper aims to explain the contentious politics underlying Georgia’s 2009 Eurovision entry and that Georgia’s disqualification actually helps to make the case that the non-political status of ESC is more complicated than the EBU would claim. Additionally, by looking at the tools of contentious politics through the works of other scholars (specifically scale shift and its associated mechanisms, event seizure, and creative resistance), this paper aims to demonstrate the protest nature of the 2009 ESC Georgian entry. But what are the tools of contentious politics found within the Georgian case? By defining the work of other scholars of contentious politics and applying these themes to other examples of ESC protest, the following section sets up the tools for analyzing the Georgian case.

Song and Literature

Sidney Tarrow defines contentious politics as “what happens when collective actors join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents around their claims or the claims of those they claim to represent.”[4] He goes on to extrapolate this definition to state actors, which are traditionally outside the “subject of ‘social movements.’”[5] The latter part of this definition, concerning confrontation with opponents around their claims and the inclusion of states as actors in contentious politics, is particularly relevant to the Georgian case (and most other examples of contentious politics at the ESC). Eurovision has had an inherently political component since the competition’s very inception. “The path taken through ESC was the encouraging of a trans-national European identity creation, first of all through the chance of imagining a community.”[6] However, Spaziante interestingly argues that the ESC does not cultivate this idealized transnational identity; instead, the ESC “tends to reproduce individual national oppositions and local belonging,” indicating that national identities and oppositions are central to the competition’s structure.[7] This makes sense — the entries in the ESC are often more representative of their state as a whole than an individual artist. Thus, the entire competition is inherently framed as a web of oppositions between competing states, which naturally draws politics to the surface. Additionally, it is essential to keep in mind that the ESC viewership often views each entry as an extension of the state for which they represent. While the entries are selected as artists, they are viewed as states, and this is why people watch the contest. As O’Connor states, “It’s why governments now see Eurovision as a tool of cultural diplomacy. It’s why it provokes such strong political reactions.”[8] Indeed, all entries are selected by a national broadcaster, for which most are state-owned – or state-influenced – broadcasters. This environment makes it easier for states through their representing artists and national broadcasters to engage in contentious politics.

The idea of “scale shift” is one mechanism that is particularly relevant to both the Georgian case and other ESC entries engaging in contentious politics. Tarrow defines this term as when “contention diffuses to different levels of the polity, where actors encounter a different set of incentives and constraints, sometimes even spreading to other states or to international institutions.” Outside of the Eurovision context, Tarrow highlights the United States' example of the Southern States segregating school systems and the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations sending federal troops, diffusing a regional dispute into a national debate on civil rights.[9] Additionally, Hank Johnston adds to this discussion, stating that “because resistant episodes of contention start small (...) a shift to larger scale where contention is openly transgressive [sic] is an essential process,” highlighting the need for protest events to diffuse to a larger scale and become more defiant of norms to be effective.[10] Numerous European entries, especially from Ukraine, have attempted to diffuse more local and national issues to the ESC’s international stage, which is watched by more than 100 million people yearly. Tony Wesolowsky highlights several entries that attempted to diffuse their contentious politics, such as Ukraine’s 2016 entry and winner of that year’s contest “1944” by Jamala. The song, with lyrics referencing the Soviet deportation of more than 240,000 Crimean Tatars, was seen by many – Russia included – as a “thinly veiled swipe at Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and subsequent treatment of Crimean Tatars on the peninsula.”[11] While Ukraine continued its military struggle with Russia, Jamala leveraged her song as a scale shift mechanism, elevating a chilling message of defiance of Russia to the Eurovision stage. Johnston also goes on to describe another element of scale shifting: event seizures. He defines event seizures as:

“Protest actions that rely on the risk taking of a few activists and the spontaneous participation of bystanders who are not initiated into the action but whose support is assumed (...) represent[ing] both an upward shift in the scale of transgressive contention and presume broader actor constitution among the general population.”[12]

Event seizure has occurred several times at the ESC. While not coming from an ESC entry itself, but the LGBTQ movement more broadly, the 2014 ESC saw a very noticeable act of protest. Amid the backdrop of Russia’s annexation of Crimea a few months earlier and the introduction of anti-LGBTQ legislation, audience members engaged in event seizure both during the Russian entry’s performance and also at the mention of Russia. During the live voting process, as Russia received its points, audience members disrupted the process with excessive booing, bringing the 17-year-old artists to tears. Additionally, audience members unfurled pride flags during the performance, at times obscured camera shots.[13][14] LGBTQ activism is not uncommon at Eurovision, and this particular event saw activists engage in resistance tactics and the spontaneous participation of fellow audience members. 

By its very nature as a music competition, the ESC has also witnessed examples of creative resistance. Lisel Hintz states that “television, music, film, and other forms of popular culture serve as a powerful site in which state-society relations are produced, contested, and transformed” and that “[c]atchy and creative presentation of dissent can grab otherwise disinterested citizens’ attention, crystallizing grievances in an easily relatable and emotionally charged lyric or image.”[15] As shown with Ukraine's 2016 entry, Jamala’s lyrics and the story behind the song embodied the grievances of the resistors of the 2014 Crimean annexation and, since then, has become a Ukrainian symbol of dissent and defiance of Russian aggression. Additionally, Hintz states, “the words and images of pop culture content are particularly well suited to convey subtle references to salient grievances that evoke emotion—whether humour, rage, empathy, or some other feeling.”[16] Within the song’s lyrics, Jamala sings, “When strangers are coming / They come to your house / They kill you all / and say / We’re not guilty.”[17] These words in the opening section of the song certainly evoked a range of emotions as Ukraine would go on to win the contest, and “1944” became both a song of grievance protest and a Eurovision winner. The Georgian case, however, is unique. Not only did Stephane & 3G’s “We Don’t Wanna Put In” not win the contest, it wasn’t even allowed to compete. The next section of this paper examines the context surrounding the Georgian entry, showing how the EBU’s decision to ban the song was itself political, before analyzing the Georgian song. 

From Georgia With Love

The 2008 ESC, which took place in Belgrade, Serbia, saw the Russian entry “Believe” by Dima Bilan take home the Eurovision trophy. This gave Russia the opportunity to host the 2009 edition of the contest, which would take place in Moscow. During this time, EU-Russian relations, while not the best, could be characterized as an “‘up and down pattern” that would continue until 2012.[18] In August 2008, three months after winning the ESC, Russia invaded Georgia, sparking Europe’s first twenty-first-century war. Indeed, the international community’s response was relatively muted, with Peter Dickinson writing for the Atlantic Council that Moscow suffered “few negative consequences. On the contrary, EU leaders led calls for a ceasefire that appeared to favor Russian interests.”[19] While the EBU and the EU are two separate organizations and the EU does not organize or control the EBU, the EBU is comprised of various European state broadcasters over which the various EU governments hold some influence. While this is not to say that EU foreign policy directly affects EBU decisions or that the EBU ban was a direct result of positive EU-Russian relations, there does seem to be some overlap in EU-Russia relations with the EBU decision to ban the Georgian entry as the months after the 2008 war “gave way to a new improvement in [EU-Russian] relations.”[20]

As stated previously, following the war, in 2009, Georgia selected the song “We Don’t Wanna Put In” by Stephane & 3G to be sent to Moscow. The EBU would reject this entry on the basis of breaching the ESC’s rules on political statements.[21] While this alone would seemingly disprove this paper’s claim that the ESC’s non-political status is more complicated, the political context surrounding the 2009 ESC suggests that the ban had political undertones. Possibly due to the competition being held in Russia, the EBU was more sensitive to Georgia’s politically-charged lyrics. If the contest had been held elsewhere and not within Russia, would the Georgian entry have sparked as much controversy? Indeed, the 2007 Ukrainian entry “Dancing Lasha Tumbai” featured lyrics that, when sung, sounded as if the artist was saying, “I want to see Russia goodbye.” This song had a similar message but was not banned and came second in the 2007 ESC, hosted in Finland.[22] While this paper can not answer this question, it can certainly raise it. Additionally, future songs such as “1944,” “Stefania,” and “Heart of Steel” (all Ukrainian entries) took swipes at Russia either through their messaging or the context surrounding them and were not banned by the EBU. 

Scholars have noted that bans often can be political, as doing so often comes with an agenda. Hintz highlights the banning of certain reality TV shows under Erdoğan’s AKP party rule in Turkey as the party pursued its agenda.[23] In considering the EBU’s ban on Georgia’s entry, it is crucial to consider the decision’s political ramifications and any potential agendas that it may appeal to. As already mentioned, the contest’s location in Russia undoubtedly caused external pressures on the EBU to prevent such a song from entering the competition. With the past success of “Dancing Lasha Tumbai” in 2007, it could be construed that the EBU would want to avoid a similar situation from occurring in the Russian capital.[24] Additionally, Georgian authorities claim that the EBU was under explicit pressure from the Kremlin, although the EBU denies such accusations.[25] Regardless of whether Russia directly or indirectly coerced the EBU to ban the Georgian entry, there was still obvious pressure to do so. 

As this paper shifts into its analysis of the Georgian case, it should also be noted that, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EBU decided to ban Russia from competing at the ESC 2022.[26] All of this serves to highlight how the ESC becomes an event for political protest and contentious politics while helping to assert this paper’s claim that the ESC banning of the 2009 Georgian entry does not negate the complicated nature of the ESC’s stated non-political status, but rather adds to it. The next section of this paper aims to explain the contentious politics underlying Georgia’s 2009 Eurovision entry by analyzing the song and the artists themselves. 

We Don’t Want Putin

After the EBU announced that the Georgian entry violated the ESC rules, it offered Georgia the opportunity to either change the lyrics of “We Don’t Wanna Put In” or select another song. The Georgian delegation responded by claiming their obvious swipe at Vladimir Putin contained no political statements; rather, it was just a disco-pop song. Following this refusal to alter the song, the EBU banned the Georgian entry.[27] Despite the delegation’s initial claims, it is clear that the song was intended as a protest response to the Russo-Georgian War. 

Looking at the lyrics, during the chorus, the artists sing, “We Don’t Wanna Put In / The negative move / It’s killin’ the groove’ / Imma try to shoot in / Some disco tonight / To boogie with you.”[28] Furthermore, when the artists sing the line “Imma try to shoot in,” it noticeably sounds as if they are saying “Imma try to shoot Him” about Putin. To reinforce this idea, the choreography of this disco jam has the artists raise their hands to their heads while making a “finger gun” gesture before dropping to the floor.[29] The next verse is seemingly a mockery of Russian propaganda, followed by a defiant transition back into the chorus, as it states, “So many people are whining / They’re freakin’ all day long / Their bitchin’ will last forever / And ever, and ever… / You better change your perspective / Your life won’t be outta luck / A groovy sun will be rising / Be rising, it’s rising…”[30] As they sing these lyrics, the lone man of the group walks over the bodies of the other three artists lying on the ground, perhaps as a nod to the war. The third verse features the lyric, “I like all Europe countries and I love Europa,” an overt call towards the Europeanization of Georgia as they attempt to leave the shadow of Russia.[31] Lastly, in the song's closing act, the artists chant “Put In” before pointing another “finger gun” directly into the camera and singing “Don’t Wanna Put In” before raising their hands to mimic a gesture that appears to be a Nazi salute. The song then closes out with another chorus while the artists make a shushing gesture to reference the not-so-hidden message within the song.[32] Using subversive song lyrics and choreography as tools of creative resistance, the Georgian case demonstrates that “mocking the oppressive regime is not only possible but also cool” as this paper’s analysis of the over-the-top disco beat proves.[33]

Despite originally claiming that the song was non-political, the male singer of the group, Stefane Mgebrishvili, explained the band’s reasoning for releasing the song, stating that “[w]e are not politicians, but we are patriots; we love our country. When you hear bombs going off in your country you have to say something. This song was our little protest.”[34] While the band was denied from engaging in event seizure by singing on the Eurovision stage, they were able to cast a shadow over the Russian-hosted ESC. The song charted in the UK and was played on the radio in several European countries, a popularity many Eurovision songs fail to reach.[35] Johnston notes that “Event seizures are important in the developing antiauthoritarian opposition” and that “it is common that a handful of performers acquire oppositional stature by virtue of veiled regime criticism in their songs.”[36] This is undoubtedly what the Georgian case had attempted to do. Through this scale shift from a Georgian issue to the broader European music market, Georgia was able to punch above its weight in its protest of the 2008 Russian invasion, especially at a time when Russia was becoming a global pariah.[37] Whether they achieved this goal is beyond the scope of this paper. Still, it does serve to highlight the protest nature of the Georgian entry as well as provide an understudied case for contentious politics at Eurovision. 

Closing Act

As the Georgian case study has shown, contentious politics remains a fundamental part of the Eurovision Song Contest. Even if the Georgian entry did not perform at Eurovision, it is still a part of the contest’s history. This paper has sought to explain the contentious politics underlying Georgia’s 2009 Eurovision entry and, in doing so, made the case that the non-political status of ESC is more complicated than it would seem. While scholars have studied some Eurovision entries (primarily Ukraine in relation to Russia), the Georgian case highlights the value of studying the ESC as a geopolitical arena for political protest and other political acts within popular culture. In doing so, scholars and activists alike can learn from the tactics and understand how these entries might affect the people who enjoy them, all while engaging with the event’s cultural and artistic value. 

As previously mentioned, Ukraine, within the context of the ESC, often finds creative means of resistance in the face of Russian aggression. Additionally, many Eastern European and other post-Soviet states have submitted entries with themes and messages of protest aimed towards Russia. However, this fusion of music and creative resistance can and should be used as an effective and meaningful opposition tool in other contexts, such as LGBTQ activism in Russia or pro-democracy opposition to Putin. Perhaps, this case study of the Georgian ESC entry can be an inspiration for other activists and artists alike to engage in creative resistance against not only Russian aggression but authoritarian repression across the world.


About the author

Branson Gillispie is a Master of Arts in International Relations candidate at Johns Hopkins School of Advance Intentional Studies (SAIS). His academic interests fall under governance, politics, and society across Europe and Eurasia, particularly about nationalism, identity, and conflict.


Endnotes

  1. Luke Harding, “Georgian Eurovision Entry Takes A Swipe at Putin,” The Guardian, February 19, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/music/2009/feb/19/georgia-eurovision-putin.

  2. Judith Crosbie, “Georgia’s Eurovision Entry Rejected,” POLITICO, March 10, 2009, https://www.politico.eu/article/georgias-eurovision-entry-rejected/.

  3. Alexandra Topping, “South Ossetia on Our Minds … The Georgians Who Fell Foul of Eurovision,” The Guardian, May 10, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/music/2009/may/10/georgia-vladimir-putin-song-eurovision.  

  4. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge University Press: 2011.

  5. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 4.

  6. Lucio Spaziante, “‘So Disarmingly European’: Eurovision Song Contest and the European Identity,” in Images of Europe: The Union Between Federation and Separation, eds. Francesco Mangiapane and Tiziane Migliore (Springer:2021), 188.

  7. Spaziante, “‘So Disarmingly European’,” 190.

  8. Robert O’Connor, “A Brief History of Eurovision Being a Political Hot Mess,” VICE, May 18, 2021, https://www.vice.com/en/article/akgv9j/eurovision-2021-brief-history-of-eurovisions-worst-political-disputes

  9. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 193. 

  10. Hank Johnston, “‘Let’s Get Small’: The Dynamics of (Small) Contention in Repressive States,” Mobilization: An International Journal 11, no. 2 (2006): 197. 

  11. Tony Wesolowsky, “Politics Creep into Eurovision Despite Efforts to Keep It Camp,” RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, May 16, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/eurovision-jamala-overly-political-controversy/27739159.html. 

  12. Johnston, “‘Let’s Get Small’,” 205.

  13. William Lee Adams, “How a ‘Propaganda War’ Overtook Eurovision, the World’s Most Inclusive Song Competition,” Billboard, June 8, 2017, https://www.billboard.com/music/features/eurovision-propaganda-war-feature-7824750/

  14. European Broadcasting Union, “Eurovision Song Contest 2014 – Grand Final – Full Show,” filmed May 2014 at Eurovision Song Contest Grand Final, Copenhagen, Denmark, video, 2:45:21, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m8ACe_PKx14. 

  15. Lisel Hintz, “The Empire’s Opposition Strikes Back: Popular Culture as Creative Resistance Tool Under Turkey’s AKP,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 48, no. 1 (2021): 28, 30, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2021.1885849. 

  16. Hintz, “The Empire’s Opposition,” 30.

  17. Eurovision Song Contest, “Jamala - 1944 - 🇺🇦 Ukraine - Grand Final - Eurovision 2016,” filmed May 2016 at The Eurovision Song Contest Grand Final, Stockholm, Sweden, video, 0:18, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-rnM-MwRHY. 

  18. Maria Lipman, “How Russia Has Come to Loathe the West,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2015, https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_russia_has_come_to_loathe_the_west311346/. 

  19. Peter Dickinson, “The 2008 Russo-Georgian War: Putin’s Green Light,” Atlantic Council, August 7, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/.

  20. Lipman, “Russia.”

  21. Crosbie, “Georgian Eurovision Entry.”

  22. Topping, “South Ossetia.”

  23. Hintz, “The Empire’s Opposition,” 35.

  24. Topping, “South Ossetia.”

  25. Harding, “A Swipe at Putin.”

  26. “EBU Statement on Russia in the Eurovision Song Contest 2022,” European Broadcasting Union, February 25, 2022, https://www.ebu.ch/news/2022/02/ebu-statement-on-russia-in-the-eurovision-song-contest-2022. 

  27. Reuters, “Georgia Pulls Out of Eurovision Over ‘Put In’ Song,” Reuters, March 11, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52A4S9/.  

  28. Stephane and 3G, “We Don’t Wanna Put In,” filmed February 18, 2009 at 2009 GPB National Selection, Tbilisi, Georgia, 0:31, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5P6-7Rw4xug. 

  29. Ibid.

  30. Stephane and 3G,  “We Don’t Wanna Put In,” 0:50. 

  31. Stephane and 3G, “We Don’t Wanna Put In,” 1:52.

  32. Stephane and 3G, “We Don’t Wanna Put In,” 2:04.

  33. Hintz, “The Empire’s Opposition,” 30.

  34. Topping, “South Ossetia.”

  35. Ibid.

  36. Johnston, “‘Let’s Get Small’,” 205.

  37. Lipman, “Russia.”


Disclaimer

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the editors or the journal.