Changing Policy for a Changing Climate: The Social Implications of Rapid Glacial Recession in Peru

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Cordillera Blanca, Peru

By Peter Oesterling

As anthropogenic climate change alters the world’s ecosystems, one effect has been glacial recession across the Andes, the Himalayas, the Alps, and the Rocky Mountains. These glaciers have been receding at an alarming pace since the mid-1900s, and many are projected to disappear completely within this century—creating profound consequences for the communities and businesses that depend on these watersheds.

With the majority of Earth’s tropical glaciers, Peru is an epicenter for glacial recession. Most of Peru’s glaciers are concentrated in the Cordillera Blanca range of the Peruvian Andes. Meanwhile, the majority of Peru’s population occupies the arid coast west of the Andean slope and relies heavily on glacial meltwater for domestic consumption, crop cultivation, hydroelectric power production, and mineral extraction.

In Peru, population growth, large irrigation projects, rising energy demands, agricultural land expansion, and increased mining claims engender competition over diminishing water resources. With the addition of marginalized indigenous communities, Peru faces the risk of major conflict that would not be unprecedented in the country’s history.

The United States and the international community can play important roles in helping Peru adapt to this growing multidimensional challenge. Peru offers an early view of the challenges mountainous regions worldwide may face in coming decades. The country—if successful—may also provide the world a model for effective policies to mitigate threats to environmental and human security.

The Importance of Glaciers 

Glaciers originate from accumulations of snow and ice—the melt from which flows down mountain slopes. Partial glacial melting in the Andes provides essential water to the surrounding ecosystems and human populations. The recent snow cover is the first to melt, and, ideally, any mass lost through melting in the dry season regenerates during the wet season via accumulated precipitation that remains frozen at the Andes’ high altitudes.

However, if the glacier is in recession, the snow that has built up over prior years melts too. Eventually, melting ice may be thousands of years old. The mass balance in any given year is the direct, short-term response to the annual atmospheric conditions, while continued glacial advancing or retreating over time is a long-term response to changes in climate.[1]

Glacial meltwater is the primary contributor to Andean watersheds with changes in glacial mass increasing or decreasing annual river flows. The Cordillera Blanca glaciers’ downward flows create freshwater lakes, rivers, and streams that serve the human settlements in the valleys below. These glaciers have supported Andean societies for millennia, and today they sustain nearly 1.8 million people in the Rio Santa river basin.[2][3]

The dry Andean valleys depend on the annual glacial runoff to maintain their extensive mountain ecosystems. Glaciers regulate freshwater flow, assuring human populations have adequate resources year-round for agriculture, potable water, power generation, and ecosystem integrity—even when precipitation is limited. Cyclical glacial expansion and recession is thus essential to human existence—acting as the surrounding region’s freshwater insurance policy.

However, when glacial melting falls out of equilibrium and into a state of constant recession, water availability varies greatly—creating both flooding and water scarcity. As the glaciers melt, their surrounding watersheds reach “peak water discharge,” providing an illusion of water abundance. Once peak water passes, water availability decreases markedly—first with increased variability of discharge and followed by the end of glacial influence entirely.[4] A recent study found that seven out of nine watersheds in the Cordillera Blanca are already past “peak water” due to rapid glacial recession.[5] For example, the Rio Santa, the second largest river on Peru’s Pacific coast, has already reached its glacial water peak and is now decreasing in annual discharge.[6]

The 71 percent of Earth’s tropical glaciers that are in Peru have lost more than 22 percent of their combined surface area since the early 1980s.[7] This loss could service the total water needs of Lima—a city of some nine million people—for 10 years.[8] Many of the Cordillera Blanca’s glaciers receded by 25 percent or more since 1970 and are projected to disappear by 2050.[9][10] This recession correlates to increasing temperatures since 1951 largely caused by anthropogenic fossil fuel use.[11][12]

Increasing Demands 

In Peru, glacial recession and decreased water security are paired with increased demand from a growing population, energy generation needs, agricultural production, and mining.

Population growth, particularly in urban centers, strains limited water resources. More than 20 million Peruvians live on the semi-arid coast where only two percent of the nation’s water reserves exist—and the population is projected to grow, making access to freshwater a primary concern.[13]

Figure 1 shows Peru’s historical and forecasted rapid population growth, driven by growth in urban centers.

Figure 1: International Futures Version 7.08 [14]

Peru also depends heavily on hydroelectricity, which provides the country with 80 percent of its power.[15] If glacial water disappeared, the Cañon del Pato plant on the Rio Santa—which provides energy for millions of households, as well as industry and agriculture—would lose nearly 40 percent of its electrical generation capability.[16] The looming threat is so severe that stakeholders have broached the idea of energy rationing, despite its estimated $1.5 billion in annual costs.[17]

Growing populations also demand more food. Peru has allocated increased land and water to crop production. The Department of Ancash—which includes the Rio Santa and the majority of Peru’s glaciers—increased cultivated land from 46,000 hectares in 1995 to 353,000 hectares in 2000.[18] Ancash is no exception; this trend exists across coastal departments.[19] Land and water use for agriculture have increased to meet Peru’s crop demand, which is expected to grow alongside increased production in the coming decades, as seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: International Futures Version 7.08 [20]

In addition to increased land use, Peru is getting more from land already used for agricultural production. Peru’s history of increasing agricultural land use efficiency is expected to continue as demonstrated in Figure 3. Increased land use efficiency means inputs, including water inputs. Intensive irrigation projects from glacially fed rivers have been used to increase crop yields.

Figure 2 and Figure 3 assume Peru will have adequate water supply to maintain growth in production and yield per hectare without improvements in water efficiency.

Figure 3: International Futures Version 7.08[21]

Peru’s largest water irrigation project, Chavimochic, in La Libertad relies on the Rio Santa as well.[22] Chavimochic aims to bring 70,000 hectares of desert landscape under irrigation and improve an additional 74,000 hectares. It also looks to generate electricity and provide potable water to Trujillo, Peru’s third largest city.[23] Chavimochic is projected to export $1.4 billion in agricultural goods, making its development a priority.[24] Yet, expanding arable land will be unsustainable if the annual discharge of glacially-dependent rivers, such as the Rio Santa, continue on their current trajectory and experiences supply fluctuations.

Mining and mineral processing operations also demand crucial water resources. Mineral sector liberalization under President Fujimori fostered a mining boom in which claims increased from four million hectares to 22 million hectares—11 percent of the country—between 1992 and 2008.[25][26][27] Extraction technologies consume significant volumes of water and discharge contaminated water as a process byproduct.[28][29]

Figure 4 shows Peru’s rapid increase in mining since the early 1990s and the overlap between the concessions and essential watersheds.

Figure 4: Bebbington and Rogan, 2012 [30]

Peru’s trends in water use and supply are incompatible. Glacially-fed rivers are already at emergency levels—insufficient for the country’s agricultural and hydroelectric demands during the dry season.[31] The major coastal cities of Lima and Trujillo face serious long-term water supply needs associated with population growth. Mining concessions now cover over 30 percent of their watersheds, contaminating parts of the remaining water supply.[32] With many parties vying for access to increasingly scarce water, conflict is a likely outcome.

Peru’s Conflict-Prone Development and Environmental Governance

To comprehend glacial recession’s true effect on Peru, one must understand the country’s existing socio-environmental issues. Historically, Peru engaged in extensive social exclusion—repeatedly limiting its indigenous populations’ access to land and water in the name of economic development. The linkage between social exclusion and economic development ties directly to Peru’s mining industry.

Peruvian water governance already embeds exclusionary forces—ones glacial loss will further amplify. Since these decisions create access deprivation and discontent with the government among certain communities in Peru, water governance also fuels societal conflict.

Andean water users’ vulnerability to climate change relates not only to water scarcity but also to societal equity.[33] Peru’s 2009 Water Resources Law defines water as national property and recognizes indigenous communities’ water rights, but also grants the state purview over water license distribution.[34] Historically, the state’s control of the licensure process has perpetuated inequality and stoked competition over scarce water resources.

Peru’s governance practices exclude local populations from the decision-making process, which happens on a regional and national scale.[35] In conjunction with the 2009 Water Law, the National Water Authority was established to integrate water management from municipal, to regional and national levels. However, the legislation’s administrative framework barely considers highland community water systems. Although local water associations and committees exist, there is no institutional channel for interaction with other water users downstream.[36] Therefore, systems are not easily adapted to local intervention.

The mining industry is the epicenter of tension over Peruvian water allocation. Peruvian law does not prohibit mining development at glacial headwaters, enabling mining companies to be the initial consumers of these valuable water sources.[37] The industry’s history of contamination compounds glacial recession’s effects on available clean water resources. Water monitoring studies for the Rio Santa found high levels of mining contaminants such as arsenic, cadmium, copper, cyanide, iron, lead, manganese, mercury, and zinc—levels that exceed Peruvian water quality standards for human, animal, and agricultural consumption.[38][39] With a third of Peru’s mining claims in watersheds above 4,000 meters, and 58 percent above 3,000 meters, mining affects downstream water availability.[40]

Water contamination results from inadequate constraints on, and oversight of, the mining industry’s environmental impact. The Peruvian government created a new institution under the Ministry of Environment (MINAM) called the National Service of Environmental Certification for Sustainable Investments (SENACE)—which manages environmental impact assessments (EIAs) for national projects with potentially significant environmental impacts.[41] However, this agency oversees neither smaller projects nor claims established before SENACE’s creation.[42] The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) grants concessions to, and oversees, all other mining projects—permitting operators to sidestep water quality regulations, and thus aggravating conflict and competition over clean water access.[43][44] This system fails to support local livelihoods and the environment.

Existing enforcement mechanisms have proven ineffective at improving water quality. After the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) displayed ongoing reluctance to enforce water quality standards, in 2010, Peru transferred environmental oversight for mines to the Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (OEFA).[45][46][47] Despite this transition in power, OEFA has little funding and staff, and therefore lacks the capacity to carry out its mandate.[48] Local stakeholder accounts support this conclusion, noting that contamination still occurs due to lack of monitoring.[49] Insufficient oversight over the mining sector exacerbates Peru’s clean water scarcity.

If the mining industry continues to hold development rights in the headwaters of watersheds while shirking accountability for environmental contamination, water quality and availability for all downstream users is compromised. Social exclusion creates a state of relative deprivation for the human population downstream in favor of mining industry interests. While this inequity does not singularly determine conflict, it establishes a political arena conducive to it.[50]

On Thin Ice: The Historical Precedent for Violence and Socio-Environmental Conflict

Peru’s history of civil conflict makes diminishing glacial water even more pertinent. According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru, the Sendero Luminoso revolutionary movement of the 1980s and 1990s claimed between 61,000 and 77,500 lives.[51] The movement started in the Andean highlands, and it rallied around inequitable land rights and abject poverty, and was never completely defeated.[52][53] Water inequality exacerbated by glacier loss could produce similar escalatory violence, particularly since the Sendero movement based its message on its lack of access to productive lands and economic opportunity.

Water pollution, scarcity, and access drive most socio-environmental conflict in Peru, with glacial headwaters often at the center.[54] Lake Conococha, the Rio Santa’s headwaters in the Cordillera Blanca, was the source of a massive protest in 2010 by farming communities and urban water users. They rallied against a mining permit that would have allowed the lake to be used for mineral exploration. Protestors shut down the highway from Lima to Huaraz for days amidst police violence, because they feared the operation would contaminate the river for all users downstream.[55]

Lake Paron provides another example of local communities clashing with a major industry over water distribution control. In 2008, the Cruz de Mayo campesino community blocked access to the lake over a dispute with the Cañon del Pato hydroelectric plant, which managed the flow of water downstream. The plant operators made water available at the wrong times of day and at speeds to rapid for irrigation—causing serious erosion damage to community lands and leaving insufficient water for municipalities.[56]

The conflicts over Lake Conococha and Lake Paron represent an increasing trend in social unrest between local communities, police, and the mining industry that too often results in death. In 2007, the Peruvian ombudsman’s office recorded 37 socio-environmental-related conflicts, with 33 related to mining; by 2013, it recorded 139 socio-environmental-related conflicts, with 104 related to mining.[57][58] These numbers indicate that freshwater contamination from mining relates closely to significant instances of social conflict—setting a troubling precedent for future conflict over water governance.[59] Locals near the Cordillera Blanca expect these conflicts only to increase further as water resources continue to decline.[60]

The propensity for civic action bespeaks a lack of faith in governance structures to adequately represent local community interests both upstream and downstream. Peru’s history of marginalizing its Andean population spurs animosity towards the state. If diminished clean water due to glacial recession exacerbates competition for those resources, local communities may turn to violence—perpetuating conflict among themselves, large industry, and government authorities.

The Way Forward

Rapid glacial recession’s potential to inflame existing water allocation tensions necessitates action. Peru must simultaneously adapt to less water from the Andes as a “new normal”, while assuaging discontent over clean water access.

Numerous projects within the Peruvian government and throughout the international community attempt to address this issue. In 2010, the Peruvian government developed a National Adaptation Plan for Climate Change and recently implemented some adaptation measures in the Rio Santa basin. However, these measures are limited to information gathering, research, and capacity building for glacier-related natural disasters.[61] Similarly, Peru also participated in a joint development venture with Bolivia and Ecuador, which concluded in 2012. The project aimed to strengthen ecosystem resilience, promote sustainable land-use practices, and advocate less water-intensive economic activities; however, the project extended only to two river sub-basins.[62]

Peru is taking action through these and other projects, but the government lacks either the scope or scale to address this multidimensional challenge. According to USAID, “there is a strong need to develop and strengthen institutions at different levels of government, which in turn will help build their capacities for enhanced climate change research and action.”[63] Therefore, institutional reform is critical to overall success of any adaptation project, since glacial recession will reshape the foundation of Peru’s water allocation dynamics.

Institutional reform can help instill resilience in populations at high risk of bearing the effects of glacial recession. By fully implementing the National Water Authority and the 2009 Water Law mechanisms, Peru can better integrate local participation in the water allocation decision-making process and coordinate between upstream and downstream users.

In addition, there must be accountability regarding mining operations’ water contamination. One way to achieve this would be by transferring all EIA responsibilities to SENACE to eliminate any potential sectoral privilege that could exist for granting mining concessions. In addition, Peru must strengthen OEFA’s capacity to monitor and enforce regulations and, more generally, to carry out its mandate as Peru’s environmental regulatory body. These measures would allow local communities greater government representation and could ultimately mitigate conflict emerging from a decline in clean water resources.

The measures listed above would help address some institutional shortcomings for Peruvian water scarcity induced by mass glacial recession. While improved water dispersion could reduce conflicts borne of institutional shortcomings, it does not address rapid glacial recession and the loss of glaciers as fresh water storage reservoirs. To help utilize remaining glaciers, Peru could increase freshwater storage capacity. The Peruvian government should explore the possibility of building manmade contingency water reservoirs for public access to ensure adequate freshwater storage for the future. The reservoirs’ construction would be contingent upon a thorough investigation of environmental impact; however, the costs of building them may outweigh the impact of mass glacial freshwater storage loss.

Other strategies to create freshwater storage could also include alpine wetland remediation and conservation. Building upon the joint venture with Bolivia and Ecuador to promote efficient water use, there could be a push to help the growing coastal population do more with less. This could be achieved by mandating more efficient irrigation, agricultural, and domestic consumption practices, as well as by utilizing improved technologies. These measures could be financed through the government, though such comprehensive action would also benefit from the support of additional actors.

The United States’ influence as a neighbor, ally, and business partner in Latin America spans over a century. This ongoing influence provides an opportunity for the United States to support Peru as it faces unprecedented challenges from climate change. At the UN 2014 Climate Summit, President Obama said, “We are the first generation to feel the impact of climate change, and the last generation that can do something about it […] we have a special responsibility to lead, it’s what big nations have to do.”[64] Peru’s rapid glacial recession and growing socio-environmental conflict justify putting this discourse into action. USAID has worked in Peru since 1961, and its history and mandate qualify it to assist Peru in addressing the challenges of climate change.[65] USAID is the best and most immediate vehicle for this type of U.S.-Peru collaboration.

Although USAID is making an effort, in conjunction with the Peruvian government, in some highland communities to implement measures for populations to adapt to glacial recession, its program distribution disproportionately favors the Amazonian region. All five of USAID’s priority departments are in the Amazon, and the region also receives 80 percent of the agency’s environmental program funding.[66] Yet, two of USAID’s three objectives for Peru pertain to natural resource governance and management and could address the glacial recession problem.[67] These objectives include increasing citizen engagement in decision-making and oversight, as well as expanding capacity for environmental governance and natural resource management—both of which could be critical in comprehensively addressing glacial recession’s many impacts in Peru.[68]

The global community also plays an important role in addressing Peru’s glacial recession. Peru would not have been able to participate in the PRAA project without funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF).[69] In addition to the GEF, the United Nations created the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in 2010 to provide financial support to developing countries as they implement climate adaptation measures.[70] Mobilizing capital for adapting to the effects of climate change is essential in aiding countries like Peru.

Despite access to financial climate assistance, there are other factors holding back Peru from better addressing glacial recession. One factor is the country’s substantial debt to international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank—which diminishes the government’s capacity to invest more in its own programs. In the interest of ensuring Peru’s internal stability and capacity to repay debts over the long term, IFIs should offer debt relief programs to countries looking to invest in environmental integrity and resilience to climate change. This would free up capital for countries to aggressively address climate change and allow developing countries’ more financial flexibility to implement more robust policies and programs.

At this point, Peru cannot stop glacial recession. Instead, Peru can focus on addressing the potential environmental and societal tensions that result—issues that threaten the country’s environmental and human security. With a sound response that addresses clean water access, environmental protection, and public participation in resource allocation decision-making, Peru can mitigate the effects of glacial recession and acclimate to new environmental realities. At the same time, the United States and the international community can play supporting roles in Peru’s efforts to meet these challenges head on. Yet—much like Peru’s water supply—the time for effective action against glacial recession is dwindling—and quickly.

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About the Author

Peter Oesterling is completing his master's in international development at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, where he concentrates on environmental policy and sustainable development. He is a research assistant at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, an organization devoted to global trend analysis and long-term forecasting of human development indicators.

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Endnotes:

1. Bjørn Petter Kaltenborn et al., High Mountain Glaciers and Climate Change: Challenges to Human Livelihoods and Adaptation (Arendal, Norway: GRID-Arendal : UNEP, 2010): 17

2. Jeffrey T. Bury et al., “Glacier Recession and Human Vulnerability in the Yanamarey Watershed of the Cordillera Blanca, Peru,” Climatic Change 105, no. 1–2 (March 2011): 182, doi:10.1007/s10584-010-9870-1.

3. US Agency for International Development. Adaptation to Climate Change: Case Study-Glacial Retreat and Adaptation Options in Peru’s Rio Santa River Basin. (USAID, January, 2011): 15, http://www.caee.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/Peru/Peru%20Case%20Study%20Jul2011_v6_Draft_Final.pdf

4. Jeffrey Bury et al., “New Geographies of Water and Climate Change in Peru: Coupled Natural and Social Transformations in the Santa River Watershed,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 103, no. 2 (March 2013): 367, doi:10.1080/00045608.2013.754665.

5. Ibid., 367

6. Ibid., 365-372.

7. The World Bank, Republic of Peru Environmental Sustainability: A Key to Poverty Reduction in Peru (The World Bank, June 1, 2007): 105, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/06/7910058/republic-peru-environmental-sustainability-key-poverty-reduction-peru.

8. Ibid.,105.

9. (Bury et al. 2011): 182

10. Mathias Vuille et al., “20th Century Climate Change in the Tropical Andes: Observations and Model Results,” in Climate Variability and Change in High Elevation Regions: Past, Present & Future (Springer, 2003): 75, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-015-1252-7_5.

11. (Bury et al. 2011): 182

12. Christopher B Field, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and Working Group II, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A, Part A, 2014: 3, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415379.

13. Antonio A.R. Ioris, “The Geography of Multiple Scarcities: Urban Development and Water Problems in Lima, Peru,” Geoforum 43, no. 3 (May 2012): 612, doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2011.12.005.

14. International Futures Software version 7.08, Created by Professor Barry Hughes. University of Denver, Josef Korbel School of International Studies (2014)

15. Walter Vergara et al., “The Potential Consequences of Rapid Glacier Retreat in The Northern Andes,” Walter Vergara (Comp.), Assessing the Potential Consequences of Climate Destabilization in Latin America, 2009: 61.

16. Walter Vergara et al., “Economic Impacts of Rapid Glacier Retreat in the Andes,” Eos, Transactions American Geophysical Union 88, no. 25 (2007): 262.

17. Ibid., 263

18. “PERU Instituto Nacional de Estadística E Informática INEI,” accessed January 29, 2015, http://www.inei.gob.pe/estadisticas/indice-tematico/medio-ambiente/.

19. Ibid.

20. International Futures Software 7.08

21. Ibid.

22. Barbara Deutsch Lynch, “Vulnerabilities, Competition and Rights in a Context of Climate Change toward Equitable Water Governance in Peru’s Rio Santa Valley,” Global Environmental Change 22, no. 2 (May 2012): 368, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.02.002.

23. “Grid Magazine Issue 24,” accessed January 29, 2015, http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/a0409e/A0409E03.htm#ch3.1.

24. Ibid.

25. Jessica Budds and Leonith Hinojosa-Valencia. “Restructuring and rescaling water governance in mining contexts: the co-production of waterscapes in Peru.” Water Alternatives 5, no. 1 (2012): 120

26. “Peru Land Tenure and Property Rights Profile,” (2010): 15, accessed January 29, 2015, http://usaidlandtenure.net/peru.

27. Anthony J. Bebbington and Jeffrey T. Bury, “Institutional Challenges for Mining and Sustainability in Peru,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 41 (2009): 17297.

28. (Bury et al. 2013): 370

29. (Bebbington and Bury 2009): 17298

30. Anthony J. Bebbington, and John Rogan. “Drafts of Maps Depicting Overlaps Between Oil and Mining Concessions, Agricultural Areas, and Watersheds in Peru.” Report for Oxfam: 5/02/2012: 4

31. (USAID 2011):10

32. (Bebbington and Bury 2009): 17297-17298

33. (Lynch 2012): 364

34. Laura E. Higa Eda and Weiqi Chen, “Integrated Water Resources Management in Peru,” Procedia Environmental Sciences 2 (2010): 343, doi:10.1016/j.proenv.2010.10.039.

35. (Budds and Hinojosa 2012): 130

36. (Lynch 2012): 371

37. (Budds and Hinojosa 2012): 128-129

38. (Bury et al. 2013): 370)

39. (USAID 2011): 11-12

40. (Bebbington and Bury 2009): 17297-17298

41. “PREGUNTAS | SENACE,” accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.senace.gob.pe/preguntas/.

42. Ibid.

43. (Bebbington and Bury 2009):17300

44. “Ministerio de Energía Y Minas – Organización DGAAM – Asuntos Ambientales Mineros,” accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.minem.gob.pe/_area.php?idSector=4&idArea=36&idTitular=429&idMenu=sub57&idCateg=269?nhojsiqgdxufbjzp?zpeixuojqgtkegdx?mydnksbjclnydqnr.

45. (Lynch 2012): 367

46. “Transferencia de Funciones OSINERGMIN – OEFA,” accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.oefa.gob.pe/transferencia-de-funciones-osinergmin-oefa.

47. Erin Smith and Peter Rosenblum, “Government and Citizen Oversight of Mining: Enforcing the Rules,” Revenue Watch Institute (2011): 29

48. Ibid.,29.

49. (Budds and Hinojosa 2012): 127

50. Orihuela, José Carlos. “The Making of Conflict-Prone Development: Trade and Horizontal Inequalities in Peru.” European Journal of Development Research 24, no. 5 (2012): 689

51. “Truth Commission: Peru 01,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-peru-01.

52. Rosemary Thorp, Corinne Caumartin, and GEORGE GRAY-MOLINA, “Inequality, Ethnicity, Political Mobilisation and Political Violence in Latin America: The Cases of Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru*,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 25, no. 4 (2006): 469.

53. Michael Burch, “Natural Resources and Recurrent Conflict: The Case of Peru and Sendero Luminoso” Case Study Competition | United States Institute of Peace (2012): 2-3, accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.usip.org/case-study-competition.

54. (Orihuela 2012): 693

55. (Lynch 2012):367-368

56. Ibid., 368

57. (Bebbington and Bury 2009): 17296

58. Defensoría del Pueblo, “Decimoséptimo Informe Anual De La Defensoría del Pueblo” Defensoría Del Pueblo – Informes Y Publicaciones, (2014): 114, accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.defensoria.gob.pe/informes-publicaciones.php.

59. Ibid., 102

60. (USAID 2011): 20

61. Ibid., 24

62. CARE, “CARE Case Study: Application of Climate Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment (CVCA) Methodology in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia” Adaptation, (2011): 1-3. accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.careclimatechange.org/publications/adaptation.

63. (USAID 2011): 25

64. “President Obama Speaks at the 2014 Climate Summit – YouTube,” accessed January 30, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zmz6srlnur8.

65. “History | U.S. Agency for International Development,” accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.usaid.gov/peru/history.

66. “Peru Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2012-2016 | U.S. Agency for International Development,” (2012): x, accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.usaid.gov/documents/1862/peru-country-development-cooperation-strategy-2012-2016.

67. Ibid., x

68. Ibid., 14

69. (CARE 2011): 2

70. “Green Climate Fund,” accessed January 30, 2015, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/green_climate_fund/items/5869.php.

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