China’s Quantum Ambitions: A Multi-Decade Focus on Quantum Communications

China at night by VIIRS. Source: NASA Earth Observatory

By Ciel Qi

Numerous quantum technologies are emerging as we enter the third quantum revolution. Among quantum information science’s three areas—quantum computing, quantum sensing, and quantum communications—China has shown a strong interest in developing quantum communications, especially quantum key distribution (QKD). The National Security Agency defines QKD as “[utilizing] the unique properties of quantum mechanical systems to generate and distribute cryptographic keying material using special purpose technology.” [1]

Although that technology’s development is still relatively nascent, it could profoundly impact national security and geopolitics. Therefore, it would benefit the United States to understand China’s progress and priorities in this area. This paper provides an overview of Chinese policies supporting the country’s quantum communications efforts, a summary of China’s major quantum communications developments and achievements, and the implications of these policies and developments with recommendations for how the United States should respond.

Policy Support

Chinese policies have prioritized quantum communications development for years. In 2006, China emphasized researching quantum communications carriers, control principles, and methods. [2] In February 2013, China encouraged the establishment of a Chinese testing system for quantum communications networks. [3] Although, as early as 2008, quantum physics professor Chen Zengbing noted highly secured quantum communications, especially QKD, are better suited to transmit confidential information than traditional means, [4] China’s focus on quantum communications became most intense after the June 2013 Snowden leak. Those revelations, allegedly showing U.S. global surveillance efforts, including in China, revealed to Chinese leadership China’s vulnerabilities to cyber espionage, leading them to seek more secure  means of communication. [5]

Within three months after the initial leaks General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping, discussed quantum communications development with Chinese researchers on two occasions, [6] including meeting Pan Jianwei, a leading Chinese quantum physicist developing quantum communications, in July 2013. [7] While those two occasions were so soon after the Snowden incident that it’s not clear if they are related, a November 2013 report overtly connected China’s pursuit of quantum communications and the Snowden leak. The report detailed Western coverage of the leak, adding Chinese experts’ opinions on secure communications. It concluded with leading quantum expert Guo Guangcan’s response: QKD is the ultimate protection against eavesdropping. [8] In November 2015, discussing the government’s proposal on China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (FYP), Xi noted quantum communications would be added to the list of major sciences and technologies, recognizing its crucial role in meeting China’s long-term strategic objectives [9]. Subsequently, multiple Chinese policies concerning the 13th FYP period (2016-2020) prioritized developing quantum communications. [10]

During a Politburo study session in October 2020, Xi emphasized the importance of quantum science and technology, reiterating that China should “cultivate strategic emerging industries such as quantum communications.” [11] Consequently, the government continued supporting quantum communications development in the 14th FYP period (2021-2025), stating that China should accelerate deployment of cutting-edge technologies, including quantum communications. [12]

Developments And Achievements

Encouraged by its highest leadership, China has made steady progress in quantum communications. According to Pan, the country’s quantum communications development includes three steps: (1) quantum communications within cities through fiber optics, (2) quantum communications between cities enabled by quantum repeaters, and (3) a global quantum communications network achieved through satellite relay. [13] China achieved the first step when Hefei and Jinan constructed metropolitan quantum communications networks in 2011 and 2013. [14] With the official launch of the Beijing-Shanghai Trunk Line in 2017, China achieved the second step. Begun in July 2013, the 2,000 kilometer quantum communications line connects Beijing, Jinan, Hefei, and Shanghai. [15] In August 2016, China’s launch of the world’s first quantum satellite, Micius, means the country has initiated the third step, according to Pan. [16]

After announcing that Micius had linked with ground stations, successfully passing them photons in September 2016, [17] Pan’s team said in June 2017 the satellite had successfully distributed a pair of entangled photons to two ground stations. [18] In January 2020, Chinese scientists developed a mobile quantum satellite ground station, saying the 80 kilograms station can receive encryption keys from Micius. [19] That same month, Nanjing University researchers announced the development of drones equipped with quantum communications technology. [20] In January 2021, China Telecom launched a pilot program for users to make quantum encrypted phone calls. However, the company said the service will be first available to users in sectors such as government, military, and financial institutions who seek “absolute security.” [21] 

A few days later, Pan’s team announced a major achievement: China had built the world’s first integrated space-to-ground quantum communications network after years of testing. Reports said the network, consisting of Micius and thirty-two nodes across the Beijing-Shanghai Trunk Line, realized communication up to 4,600 kilometers. [22] In July 2022, almost six years after Micius’s launch, China launched its second quantum satellite, Jinan 1. Researchers said Jinan 1 is only one-sixth of Micius’s weight but can generate quantum keys at speeds two or three times faster. [23] The most recent development was revealed during China’s 2023 “Two Sessions.” Pan said in a briefing that China is developing medium-high orbit quantum satellites. He noted that such satellites have more advantages than low-orbit satellites (which Micius and Jinan 1 are), including longer working time and bigger coverage of the globe, which will further advance China’s quantum communications efforts. [24]

Implications And Recommendations

First, as China is the first country to launch a quantum communications satellite and the only country that has demonstrated technical capability in establishing long-distance quantum communications networks, [25] U.S. policymakers may worry China could erode US technological leadership and suggest the United States pursue long-distance quantum communications to keep apace. This may be good advice, but the United States should be cautious about pursuing QKD, which enables long-distance quantum communications. Although China describes QKD as “absolute[ly] secure,” it is not unconditionally secure, as it is susceptible to insider threats, hardware/software attacks, and denial of service. Moreover, without a means to authenticate QKD transmission sources, that technology is only a partial solution. [26] As such, whether China has indeed gained a first-mover advantage remains to be seen, and there’s no need for the United States to immediately follow suit, as it is currently researching other technologies that secure communications, such as post-quantum cryptography. [27] Also, China will continue touting its quantum communications achievements, so joining its nascent network may appeal to some U.S. partners and allies. Therefore, the United States should demonstrate to them QKD’s shortages—while monitoring Chinese research progress for breakthroughs in potentially overcoming QKD’s shortages, which could change the level of urgency for the United States in pursuing this technology.

Second, China’s policies demonstrate that one driver for its quantum communications development is to establish communications immune to U.S. surveillance. But such a network could increase miscalculation between the two countries—especially as China is increasingly prone to cutting military-to-military communication channels. [28] Previously, when channels were shut, both countries could still gather intelligence on each others’ intentions, but if Chinese leaders start using effective, secure quantum communications, the United States could lose insight on Chinese thinking, whereas China would still be able to collect intelligence on the United States. This could create a dangerous intelligence asymmetry between the two countries, potentially increasing the chance of risky behavior from either country. Therefore, while it can be challenging and controversial for the United States to develop means to monitor Chinese activities on the quantum communications networks, the United States should still try. 

Third, although China’s quantum communications network has made some significant achievements, it is far from complete—the network aims for a global coverage it doesn’t yet have. However, the Belt and Road Initiative, a China-led global infrastructure project, could facilitate the expansion of China’s quantum communications satellite ground stations internationally, and the development of mobile quantum ground stations may further ease this process. Given the possibility that surveillance equipment could be integrated into such global quantum communications networks and thus utilized by China to conduct surveillance activity worldwide, it could erode America’s intelligence advantage. Therefore, it would benefit the United States to closely monitor Chinese progress and any Chinese efforts to build stations in sensitive locations. While potentially escalatory, in an emergency situation, U.S. options could include satellite hacking to disable communications. [29]

Finally, due to their dual-use nature, quantum communications are part of China’s civil-military fusion efforts. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is among the major clients of China’s quantum communications network, [30] and Pan himself has links to Chinese defense contractors. [31] This has a few implications. First, the technology’s developments will strongly affect the military domain. Therefore, as the United States monitors Chinese development, it should assess how certain achievements could upgrade the PLA’s capabilities—and how to counter them. Second, the civil-military fusion nature of China’s quantum communications project means the Chinese entities involved could be supporting the PLA’s modernization efforts. The United States should track these entities to identify sanctions targets. Additionally, while the United States is cautious about cooperating with China in this area, U.S. partners and allies may not be, viewing such cooperation as purely academic and so not exercising the same level of vigilance. It is important for the United States to demonstrate to these partners and allies the potential risks of this cooperation and take steps to ensure that they do not inadvertently aiding the PLA. Lastly, China’s quantum communications being limited to sectors including the government, military, and financial institutions provides the United States another opportunity—it should develop general-purpose quantum communications and technologies for the broader good. This will make the United States more attractive to partners and allies, providing them a non-China alternative. The Department of Energy and the National Institute of Standards and Technology have initiated projects. [32]

Conclusion

Backed by its highest leadership, China has made and will likely continue making progress in quantum communications. Even though the United States considers itself in a technology competition with China, the United States needs not rush to follow suit, as quantum communications technology is still immature and susceptible to many of the same vulnerabilities as other forms of secure communications. Nevertheless, it would benefit the United States to track and understand Chinese developments, given their potential to substantially influence China’s capabilities and geopolitics, some of which could have significant implications for U.S. international strategy. Most importantly, if the United States wants to appeal to other countries as an alternative to China in the quantum race, it should pursue general-purpose quantum communications and technologies.

About the author

Ciel Qi is a researcher focusing on China’s technological and economic development and foreign policy. She also focuses on major OECD countries’ sanctions, export controls, and outbound investment policies related to China. She holds master’s degrees from Harvard and Georgetown’s Security Studies Program.

Endnotes

  1. “Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Quantum Cryptography (QC).” National Security Agency. https://www.nsa.gov/Cybersecurity/Quantum-Key-Distribution-QKD-and-Quantum-Cryptography-QC/.

  2. “National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology Development (2006-2020)” (国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要（2006—2020年）), State Council, 2006. http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_240244.htm.

  3. “Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Construction of Major National S&T Infrastructure” (国家重大科技基础设施建设中长期规划), State Council, February 23, 2013. http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-03/04/content_2344891.htm.

  4. Geng Xi, “Interview with Chen Zengbing of the University of Science and Technology of China: Interpretation of Quantum Communication That ‘Will Not Be Stolen’” (中国科大陈增兵专访：解读“不会遭窃”的量子通信), Beijing Science and Technology Daily, November 11, 2008. https://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2008/11/213047.html.

  5. Elsa B. Kania and John K. Costello, “Quantum Hegemony? China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership,” CNAS, September 12, 2018. https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/hero/documents/CNASReport-Quantum-Tech_FINAL.pdf?mtime=20180912133406&focal=none.

  6. “Xi Jinping Hosted the Ninth Study Session of the Politburo of the Central Committee” (习近平主持中央政治局第九次集体学习), People’s Daily, November 1, 2013. http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1001/c1024-23094554.html.

  7. “Xi Jinping: Deepen the Reform of the Science and Technology System and Enhance the Vitality of Scientific and Technological Innovation” (习近平：深化科技体制改革增强科技创新活力), Xinhua, July 17, 2013. http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-07/17/content_2449985.htm.

  8. “The Wall Has Ears: Eavesdropping, Invisible Radio Waves” (隔墙有耳：窃听，看不见的电波), People’s Daily, November 8, 2013. http://scitech.people.com.cn/n/2013/1108/c1007-23474933.html. 

  9. “Xi Jinping: Explanation of the Recommendations of Provided by the Central Committee of the CCP on the Formulation of the 13th FYP on the National Economic and Social Development” (习近平:关于《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划的建议》的说明), Xinhua, November 3, 2015. http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2015-11/03/c_1117029621_3.htm

  10. “Outline of the 13th FYP for National Economic and Social Development” (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展 第十三个五年规划纲要), Xinhua, March 17, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-03/17/content_5054992.htm; “13th FYP for the Development of the Chinese Academy of Sciences” (中国科学院“十三五”发展规划纲要), Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2016. https://std.cas.cn/zcfg/ynwj/201703/W020170310373457195624.pdf; “Outline of the National Information Technology Development Strategy” (十三五”国家战略性新兴产业发展规划), State Council, December 19, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/19/content_5150090.htm; “13th FYP for National Key Basic Research and Development Program” (关于印发“十三五”国家基础研究专项规划的通知), MOST, June 8, 2017. https://www.most.gov.cn/xxgk/xinxifenlei/fdzdgknr/qtwj/qtwj2017/201706/t20170608_133409.html.

  11. “During the 24th Study Session of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Xi Jinping Emphasized the Importance of Understanding of the Significance of Promoting the Development of Quantum Technology and Strengthening the Strategic Planning and System Layout of Quantum Technology Development” (习近平在中央政治局第二十四次集体学习时强调 深刻认识推进量子科技发展重大意义 加强量子科技发展战略谋划和系统布局), Xinhua, October 17, 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-10/17/c_1126623288.htm.

  12. “Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035” (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要), State Council, March 13, 2021. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm.

  13. “The Launch of Quantum Satellites Will Give Birth to a Market of 100 Billion in the Communication Industry Chain” (量子卫星升空 将催生通信产业链千亿市场), People’s Daily, August 16, 2016. http://scitech.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0816/c1007-28639081.html.

  14. Ibid.

  15. “The National Quantum Confidential Communication “Beijing-Shanghai Trunk Line” Project Passed the General Technical Acceptance” (国家量子保密通信“京沪干线”项目通过总技术验收), USTC, September 4, 2017. https://quantum.ustc.edu.cn/web/node/466.

  16. “The Launch of Quantum Satellites Will Give Birth to a Market of 100 Billion in the Communication Industry Chain” (量子卫星升空 将催生通信产业链千亿市场), People’s Daily, August 16, 2016. http://scitech.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0816/c1007-28639081.html.

  17. Viola Zhou, “China’s Orbiting Quantum Satellite Links with Ground Stations,” SCMP, September 24, 2016. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2022320/chinas-orbiting-quantum-satellite-links-ground-stations.

  18. Stephen Chen, “Chinese Satellite Makes Breakthrough in Quantum Communication,” SCMP, June 16, 2017. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2098743/chinese-satellite-makes-breakthrough-quantum.

  19. Stephen Chen, “Chinese Scientists Develop Portable Quantum Satellite Communication Device,” SCMP, January 3, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3044385/chinese-scientists-develop-portable-quantum-satellite.

  20. Stephen Chen, “China Is Developing Drones That Use Quantum Physics to Send Unhackable Messages,” SCMP, January 10, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3045229/china-developing-drones-use-quantum-physics-send-unhackable.

  21. Coco Feng, “China Telecom Launches Quantum Encrypted Phone Calls on Smartphones in A New Pilot Programme,” SCMP, January 7, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/tech/innovation/article/3116659/china-telecom-launches-quantum-encrypted-phone-calls-smartphones.

  22. Liu Zhen, “China’s Experiment in Quantum Communication Brings Beijing Closer to Creating A Hack-proof Network,” SCMP, January 9, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3117005/chinas-experiment-quantum-communication-brings-beijing-closer.

  23. Stephen Chen, “China Launches New Satellite in ‘Important Step’ towards Global Quantum Communications Network,” SCMP, July 27, 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3186802/china-launches-new-satellite-important-step-towards-global.

  24. Qian Tongxin, “China Is Developing Medium-high Orbit Quantum Satellites,” Yicai, March 4, 2023. https://m.yicai.com/news/101692400.html.

  25. Edward Parker et al., “An Assessment of the U.S. and Chinese Industrial Bases in Quantum Technology,” RAND, 2022. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA869-1.html.

  26. “Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Quantum Cryptography (QC),” National Security Agency. https://www.nsa.gov/Cybersecurity/Quantum-Key-Distribution-QKD-and-Quantum-Cryptography-QC/.

  27. “Post-Quantum Cryptography,” NIST, https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography.

  28. [28] Andrea Shalal and David Brunnstrom, “U.S. and China Diplomats Communicating, But Not Militaries,” Reuters, February 17, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-china-military-unfortunately-not-communicating-white-house-2023-02-17/.

  29. Robert Lemos, “Satellite Hacking,” Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/insights/cards/space-based-c4isr/7/.

  30. The Launch of Quantum Satellites Will Give Birth to a Market of 100 Billion in the Communication Industry Chain” (量子卫星升空 将催生通信产业链千亿市场), People’s Daily, August 16, 2016. http://scitech.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0816/c1007-28639081.html.

  31. Jeanne Whalen, “China’s Top Quantum Scientist Has Ties to the Country’s Defense Companies,” The Washington Post, December 26, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/26/chinas-top-quantum-scientist-has-ties-countrys-defense-companies/.

  32. “Scientific Enablers of Scalable Quantum Communications,” Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science (SC) Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR), April 18, 2023, https://science.osti.gov/grants/Lab-Announcements/-/media/grants/pdf/lab-announcements/2023/LAB_23-3040.pdf; “Quantum Communications and Networks,” NIST, https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/quantum-communications-and-networks.

ArticleYale Journal of International AffairsAsia, Fall 2023