Taking Obama’s Offer Seriously: Ending the War on Al Qaeda
By Christopher McIntosh
Despite mostly successful efforts to draw down forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, President Obama’s policies in the war on terror have placed the United States on a path for indefinite conflict. While there was much to appreciate in his May 23rd address, the overall vision he outlined does not bring us closer to finally ending the conflict itself. Obama offered to sign a repeal of the congressional resolution authorizing military force (AUMF), an act that would end the war on terror with the stroke of a pen. Congress should present him exactly that option.
The Obama Administration currently sees the war on terror as a long-term commitment.[1] Although Obama laid out his vision for the end-stages of the war on terror, including limits on targeted killings and renewed efforts to end indefinite detention, his vision for victory over al Qaeda was couched in generalities—parents taking their children to school, veterans starting businesses, and Americans generally feeling safe. The only specific statements regarding when the Administration will feel that al Qaeda has been defeated were last December when then DOD Counsel Jeh Johnson outlined the Administration’s belief that the war will continue indefinitely until al Qaeda reaches a “tipping point” where “so many leaders and operatives” have been captured or killed that the organization has been “effectively destroyed”.[2] The problem facing the Administration is that this is an unreachable goal.
Under President Obama’s leadership, aQaeda’s organizational capacity has already been deeply disrupted; Osama bin Laden, along with 22 of 30 other “high value targets” comprising much of the group’s leadership, has been killed.[3] And despite some optimistically reading Obama’s address as approximating an end to the war on terror, Wednesday’s drone strike in Pakistan was a tangible reminder that the war continues. Limitations on strikes, while laudable, are equally an admission that strikes will continue so long as the Administration believes they are necessary. The May 29, 2013 strike on Wali-ur-Rehman, the Pakistani Taliban’s second in command, provides a clear indication that even if limited, these strikes will continue until al Qaeda is defeated.
The problem facing the Administration is that the “tipping point” at which al Qaeda is “effectively” destroyed will remain unachievable because terrorist organizations pose a potential threat by their very existence.[4] Even if al Qaeda is rendered ineffective for a substantial period of time, there is no way to be certain that the future threat has been fully eradicated. Given the conditions laid out by this administration, without that assurance the war not only will not end, it cannot end. Short of killing or capturing every present and future member of al Qaeda, even pushing al Qaeda to this “tipping point” could not eliminate the possibility of future attacks. Attacks by other individuals or groups committed to the cause will always remain a possibility, regardless of how many leaders are successfully targeted. For al Qaeda, “effective destruction” is nearly indistinguishable from temporary disruption—the 2001 attacks were part of a terrorist campaign that included years of dormancy between attacks.[5] So long as the possibility for a future attack exists, the war not only will not end, it cannot end.
Modern wars typically end one of two ways, neither of which involves the “effective destruction” of the enemy.[6] Historically, wars end when belligerent parties negotiate an agreement (cease-fire, peace treaty, surrender) or one power unilaterally withdraws its military forces from the theater of operations.[7] This war, however, cannot end through a negotiated settlement because al Qaeda is neither a state nor a recognized political actor.[8] Recognizing this from the outset, President Bush emphasized that this is “a different kind of war” that will not, in the words of Secretary Rumsfeld, end “with a signing ceremony on the Missouri.” [9] Any agreement, even one ratifying an unconditional surrender, would require recognizing a terrorist group in a way that is politically impossible.[10]
Obama’s comments on the AUMF deserve heightened scrutiny because they offer a specific means by which the war can end. The AUMF is the linchpin undergirding nearly every controversial aspect of the conflict. It’s what makes the war on terror an actual war, rather than simply a metaphor. If repealed or dramatically revised, this Administration—as well as those in the future—would see their capacity to engage in military strikes anywhere in the world substantially curtailed, if not eliminated entirely.
War may have been the right call at the outset of the conflict, but over twelve years later things have changed dramatically. The question facing us now is not whether war was the right choice, but whether it’s the most effective strategy going forward. Alternatives exist. Law enforcement can take the lead domestically. Intelligence agencies can continue their efforts to penetrate and disrupt organizations abroad. Ending the war on terror would not constitute surrender nor would it necessitate ceasing actions to, as the 2010 National Security Strategy outlines, “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al Qaeda.[11] It also would not eliminate the United States’ ability to use force in countering al Qaeda—one need only look to the history of counterterrorist policy pre-2001 for precedent.[12] Obama claims to want to end the war and Congress should provide the President that opportunity—it may be the most effective thing we can do to insure the defeat of al Qaeda.
About the Author
Christopher McIntosh is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Politics at Bard College--his research focuses on the contemporary practice of war and state sovereignty and examines the ways in which these concepts structure foreign policy decisionmaking especially in the war on terrorism.
Endnotes
Jackson, Richard. “Culture, Identity and Hegemony: Continuity and (the Lack of) Change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama.” International Politics 48, no. 2-3 (March 2011): 390-411 and Wexler, Lesley M., Litigating the Long War on Terror: The Role of Al-Aulaqi v. Obama. Loyola University Chicago International Law Review, Vol. 159, 2011.
Johnson 2012
Wilson, Scott. “Obama fires back at Romney for his ‘appeasement’ comment”, Washington Post, December 8, 2011 and Williams, Brian Glyn. “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004 – 2010 : The History of an Assassination Campaign.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33 (2010): 871-892.
Desch, Michael C. “The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Liberal Tradition and Obama’s Counterterrorism Policy.” PS: Political Science & Politics 43, no. 3 (June 30, 2010): 425-429.
Shultz, Richard and Vogt, Andreas. “It’s War! Fighting Post 11 September Global Terrorism Through a Doctrine of Preemption”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Spring 2003, 15:1, p. 1-30.
Reiter, Dan. How Wars End. Princeton University Press, 2009.
For a discussion theorizing how and when these agreements work see Reiter, Dan. “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War.” Perspective on Politics 1, no. 1 (March 2003): 27-43.
Toros, Harmonie. “We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists!: Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts.” Security Dialogue 39 (2008): 407-426.
Montgomery, David. “In This War, ‘V’ May Be For Vague Victory; Fight Against Terrorism Unlikely to End Decisively”, December 18, 2001, Washington Post, p. C1
Toros 2008
Obama, Barack. “National Security Strategy.” Washington, DC (2010).
Shultz and Vogt, 2003