The Return of the Roosevelt Doctrine: How History Can Inform American Naval Policy in the Pacific Theater
Newly appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt Jr. basks in the work of the Navy Department, preparing for a war his government has not yet committed to. Photo credit: U.S. Naval Institute: (https://tinyurl.com/eu2zvbny)
By Ilani Nurick
A Historic Lesson
The two greatest successes of the American Navy between the battle of the Monitor and the United States entry into World War I appear to represent opposite poles of the diplomatic spectrum. The first was a bold pre-emptive strike on the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay during the early days of the Spanish-American War [1]. The second, the peaceful, worldwide voyage of the Great White Fleet that defused tensions in the Pacific and averted a potential conflict [2]. Yet, upon closer inspection, both events share a crucial commonality: they were the right decision at the right time. And not coincidentally, both were made by the same man: Theodore Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and later as President.
Today, the United States faces multiple emergent superpowers—some eager for conflict and others patiently pursuing long-term strategic goals. There is once again a pressing need for innovative applications of naval power. However, this does not mean forsaking the successful strategies of the past. The lessons of American mobilizations in the Pacific aimed at deterrence and de-escalation offer valuable insights for maintaining peace. The actions of Theodore Roosevelt, both as the maverick Assistant Secretary of the Navy and the more sober, even-keeled President, occurred over a century ago. Nevertheless, the reasoned logic behind Theodore Roosevelt’s diplomatic doctrine remains highly relevant in today’s charged climate in the Pacific Theater.
By adopting a Rooseveltian proactive, assertive approach to deterrence—rooted in Roosevelt’s decisive readiness in the preemptive strike at Manila Bay and the peaceful strength of the Great White Fleet—the U.S. can signal a willingness to act that can prevent conflicts, protect interests, and preserve peace in an uncertain world.
The Understudy’s Debut
The year 1898 dawned with a bleeding Cuba as Spain lost control of her empire [3]. Uprisings in Puerto Rico and the Philippines further destabilized Spain’s already weakened global position, highlighting the shifting tides of colonial power [4]. Peoples around the world were fighting for their rights, for freedom, for democracy—and American economic interests in Cuban sugar and tobacco happened to be threatened by the chaos [5]. While the American people sympathized with the struggling Cubans and Filipinos, American businesses and President William McKinley’s administration sought peace, stability, and economic well-being [6].
Then the course of American history changed with a conspicuously timed vacation [7]. The vacationer was Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, a staunch advocate of President McKinley’s anti-war platform [8]. During this brief hiatus, Secretary Long’s assistant, an up-and-coming New Yorker with a penchant for mustachioed bravado assumed the reins of the department [9]. Theodore Roosevelt saw the world through a decidedly different lens. His was a more pragmatic world, and he was more prone to action, willing to flex America’s growing muscles [10]. In this lull of formal leadership, the 38-year-old acting Secretary of the Navy set the department in motion amid the insurgencies in Spain’s colonies and issued one of the most famous naval directives to his favored Commodore, George Dewey: “Order the squadron…to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war… your duty will be…offensive operations in Philippine Islands” [11].
This was Roosevelt’s Big Stick philosophy incarnate, and the rest, as they say, is history. Commodore Dewey grounded the Spanish fleet, repelled a German incursion, and shuttled in Filipino independence fighter Emilio Aguinaldo without the loss of American life [12]. The success was so quick and so total that the backstage choreographer in Washington D.C. was nearly forgotten amid the pomp and honors bestowed on Commodore Dewey [13]. It would take Roosevelt a second swing of his Big Stick, sprinting up a hill in Cuba, to catapult himself into the limelight. Yet Roosevelt’s legacy as Assistant Secretary of the Navy carries far more significance in the shaping of modern American foreign policy than does his heroic charge up San Juan Hill.
When Roosevelt’s doctrinal mantra “speak softly and carry a big stick” is broken down, it coalesces into two separate and distinct clauses [14]. “Speak softly”—remain peaceful, exercise restraint, and use diplomacy whenever possible. And of course, the “Big Stick”—back up soft speech with an overpowering arsenal. But the actionable verb is lost in this oversimplified interpretation. “Carry” carries implications. It transforms the Big Stick from a passive noun into a vehicle of purpose. A tool always carried, ready to strike the moment diplomacy fails.
Under the principles of the Roosevelt Doctrine, the Big Stick boils down to tactical preparedness. Roosevelt was not simply advocating for America to build ships and then rest on her laurels; he demanded America maintain the level of preparedness necessary to mobilize and defeat an equally powerful hostile fleet the moment war was declared [15]. The threat of force is no threat at all if it cannot be wielded in time to make a difference. That is what Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt championed, and his relentless preparation in the face of a government reluctant to engage in war empowered the United States to achieve a resounding victory [16].
With its early aversion to a standing army, American history is replete with examples of the unfulfilled potential of the Big Stick, a latent power forgotten amid calls for isolationism. When war broke out in 1812, despite the numerical and geographical advantage the United States held in North America, the Navy was unable to break the British fleet’s blockade of the continent [17]. A century later, the United States had an army of only 100,000 soldiers before entering World War I [18]. The war eventually demanded the mobilization of nearly five million Americans [19]. This foreign policy failure stood in stark contrast to America’s domestic position as the largest economy left intact by the war [20].
Our present state of knife-edge peace follows a similar pattern: America’s markets are booming to the point where the government can bankroll two foreign wars without missing a beat [21]. Meanwhile, America’s own military is inadequately staffed and only partially funded, while the world tilts closer to all-out global conflict [22]. And if the doctrinal lessons of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt are not acted upon immediately, if and when that war does break out, the world’s strongest economy may once again find itself as ill-prepared as in 1812 and 1917.
The lesson is stark and simple: prevention begins with proactive measures of preparation. The Big Stick should be carried everywhere and that ethos must be integrated into foreign policy initiatives and reflected in naval strategy.
While the concept of military preparedness is no longer controversial, there remains a bipartisan reluctance among policymakers to extend operations beyond routine naval exercises. There is an underlying fear that increased military posturing could escalate tensions into open conflict. Yet Roosevelt’s lesson was that the opposite can often be true: proactive, visible readiness can prevent conflict rather than incite it, and tactical preparation increases the likelihood of victory if conflict does arise.
What does this look like today? The Navy must expand the deployment of drones (such as the Orca eXtra Large Uncrewed Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV)) and submarine patrols in critical maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca [23]. While the covert nature of drones and submarines might seem to cut against their utility in a deterrence strategy, their potential presence forces adversaries to factor in the possibility of a counterstrike, thereby complicating their tactical calculations. This strategic ambiguity complements the visible signaling of traditional Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), enabling a swifter, Dewey-like response should conflict arise.
Just as Dewey leveraged Hong Kong as a springboard for immediate action, the U.S. should pursue formal agreements with Vietnam and Indonesia to establish basing and logistical support, following the successful model of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines [24]. In light of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, Vietnam may be more open to increased military cooperation with the U.S [25]. Meanwhile, traditionally non-aligned Indonesia has shown signs of reconsidering its position [26]. These sample initiatives represent the proactive deterrence, the willingness to act of Roosevelt’s Big Stick philosophy.
As today’s military hemorrhages under long-term recruiting shortages and static policy, the warning of Teddy Roosevelt echoes that urgent change is essential: Keep full of coal [27]. Because one day, it will be needed—and no one knows when that day will come.
A Peace of Steel
Imperial Russian warships pitched perilously as burning wood and searing steel rained down into the roiling black northern Pacific [28]. Sailors screamed and drowned, trying to escape both the freezing waters and the blazing fleet [29]. Japan’s fleet, under the watchful command of Admiral Tōgō, looked on relatively unscathed and, in a single day, transformed the once isolated island nation into a formidable power on the Asian continent [30].
Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was eager to test this newfound strength in the Pacific sphere [31]. And because of the decisive leadership of Teddy Roosevelt, the Pacific now included the American Philippines [32]. But we don’t read about the 1907 Japanese-American War—because it didn’t happen. This time, American peace was won not through bloodshed but through a non-violent demonstration of naval might.
The Great White Fleet set sail from Virginia in late 1907, sixteen battleships bound on a Magellanic journey to foster diplomacy and showcase American force and capability [33]. By mid-October the following year, the fleet reached the Japanese littoral amid rising tensions and diplomatic friction [34]. Anti-Japanese sentiment in California clashed with Japanese resentment over the discrimination and segregation faced by Japanese immigrants, bringing diplomatic relations to a boil [35]. With Japan’s fresh sense of confidence, American territories in the Pacific looked increasingly vulnerable.
Yet instead of a Commodore Dewey-like armada, President Theodore Roosevelt deployed the white fleet, and American sailors were greeted as friends and allies upon landing at Yokohama [36]. The war fever broke and America avoided a Pacific front until 1941. This time, it wasn’t Roosevelt’s boldness or his willingness to risk the uncertainties of war that prevented wider conflict, but his forbearance and willingness to patiently work through his options before resorting to the Big Stick.
In both cases, Roosevelt’s judgment proved correct. The Spanish-American War turned into an economic windfall that cemented America’s place as an equal among the European powers and the odyssey of the Great White Fleet averted a war that would have sapped America’s strength while the nation was jockeying for a greater role on the world stage [37].
So why didn’t war break out with Japan in 1907? Militarily, Japan may have been in a stronger position than the United States, with a war-tested fleet, the geographic advantage, and its people perhaps mentally braced for another conflict [38]. Japan had motive and means. But something about the Great White Fleet, an expressly peaceful “pageant of power,” turned the tide toward peace [39]. Despite its peaceful nature, this was not appeasement disguised as diplomacy. This was a clarifying act of non-violence, demonstrating America’s strength, commitment to using the Big Stick, and the formidable opposition Japan would face if war erupted. This was a new and vigorous form of diplomacy, distinctly Rooseveltian and rooted in America’s burgeoning naval powers.
The core of the Great White Fleet was Roosevelt’s principle of follow-through [40]. In the Spanish-American War, President Roosevelt had shown the world he could—and would, if necessary—act swiftly and conclusively [41]. A clear perception persisted that Roosevelt was prepared to go to war, represented by the Great White Fleet and a Navy that stood ready in the background [42]. This mutually understood projection of military resolve alone accomplished what war aims to achieve: defusing crises, answering major geopolitical questions, and realigning power. Japan didn’t need to be physically attacked to grasp the determined underlying threat America under Roosevelt was broadcasting from a global bully pulpit. The show of force was not merely a show, it carried real meaning; it was the Big Stick, poised to strike.
This is Roosevelt’s second lesson, the kind of assertive peace that must define American foreign policy today. Not a peace dogged by fear that every defensive maneuver and tepid support of an ally will bring about nuclear war, but a peace confidently committed to an expansive position on the world stage. It’s this unforgiving and unabashed diplomacy that instills fear in adversaries, fear that if this is what the U.S. Navy can and will do in peacetime, my god, what would they do in a war? This “steely willingness to fight” does not necessitate immediate conflict or bloodshed, but it does require a shift in the national mindset toward the reality of war [43]. Sometimes war will be unavoidable, and when that time comes, the United States must be prepared to go to any lengths to uphold long-term peace—even if those lengths include going to war.
What does this look like today? Unlike Roosevelt’s repositioning of Dewey’s fleet, there is a direct modern proposal analogous to the Great White Fleet of 1907: a Great White Fleet of 2025. While the United States regularly conducts FONOPs and maintains a global naval presence through Carrier Battle Groups, these missions are often narrowly tailored to immediate deterrence [44]. A modern Great White Fleet would pursue broader goals. This long-term, strategic expedition would extend beyond combat readiness, combining military presence with diplomatic engagement, environmental initiatives, and the public showcasing of cutting-edge military technologies.
The new Fleet’s mission would not be to counter immediate threats, but to reaffirm the United States’s enduring commitment to its allies, project technological superiority, and strengthen global relationships through visible, sustained engagement. Just as the first Great White Fleet proved the United States’s capacity to project power independently, this second Fleet would highlight the United States’s readiness while integrating military presence with soft power initiatives.
Roosevelt’s Tomorrow
These two pivotal moments in naval history—one where the Navy led the United States to sweeping military victory and teetered on the brink of war—demanded two very different responses from two very different kinds of leaders. It just so happened that these two leaders were the same person. A young Roosevelt immortalizes the lesson of resolve, preparing for the worst-case scenario and acting decisively when that moment arrives. An older Roosevelt demonstrated a different kind of resolve, strategic patience, where force lingers just around the corner—but not quite here yet. The lessons are distinct: be prepared, and when push comes to shove, use the Big Stick. Then there is the assertively peaceful diplomacy of the Great White Fleet, using the perception of potential force reinforced by the certainty of follow-through to avoid actual violence.
This is the dual legacy of Theodore Roosevelt, his personal ideology for peacekeeping reliant on the United States’s naval strength [45]. The Roosevelt Doctrine was subtly flexible yet also brash, tempered by an earnest patience. Roosevelt’s lessons demand much from the American people and specifically from the armed forces in confronting and containing modern threats. The United States of America must hold the Big Stick aloft and ready to strike, while confidently asserting a right to peace without the timidity that stems from a fear of war.
About the author
Ilani Nurick is currently in his first year at Yale Law School. Formerly, Ilani served as a Boatswain's Mate in the U.S. Coast Guard in Cape Charles, Virginia. Before enlisting, Ilani worked in local politics while keeping his nose buried in presidential biographies. Ilani holds a B.A. in History from the University of Washington and an MBA from the University of Wisconsin.
Endnotes
Edmund Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 643-644.
Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex (New York: Random House, 2001), pp. 533-534.
Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 618.
Octavio Ruiz, “Spain on the Threshold of a New Century: Society and Politics before and after the Disaster of 1898,” Mediterranean Historical Review 13, no. 1/2 (June 1998): pp. 7–27.
John L. Offner, “McKinley and the Spanish–American War,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2004): p. 51.
Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 597,p. 627,pp. 631-32.
Ibid., p. 629.
Ibid., pp. 590-591, p. 599.
Ibid., p. 629.
Ibid., pp. 592-593.
Ibid., p.629.
George Dewey, “The Battle of Manila Bay,” The War Times Journal, archived October 14, 2007.
Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 643-644.
Nick Woltman, “Roosevelt’s ‘Big Stick’ Line at State Fair Stuck...Later,” Twin Cities Pioneer Press, August 31, 2015, archived June 10, 2020.
William Henry Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1961), 97, quoting Roosevelt: Without preparation, America would “certainly be forced to spend the first three or four weeks not in striking, but in making those preparations to strike which we should have made long before.”
Doris Kearns Goodwin, The Bully Pulpit: Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and the Golden Age of Journalism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), p. 224, quoting Taft: “If it had not been for Theodore Roosevelt, we would never have been in a position to declare war, for it was he and only he who got from congress sufficient ammunition to back any bluff we might make with actual play.”
Brian Arthur, How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2011), p. 73.
Library of Congress, “American Expeditionary Forces,” Stars and Stripes: A World at War.https://www.loc.gov/collections/stars-and-stripes/articles-and-essays/a-world-at-war/american-expeditionary-forces/ last accessed 29th November 2024
Ibid.
Hugh Rockoff, “Until It’s Over, Over There: The U.S. Economy in World War I,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 10580 (Cambridge, MA: NBER, June 2004), p. 4.
Aris Folley and Taylor Giorno, "Yellen: Ample Aid for Israel and Ukraine," The Hill, October 16, 2023.
Associated Press, “US Army Is Slashing Thousands of Posts to Prepare for Future Wars,” February 27, 2024.
Naval News, “First Look at the US Navy’s Orca XLUUV with Massive Payload Module,” June 2024.
United States Department of State, Agreement Between the United States of America and the Philippines: Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, June 25, 2014. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/14-625-Philippines-Defense-Cooperation.pdf
Shannon Tiezzi, “Amid South China Sea Tensions, Vietnam Seeks Closer Ties with US,” The Diplomat, May 2014, pp. 1–2.
Muhamad Hasanuddin Wahid, Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Suyono Thamrin, and Joni Widjayanto, “Indonesia's Defense Diplomacy Strategy in Facing China's Gray Zone in the South China Sea,” SDG Journal of Law and Sustainable Development 1, no. 1 (2023): pp. 2–3.
Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 629.
Morris, Theodore Rex, p. 387.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 312-313, p. 387.
Ibid., pp. 399-400.
Goodwin, The Bully Pulpit, p. 224.
Morris, Theodore Rex, pp. 502-503.
Naval History and Heritage Command, “Itinerary of the Great White Fleet,” U.S. Navy History and Heritage Command, September 21, 2015. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/the-great-white-fleet/itinerary-of-the-great-white-fleet.html
Morris, Theodore Rex, pp. 492-493.
Charles E. Neu, An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906–1909 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968),p. 116–22.
Morris, Theodore Rex, p. 494.
Ibid., pp. 312-313.
Ibid.,p.494.
Ibid.
Goodwin, The Bully Pulpit, p. 224.
Morris, Theodore Rex, p. 534.
Ibid.
Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis, "The Risk of Too Many Freedom of Navigation Operations," The Diplomat, July 18, 2020.
Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 594-596.
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the editors or the journal.