From Big Five to Big Four? – Rethinking Geopolitical Power

The United National Security Council Chamber in New York. Source: Patrick Gruban

By Nilanthan Niruthan

The permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council—Russia, the United States, United Kingdom (UK), France, and China—have often been referred to as the five most powerful nations in the world. A phrase commonly used is the “Big Five,” thanks to their veto powers extending an ironclad grip over the United Nations and, consequently, over the fundamental contours of world politics. [1]

This article seeks to challenge the “Big Five” assumption. More specifically, it juxtaposes the growing role of India with the UK and France, whose ability to shape world affairs seems diminished from what it once was. The article explores three macro areas—security, economy and diplomacy—where India’s trajectory as a uniquely autonomous decision-maker contrasts with the waning impact of the UK and France. The effect is so pronounced that it seems like the “Big Five” classification has already become the “Big Four” for all practical purposes.

 

Security

Despite the rising importance of economics and diplomacy, traditional military might is often highlighted as the primary determinant of geopolitical power. [2] In new military domains like space warfare, the Big Five to Big Four transition is already complete. For instance, the only four countries that have successfully conducted anti-satellite missile tests are the United States, Russia, China, and India. [3] The United States concluded the Bold Orion project in 1959, Russia had its first “space kamikaze” test in 1968, China successfully struck the FY-1C weather satellite in 2007, and India joined the fray in 2019. [4] The UK and France have yet to demonstrate this capability, with no successful missile tests on record.

As technology continues to advance and geopolitical competition expands, space warfare will soon become one of the most important domains of security competition shaping world power. Much of modern life relies on some kind of space-based infrastructure, from telephone communication and GPS to online banking. [5] It is almost certain that a large-scale global conflict will extend to outer space as well. The nations that have an edge in this department are thus poised to dominate the next world war, whenever it comes.

Missile technology, in general, has moved to a Big Four dynamic, where the United States, Russia, China, and India already have a recurring pattern of developing successful end-products before the rest. In new domains of technology, power is often determined by early adopters. In this case, it has been the member countries of the new Big Four who have most successfully leveraged new missile technology. Consider a recent example of hypersonic missiles. There has been much debate on their effectiveness, but their key role in power projection is undeniable, such as the sensationalist hype around whether Iran armed Houthi rebels with hypersonic missiles. [6] Here too, India successfully tested hypersonic missiles as far back as 2019 to join the elite club, while France caught up only in 2023 with the V-MAX, Japan tested the hypersonic glide vehicle (HGVP) in 2024, and the UK is yet to complete development. [7]

In older areas like nuclear power, India has already caught up to the Big Five. In August 2016, India commissioned the INS Arihant, its first nuclear submarine, officially joining the Big Five with Nuclear Triad—the ability to launch nuclear strikes from land, sea, and air— capabilities. [8] Once again, this is no small matter, given the persisting importance of nuclear weaponry. What gives India a stronger position than the UK and France here is its military autonomy in the use of nuclear weapons.

It is quite difficult to believe either the UK or France could nuclearize a conflict without operating within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) framework or without consultation with Washington. [9] This is not necessarily a bad thing for them; belonging to an alliance brings many benefits. However, the very nature of a treaty alliance entails sacrificing some strategic autonomy for the collective interest. India does not have the luxury of a treaty alliance, but it does enjoy complete autonomy in how it exercises nuclear power. And despite affirming commitment to a No First Strike policy, there is no senior partner or collective interest preventing India from nuclearizing a conflict if it chose to rethink that position. [10]

On the question of security autonomy itself, India has demonstrated a near-tectonic shift in its approach to geopolitics under the regime of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. While cross-border retaliations were virtually unheard of in India before 2014, a number of military operations in the years since demonstrate not only autonomy, but the political will to exercise military power. For example, in 2015 and 2016, India conducted cross-border strikes into Myanmar in retaliation for Indian troops being ambushed and murdered by communist insurgent groups like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland. [11] In 2019, the Balakot operation saw unprecedented airstrikes into Pakistani territory in response to the Pulwama attack. [12] Even more striking is the Galwan Valley standoff between India and China, which has already seen numerous skirmishes between the two nations. [13]

None of this means India should simply be placed in a special category that has erstwhile been reserved for the Big Five. What it does mean, though, is that India is both a nuclear and space power, which also happens to enjoy a proven track record of military autonomy and technological innovation. Only the United States, Russia, and China can make a similar claim.

Economy

The economy is probably the weakest link in the “Big Four” thesis, given India’s per capita income of less than $3,000. To put this in perspective, the UK and France have a per capita income of around $50,000, which showcases the vast gulf that still exists. [14]

Despite this glaring hole, however, other macro data clearly shows how the momentum is swinging in India’s favor. India’s overall economy has surpassed the $3 trillion mark, placing it firmly ahead of both the UK and France, neither of which have breached $3 trillion yet. As some experts have noted, it took India 16 to 17 years after liberalization to hit the $1 trillion mark, a further seven years to hit $2 trillion, another seven—despite Covid—to get to $3 trillion in 2021.The Indian economy is projected by some to reach $4 trillion by 2025, firmly placing it as the third largest economy after the United States and China. [15] This is certainly a very realistic target, given the IMF’s assessment that India is “easily” the fastest growing large economy in the world today. [16]

It is also important to note that, while per capita income is crucial to measure prosperity, it is not necessarily an indicator of geopolitical power. After all, China’s per capita income is only around $13,000, far behind most Western states, but Beijing is clearly second only to Washington on the world stage. [17] A far clearer economic indicator of power is the amount a nation is willing to invest in military expenditure. Here too, there is already a clear “Big Four,” with the United States, China, Russia, and India holding the top spots in military spending, accounting for about 57 percent of global military expenditures. [18]

Once again, this does not confirm the article’s hypothesis. It merely indicates that the argument has some merit.

 

Diplomacy

Lastly, many indicators suggest that India’s influence is now at a much higher level than that of the UK or France individually. For example, India is one of the few major powers to maintain long standing positive diplomatic relationships with both Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran. [19] And if that were not complex enough, India also enjoys a strong diplomatic friendship with Israel. [20] One would be hard pressed to find another country with the same level of trilateral outreach in the Middle East. India’s emerging position as a “global swing state” affords it a level of international engagement that few, including the established major powers, can match. [21]

This ability to remain independent was further emphasized this year, with Prime Minister Modi visiting Russia in July and Ukraine in August, another feat very few nations could have achieved. [22] Even India’s refusal to castigate Russia at the behest of its Western allies turned into a strength rather than a weakness, with international dignitaries pouring into New Delhi after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Sergei Lavrov, Elizabeth Truss, and Wang Yi were hosted for discussions within days of each other. [23]

When studying the two conflict theaters in the media spotlight today—Eastern Europe and the Middle East—there is seemingly a positive correlation between states that are pro-Israel and pro-Ukraine, given their affinity for the U.S.-led Western alliance. Only a handful of nations can be described as being both pro-Israel and pro-Russia, pursuing a totally independent geopolitical direction suited to their specific interest, and India is one of them. France and the UK, on the other hand, have been unsuccessful in making any independent breakthroughs in these conflicts, even with traditional allies like Israel. [24]

The most important consequence of this impartiality, however, is India’s direct engagement with global security issues. This was most notably heralded earlier this year with the liberation of the MV Ruen, a bulk carrier that had been hijacked and turned into a “mother ship” by Somali pirates. The operation involved drones, naval destroyers, surveillance aircraft, and marine commandos who were flown over 1,500 miles from India to be airdropped for the attack. [25] India’s successful military operations near the Horn of Africa, and its increased activity compared to the Chinese navy—despite China’s base in Djibouti—highlight the extent to which New Delhi is gearing up to flex on the world stage. [26]

Wider diplomatic outreach has also resulted in the ability to safeguard Indian citizens around the world. In the post-pandemic world, India has managed to use its diplomatic connections to conduct rescue operations of Indians stranded in nearly every warzone. From Operation Devi Shakti in Afghanistan, to Operation Ganga in Ukraine, to Operation Kaveri in Sudan, to Operation Ajay in Israel, hardly a conflict has gone by without the Indian government actively deploying its diplomatic resources for humanitarian operations. [27]

Finally, India’s independence is equally evident on a macro scale. New Delhi is an active member of both the Quad and BRICS, despite the two having seemingly contradictory goals. [28] The former is seen as a U.S.-led alliance to counter Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific, while the latter is seen as an active attempt to counter American dominance with an alternative system. While this might seem contradictory, it fits neatly into everything this analysis has demonstrated thus far—that India’s positioning is based on the country’s unique geopolitical interests, rather than the behest of larger partners. Neither the UK nor France has this luxury, calling into question their true status as world powers.

 

Conclusion

An argument could be made that the global powers should now be referred to as the “Big Six,” with India added to the list, while still including the UK and France. However, this defeats the entire purpose of using such categories in international relations. The reason categories and labels are used is to improve understanding of the world, not to muddle it. The UK and France, with their lack of strategic autonomy and sluggishness in acquiring new military technology, cannot be placed on the same level as India simply because of their veto power at the UN—an institution already at risk of losing its credibility if the veto system is not reformed—or their historical legacies. [29]

There was certainly a time when the Big Five classification made logical sense, but using the UN as a measure of global power is no longer tenable. A number of global issues, from Palestine to Kashmir, have lingered at the UN for over 75 years without resolution. [30] Additionally, being a permanent member of the UN Security Council no longer means being among the only nuclear powers. It is difficult to cite any “elite categories” the UK and France belong to. Thus, placing them on the same tier as the United States, Russia, China, and India only creates confusion, not clarity.

It is quite clear that, on a wide spectrum of issues, India has showcased capabilities typically attributed only to highly influential global actors. It is also evident that in all three key areas, India now holds the edge over the UK and France more often than not.

These four are the new “Big Four,” in a league of their own, with a proven record of acquiring critical military hardware before anyone else and being in control of their own destinies. As this article has attempted to show, even those who do not subscribe to this view must consider the argument seriously to understand modern geopolitical power. 

About the author

Nilanthan Niruthan is the Executive Director of the Center for Law and Security Studies, a geopolitical analyst, and a lecturer at the National Defense College in Sri Lanka. He has written and edited multiple publications on international security, military technology, and humanitarian law.

Endnotes

  1. Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Big Five: Clinging to Power,” iwallerstein.com, February 1, 2019, https://iwallerstein.com/the-big-five-clinging-to-power/; Oona Hathway and Stewart Patrick, “Can the UN Security Council Still Help Keep the Peace? Reassessing Its Role, Relevance, and Potential for Reform,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/07/can-un-security-council-still-help-keep-the-peace?lang=en.

  2. Allison Fedirka, “Hard Power is Still King,” Geopolitical Futures, July 20, 2017, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/hard-power-still-king/.

  3. “The Space Domain,” US Army War College Publications, July 24, 2024, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3849725/2024-annual-estimate-of-the-strategic-security-environment/.

  4. Max Polyakov, “Satellite Combat: The History of Space Weapons,” Max Polyakov Space News, May 01, 2024, https://maxpolyakov.com/satellite-combat-the-history-of-space-weapons/.

  5. David Eagleson, “Protecting our critical satellite infrastructure: the importance of space-based infrastructure to humanity and its status within NATO,” NATO Review, October 24, 2023, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2023/10/24/protecting-our-critical-satellite-infrastructure-the-importance-of-space-based-infrastructure-to-humanity-and-its-status-within-nato/index.html.

  6. Antonio Graceffo, “Hypersonic Weapons: Paradigm Shift or Empty Hype?” Geopolitical Monitor, October 01, 2024, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/backgrounder-hypersonic-weapons/; Emily Milliken, “Do the Houthis really have a hypersonic missile?” Atlantic Council, September 24, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/yemen-iran-houthis-hypersonic-missile-israel/

  7. Prateek Tripathi, “How hypersonic weapons are redefining warfare,” Observer Research Foundation, May 02, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/how-hypersonic-weapons-are-redefining-warfare; Elise Vincent, “Test firing of V-MAX brings France into exclusive club of countries with hypersonic missiles”, Le Monde, June 28, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/06/28/test-firing-of-v-max-brings-france-into-exclusive-club-of-countries-with-hypersonic-missiles_6038696_4.html; Gordon Arthur, “Japan reveals test launch of its hypersonic strike missile program”, Defense News, July 10, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/07/10/japan-reveals-test-launch-of-its-hypersonic-strike-missile-program/; William Freer, “Britain’s hypersonic challenge: Strategic opportunities and risks,” Council on Geostrategy, September 10, 2024, https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/research/britains-hypersonic-challenge-strategic-opportunities-and-risks/#:~:text=Britain%20plans%20to%20develop%20a,too%20much%20with%20too%20little.

  8. Keshav Padmanabhan, “Navy gets second nuclear-powered submarine. INS Arighaat boosts India’s nuclear triad,” The Print, August 29, 2024, https://theprint.in/defence/navy-gets-second-nuclear-powered-submarine-ins-arighaat-boosts-indias-nuclear-triad/2244452/.

  9. Simon Tisdall, “A failing British nuclear arsenal reliant on the goodwill of Donald Trump? It’s a terrifying thought,” The Guardian, February 24, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/feb/24/failing-british-nuclear-arsenal-reliant-on-the-goodwill-of-donald-rump-is-terrifying-thought.

  10. Debalina Ghoshal, “India’s New Submarine Strengthens ‘No First Use’ Doctrine,” Defense.info, September 09, 2024, https://defense.info/global-dynamics/2024/09/indias-new-submarine-strengthens-no-first-use-doctrine/.

  11. Bibhu Routray, “India: Lessons from ‘surgical strikes’ in Myanmar,” Mantraya, October 03, 2016, https://mantraya.org/india-lessons-from-surgical-strikes-in-myanmar/.

  12. Yogesh Joshi, Five Years of Balakot: A New Nuclear South Asia,” ISAS Briefs, February 16, 2024, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/five-years-of-balakot-a-new-nuclear-south-asia/.

  13. Pooja Bhatt, “From the Mountains to the Seas: India-China Competition in the Wake of Galwan,” Stimson.org, June 16, 2024, https://www.stimson.org/2024/from-the-mountains-to-the-seas-india-china-competition-in-the-wake-of-galwan/.

  14. International Monetary Fund, “GDP per capita, current prices,” 2024, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPDPC@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/IND.

  15. All India Management, “India will become $5 trillion economy by 2024 – Sanjiv Sanyal at #AIMCNMC,” Youtube, September 20, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X8YaMjeWl94.

  16. Shreyashi Sanyal, “India ‘easily’ the fastest growing economy, IMF executive director says, as GDP growth blows past estimates,” CNBC, March 01, 2024, https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/01/india-easily-fastest-growing-economy-imf-director-says-as-gdp-growth-soars.html

  17. International Monetary Fund, “GDP per capita, current prices,” 2024, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPDPC@WEO/CHN/HKG/JPN/KOR/SGP/TWN.

  18. Nan Tian, Diego Lopez Da Silva, Xiao Liang, and Lorenzo Scarazzato, “Trends in World Military Expenditure 2023,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2024, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf.

  19. Faisal Al Saud, “India and Saudi Arabia: A Thriving Partnership Towards a Promising Future,” Observer Research Foundation, February 23, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-and-saudi-arabia-a-thriving-partnership-towards-a-promising-future; Rajeev Agarwal, “The Role of Iran in India’s Strategic Outreach in West Asia,” Observer Research Foundation, August 14, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-role-of-iran-in-india-s-strategic-outreach-in-west-asia.

  20. Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “India Outs Its Israel Affair,” Friedrich Naumann Foundation, December 27, 2023, https://www.freiheit.org/south-asia/india-outs-its-israel-affair.

  21. Brahma Chellaney, “The Global Swing State”, Stage and Statecraft, March 3, 2024. https://chellaney.net/2024/03/03/the-global-swing-state/.

  22. Anbarasan Ethirajan, “Modi's balancing act as he meets Putin in Moscow,” BBC, July 9, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpd91pe5r9go; Tanika Godbole, “Why is India's Modi visiting Ukraine after Russia?” DW News, August 23, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/india-narendra-modi-ukraine-russia/a-69992108.

  23. Murali Krishnan, “Lavrov visits India with US relations at a crossroads,” DW News, April 01, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/sergey-lavrov-visits-india-with-us-relations-at-a-crossroads/a-61329983; Patrick Wintour, “Liz Truss’s India visit made awkward by presence of Russian counterpart,” The Guardian, March 30, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/mar/30/liz-truss-india-visit-narendra-modi-russia-sergei-lavrov; Ananth Krishnan, “Wang Yi comes to India,” The Hindu, March 29, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/the-view-from-india-march-28-2022/article65267472.ece.

  24. Philippe Ricard, “Macron-Netanyahu tensions escalate after French president's comments on the creation of Israel,” Le Monde, October 16, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/10/16/macron-netanyahu-tensions-escalate-after-french-president-s-comments-on-the-creation-of-israel_6729542_4.html.

  25. Brad Lendon, “Pirate ship capture showcases India’s world-class special forces,” CNN World, March 19, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/19/india/india-pirate-ship-capture-intl-hnk-ml/index.html.

  26. Michael Tanchum, “China’s new military base in Africa: What it means for Europe and America,” European Council on Foreign Relations, December 14, 2021, https://ecfr.eu/article/chinas-new-military-base-in-africa-what-it-means-for-europe-and-america/.

  27. Tulika Tandon, “What is Operation Dev Shakti?” Jagran Josh, August 25, 2021, https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/what-is-operation-dev-shakti-1629875392-1; Tanika Godbole, “Was India's rescue effort in Ukraine a success?” DW News, March 11, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-crisis-how-successful-were-indias-repatriation-efforts/a-61099021; Kallol Bhattacherjee, “India launches Operation Kaveri to evacuate stranded citizens from war-hit Sudan,” The Hindu, April 25, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-launches-operation-kaveri-to-evacuate-stranded-citizens-from-war-hit-sudan/article66773499.ece; Kallol Bhattacherjee, “‘Operation Ajay’ set to evacuate Indian nationals from Israel,” The Hindu, October 11, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-to-launch-operation-ajay-to-evacuate-nationals-from-israel/article67409408.ece.

  28. Shruthi Pandalai, “The Quad Is Quietly Adapting Methods of Security Cooperation,” South Asian Voices, October 14, 2024, https://southasianvoices.org/geo-f-in-n-quad-security-cooperation-10-14-2024/; Mariel Ferragamo, “What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding?”Council on Foreign Relations, October 18, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding.

  29. Vesselin Popovski, “Revising the United Nations Charter,” Stimson.org, April 12, 2024, https://www.stimson.org/2024/revising-the-united-nations-charter/.

  30. Nasim Ahmed, “Remembering Resolution 181 calling for the partition of Palestine,” Middle East Monitor, November 29, 2021, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20211129-remembering-resolution-181-calling-for-the-partition-of-palestine/; Sourav Roy Barman, “Taking Kashmir to UN, 1948 ceasefire with Pakistan—Amit Shah lists ‘Nehru’s historic blunders’ in LS,” The Print, December 06, 2023, https://theprint.in/india/taking-kashmir-to-un-1948-ceasefire-with-pakistan-amit-shah-lists-nehrus-historic-blunders-in-ls/1874825/

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the editors or the journal.

ArticleYale Journal of International AffairsUnited States, Russia, China, India, Fall 2024