What Should CPC Learn from Bo's Removal?
Photo credit: Shanghaiist
By Wen Rixin
The biggest upheaval on the Chinese political stage this spring was the abrupt removal of Bo Xilai from the post of party secretary in southwestern Chongqing Municipality. The event's shocking nature has to do not only with its timing but also with the way the dismissal took place. As is well-known, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China this autumn will bring about the once-in-a-decade generational power transition in the party's top leadership. Seven of the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee- China’s most authoritative decision-making body- are expected to be replaced. Prior to its national meeting, the ruling Communist Party keeps a watchful eye on anything possibly causing mass incidents or social instability, and tries its best to maintain the party's superficial unity by abstaining from making changes in senior personnel or exposing any rifts at the peak.
Bo's sudden fall from grace spells the end of his ambition to be promoted to the membership of the new Politburo Standing Committee, and that is by itself a big surprise in Chinese politics. Nevertheless, Bo's continued, albeit suspended, membership of the politburo- China’s second most important decision-making organ- along with his status as a princeling, suggests he may only be disciplined internally and may be exempt from further prosecution. Even as the masses make their various guesses about Mr. Bo's future, the silence of top Chinese leaders regarding this case draws unusually long. Since the Chinese political system functions through opaque closed-door meetings and under-the-table bargains, the public have no way of knowing what is happening. Therefore, in the days following Bo's ouster, Chinese cyber space grew fraught with rumors and unsubstantiated reports of the party's debate over Bo's fate. Whereas ultimately only history will shine light on the details of Bo's departure, it is safe to say even now that this episode reminds the CPC of the necessity and urgency of initiating overdue political reforms for China's long-term national interest as well as the good of the party.
The CPC of today is more suspicious than appreciative of strong individual leaders who are both charismatic and competent. Having drawn an unforgettable lesson from the devastating Cultural Revolution, the CPC has made every effort to eschew one-man dictatorship. The party abolished life tenure by limiting a top leader’s time of service, arranged for injecting new vigor and energy into its leadership by erecting age thresholds, and successfully avoided too much concentration of authority by widely distributing power. These mechanisms enabled the CPC to realize a smooth transfer of power at the top for the first time in its history in 2002.
For a party without strongmen like Mao and Deng, collective leadership has become the format it adopts to govern state affairs and control the society. Today, China is politically an oligarchy with several party officials comprising the CPC's innermost circle collectively carrying out the administration of the world’s most populous country. Despite the available official hierarchy, the relationships among those in charge of key aspects of Chinese public administration are essentially equal, guaranteeing that nobody stands out and necessitating constant cooperation and concessions on major issues. Bo Xilai, a senior party official courting high-profile publicity and frequently interacting with the mass media, appeared threatening to this notion of collective leadership because of his charismatic personality and growing popularity. The party feared that, once elevated in the hierarchy, Bo would make full use of his public support to gain superiority over other more impersonal and stoic peers. The emergence of another politically formidable figure is a possibility the CPC has been consciously trying to prevent for the past twenty years.
Moreover Bo's naked ambition was an obvious affront to the Party's principles regarding the selection of public officials. The CPC chiefly appoints local bureaucrats through consent reached at higher levels, while it selects members of the politburo and its standing committee through rounds and rounds of laborious negotiations and discussions between the incumbents and influential retirees. That is not, however, to say a candidate for a leading post just waits passively for their appointment. Despite tacit consent to some personal campaigning, the Party draws a red line at overt or aggressive lobbying. Xi Jinping, the Chinese vice-president slated to succeed President Hu, purposefully chose to avoid open discussion of his future role in China during a recent visit to United States lest it compromise his position back home. On the other hand, by publicly launching his anti-gang movement and nostalgically singing revolutionary songs to crowds, Bo appeared too ambitious to mask his desire for more power or to show respect for the Party's culture in such matters.
But Bo's rebellious behavior also underscores the urgent need to correct the CPC’s absolutist GDP-focused development strategy. Over three decades of reform and opening up have enormously enriched China and significantly enlarged its economy. Dividing this large economic pie optimally is the crucial task confronting Chinese leaders for launching the country’s next phase of progress. But when formulating and implementing policy, China’s political system does not fully represent public will and interest. For instance, the annual conventions of the National People's Congress (NPC)- the docile Chinese parliament- and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)- a decorative showcase of China's non-participatory politics- do little, if nothing at all, to settle assorted public anxieties. The NPC's primary function is to turn the Party's priorities into state laws or government policies, while the CPPCC passes non-binding proposals and invites non-party attendees for PR purposes. These partners never oppose their big brother- the CPC- in matters of governance. Also, excluding the sixty one delegates from Hong Kong and Macau, state employees like government bureaucrats and executives and heads of state-owned enterprises and public service institutions account for more than 85% of the NPC and CPPCC members. Hence, the majority of these delegates are officials, the rich, and celebrities seen as insensitive to pressing issues like high inflation, unaffordable housing, health care, education, environmental degradation, poor working conditions, and social injustice- further fanning resentment among the public.
This disappointment with the government formed the backdrop against which Bo rose to meet public expectations- taking drastic populist actions to address significant issues without regard to legal procedures. His anti-gang campaign gave the public an impression of restored safety and rule of law, generous government spending on social service and public goods helped ordinary people with improvements in their lives, and ostentatious gatherings of thousands of people to sing revolutionary songs reminded people of Mao's era when common folk had access to free-of-charge public services. Similarly, heavy investment in public enterprises strengthened state dominance in local economy and gradually squeezed out “rapacious” private entrepreneurs. All of Bo's endeavors aimed at telling a “truth” to the public: that the Chongqing Municipal Government, of which he held the reins, cared about the people.
In spite of its growing popularity amongst the ordinary and disadvantaged, however, Bo’s campaign in Chongqing, guided by a firm belief that ends justified the means, was controversial at best and profoundly troubling upon further investigation. His anti–organized crime drive veered into a purge of political rivals, the money spent on better public services often emanated from illegal robbery and forced confiscation of private property and wealth, and secret detention and widespread torture underpinned the official glory of his crusade. Similarly, periodic arrests of large numbers of public officials disrupted the normal operation of public bureaucracies, and the flight of Chongqing’s rich worsened the business environment. As such, many of Bo's measures displayed the troubling features in his movement: namely, that speed outweighed direction and efficiency trumped effectiveness.
This was connected to the larger political culture. Following the conclusion of this year's NPC plenary session, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao warned at a press conference about the possibility of the reoccurrence of the tragic Cultural Revolution unless the party and the government are reformed. For the party, collective leadership at the top to prevent tyranny by an individual is only a good beginning. Without further introduction of democratic elements to the party's internal administration- such as real accountability of the CPC central committee, effective supervision of party chiefs at various levels and departments, gradual introduction and expansion of multi-candidate elections from bottom to top, tempering of fractional competition, and institutionalization of the modalities for transfer of power and generational succession- the party will always be vulnerable to the kind of individualism and exceptionalism which can see a confident party official like Bo becoming overly disruptive.
Re-examination of the Chongqing episode should not become a pretext for the Party leaders to ignore the urgent need for more social fairness in China, which is experiencing the problems economic growth sans political reform brings forth. It was correct on part of the top CPC leadership to put a timely brake on Bo's activities; however, it is also erroneous, myopic and harmful of them to procrastinate about changing the political status quo and democratizing China’s public management.
About the Author
Wen Rixin is a government official in charge of public petitions in a large city in China's northeastern Liaoning Province. He studied public administration and international development at University of Southern California from 2004 to 2007 and graduated with an MPA. He is interested in studying political reform and democratic governance in China during the country's social transformation and drive for modernization.